Is This The End of The Carrier

[davidbfpo]

A side issue this and in response to Kiwi Grunt's comment:

That is why I question the wisdom of the UK with their two new 65000t carriers.

You are not the only person. My understanding is that if the carriers are finished they will have no aircraft in service to carry, so they may end up as helicopter carriers. I do not follow the RN closely, but I have seen no comments on a "fix". Whether they survive the cuts is a moot point, although the ships are being built by our premier "arms baron" (a plc) and in places with a political impact.

[Alfred_the_Great]

Because air is free and steel is cheap.

Below a critical size, Carrier Operations cease to truly useful when considering multi-role packages. The current CVS are below that size, with limited hangar space and an inability to use all of it's spots whilst conducting fixed wing operations.

The QE class is massively too big for the current outfit of a/c (F35?!), however it costs peanuts to build a big ship now instead of building a slightly too small ship and trying to expand it later on (cf the French Aircraft Carrier Charles de Gaulle's extension!). Generations of Naval Architecture will attest to this, the Type 42 Destroyer or ANZAC frigate have limited space to take on new missions; the Type 45 or Absalon Class have enough space to cope with upgrades we can't predict yet.

Whilst the CV BG may be asset rich, anyone who takes on a near-peer competitor solely using them deserves to get their arse kicked. That's what B2 a/c, cruise missiles and SOF are for - to attrit the enemy before you get within his range.

[Tukhachevskii]

A side issue this and in response to Kiwi Grunt's comment:

You are not the only person. My understanding is that if the carriers are finished they will have no aircraft in service to carry, so they may end up as helicopter carriers. I do not follow the RN closely, but I have seen no comments on a "fix". Whether they survive the cuts is a moot point, although the ships are being built by our premier "arms baron" (a plc) and in places with a political impact.

Plans are afoot to redisgned the deck to accomodate a CTOL or STOBAR version of the Typhoon if the Yanks keep preventing the technology transfer/sharing of the F35 (god forbid the silly idea, back in 2006?, of us buying French Rafales should ever get back on the table! Although its a nice plane to be sure)

[pvebber]

Intersting comments.

As to a) destroy whatever is sensing me and b) move my CVN. Are you being sensed by over-the-horizon radar, spacecraft, a Merchant ship? There are number of ways to detect a Carrier that do not result in a causal arrow pointing at the perpetrator. You can't just "run away" because these missiles have guided warheads. The same reason you can't run away from a cruise missile.

The comment " I have yet to see anyone propose realistic ways to allow land-based aircraft to stand in for the carrier" points out a much broader problem. If your land bases are inside the footprint of the missiles, how do you operate short legged aircraft (at least shorter than the threatening missiles) from either one? The primary choices are to invest heavily in a new generation of affordable missile defense (High Energy, to get away from the magazine battle) or dispersal so the enemy has to divide his TBM arsenal into packets you can defend against to make a dent in your combat power.

The notion that a carrier is too useful to be declared obsolete is a testiment to the flexibility of the large deck CSG, but unfortunately usefulness does not beget survivability, and when the useful thing is not survivable in certain environments, all the usefullness in the world is to no avail.

The nature exactly how much vulnerability is "too much" is something that I simply wanted to demonstrate in broad brush strokes, that whether it requires 275 or 10 missiles, the vulnerability exists, and its simply a matter of investment calculus to exploit - not a technological hurdle. It may indeed be expensive, but China has the money to spend. For a well-documented analysis of Chinese moernization see:

http://project2049.net/documents/aer...kes_easton.pdf

On the point of not being able to tell a conventional missile from a Nuke, that is a primary reason we have not developed conventional TBMs. The role we would employ such a missile in would be to attack the bases of an adversary's missiles inside thier boarders, where differentiating a nuclear from a conventional attack has dire implications. Shooting a missile out to sea is very different story. Yes, it might be a nuke, but given the capability of conventional ordnance there is little reason to escalate to that extent.

Also the same argument was made regarding cruise missiles (which can be nuclear armed just as easily as ballistic missiles) but we expect our adversaries to "just take our word for it" that we will not use nuclear cruise missiles without telling them first. For us to tell China that any use of TBMs would be assumed to be nuclear, would likely be met with a response to declare any use of cruise misles on our part to be met with a nuclear response. This is tantamount to going back to the old days when we assumed that we could deter any conventional military action with the threat to respond with nukes. That policy never worked because, as a Chinese diplomat recently quipped "you are unwilling to trade Los Angeles for Taipei". I would add "or a CSG".


So what do we do? Given that the current CSG will have freedom of action inside the Chinese missile envelope given the Chinese choose not to hold it at risk, what is it that the CSG provides that we cannot achieve through other menas? Carriers provide a sortie generation rate of about 100 sorties a day (with occasional surges to maybe twice that) out to say 500 miles from a location unencumbered by politics.

It is as big as it is becasue it carries everything it needs to be essentially self sufficient airbase for manned aircraft for about 6 months. The new Ford class CVN is the most efficient and effective platform to do that ever designed. But it is still limited to having to close within about 500 miles to achieve its effect. That means it is vulnerable. This can be addressed by decreasing its vulnerability (through dispersal or defenses) of by looking at ways to have it stand off at greater than 500nm. IF you integrate unmanned aircraft into the air wing, you can greatly extend the reach, you can extend it even more by utilizing "lillypad" rearm and refuelling platforms.

This is crux of my argument that it is the currently configured CSG that is "obsolete" but necessarily the CVN. It just needs a much different supporting cast to enable it to mitigate new vulnerabilities.

[Alfred_the_Great]

In fact it's incredibly easy to run away from a cruise missile. You just need to get inside the sensor to shooter loop, and move enough, and bob is your uncle.

As for a "non-traditional" sensor; unless the En is willing to dis-regard attacking possible third parties, then there needs to be some kind of final confirmation that the blip on the radar is actually your CVN. A 150nm SAR radar picture is all well and good, except when the Carrier has defensive CAP up.

I'm not denying that there is a need to ensure that the CSG (and it's composition etc etc) is the right answer to what ever question we are asking, but I don't feel there is a paradigm shift being brought about by the DF21.

[Fuchs]

All things seem simple in war, yet it's the simple things that go wrong all the time in war.

[pvebber]

In reply to Alfred the Great's post

In fact it's incredibly easy to run away from a cruise missile.

So why has the Navy spent 10s of Billions on Aegis and SM-2s to shoot them down?

You just need to get inside the sensor to shooter loop, and move enough

How exactly do you do that for say, an over the horizon radar hard wired into teh missile aunch sites C2?

The sensor to shooter loop of an airstrike is a similar problem. Why isn't it 'incredibly easy' to avoid an air strike by "getting inside its sennsor to shooter loop"?

then there needs to be some kind of final confirmation that the blip on the radar is actually your CVN.

We are very cooperative in the way we operate our CSGs so it is well nigh impossible to confuse a strike group conducting flight ops with anything else on the ocean.

Just like tanks did not result in the blitzkrieg transformation, the DF21 is not itself responsible for transforming war at sea. But the combination of space-based, over the horizon, and non-military platform sensing, resiliant command networks, and supersonic cruise missiles and TBMs enable Carriers to be threatened at ranges well beyond their aircraft's ability to fight back.

Operating as they do now.

That does not mean that the addition of UCAVs and the integration off CV based aircraft with long endurance aircraft from distant shore bases don't have the ability to counter these new threats. The question is are we agile enough in our procurement to work out a response strategy quickly enough?

[Bob's World]

Just as "amateurs argue tactics while professionals argue logistics" I would suggest considering the following twist on that logic:

"Amateurs argue programs and platforms while professionals argue policies."

A hard scrub of platforms and programs is at the heart of the QDR process, and is a massive game of inter-service head butting. But a hard scrub of just two or three outdated policies could sweep the table of dozens of programs and platforms across service lines in one stroke; and similarly create a new focus for those same services at the same time.

I was personally and professionally floored when I was politely told by the very smart, very nice DASD running a QDR group that I worked in that "we would work the programs first, and then get to policies later."

So, months of effort to debate and rack and stack programs and platforms based on old policies; then once that is done, create new policies, that will have to fit the military we have just built? I didn't get it then. I still don't get it. But I see the effects of it in both the QDR programmatic decisions and the post QDR policy positions that have been coming out.

[Alfred_the_Great]

In reply to Alfred the Great's post

So why has the Navy spent 10s of Billions on Aegis and SM-2s to shoot them down?



How exactly do you do that for say, an over the horizon radar hard wired into teh missile aunch sites C2?

The sensor to shooter loop of an airstrike is a similar problem. Why isn't it 'incredibly easy' to avoid an air strike by "getting inside its sennsor to shooter loop"?



We are very cooperative in the way we operate our CSGs so it is well nigh impossible to confuse a strike group conducting flight ops with anything else on the ocean.

Just like tanks did not result in the blitzkrieg transformation, the DF21 is not itself responsible for transforming war at sea. But the combination of space-based, over the horizon, and non-military platform sensing, resiliant command networks, and supersonic cruise missiles and TBMs enable Carriers to be threatened at ranges well beyond their aircraft's ability to fight back.

Operating as they do now.

That does not mean that the addition of UCAVs and the integration off CV based aircraft with long endurance aircraft from distant shore bases don't have the ability to counter these new threats. The question is are we agile enough in our procurement to work out a response strategy quickly enough?

AEGIS isn't against cruise missiles, it's against anti-ship missiles. A subtle difference, but an important one: cruise missiles tend to use inertial guidance and terrain following to locate their target, which may include GPS positions; anti-ship missiles will typically use an active radar seeker (at some point) in order to determine a contact that corresponds to the target type.

Given that a CVN will be doing in the order of 30kt during flight deck operations, then it will be upto 5 miles away from the original position at missile launch, making inertially guided weapons (without an ability to carry to terminal guidance within an area of say 10nm radius) useless.

Defence against ASM is nothing new, and lots of effort has gone into it (but I don't promise we'll shoot down everything that flies towards us). Defence against long range targetting is equally practiced (and has at least 2 NATO doctrine manuals associated with it). I can't comment on the USN's ability to maintain their readiness in accordance with doctrine, but the RN is consistently training (how well is a question for another day).

I also have my doubts that CVN ops in an area that may, or may not, be permissive will be exactly the same as peacetime ops. I suspect that hiding amongst merchant traffic, deceptive AIS etc etc may well be used.

As for the rest of it, it's all Naval Warfare; nothing can be guaranteed, but I don't think anyone, least of all the Chinese, are in the position to take advantage of it within the next 10 - 15 years. Your own sources are incredibly circumspect, with no positive statements and lots of hedging.

The argument of policy vs platform is instructive, would you care to outline which policies should/could/ought be scrapped? I know what I would propose for the UK, but don't really have a handle on the US internal politics. Moreover, isn't policy a Civilian function, into which sticking a Service Oar is loaded with problems?