Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[davidbfpo]

Mike,

The cogs in my memory are now working; you asked:

Looking for thoughts and references on successful transformations of militaries after a successful negotiated peace or demobilization of an insurgent force.

The Lancaster House Agreement 1979, that ended the rebellion by Rhodesia and the insurgency conducted by the nationalists, was often cited in the 1980's as an example. In particular the process by which the insurgents largely moved into camps within Rhodesia, assembly points IIRC, watched over by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF, from Australia, NZ, Kenya and the UK). Then after the elections the integration of the guerillas into new Zimbabwe's armed forces and the police. With a British team assisting (known as BMATT).

Less well known is the peace accord for Namibia, with South Africa's decision to withdraw, a period of UN rule (UNTAG) and the integration of SWAPO's armed wing into the new armed forces - again with a BMATT. There was an early upset when SWAPO insurgents crossed the Angolan border and were repulsed bloodily - several books cover that time. Incidentally a number of black Namibians or South-Westers who had fought against SWAPO left for South Africa; as recorded in one book by Jim Hooper on the para-military Koevoet. Check the thread on these small Southern African small wars:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10859

Then there is Africa's giant, South Africa and the national agreement on ending apartheid, which involved the SADF being reformed, taking in numbers of externally based insurgents and others who had been within. My interest remain in the country, but not to the extent of buying books! There must be a plethora of articles on that process, some of which will feature 'security sector reform' and the variety of overseas advisers who participated.

I am pretty certain that the individual independence agreements for the Portuguese African colonies in 1974 are not so well documented. My recollection is that the insurgent forces became the military, even though a large part of the Portuguese military was black African. Maybe the SWJ author, Miguel Silva can help? See:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...1%E2%80%931974

One hesitates to mention Algeria, but the Evian peace agreement must have dealt with the insurgents becoming the state. We know that many of those who served France, often called the harkis, were betrayed and paid a high price. I have just found only 15k were allowed to leave and 100k killed (inc. families). Not to overlook 1.5m 'pied noir' or white settlers left abruptly. See various links on:http://africanhistory.about.com/od/a...ianAccords.htm

As Algeria marked its 50th anniversary of independence in 2012 there were numerous conferences held, so maybe far more is available now. The wider thread on France's war in Algeria may help:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15864

I have a small pile of books on Zimbabwe and Namibia if you need references; most of them date back to the 1980's.

Try the old threads Policies in Post-Conflict Countries:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3957 and the great RFI thread started by Colin Robinson, a Kiwi doing a Ph.D. 'Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10049

Finally, leaving Africa how about Nepal? Where there is peace agreement, with a planned integration of the 32k insurgency, Communist army:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5236

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mike--

The 1992 El Sal peace accords called for the reduction in size of the ESAF and teh creation of a new Policia Nacional Civil separate from the MOD. More on the PNC in a minute as it is the more complex part.

During the 12 year war the ESAF grew from under 10,000 to over 56,000 but the officer corps barely grew at all. So, demobilization essentially involved letting the conscripts go home. One result of the US effeort was to leave El Sal with a record of who had been trained in a national computer database. this allowed the ESAF to retain a reserve military force that was called up for duty during Hurricane Mitch.

The PNC was to replace the 3 police forces that had previously existed under the MOD (Vice Min for Public Security). These were (1)the National Police (PN), (2) the Guardia Nacional (GN), and (3) the Policia de hacienda (PH). PN had mainly urban duties, GN mainly rural, and PH focused on white collar crime. The PNC was to incorporate as 20% of its number former PN, 20% former FMLN guerrillas, and 40% new recruits all under a civilian minister.

The new ESAF has become quite professional. The PNC has been a problem and relatively unable to control crime particularly from gangs like MS-13 which grew from the US deportation program of the 1990s.

Email me and I'll give you some addtional detail.

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

Excellent stuff. Thank you very much.

The attached is an info paper I found discussing SLV lessons learned.

I would think in these situations where you have a criminal element waiting to recruit ex-soldiers that keeping your army actively employed and slowly downsizing is the right answer.

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

but ex guerrilla combatants as well.

Issue is always what are you going to do with trained military manpower after the war ends and the civilian economy can't absorb them easily.

Cheers

JohnT