Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[MattC86]

Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? ... Yes. They're on their last leg, even before the hostages were rescued, even before they put Marulanda on ice, FARC was reeling from Plan Colombia and Democratic Security (Uribe's domestic policy). I was pretty critical of some parts of Plan Colombia, mainly the use of chemical defoliants which seemed to exacerbate the plight of IDPs (internally displaced persons), but it allowed the CAF to finally come into their own, to the point where they were able to pinpoint FARC leaders for strikes, and to pull off the Betancourt rescue.

Agreed. It does serve to reinforce the value of high-visibility, propaganda victories like the Betancourt rescue - most of the world was not particularly aware of the state of the Colombian Civil War. Coverage has gone from the "intractable" struggle between rebel groups and the government to a widespread perception that FARC is dying. Like I suggested, I think this will give Uribe a lot more breathing room in the international community - far less pressure for a settlement or anything of the sort.

In my mind, Plan Colombia has been vindicated, and I hope this generates some interest in Congress for broadening our avenues for trade and investment with Colombia. I also hope it may serve to convince some people of the need for patience and political will when it comes to defeating insurgencies. There's still a ways to go, though. Demobilizing the rest of the guerrillas, reintegrating them into society if possible, as well as not forgetting the presence of the paras and the ever-present drug trade.

Here's where it gets dicey. Once again, suppressing the symptoms (i.e., the armed rebellion) will prove easier than curing the disease. The landless and peasant classes, in many parts of the country, have been hostile to the governments in Bogota since Gaitan's assassination in 1948. Just because they no longer support an ideologically obsolete (and never particularly pure) rebellion any longer does not mean their complete support for the state, nor ensure against further rebellion or illicit behavior if allegiance to Bogota does not improve their economic state. A development package along the original lines of Plan Colombia, at least, is going to be needed. Perhaps finally all the disciples of "alternative development" who've been crying their programs don't work because of security conerns will get their chance to make good. But the cash needs to be there, from Bogota and internationally.

And as far as trade, the neo-protectionism in the Democratic party right now (which I believe will win both the White House and maintain considerable majorities in both houses) along with knee-jerk anti-Bush reactions means not only is the Colombia FTA DOA right now, but I doubt you will see it passed in the next four years. That's a big hit for the Colombians.

And Lord knows what will happen with the paramilitaries. One would hope that the demise of FARC leads to their buddies in the CAF abandoning this marriage of convenience, but I fear it will not be so. And the paras have their fingers as deep into the coca trade as FARC ever did. . .

I would say the real winner here was Democratic Security, and, as a result, Uribe. He's been maligned by a few neighboring heads of state, but he has shown Latin America the true meaning of "staying the course." He got tough with the guerrillas and paras, but he also go smart. Offering them chances to demobilize and reintegrate were critical in taking the wind from their sails. If I were him, I would go out gracefully once his term is up. I know a lot of Colombianos are pushing for him to take another term, but he needs to quit while he's ahead. Continue to root out corruption (which some of his own family have been involved in) and do as much damage to the guerrillas as he can before his successor takes over.

Concur, particularly on the corruption issue.

The Colombian military has matured quite well. Not really much else to say. I wish I knew more about Operation Jaque, but on the surface it looks like a pretty sophisticated plan, and they pulled it off without a hitch, and without a shot fired in anger. They are disciplined veterans at this point. Chavez and Correa would do well to avoid tangling with them, I think.

The US should take some serious lessons from its aid to the Colombian military - the turnaround has been dramatic, and relatively rapid. I've spent a few cursory moments looking for more complete information on US military aid, but haven't found exactly what I'm looking for.

As to the Washington dynamics, like I said, I hope it changes. Congress has been blocking some initiatives based on concerns over Uribe's human rights record, and probably out of a sense that Plan Colombia was going nowhere. Hopefully recent events will turn some heads. Several Latin American countries are modernizing and enlarging their militaries. I saw a recent Economist article that cited huge defense spending boosts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil. It's probably in our best interests to see Colombia stay on top of the heap.

I think this is potentially dangerous. Latin America has a huge way to go economically, and seeing everybody shoot their military spending through the roof is not beneficial to any of that. Brazil is going to be the regional power in the long-run; they are already an economic "dwarf-giant," if you will, and their political power will rise in tandem. We should continue to support Colombia, but I just don't see the utility, for us, the Colombians, or anybody in Latin America from a new round of arms races caused by descent into competing "camps." In the long run, Brazil (especially), Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the powers in LA, not Venezuela or Ecuador or Bolivia, no matter what Chavez and Morales would say.

I don't think Washington's involvement in Colombia has always been predicated on drug interdiction. We've had our hands in Colombian affairs since the Panama Canal was being built. We were assisting the CAF in counter-guerrilla operations as early as the 1960s, before the drug trade really blossomed, because that's when communist revolutions were in vogue. The drug trade merely became a nice pretext for escalating our involvement since it just happened to coincide with the rise of the FARC in the late 60s and early 70s. I think it's always been about keeping a stable democratic ally in a region that is prone to violent political upheavals. Realpolitik, my friends, realpolitik...

Indeed, but since the 1980s, the drug trade has been the watchword and political cover. And to a degree, even if FARC is defeated, our real goals will still coincide with counternarcotics. Economic development and eradication of the drug trade are going to require huge amounts of aid and effort.

It's just a matter of locking down security for those areas by pushing out the FARC, and then letting NGOs fill the vacuum to start alternative development projects.

I think the war is winding down. Chavez and Correa can't afford to be implicated any further in supporting the guerrillas, and the FARC themselves have ceased to be a threat. It's time for them to either melt into the jungle, or melt back into civil society.

Indeed.

But like I said, the fear is thinking the hard part is over. I think Africa shows that a bunch of NGOs running around the countryside doing their own alternative development is not going to be effective. The money is going to have to come from a lot of places, and the development strategy needs to be cohesive, which is not a traditional strongsuit of NGO-designed development projects. The US has poured billions into assistance for the Colombian military - it is vital that we continue to give generously for economic or "alternative" development.

Regards,

Matt

[Wildcat]

I think this is potentially dangerous. Latin America has a huge way to go economically, and seeing everybody shoot their military spending through the roof is not beneficial to any of that. Brazil is going to be the regional power in the long-run; they are already an economic "dwarf-giant," if you will, and their political power will rise in tandem. We should continue to support Colombia, but I just don't see the utility, for us, the Colombians, or anybody in Latin America from a new round of arms races caused by descent into competing "camps." In the long run, Brazil (especially), Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the powers in LA, not Venezuela or Ecuador or Bolivia, no matter what Chavez and Morales would say.

Whether or not it's beneficial to them, the Latin American states have already started the arms race (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...73&postcount=3). Chavez recently acquired some new Sukhoi fighters, and apparently he's looking for more from the Russians. Regardless of the fact that his people are still struggling to make ends meet, he's going to buy weapons and boost his domestic surveillance programs. He's got a country flush with oil revenues and he's got a whole lot of ambition. He wants to stick it to The Man, that being the United States and its "puppet," Colombia. Just because it's the proper and prudent course of action doesn't mean that a man like Chavez is going to follow that path.

Remember, this is IR we're talking about. Regional hegemons wax and wane, and states always compete to enhance their power and influence. An arms race was easy to predict in this case. It was inevitable, IMO.

Indeed, but since the 1980s, the drug trade has been the watchword and political cover. And to a degree, even if FARC is defeated, our real goals will still coincide with counternarcotics. Economic development and eradication of the drug trade are going to require huge amounts of aid and effort.

Oh, don't get me wrong. If the FARC evaporates tomorrow I don't expect us to pick up and leave. Drug interdiction is still a huge reason why we're there. But I will counter by saying that if the FARC and the drugs disappear overnight, we will still have a considerable presence in Colombia and we will still shower money on them, because the overarching reason for our involvement in Colombia is based on its importance as a strategic and democratic ally in that region.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 26 Mar 09: Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card

.....Despite the FARC’s historic resilience and proven capacity to overcome military and political setbacks, President Uribe’s strategy aimed at military victory and ending the conflict without political negotiations began to yield visible results in 2007. The government is confident that further attacks on the insurgents’ command-and-control structure, sustained operations in its strongholds and the increasing rate of defections will slowly break the FARC’s backbone. In time, units will crumble or splinter into factions that may become interested in negotiating their disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion (DDR). The remaining FARC Secretariat members and hardline factions would then be more isolated, militarily and politically, and thus easier to defeat.

Uribe’s broad popularity is based largely on the tough stance he has taken against the FARC. His political priorities in advance of the 2010 presidential elections and his conviction that the insurgents would again use any political pause to regain strength rather than negotiate seriously give him little motive to assign the same weight to a vigorous political strategy as to his security policy.

But the FARC has been adapting to more difficult circumstances with some success, and several of its fronts are capable of resisting offensives in key areas, especially in high mountain ranges and tropical jungles along the Pacific coast and the borders with Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama. In these locations the government’s security consolidation strategy is incipient at best, and drug trafficking revenue continues to fuel the conflict. Even if some units eventually split away, partly as a result of the new, more decentralised system that gives them greater autonomy, the leadership under Alfonso Cano appears unlikely to give up as a result of the ongoing military pressure. And should the government’s strategy of fracturing the FARC into easier-to-demobilise pieces succeed, it entails the serious risk of driving the resulting splinter groups not into a DDR program but into closer forms of cooperationwith powerful organised criminal groups or NIAGs.....

Complete 38-page paper at the link.