Some were more attentive than others. When we got into the area around the presidential residence in Bogota, they were all-business. Magazines were inserted, though I doubt they had racked rounds into the chambers yet. There were even quite a few plain-clothes security folk around with earpieces and probably concealed sidearms, and no pictures were allowed. It was intimidating, to say the least.Originally Posted by goesh
Thanks for the AAR. I really appreciate your on-the-ground insights.
To expand on Columbia, here's an article from the current (Mar-Apr 07) Military Review:
A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Columbia (2002-2006) vs FARC
..and older background from SSI:...What bears repeating is the point to which this analysis has returned often: the present effort is both correct and sustainable; it is the right strategic posture required for progress and popular security. Hence, continued care must be exercised to ensure that Democratic Security remains a multifaceted approach—a strengthening of the state’s governance, finances, and democratic capacity enabled by the ever more powerful and capable shield provided by the security forces. By themselves, these facets are not the solution—that lies in the use of legitimacy to mobilize response against those using political violence for illegitimate ends—but they will certainly enable it.
Columbian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Jan 02)
The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66 (Mar 02)
Is there any analysis available about the impact of the AUC militias on FARC? I think any analysis that focuses exclusively on FARC vs Colombian Army is very incomplete.
Wildcat, are you the dude that promised me beer, then blew me off?Nice AAR.
goesh,
It don't work that way.
Affirmative, sir. That was me. Sorry again, but as you can tell from the AAR, we were slammed with wall-to-wall meetings. The only break we had while in Bogota was the night we went to the BBC to get smashed and armwrestle each other and play drinking games with hot Colombian university chicas. Good times...Wildcat, are you the dude that promised me beer, then blew me off?
If I ever return to Bogota, or you get back to the States, you may have some beer (or some Cope) inbound.
P.S.: Dectac03 over at MarineOCS.com just gave me a heads-up on your post here (I believe his handle here is "jcustis"), which is good because I didn't have email notifications turned on at the SWC, and I haven't been here in weeks, so your post would have gone unnoticed for a long time if he hadn't made me aware of it.
ICG, 10 May 07: Columbia's New Armed Groups
....Since early 2006, the Organization of American States (OAS) Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), human rights groups and civil society organisations have insistently warned about the rearming of demobilised paramilitary units, the continued existence of groups that did not disband because they did not participate in the government-AUC negotiations and the merging of former paramilitary elements with powerful criminal organisations, often deeply involved with drug trafficking. Worse, there is evidence that some of the new groups and criminal organisations have established business relations over drugs with elements of the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). At the same time, the government’s plan for reintegrating demobilised paramilitaries has revealed itself to be deeply flawed.
These alerts have to be taken seriously since conditions now exist for the continuity or re-emergence either of oldstyle paramilitary groups or a federation of new groups and criminal organisations based on the drug trade. The military struggles with the FARC and the smaller ELN are ongoing, and drug trafficking continues unabated. Massive illegal funds from drug trafficking help fuel the decades-long conflict, undermine reintegration of former combatants into society and foment the formation and strengthening of new armed groups, as occurred with the AUC and the FARC more than a decade ago....
ICG, 11 Oct 07: Columbia: Moving Forward with the ELN?
....Due to its reduced military capability, many in Colombia believe the ELN is no longer a threat, will eventually disappear on its own, and hence the government is under no pressure to conclude the negotiations. This reasoning is flawed. While the ELN is more a “party in arms” than an insurgent army, it is not defeated. Insurgent groups rarely just go away. The ELN has shown a capacity to survive and revive after coming close to demise. In addition, a peace agreement would be highly beneficial, not only politically for Uribe but also for the ELN, which, however, must find answers to a number of serious questions.
Some of its fronts are in a more favourable situation than others. Some interact with other illegal armed groups, in particular the FARC, while others are at loggerheads with them; their financial solidity and grip on local communities differ a great deal. The movement risks implosion or fragmentation as well as the possibility that it could not fully implement a ceasefire, since its internal cohesion is weak. Since the death in 1998 of its leader, Spanish priest Manuel Pérez, Nicolas Rodríguez, alias “Gabino”, is responsible for political and military unity, but there are rifts within the COCE itself. Antonio Garcia is allegedly more hardline than Pablo Beltrán and Ramiro Vargas. The interests of Francisco Galán, who is not a COCE member and has spent a decade in prison, from where he has been working for a peace agreement, are not the same as those of the still active commanders.....
Do you read Spanish? There is some material, but I don't think it's been translated.
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