Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[Strickland]

If Plan Colombia is not an operational model of successfully COIN that can be replicated, then it is a strategic policy model of success that should be replicated. If one reviews the process that was followed by the Clinton administration between Pastrana's initial call for a Marshall Plan for Colombia, and Clinton's appeal for Congressional support during the 2000 State of the Union Address, then one will discover a process that should be emulated by all future administrations working within divided government. The genius of Plan Colombia is not to be found in its operational successes or failures, but rather in the simple fact that it satisfied everyone in some manner - human rights advocates, tough on drugs folks, interventionists, non-interventionists, environmentalists (yes - they were pissed about spraying), SOUTHCOM, Congress, and most importantly - the Colombians. It was the policy that become something to everyone. It is the essence of good policy via compromise.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to AbuM for raising this issue and citing Colombia as an example:

The argument essentially goes that, as weapon power has increased exponentially in past millennia, so too has the density of combatants in the field appeared to decrease substantially. The relationship here is obvious, but also obviously not one-sided. The increased lethality of weapons raises the risk of concentrated formations, but additionally, technological advances in logistics, battlefield mobility and communications enable more dispersed formations as well.

Link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...dispersal.html

AbuM cites a Colombian paper, which is in Spanish and defeats Google Translator.

[davidbfpo]

A new IISS Strategic Comment:

Colombia is reassessing its approach to its decades-long struggle against guerrillas and criminal gangs. It is embarking on reforms of its security services and legal system as part of its efforts to tackle a new hybrid threat: groups with the military know-how of insurgents and the adaptability of criminal actors..

Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/...la-threat-635f

[AdamG]

Illicitly ‘homemade’ submachine guns feature very prominently in firearms seizures by police across South America, Brazil in particular. These weapons vary in their level of sophistication though a large number appear to be semi-professionally produced. In a recent study of over 14,488 firearms seized between 2011 and 2012 in Sao Paulo alone, 48% of submachine guns analyzed were reportedly homemade. Given the decent quality of many SMG clones, even that high statistic is probably significantly under reported.

http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2...ne-guns-brazil

[AdamG]

The Armed Forces of Colombia commissioned a pop song that included a Morse code message to kidnapped military personnel, "19 people rescued, you're next. Don't lose hope", because the kidnappers would let their captives listen to radio.

http://www.coloribus.com/adsarchive/...code-17518455/

[davidbfpo]

From Kings War Studies blog, Strife, a short article that could fit elsewhere, but it uses Colombia as the focus. The full title is: Colombia and the ‘Small footprint’ intervention illusion:http://strifeblog.org/2014/11/25/col...tion-illusion/

It opens with:

The challenge posed by ISIS has intensified debates in the West over the possibility of dispatching “boots on the ground” and has, yet again, brought to the forefront the search for alternative modes of military intervention following the recent disillusionment with “Big footprint” counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

A new book available for pre-order from Hurst (London-based) on Colombia, with an impressive line up of authors: Davis, Kilcullen, Mills and Spencer:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/a-great-perhaps/

There is a 33% discount if you register with Hurst, with free P&P.

From the publishers notice:

No country has managed as rapid and positive a turnaround in governance and security conditions this century as Colombia. In 1999, FARC and ELN rebels were literally at the gates of Bogot, and Colombia was a country synonymous with the antics of Pablo Escobar, known primarily for rapacious corruption, weak government, drug smuggling and criminality. Fifteen years later the guerrillas, seriously weakened, have been persuaded to attend peace talks in Havana, and the Colombian economy has been a top performer in Latin America.

To date, however, there has been no comprehensive examination of the different elements employed by the government to combat the guerrillas, win local and international political and military support, extend government authority to the 75 per cent of the countryside where it was seldom felt, and turn the Colombian economy around. How the Colombians did all of this is the subject of this book by four international specialists with unrivalled policy and practical expertise in counterinsurgency campaigns in Colombia and elsewhere, bringing a unique comparative perspective.


Based on fieldwork in Colombias regions, the study provides a history of the conflict, compares it to other case studies, examines the war from the perspectives of the government and the guerrillas, delves into the development of special Colombian capabilities (notably in intelligence and the use of airpower and special forces), and explains the economic dimension in terms both of historical exclusion and ongoing attempts at growth and inclusion. Finally, it concludes with an assessment of the countrys prospects: can the combination of improved security, a flourishing economy and the peace process offer an opportunity to finally translate Colombia from, in Gabriel Garcia Marquezs words, a great perhaps into something more permanent?