Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Tequila--

My former colleague at the Center, COL (Ret.) Bill Spracher was the DATT in Colombia during the Convivir period. He is of the opinion that it was a pretty successful program that should not have been disbanded. That said, I find it interesting that every insurgency I have ever encountered demands the disbanding of the civilian defense groups and accuses them of of atrocities.

It is clear that these organizations work - they are effective in dealing with insurgents, if backed up by the regular military. I am also suspicious of research that fails to identify more specifically than interviews with demobilized AUC members, government officials, etc. I know that it is sometimes difficult to reveal sources but somewhat greater precision is possible than HRW used. I was also looking for the author of the report and found no names which also concerns me when citing those sources - as well as similar ones on the other side of this/other issue(s). HRW has a political agenda as does, say Heritage Foundation, and I take that into account when I read their stuff. However, if it is Heritage on Latin America, then it was written by Steve Johnson (who is identified as the author) who has pretty good credentials developed over a long period.

Cheers

John

[tequila]

Hi Tequila--

My former colleague at the Center, COL (Ret.) Bill Spracher was the DATT in Colombia during the Convivir period. He is of the opinion that it was a pretty successful program that should not have been disbanded. That said, I find it interesting that every insurgency I have ever encountered demands the disbanding of the civilian defense groups and accuses them of of atrocities.

It is clear that these organizations work - they are effective in dealing with insurgents, if backed up by the regular military. I am also suspicious of research that fails to identify more specifically than interviews with demobilized AUC members, government officials, etc. I know that it is sometimes difficult to reveal sources but somewhat greater precision is possible than HRW used. I was also looking for the author of the report and found no names which also concerns me when citing those sources - as well as similar ones on the other side of this/other issue(s). HRW has a political agenda as does, say Heritage Foundation, and I take that into account when I read their stuff. However, if it is Heritage on Latin America, then it was written by Steve Johnson (who is identified as the author) who has pretty good credentials developed over a long period.

Cheers

John

Convivir involvement with death squads has been pretty well documented, for instance in this embassy cable listing the involvement of a convivir local president in the massacre of 14 peasants in La Horqueta in 1997. There is also the indictment of Chiquita where Carlos Castano explicitly instructs Chiquita execs to pay the AUC through the local convivir. Is it your contention that they did not commit atrocities? Note that effectiveness vs guerrillas using similar tactics does not necessarily rule out the use of massacre and atrocity. Indeed, similar tactics in Iraq used by the Mahdi Army against Sunnis are largely behind its popularity in Baghdad, for instance.

Also, what do you mean when you say you need more specificity from HRW with regards to the status of demobilized paramilitaries? Given the very nature of such groups, which principally traffick in drugs and homicide, one of the best ways to gain an understanding of them is to interview former members, especially those recruited as children who served as "foot soldiers" and may not have benefited in the same way as commanders did in the wake of "demobilization."

[zenpundit]

What is the substantive moral difference between guerillas and paramilitaries?

[tequila]

Not much of one. Both traffick drugs and use terror to cow the civilian populations. The paramilitaries tend to specialize in brute terrorization of civilians, though, and spend much less time fighting the FARC than the FARC does the Colombian Army.

The Colombian government in general, of course, is a far worthier cause and represents the Colombian people far better than the bloody dreams of the FARC high command. That doesn't mean they necessarily deserve $5 billion, not with the people they're in bed with.

[NDD]

Not much of one. Both traffick drugs and use terror to cow the civilian populations. The paramilitaries tend to specialize in brute terrorization of civilians, though, and spend much less time fighting the FARC than the FARC does the Colombian Army.

The Colombian government in general, of course, is a far worthier cause and represents the Colombian people far better than the bloody dreams of the FARC high command. That doesn't mean they necessarily deserve $5 billion, not with the people they're in bed with.

This is basically a gross over-simplification and simply not true.

[NDD]

Hi Tequila--

My former colleague at the Center, COL (Ret.) Bill Spracher was the DATT in Colombia during the Convivir period. He is of the opinion that it was a pretty successful program that should not have been disbanded. That said, I find it interesting that every insurgency I have ever encountered demands the disbanding of the civilian defense groups and accuses them of of atrocities.

It is clear that these organizations work - they are effective in dealing with insurgents, if backed up by the regular military. I am also suspicious of research that fails to identify more specifically than interviews with demobilized AUC members, government officials, etc. I know that it is sometimes difficult to reveal sources but somewhat greater precision is possible than HRW used. I was also looking for the author of the report and found no names which also concerns me when citing those sources - as well as similar ones on the other side of this/other issue(s). HRW has a political agenda as does, say Heritage Foundation, and I take that into account when I read their stuff. However, if it is Heritage on Latin America, then it was written by Steve Johnson (who is identified as the author) who has pretty good credentials developed over a long period.

Cheers

John

He is correct, your friend. The CONVIVIR program worked very well. The problem came IMO because of a lack of management, mostly on the part of the military. That, and external pressures. The political power of insurgent groups in Colombia and their ability to influence world opinion is often under-rated.

[NDD]

The thing is, you can't say "The AUC is this..." or "The FARC is that..." It doesn't work that way. These are fairly large organizations with hundreds of splinter groups with their own agendas. They all also have fringe elements hovering around them and doing things in their names. They have all evolved far beyond the ideals of the initial members and any central control. There are few policies and no way to enforce any of them.

The situation is in a state of flux and with that chaos.

The CONVIVIR were not part of the paras - but members do change organizations. There are many people that switch back and forth between Gs and paras depending on what is most viable at the moment and how bad they want to stay alive.

To say that there is institutional involvement between the Colombian military and paras is not correct. In those days, battalion commanders were put out in an area and told to survive as best they could. Yes, some or even many crossed the line and supported the paras. They had a resource without constraints moving in their direction. They were short-sighted. But in their defense, there was a time when the paras were not so tied to drugs as an organization.

Yes, some of the para units evolved from organizations formed by cartels. Others came from better sources. Some CONVIVIRS evolved into para units. Some para units were dirty and others did great things in their areas.

Colombia is indeed a very complex situation. People are often forced to accommodate in order to stay alive or to keep those in their charge alive.

But make no mistake about it, the tide is turning. And Uribe is a big, big part of that. He has taken on a military in a country where a coup is always just under the surface (like most of LATAM) several times. He has had over 20 assassination attempts on his life. He has fought corruption and nepotism that had to be seen to be believed. And he is a friend to the US. About the only one left in the region. He is fighting the world's longest running insurgency without any support from anyone in the region or Europe. In fact, he is surrounded by enemies on all sides. They provide safe haven for those that would destroy the country on every border he has. He is attacked for everything he does.

He needs to be supported.

It is very easy to criticize a lack of demonstrable progress from thousands of miles away. It is another thing entirely to be The Man in the Arena.

[slapout9]

NDD, glad to see you posting. I used to post about the successes in Columbia and generally got a lot of flak about it. I am retired LE and have been out of the loop for several years so I really enjoy getting some current ground truth from that area.

[John T. Fishel]

Excellent discussion of the complexity of the Colombian environment. The only point I would quibble with you about is the threat of a coup. Since 1902 Colombia has had only one extra-constitutional change of government and that was in 1954 when General Rojas Pinilla was asked by a large group including members of both political parties who were then engaged in the civil war called La Violencia to seize power. He did. Four years later the parties agreed on the National Front power sharing government that alternated them in power for 20 years but guaranteed constitutional transitions. The Colombian military generally has chosen not to participate as a typical political actor - it is not coup prone.

A note on drug corruption: Good people can easily get caught up in it, especially in Colombia. This includes Americans like COL J. C. Hiett who was MILGP commander, and DEA Agent Rene de la Cova who headed the office in Bogota. Both have done time but some might well suggest that their sentences were mere slaps on the wrist.

[NDD]

Excellent discussion of the complexity of the Colombian environment. The only point I would quibble with you about is the threat of a coup. Since 1902 Colombia has had only one extra-constitutional change of government and that was in 1954 when General Rojas Pinilla was asked by a large group including members of both political parties who were then engaged in the civil war called La Violencia to seize power. He did. Four years later the parties agreed on the National Front power sharing government that alternated them in power for 20 years but guaranteed constitutional transitions. The Colombian military generally has chosen not to participate as a typical political actor - it is not coup prone.

A note on drug corruption: Good people can easily get caught up in it, especially in Colombia. This includes Americans like COL J. C. Hiett who was MILGP commander, and DEA Agent Rene de la Cova who headed the office in Bogota. Both have done time but some might well suggest that their sentences were mere slaps on the wrist.

While what you say is true, the threat of coup is always there in any LATAM country. It runs deeper in some than others, but it is always there. The lack of it in Colombia is, IMO, as much to do with politicians accommodating the military because they know it is there as it is with the military not doing it. Until Uribe, there weren't a lot of Presidents with the huevos to fire a general, much less 3-4 on the same day. But they know he is leading from the front. I doubt they would be that forgiving of a lesser man.

The Rojas Pinilla coup, if you have to have one, wasn't a bad way to do it. His daughter is now in politics, or trying to be.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi NDD--

While you may be correct as to the reason the Colombian military is coup averse, I suspect that it is only one of many reasons. Among those are an internalization by Colombians, civilian and military alike, of the democratic norm of elected government along with greater internalization of the difficult in Spanish concept of the English word "compromise." (Reflected in the National Front.)

As to the rest of LATAM, more complex still. First, there are the countries that have disolved their militaries - Costa Rica, Panama, and Haiti. They face no coup threat although that does not eliminate the threat of other politcal violence, eg Haiti. Costa Rica has internalized democratic norms; it has a democratic political culture. Panama, IMO, is well on its way there as well.

My experience with El Salvador suggests that its military faced its crisis in 1989 with the last major FMLN offensive and its reaction to the murder of the Jesuits ordered by a member of the Tandona resulted in a change of institutional culture that helped the ESAF internalize democratic norms. I have seen similar behavioral and norm change in the Argentine military as a result of its failure as a military in the Falklands/Malvinas war and the revelations of the dirty war.

Where I have not seen this kind of norm change is in Chile, usually upheld as the model Latin American democracy. I would note that Chile and Uruguay shared that same evaluation until the military coups that overthrew their respective civilian governments in 1973 and 1974. I would suggest that your blanket analysis needs to be revised to take account of the changes in the norms of the individual countries and their militaries as well as the change in the norms region wide. The latter are, of course, not as strong in some countries as in others but there has been such a change throughout the region and it is reflected in Guatemala and Peru although not as strongly as Argentina and El Salvador or, even, Colombia.

Cheers

John

[tequila]

NDD, thanks for the clarifications and info.

To say that there is institutional involvement between the Colombian military and paras is not correct.

Is this strictly true, given what we now know about Noguera's ties to the paramilitaries, and also recent information publicized about Operation Orion which implicates top Colombian Army officers?

On topic: ICG report on Colombia's New Armed Groups. This report is much more favorable towards the progress of "demobilization" than my posts have been and has a lot of good info about how the paramilitaries have evolved.

edit: Also, I have been to Bogota twice as a guest of a friend from my old job at Goldman Sachs. I actually was carjacked once two blocks from a police station, which certainly gave me some flashbacks to the good old days in Brooklyn, but Colombian women more than made up for that - they are truly awesome to behold! (though my friend says this situation only exists in Bogota). His family is relatively well off and his grandfather was briefly kidnapped once; they are 100% pro-Uribe through and through.

[NDD]

NDD, thanks for the clarifications and info.



Is this strictly true, given what we now know about Noguera's ties to the paramilitaries, and also recent information publicized about Operation Orion which implicates top Colombian Army officers?

On topic: ICG report on Colombia's New Armed Groups. This report is much more favorable towards the progress of "demobilization" than my posts have been and has a lot of good info about how the paramilitaries have evolved.

edit: Also, I have been to Bogota twice as a guest of a friend from my old job at Goldman Sachs. I actually was carjacked once two blocks from a police station, which certainly gave me some flashbacks to the good old days in Brooklyn, but Colombian women more than made up for that - they are truly awesome to behold! (though my friend says this situation only exists in Bogota). His family is relatively well off and his grandfather was briefly kidnapped once; they are 100% pro-Uribe through and through.

Yes it is true. Noguera is a man, not the institution. The DAS is not part of the Colombian military and Noguera has not been convicted of anything that I know of.

You need to tone down the rhetoric a bit.