Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

the Columbians haven't heard of My Lai.

Poor form that!

[jonSlack]

AP - Colombia: Betancourt, US hostages freed

BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) — Colombia's military says it has rescued 15 hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. military contractors, from leftist rebels.

Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos made the announcement at a news conference on Wednesday.

Just saw this on CNN as Breaking News. Cannot find much on the Internet as of yet. MTF.

Currently, it is being reported that the hostages were rescued in a military operation as opposed to being released.

[Wildcat]

Noticed that, too. Great news. Makes me wish I had a bottle of Club Colombia so I could celebrate properly.

[jonSlack]

Washington Post - Colombia Rescues Hostages Held by Guerrilla Group for Years

Santos said the rescue, dubbed Operation Jaque and carried out by Colombian military intelligence, began with the infiltration of a FARC squad commanded by guerrilla known as Cesar. The squad has controlled a group of hostages in recent years, he said. Jaque is a Spanish chess term meaning "check."

In a ruse in which Cesar was told the hostages were to be flown to a meeting with the FARC commander known as Alfonso Cano, the hostages were brought together and put on board a helicopter supposedly operated by a humanitarian organization, Santos said. In fact, the organization was fictitious, and the helicopter belonged to the Colombian army, he said.

While the hostages were flown to freedom, Cesar and another member of his squad who were to accompany them to the meeting were "neutralized in the helicopter" and will be brought to justice, the defense minister said.

Wow. How disrupted must command and control and overall communications within FARC be to allow an operation like that to succeed? Or is it more likely that "Cesar" is now going to disappear into a Witness Protection Program with full amnesty?

As for about 15 other members of Cesar's squad, as well as other FARC guerrillas a few kilometers away, "we decided not to attack them" in hopes that the rebel group will reciprocate by releasing the rest of its hostages, Santos said.

I wonder what those 15 are doing, and thinking, right now...

[mmx1]

Unfortunately, looks like there's a downside to the rescue:
Colombian military used Red Cross emblem in rescue

[Creon01]

This may seem like a good idea to some but I can't begin to explain why in the long term this is going to hurt the cause. Although I'm happy that these hostages are free, the use of well known humanitarian symbols as an integral part of the mission will feed into the belief that humanitarian NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross are all just tools of the US and full of spies. Does the end justify the means on this occasion? Hard to justify to me, but like I said I’m happy to see these guys back home.

[Fuchs]

This may seem like a good idea to some but I can't begin to explain why in the long term this is going to hurt the cause. Although I'm happy that these hostages are free, the use of well known humanitarian symbols as an integral part of the mission will feed into the belief that humanitarian NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross are all just tools of the US and full of spies. Does the end justify the means on this occasion? Hard to justify to me, but like I said I’m happy to see these guys back home.

That was a covert mission. They were obviously not wearing visible military uniforms as well. The kidnappers thought that the helicopter was a charter helicopter.
I believe that's not covered by conventions.

And everybody knows that NGO personnel, UN organization personnel, embassy personnel and journalists have a high probability of co-operation with interested nations. The IAEA inspectors that searched in Iraq during Saddam's time were full of MI6/CIA spies, for example.

[Rex Brynen]

That was a covert mission. They were obviously not wearing visible military uniforms as well. The kidnappers thought that the helicopter was a charter helicopter.
I believe that's not covered by conventions.

And everybody knows that NGO personnel, UN organization personnel, embassy personnel and journalists have a high probability of co-operation with interested nations. The IAEA inspectors that searched in Iraq during Saddam's time were full of MI6/CIA spies, for example.

The ICRC is a different kettle of fish--the red cross insignia is protected under Chapter VI of the 1906 Geneva Convention (and subsequent IHL), and its misuse is a war crime.

[Tom Odom]

And everybody knows that NGO personnel, UN organization personnel, embassy personnel and journalists have a high probability of co-operation with interested nations. The IAEA inspectors that searched in Iraq during Saddam's time were full of MI6/CIA spies, for example.

Sorry you are wrong in that assertion. Everyone does not know that and to assert that embassy and NGO personnel are all part of the same group is ill-informed. The IAEA was an international group and its composition was openly discussed in the media. That is a completely different case from an ICRC worker in Columbia or elsewhere. In cases like the camps in Zaire, NGO workers rightly distanced themselves as a means of self-preservation.

Tom

[Bill Moore]

I thought about posting this in the Latin American section, but decided there are relevant points in this article about international support (both State and non-state) for insurgents and terrorists are relevant on the global level. The take away is that the McCormick Counterinsurgent Diamond model argues you must isolate the insurgents not only from the populace and but also international support. Of course theory is always easier than practice.

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscel...eption0908.pdf

This paper examines:
• The FARC's long-standing ties to Latin American countries such as El Salvador
and Nicaragua,
• The information-sharing with other terrorist groups, particularly the Provisional
IRA of Ireland and the ETA Basque separatists of Spain, and the role this
collaboration played in allowing the FARC to develop weapons that primarily
targeted the civilian population,
• The FARC's role in founding and directing the Coordinadora Continental
Bolivariana (CCB), an umbrella group active in much of Latin America.
• The FARC's European network,
• The FARC's attempts to acquire weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, from a
variety of countries and intermediaries of different nationalities.

[Jedburgh]

I thought about posting this in the Latin American section, but decided there are relevant points in this article about international support (both State and non-state) for insurgents and terrorists are relevant on the global level. The take away is that the McCormick Counterinsurgent Diamond model argues you must isolate the insurgents not only from the populace and but also international support. Of course theory is always easier than practice.

The FARC’s International Relations: A Network of Deception

The necessity of isolating the insurgent from international support has long been a recognized keystone of successful COIN, but - as you state - it is a goal that is very difficult to reach. Reduction of such support (to varying degrees), rather than isolation from, tends to be what is achievable in practical terms. And in today's operational environment, there is a broad spectrum of factors that make such reduction much more difficult than it was in the Cold War era.

Back in 2001, RAND published a decent, if simplistic, study on Trends in Outside Support for Insurgencies. The brief NEFA paper talks to several of the issues in the context of the FARC that the authors identified as post-Cold War support trends.

As an aside, given events since '01, the topic could use an in-depth relook.

[bourbon]

Colombia Confronts Drug Lord’s Legacy: Hippos, by Simon Romero. The New York Times, September 10, 2009.

DORADAL, Colombia — Even in Colombia, a country known for its paramilitary death squads, this hunting party stood out: more than a dozen soldiers from a Colombian Army battalion, two Porsche salesmen armed with long-range rifles, their assistant, and a taxidermist.

They stalked Pepe through the backlands of Colombia for three days in June before executing him in a clearing about 60 miles from here with shots to his head and heart. But after a snapshot emerged of soldiers posing over his carcass, the group suddenly found itself on the defensive.

As it turned out, Pepe — a hippopotamus who escaped from his birthplace near the pleasure palace built here by the slain drug lord Pablo Escobar — had a following of his own.

Pepe bears a resemblance to his owner.

[Tom Odom]

Hippo makes a fine meal...

[Mike Burgoyne]

I recently returned from an interesting visit to Colombia. The government is working to consolidate its gains against the FARC and establish government services in formerly lawless areas. Colombia has developed the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/descarg...c_Security.pdf) which is supported by the United States’ Colombian Strategic Development Initiative.

Both plans focus on delivering enduring economic opportunity and government services to formerly ungoverned or FARC controlled regions. Both plans shift resources from the primarily security heavy efforts of the last decade while maintaining extremely successful and unrelenting intelligence based targeting of the FARC leadership. With continued US support and Colombian political will, Colombia could prove to be an example of successful government consolidation following an internal conflict.

General Freddy Padilla de Leon’s analysis “Beyond Victory: The Future of the Armed Forces of Colombia” also provides some interesting insights into the way forward in Colombia. http://www.world-military.net/IMG/pd...RY_padilla.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Mike,

Good catch and although rather laudatory in places I liked the following:

Our vision is to develop men and women in our armed services with this exceptional character:

* We need the future members of the military class to be thinkers. This is the only alternative, not only so that they will have the necessary criteria for making good operational decisions, but also so that they can deal with a strategic scenario that is characterized by a growing uncertainty.
* We also want officers and soldiers to share a solid military ethic as the only response for guaranteeing legitimacy in the context of the dramatic dilemmas inherent to war.
* We require Colombian officers to behave as doubly excellent citizens who are capable of setting an example for their countrymen while being aware of their duty to their service.
* Moreover, we expect armed service officers to develop an informed vision of the world and discernment to be able to assume the role of defense intellectuals capable of understanding society’s security needs beyond the current conjuncture.
* We demand that armed forces members be imbued with the character of leaders who can conduct the institution in battle, and also lead it and make it grow in times of peace.
* As is natural, the officer corps must incarnate military ethics such as discipline, determination, and the values that make them the nation’s greatest resource at the times of greatest difficulty.

I wonder if TRADOC have read the speech?

davidbfpo

[John T. Fishel]

Max Manwaring of SSI has made a number of trips to Colombia in the past few years and is deeply pessimistic. I'll get into his reasons in a moment. In 2006, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies hosted a Colombian conference of their Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI in Spanish) which is the institutional interagency implementer of the Strategic Plan. The problem was that CCAI had never been institutionalized by legislation and the last time I discussed it with Max it still had not been. This is an indicator in his mind, supported by other observations, that President Uribe's positive impact can only be transitory. He really doesn't build, hasn't built institutions, so little of what he has done will survive his tenure in office. The root of the problem is that Uribe, like Chavez, in Venezuela, is a caudillo - the tradition of strong man leadership that is enshrined in most Latin American constitutions in a Presidency that is the 800 pound gorrilla to all the other institutions of governement.
As our good friend Ambassador Ed Corr puts it, the best thing Uribe could do for Colombia is not run again. Then he would go down in history as a great President. To which I would add that before he leaves office he should institutionalize his innovations like CCAI in legislation. But, of course, this is all wishful thinking on my part.

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

John:

I came away feeling cautiously optimistic.

It seemed to me that the political future of Colombia was the critical issue. I would think that having someone like former defense minister Santos continue the Uribe government policies would be the best. However, if Uribe does achieve a third term will this derail the gains of the last ten years?

The PCSD and my observations of their forces leads me to believe that they have identified and are now dealing with the challenges of this phase of the war. I am heartened to hear that, after defeating the large FARC columns, they haven't declared victory and ignored the root causes.

"Irreversibility" was the buzz word around Bogotá. In your opinion what are the signs/steps that must be seen for Colombia to achieve a lasting victory over the FARC?

V/R

Mike

[Valin]

WSJ
JOSé DE CóRDOBA And DARCY CROWE
9/24/10

BOGOTA—Colombia's army killed the military leader of the country's communist guerrillas in a two-day battle that involved airstrikes against his jungle bunker, dealing a major blow to the four-decade insurgency, officials said Thursday.

Related:
How They Found Him

[davidbfpo]

A very nice story, however well sourced I am sure others will be sceptical. Personally I think it is "smoke".

[AdamG]

Special forces used helicopters to reach the remote Macarena mountain range, where they decorated a 82 foot (25 metre) tree with 2,000 lights.

The tree's lights are fitted with motion sensors, so that the festive offering is illuminated when rebels pass.

Banners reading: "Demobilise, at Christmas everything is possible" and "If Christmas can come to the jungle, you can come home" decorate the branches.

Rest of story and Youtube video here
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...tmas-tree.html