Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[SWJ Blog]

Colombia Assuming Instructor Role for Other Militaries

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Colombia Assuming Instructor Role for Other Militaries by Chris Kraul, Los Angeles Times. BLUF: "We have a lot to learn from Colombia. We're now going through what they have experienced for the last 20 years," the 27-year-old Garcia said later of the drug-fueled violence plaguing Mexico. "What Colombian pilots know about night missions, flying over difficult terrain, and participating in joint task forces is invaluable to us."



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[SWJ Blog]

WTF: Is Colombia Losing Now?

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[Misifus]

This was just on the SWJ Blog feed from Foreign Affairs Journal. What a friggin' joke! Plan Colombia is nothing but a money pit failure. And now the same geniuses who put it in place want to couple it with the same geniuses who brought you "Hearts & Minds" and sissified Romeos in OIF and OEF? Is there no end to our stupidity?

More drugs are flowing into the US now than ever. While we would like to claim that it's a Mexico problem, the fact is that the Mexicans are just the transporting middle-men for the Colombians and their junkies in the US.

Link to cited article:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...istan_colombia

[Bill Moore]

Is there no end to our stupidity?

If there is, I see no sign of it. Too many crack pots out there want to lobby through think tanks and various journals for failed models, whether it be Plan Columbia or the Operation in the Southern Philippines. Which I could find it on (I think it was removed from U-tube), but it was a General Officer from Columbia stating that they starting making progress against the FARC (not the narco trade) when they quit listening to the U.S. and started treated it like a war. Um? You mean waging a war like a war might actually work?

Of course with our very loose definition of success, I guess that means we can never lose.

[davidbfpo]

I read the linked FP article and was staggered at the suggestion. Re-reading it today I found this, which confirms it is wishful thinking:

However, the United States should solicit a significant sharing of the burden from other countries, particularly from some of the wealthy Gulf countries, which have so much at stake in the region and have so far done so little to help.

These are the countries that to date, with one tiny exception, UAE SF, have not contributed to ISAF, like others "walked away" after the Soviet withdrawal and are still suspected to have insufficient control over donations to the 'cause'.

Barely credible IMHO.

[Misifus]

I read the linked FP article...

Thanks for posting the link and the correction. I meant FP and not FAJ in my post. I use them interchangeably sometimes. FAJ used to be balanced IMO, but now it appears to be just as Left as FP.

[Misifus]

If there is, I see no sign of it. Too many crack pots out there want to lobby through think tanks and various journals for failed models, whether it be Plan Col[o]mbia or the Operation in the Southern Philippines. Which I could find it on (I think it was removed from U-tube), but it was a General Officer from Columbia stating that they starting making progress against the FARC (not the narco trade) when they quit listening to the U.S. and started treated it like a war...

Yes, there are many who think the El Salvador insurgency would have been defeated quicker had the US not gone in there to dictate nice guy tactics. As an example next door, Guatemala quashed its insurgency rather quickly once Gen. Rios Montt decided to kick the army out of the barracks and make them go do their job correctly.

You are correct that with the focus against FARC, and not the narco trade, that Colombia has made "progress." Leave the narcos alone and it is apparent how the violence reduces quickly. Indeed if President Calderon in Mexico brought the troops back into the barracks the violence in Mexico would decrease as well, with the exception of the Zetas that is until the other cartels wipe them out.

These are strategies of capitulation against the narcos. The capitulation to the narcos in Colombia is being sold as a "victory" of Plan Colombia when it is in fact a failure. Drugs flow freely from Colombia into Mexico now more than ever. So much for Plan Colombia.

[davidbfpo]

Created to assist Mike Burgoyne's quest.

[Mike Burgoyne]

Looking for thoughts and references on successful transformations of militaries after a successful negotiated peace or demobilization of an insurgent force.

Looking at the future of the Colombian military, either the FARC will come to terms at the negotiating table or will be reduced through military action in the coming years. I'm interested in best practices and earlier blunders in this type of situation.

What worked and didn't work in El Salvador and other places?

[davidbfpo]

Mike,

The cogs in my memory are now working; you asked:

Looking for thoughts and references on successful transformations of militaries after a successful negotiated peace or demobilization of an insurgent force.

The Lancaster House Agreement 1979, that ended the rebellion by Rhodesia and the insurgency conducted by the nationalists, was often cited in the 1980's as an example. In particular the process by which the insurgents largely moved into camps within Rhodesia, assembly points IIRC, watched over by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF, from Australia, NZ, Kenya and the UK). Then after the elections the integration of the guerillas into new Zimbabwe's armed forces and the police. With a British team assisting (known as BMATT).

Less well known is the peace accord for Namibia, with South Africa's decision to withdraw, a period of UN rule (UNTAG) and the integration of SWAPO's armed wing into the new armed forces - again with a BMATT. There was an early upset when SWAPO insurgents crossed the Angolan border and were repulsed bloodily - several books cover that time. Incidentally a number of black Namibians or South-Westers who had fought against SWAPO left for South Africa; as recorded in one book by Jim Hooper on the para-military Koevoet. Check the thread on these small Southern African small wars:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10859

Then there is Africa's giant, South Africa and the national agreement on ending apartheid, which involved the SADF being reformed, taking in numbers of externally based insurgents and others who had been within. My interest remain in the country, but not to the extent of buying books! There must be a plethora of articles on that process, some of which will feature 'security sector reform' and the variety of overseas advisers who participated.

I am pretty certain that the individual independence agreements for the Portuguese African colonies in 1974 are not so well documented. My recollection is that the insurgent forces became the military, even though a large part of the Portuguese military was black African. Maybe the SWJ author, Miguel Silva can help? See:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...1%E2%80%931974

One hesitates to mention Algeria, but the Evian peace agreement must have dealt with the insurgents becoming the state. We know that many of those who served France, often called the harkis, were betrayed and paid a high price. I have just found only 15k were allowed to leave and 100k killed (inc. families). Not to overlook 1.5m 'pied noir' or white settlers left abruptly. See various links on:http://africanhistory.about.com/od/a...ianAccords.htm

As Algeria marked its 50th anniversary of independence in 2012 there were numerous conferences held, so maybe far more is available now. The wider thread on France's war in Algeria may help:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15864

I have a small pile of books on Zimbabwe and Namibia if you need references; most of them date back to the 1980's.

Try the old threads Policies in Post-Conflict Countries:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3957 and the great RFI thread started by Colin Robinson, a Kiwi doing a Ph.D. 'Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10049

Finally, leaving Africa how about Nepal? Where there is peace agreement, with a planned integration of the 32k insurgency, Communist army:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5236

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mike--

The 1992 El Sal peace accords called for the reduction in size of the ESAF and teh creation of a new Policia Nacional Civil separate from the MOD. More on the PNC in a minute as it is the more complex part.

During the 12 year war the ESAF grew from under 10,000 to over 56,000 but the officer corps barely grew at all. So, demobilization essentially involved letting the conscripts go home. One result of the US effeort was to leave El Sal with a record of who had been trained in a national computer database. this allowed the ESAF to retain a reserve military force that was called up for duty during Hurricane Mitch.

The PNC was to replace the 3 police forces that had previously existed under the MOD (Vice Min for Public Security). These were (1)the National Police (PN), (2) the Guardia Nacional (GN), and (3) the Policia de hacienda (PH). PN had mainly urban duties, GN mainly rural, and PH focused on white collar crime. The PNC was to incorporate as 20% of its number former PN, 20% former FMLN guerrillas, and 40% new recruits all under a civilian minister.

The new ESAF has become quite professional. The PNC has been a problem and relatively unable to control crime particularly from gangs like MS-13 which grew from the US deportation program of the 1990s.

Email me and I'll give you some addtional detail.

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

Excellent stuff. Thank you very much.

The attached is an info paper I found discussing SLV lessons learned.

I would think in these situations where you have a criminal element waiting to recruit ex-soldiers that keeping your army actively employed and slowly downsizing is the right answer.

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

Translating Lessons Learned in Colombia and Other Wars Among the People: Confronting the Spectrum of 21st Century Conflict

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[SWJ Blog]

Covert Action in Colombia

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[SWJ Blog]

BACRIM in Colombia

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[SWJ Blog]

Persistent Engagement in Colombia

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[SWJ Blog]

The Intractable Conflict: Why Colombia’s War Against the FARC Eludes Resolution

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[SWJ Blog]

Colombia, FARC Announce Breakthrough in Peace Talks

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[SWJ Blog]

Event: Lessons for Africa from Colombia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience

The events two hour podcast is now available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AY2T...ature=youtu.be

[davidbfpo]

The Colombian government and the Farc rebels have signed a historic ceasefire deal, bringing them closer to ending more than five decades of conflict.The agreement is expected to pave the way for a full peace deal.
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and Farc leader Timochenko shook hands at a ceremony in the Cuban capital.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-36611952


Three other items in support.