Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[slapout9]

Setting aside the moral question, criminalizing usage does have the effect of driving prices up--evidence of declining demand in absence of declining supply. The baseline fluctuating between 50 and 300 percent, if I remember, but it does clearly set the price higher here than it does in say Amsterdam.



Buying up the crop wouldn't necessarily drive down prices, in fact it shouldn't unless the government--as either a result of playing the futures game poorly or as a matter of deliberate policy--consistently undercuts its own position on the eventual harvest price or imposes a price that promotes illegal crop selling. The model here is farm subsidies.

I agree with point one. Criminalizing something usually starts a high price black market.

As for point two, the main idea was to remove the crop from the market entirely. If we (the US) decided to do something with the product beside destroy it then the economics of drug companies would or would not come into play.

You seem well versed in this area...what are your suggestions on how to handle it?

[Presley Cannady]

I agree with point one. Criminalizing something usually starts a high price black market.

Errata: I mentioned "evidence of declining demand in absence of declining supply." I meant "despite." Criminalizing usage (with no additional change to penalties for suppliers, should force a drop in prices eventually. Decriminalizing should do the opposite. On the other hands, the Netherlands has this weird system where they've decriminalized only possession for personal use and the coffee shop boutique. Supply remains unaffected by the law, demand increases, but prices drop. Go figure.

As for point two, the main idea was to remove the crop from the market entirely. If we (the US) decided to do something with the product beside destroy it then the economics of drug companies would or would not come into play.

My sentiments exactly. It's almost disturbing how little public literature there is at least humoring the idea.

You seem well versed in this area...what are your suggestions on how to handle it?

I'm interested in epidemiology in general, and drug policy addresses such a problem. I don't have any particular expertise in it, though. Still, I'm an American and a New Yorker so I'll offer my opinions anyway:

1) On the demand side, OECD nations have done a reasonable job containing the threat of hard drugs to civil society, though it remains to be seen if prohibition's gone overboard and is more costly than other alternatives--decriminalization is now going on in enough countries to do a real longitudinal study with good regional variance. I really don't have any recommendations that don't boil down to "those Romanian Newports are looking like a bargain right now."

2) The supply side effort has been inadequate, largely because of how tunnel-vision in drug policy in OECD nations has shaped our relations with key cocaine and heroine supply termini. You've outlined a serious operation that could be used to achieve much broader objectives in say, Colombia, where we can identify farmers, politicians seeking broader farmer constituencies, military and law enforcement officers and even narcotraffickers who'd rather deal legally with a government agency's billion dollar budget than their more bloodthirsty confederates. I think this is what folks at SWJ call a "population-centric" approach.

[davidbfpo]

The 'War on Drugs' is a snappy, old title and of little relevance now IMHO.

In the UK and I suspect elsewhere the price of both hard and soft drugs has gone down. Here SOCA (similar to the FBI & DEA) acknowldeges that supply remains robust and is reflected in the ready availability on the street.

In the UK and hard drugs aside, as those users remain a small consumer minority. The problem is first a significant consumer minority exists (around 40% of under 25's IIRC) and this affects the legitimacy of anti-drug policy. I would expect a large minority would support decriminalisation of cannabis. Eventually this will be reflected in institutions.

Secondly most national effort is concentrated on supply and not demand. I wonder if HIV & AIDS has had an impact on the use of needles, for the non-addict.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Today the UK Home Office have released some figures on seizures plus other data sources: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...rd-levels.html

Some 'spin" has been applied, thankfully supports my previous posting.

davidbfpo

[bourbon]

Plying the Pacific, Subs Surface as Key Tool of Drug Cartels, by William Booth and Juan Forero. The Washington Post, June 6, 2009.

MEXICO CITY -- When anti-narcotics agents first heard that drug cartels were building an armada of submarines to transport cocaine, they thought it was a joke.

Now U.S. law enforcement officials say that more than a third of the cocaine smuggled into the United States from Colombia travels in submersibles.

An experimental oddity just two years ago, these strange semi-submarines are the cutting edge of drug trafficking today. They ferry hundreds of tons of cocaine for powerful Mexican cartels that are taking over the Pacific Ocean route for most northbound shipments, according to the Colombian navy.

The sub-builders are even trying to develop a remote-controlled model, officials say.

"That means no crew. That means just cocaine, or whatever, inside the boat," said Michael Braun, a former chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

Had the impression the narco-subs were kind of a novelty for the traffickers. Guess it isn’t anymore; one-third of all cocaine going from Colombia to the Mexican cartels in semi-subs is serious weight.

[tequila]

Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies. Cato Institute.

On July 1, 2001, a nationwide law in Portugal took effect that decriminalized all drugs, including cocaine and heroin. Under the new legal framework, all drugs were "decriminalized," not "legalized." Thus, drug possession for personal use and drug usage itself are still legally prohibited, but violations of those prohibitions are deemed to be exclusively administrative violations and are removed completely from the criminal realm. Drug trafficking continues to be prosecuted as a criminal offense.

...

The political consensus in favor of decriminalization is unsurprising in light of the relevant empirical data. Those data indicate that decriminalization has had no adverse effect on drug usage rates in Portugal, which, in numerous categories, are now among the lowest in the EU, particularly when compared with states with stringent criminalization regimes. Although postdecriminalization usage rates have remained roughly the same or even decreased slightly when compared with other EU states, drug-related pathologies — such as sexually transmitted diseases and deaths due to drug usage — have decreased dramatically. Drug policy experts attribute those positive trends to the enhanced ability of the Portuguese government to offer treatment programs to its citizens — enhancements made possible, for numerous reasons, by decriminalization.

Full white paper at the link.

[bourbon]

90% of U.S. currency tainted with cocaine. Which city's is the worst?. Top of the Ticket - L.A. Times, August 18, 2009.

A new -- and strange -- study by the American Chemical Society has just revealed that nine out of 10 pieces -- as in 90% -- of the paper currency sampled around the United States recently contained traces of cocaine -- as in the illegal substance, which binds to the green ink.

[Schmedlap]

I read of a similar report a while back, but that one only referred to 100 dollar bills and the highest rate of incidence was in LA and Las Vegas, if I recall correctly. I am surprised to see DC at the top. I knew that there was a drug problem in DC, but I always figured that they were smoking crack, judging by the legislation.

[Ken White]

...I am surprised to see DC at the top. I knew that there was a drug problem in DC, but I always figured that they were smoking crack, judging by the legislation.

that refined...

[IntelTrooper]

I read of a similar report a while back, but that one only referred to 100 dollar bills and the highest rate of incidence was in LA and Las Vegas, if I recall correctly. I am surprised to see DC at the top. I knew that there was a drug problem in DC, but I always figured that they were smoking crack, judging by the legislation.

Dude, can you filter your comments so that they're not making me laugh out loud while I'm supposed to be working?

[bourbon]

Colombia Confronts Drug Lord’s Legacy: Hippos, by Simon Romero. The New York Times, September 10, 2009.

DORADAL, Colombia — Even in Colombia, a country known for its paramilitary death squads, this hunting party stood out: more than a dozen soldiers from a Colombian Army battalion, two Porsche salesmen armed with long-range rifles, their assistant, and a taxidermist.

They stalked Pepe through the backlands of Colombia for three days in June before executing him in a clearing about 60 miles from here with shots to his head and heart. But after a snapshot emerged of soldiers posing over his carcass, the group suddenly found itself on the defensive.

As it turned out, Pepe — a hippopotamus who escaped from his birthplace near the pleasure palace built here by the slain drug lord Pablo Escobar — had a following of his own.

Pepe bears a resemblance to his owner.

[Tom Odom]

Hippo makes a fine meal...

[Mike Burgoyne]

I recently returned from an interesting visit to Colombia. The government is working to consolidate its gains against the FARC and establish government services in formerly lawless areas. Colombia has developed the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/descarg...c_Security.pdf) which is supported by the United States’ Colombian Strategic Development Initiative.

Both plans focus on delivering enduring economic opportunity and government services to formerly ungoverned or FARC controlled regions. Both plans shift resources from the primarily security heavy efforts of the last decade while maintaining extremely successful and unrelenting intelligence based targeting of the FARC leadership. With continued US support and Colombian political will, Colombia could prove to be an example of successful government consolidation following an internal conflict.

General Freddy Padilla de Leon’s analysis “Beyond Victory: The Future of the Armed Forces of Colombia” also provides some interesting insights into the way forward in Colombia. http://www.world-military.net/IMG/pd...RY_padilla.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Mike,

Good catch and although rather laudatory in places I liked the following:

Our vision is to develop men and women in our armed services with this exceptional character:

* We need the future members of the military class to be thinkers. This is the only alternative, not only so that they will have the necessary criteria for making good operational decisions, but also so that they can deal with a strategic scenario that is characterized by a growing uncertainty.
* We also want officers and soldiers to share a solid military ethic as the only response for guaranteeing legitimacy in the context of the dramatic dilemmas inherent to war.
* We require Colombian officers to behave as doubly excellent citizens who are capable of setting an example for their countrymen while being aware of their duty to their service.
* Moreover, we expect armed service officers to develop an informed vision of the world and discernment to be able to assume the role of defense intellectuals capable of understanding society’s security needs beyond the current conjuncture.
* We demand that armed forces members be imbued with the character of leaders who can conduct the institution in battle, and also lead it and make it grow in times of peace.
* As is natural, the officer corps must incarnate military ethics such as discipline, determination, and the values that make them the nation’s greatest resource at the times of greatest difficulty.

I wonder if TRADOC have read the speech?

davidbfpo

[John T. Fishel]

Max Manwaring of SSI has made a number of trips to Colombia in the past few years and is deeply pessimistic. I'll get into his reasons in a moment. In 2006, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies hosted a Colombian conference of their Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI in Spanish) which is the institutional interagency implementer of the Strategic Plan. The problem was that CCAI had never been institutionalized by legislation and the last time I discussed it with Max it still had not been. This is an indicator in his mind, supported by other observations, that President Uribe's positive impact can only be transitory. He really doesn't build, hasn't built institutions, so little of what he has done will survive his tenure in office. The root of the problem is that Uribe, like Chavez, in Venezuela, is a caudillo - the tradition of strong man leadership that is enshrined in most Latin American constitutions in a Presidency that is the 800 pound gorrilla to all the other institutions of governement.
As our good friend Ambassador Ed Corr puts it, the best thing Uribe could do for Colombia is not run again. Then he would go down in history as a great President. To which I would add that before he leaves office he should institutionalize his innovations like CCAI in legislation. But, of course, this is all wishful thinking on my part.

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

John:

I came away feeling cautiously optimistic.

It seemed to me that the political future of Colombia was the critical issue. I would think that having someone like former defense minister Santos continue the Uribe government policies would be the best. However, if Uribe does achieve a third term will this derail the gains of the last ten years?

The PCSD and my observations of their forces leads me to believe that they have identified and are now dealing with the challenges of this phase of the war. I am heartened to hear that, after defeating the large FARC columns, they haven't declared victory and ignored the root causes.

"Irreversibility" was the buzz word around Bogotá. In your opinion what are the signs/steps that must be seen for Colombia to achieve a lasting victory over the FARC?

V/R

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

Mike, in a word. I must say I'm not as pessimistic as Max but he said that Dave Spencer (at CHDS) is pessimistic too. That said, I would go on and use the old 1950s-60s slogan of Peru's CAEM, No hay defensa sin desarrollo (there is no defense w/o development). The critical development IMO is a real civil service in all areas. For example, although the MOD is a civilian, his position in the chain of command is shaky at best and the position is totally political. Well, you say, ours is too. Yes, but, look at the politicals, especially our USDP, Michelle Flournoy a total defense professional and one in the shadow Democratic Administration for the duration of the G W Bush years. There is nothing like this in Colombia. My old colleague from CHDS, Andres Suarez, attached himself to the Deputy MOD; when that gentleman moved on to the intel service he took Andres with him. Nor are there professional civilian bureaucrats in the MOD or other ministries who continue beyond a single Presidency. Thus there is no institutional civil service in Colombia or most of Latin America. There are exceptions like Chile and Argentina or the Brazilian foreign service (and some others) but mostly they aren't. Another area of major weakness is in the realm of legislative staff. they really don't exist either. (As a FAO you will be beleaguered by CODELS consisting solely of Staff but remember as you are griping that thos staffers [kids barely out of diapers] are the ones who provide the Congressmen and senators the info they need.) Anyway, good, professional legislative staff is essential to intelligent institutionalization and development.

Boy, did you hit a button!

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

From my armchair, the various points you make (no disagreement here) are symptomatic of the larger Cental and South American problem of a limited middle class, whether in the civil service, in business or in the military. While the text quoted by David is edifying, it mentions "officers" (mostly) and "soldiers" (sometimes). The non-mention of NCOs stood out to me; but then I may have been guilty of reading too much MM and JTF, as well as some studies on the FID efforts in ES.

The "caudillo" problem - both in large and small sizes.

In justice to GEN Padilla de Léon, he does mention NCOs once, officers 17 times and soldiers thrice.

[John T. Fishel]

The is heresy for all my SF friends. Latin America doesn't have an NCO problem. It also doesn't lack a middle class, so that isn't the source of the civil service problem.
Back to NCOs. What the LATAM militaries lack is a first level supervisor. We use NCOs for that purpose. The Soviets and the LATAM militaries used/use junior officers. In LATAM the problem was too few LTs and a culture that said/says that officers don't get their hands dirty. El Salvador never solved the problem during the war and few, if any, LATAM militaries have.
John Waghelstein tried to solve the problem with an OCS course that produced a lot of LTs but ran into the problem of the regular officers not seeing the OCS products as real officers and seeing them as a threat. So, that approach died. Nobody ever tried my proposed solution which was to create a class of Warrant Officers - the requirement would have been a high school diploma and reserve, not regular status. This would have taken advantage of El Salvador's middle class...

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

with your SF friends - cuz I'd lose; but a Google search - "el salvador" "middle class" - brings up 187,000 hits, with the first 3 being....

middle class - 8%:

Unfortunately, this small country's most serious problems didn't end with the war. An estimated 90 percent of the nation's population is considered poor and clamoring for land. Only 2 percent of the country's population can be considered wealthy, while an additional 8 percent from a struggling middle class.

A nice anecdote from 1950:

EL SALVADOR: Discovery of a Middle Class
Monday, Jul. 10, 1950
....
Placed on sale early last week in Salvadorean banks, the bonds sold briskly to shop girls, taxi drivers and other small citizens. Less than $400,000 worth were bought by members of the Twenty Families. At week's end the $5,000,000 issue was entirely subscribed.

middle class-- about 8 percent in the early 1980s:

The small proportion of society constituting a middle class-- about 8 percent in the early 1980s--included skilled workers, government employees, professionals, school teachers, smallholders, small businessmen, and commercial employees. These people were caught between the polar extremes of wealth and poverty. Not being members of the traditional oligarchy--although the great success of nineteenth- century coffee production had stimulated the development of the middle sector as well as of the elite--the middle sector traditionally had little direct influence in government affairs.

That being said, the 2009 Brookings Report, "Central America in 2009: Off the U.S. Radar" (Google cache) has this marked improvement over the approx. 90% poverty rate of the 1980s:

These countries remain sharply divided, however, between highly privileged elites and very large sectors of the population mired in poverty or extreme poverty. These two latter categories together total about half the population in Guatemala and Nicaragua, more than 30% in El Salvador, and more than 28% even in wealthier Panama. Politics and communications have democratized, but access to major economic assets and to high quality education is still extremely restricted. Significant economic growth has occurred since 1990 in Panama, El Salvador and Guatemala and since 2000 even in Nicaragua, but the benefits of growth are still very unequally distributed in all four countries. Guatemala’s elite has more helicopters per capita than any other country (admittedly in a mountainous terrain) but infant malnutrition rates in Guatemala, although improving, are still among the worst in the world. The contrast between the homes and lifestyles of the wealthy and of the poor, both urban and rural, remains stunning.

Apparently, economic changes since 1990 require some amendment to pre-conceptions from more ancient times.

Cheers

Mike