"North Vietnam couldn't win through their hearts and minds approach, so instead they had to launch a conventional invasion and only when the tanks rolled into Saigon did they win. "

You realize that this is exactly in accordance with classic Maoist insurgency that Ho modeled his campaign after, right? Phase III is to surge to conventional military operations to finish off the the counterinsurgent government and its forces. They tried to reach this level a few times, and had to back off when beaten up for surging too soon. This does not make it suddenly not an insurgency because they seek to rise to conventional combat, it just means it is a Maoist insurgency.

As to the stats on the number of successful non-violent insurgencies vice violent ones, they have been gathered, I have seen them, but don't have them handy. I'll see if I can get them to share here.

Lastly, "politically correct" is to hold to the current position that is shaped by current norms and deemed therefore acceptable...you may, Mr. Global Scout, want to check your bathroom mirror for the next target of this accusation. My positions are based upon what I believe will work best based upon my experience and research, no more and no less; but thanks for calling my politically correct, as that is, I believe a first.

I don't adhere to the "population-centric" success through development and protection of the populace that gentlemen like Dr. Nagl promotes; I see not historic basis for the position. Neither do I subscribe to the "COIN is war, just defeat the insurgent" school of thought, as similarly, I see not historic basis for that working either. I'm trying to sort out what works, and you can neither bribe nor kill your way out of insurgency, you actually have to assess where you are failing as a government and address those failures. Portions of both of the above mentioned approaches have a place within a successful strategy, but neither, IMO, is a successful strategy unto itself.