Taliban successes in the North

[davidbfpo]

All too often the focus is in the South and East, not the North:

Some of them quiver in diffraction only a few miles away from Mazar-e-Sharif, the provincial capital.

Four weeks after the Taliban announced the beginning of their annual spring offensive, the insurgents have quietly taken over most of Balkh.

(Later) Or maybe because they realize that they are trapped, as Afghans have been forever, between armed men in different uniforms contesting their wretched land. Maybe they are simply hoping to get through the latest torment.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...lages?page=0,1

Note the author is not an 'embedded' journalist.

[davidbfpo]

Hamid Hussain, our irregular contributor on the Pakistani Army and other factors, has provided a commentary on the situation today, which also looks to what may happen. See attachment.

An assumption challenged:

Everyone is assuming that a friendly northern Afghanistan will be happy to host U.S. bases but things are changing quite rapidly. There is slow and steady rise of resentment even in the north against the presence of U.S. troops due to suspicion, war weariness and fear that these installations will invite attacks. There will be debate and significant opposition from various segments of Afghan population against a long term U.S. presence.

[Bob's World]

This is complicated. All is not happy and content in the Northern Alliance-based government that the US elevated into control of Afghanistan. Not only are they not happy with how we choose to protect and preserve them, but internal frictions between the various ethnic groups, tribes, families, etc that make up the Northern Alliance are increasing as well.

The one thing they can agree on, however, is that they do not want to return to a Pashtun dominated Afghanistan; and for that they will always resist seriously taking on the task of reconciliation that ISAF has left to them; or the task of conducting a Constitutional Loya Jirga that allows participation by all Afghan equity holders in both the design and benefits of said document.

This is a marriage of convenience, there is little wonder that it shows signs of strain.

[davidbfpo]

SWC missed this PRISM in December 2011 article 'War comes to Bala Morghab: a tragedy of policy and action in three parts’ and I think this is the best place for it:http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/pri...36_bessler.pdf

Noted by a non-SWC member:

Bala Morghab is a remote district within one of Afghanistan’s poorest provinces, on the border of Turkmenistan. It describes how inappropriate efforts to provide reconstruction and reform succeeded only in bringing war to the area.

The story of the Bala Morghab district of Badghis Province in 2008–2009 reveals lessons derived from the difficulties posed by the friction of coalition warfare at the tactical and operational levels, the gaps between policy and operations, the contradictions of winning hearts and minds, and the challenges of day-to-day survival. Not to engage with local leaders well in advance of policy implementation is a recipe for failure. Building trust among the local population in legitimate leaders will itself build capacity and minimize the influence of insurgents. Finally, half-measures of the whole-of-government approach in the absence of unity of purpose will fail.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to a "lurker" for this AAN article, which opens with:

It took little more than seven months to turn Faryab from a province with a worrisome security situation into a province under constant attack. Since the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab closed in September 2012, the security situation has quickly deteriorated. These days, Faryab is one of the main targets of the Taleban’s spring offensive. On the very first day of the offensive, the insurgents launched their biggest attack so far in the country, with several hundred fighters sweeping the Afghan Local Police (ALP) out of important positions in two districts. Clashes between national security forces and insurgents are continuing on a daily basis and the regular Afghan forces seem unable to make a lasting impact. AAN’s Obaid Ali updates an earlier report on a province perceived as a gateway to the north of the country and how the Taleban are targeting strategically valuable locations.

Link:http://www.aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3401

The departure of the Norwegian PRT I am sure was not the critical factor.

[Bill Moore]

Hat tip to a "lurker" for this AAN article, which opens with:

Link:http://www.aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3401

The departure of the Norwegian PRT I am sure was not the critical factor.

The introduction paragraph in bold is misleading, but the article itself is well worth the read. It clearly states the Taliban have been increasing their presence and activities in the North for the past four or so years. At the link below one can see that attacks in the North surged over 100% in most locations in 2010.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...046367482.html

I think what we're seeing reported in Northern Afghanistan is prologue for the post 2014 time frame. ALP outposts will be targeted and in many cases over run forcing security forces to become part of the Taliban or withdraw to defendable areas allowing the opposition freedom of movement throughout the country side (the Taliban will have the initiative)

The North is strategic for a lot of reasons so it shouldn't be a surprise that the Taliban want to control it. I suspect other factors driving an increase of activity in the region is increased Chinese investment (oil, minerals, etc.), and the likelihood they're paying considerable funds in protection money (Taliban tax system), which would make it a lucrative place to conduct operations.

One of the better quotes in the article in bold below that we all should heed. Bold highlights are mine.

He also drew attention to another facet of the story: to the relations between the Taleban and those who are supposed to fight them. One of his stories demonstrates the shakiness of allegiances in an environment like this and the truth of the phrase: ‘you can’t buy a commander, you can only rent him’. He told AAN about the former Taleb Mulla Maluk who joined the peace process four months ago and in return, was made ALP commander in the village of Khwaja Musa. Yet when the Taleban attacked this village during their surge in Pashtun Kot district, commander Maluk with his ten armed men surrendered his post and became Mulla Maluk once again.