The Other Side of the Mountain

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have been doing some research on tribal governments, particularly early big man systems, and their similarity to comments made by Mujaheddin leaders in "The Other Side of the Mountain" by A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau. In particular, the need to provide spoils to their followers in exchange for continued service and to maintain prestige. I am curious if other similar stories exist either from the Afghan conflict or from other conflicts.

I understand the obvious connection with criminal enterprises (subsets of the major social system) but I am looking more for incidences where larger societies or the entire cultural systems were in play.

Thanks

[Chris jM]

I am curious if other similar stories exist either from the Afghan conflict or from other conflicts.

Lawrence of Arabia's 'Seven Pillars of Wisdom' references the patronage between commander and fighters amongst the Arab forces he worked amongst. That may be worth a look.

[Dayuhan]

In particular, the need to provide spoils to their followers in exchange for continued service and to maintain prestige. I am curious if other similar stories exist either from the Afghan conflict or from other conflicts.

A bit farther afield, but you might want to look at the Tausug in the southern Philippines, a group that's often been involved in insurgency and general disorder. The description fits like a glove... it fits also in other conflict zones in the area, but the Tausug would probably be the group to start with.

[davidbfpo]

Try the campaigns in the Sahara, historically by the French -v- the Tuaregs and contemporary incidents (partly reflected in the Mali thread).

Starting point:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuareg

Steve Blair may e along, but surely the native American conflicts will have example and be recorded in English (I fear the Tuareg material will be in French).

[Bob's World]

This is a basic principle of SF engagement. Always work through and empower the local (legitimate) leadership at the populace level, and also bring in the official (though often sadly lacking in legitimacy) government that you are trying to support work through them as well as you bring these two governing structures together in the eyes of the populace through your engagement.

Too often well intended external players come in and provide development or medical support, or relief aid in a way that disempowers these local leaders, insulting or embarrassing them at best, undermining their legitimacy at worst. Or they bypass the very official government that is already struggling to earn the legitimacy of its populace, often reinforcing in the eyes of the people that their government cannot do for them basic things that others can. (Many of the MERCY operations fall in this category. Charity is great, but it is not great COIN/FID; and may actually fuel the causation of insurgency when done inartfully, regardless of pure intentions).

I saw this over and over again in my 4 years in PACOM as conventional forces executed security force assistance operations in a manner designed to build the glory of the US and their service over building the prestige and legitimacy of the people and governments they were trying to help. I saw it in Afghanistan as well.

The SF principles I describe above are what is really at the root of the village stability operations, though everyone wants to focus on the security forces that we develop first to allow this reinforcing of governance to happen. Working everything from the selection of the security force members to the nature of development and the distribution of jobs and aid through the local governance (village, tribal and religious); and then, sometimes almost literally, dragging members of the official government out of the safety of the district centers and introducing them to their populace, and enabling them to extend official governance to the governance that is legitimate, while at the same time extending legitimacy up to the government that is official.

[John T. Fishel]

Kudos, Bob! Whether SF, conventional forces conducting SFA, or civilians working development assistance, that is the only way to be successful. We have recorded those lessons since, at least, the 1950s, but except for SF, a few elements of USAID, and some NGOs we have never internalized them.

Cheers

JohnT

[TheCurmudgeon]

This is a basic principle of SF engagement. Always work through and empower the local (legitimate) leadership at the populace level, and also bring in the official (though often sadly lacking in legitimacy) government that you are trying to support work through them as well as you bring these two governing structures together in the eyes of the populace through your engagement.

Bob, thanks for explanation. I have come to dislike the word "legitimacy". I believe that in many village situations legitimacy equates directly to results. Results in feeding the people, providing basic services, and keeping the peace. Not in the "legitimate" or externally recognized ability of a government to use force to impose its authority.

Having sat in on some PACOM Theater Security Cooperation Group meetings, I understand what you are talking about. I used to think the program was a great idea, particularly as a Phase 0 operation. As an engineer I still think it can be as long as we take a much more subdued roll (get rid of the plaques on the buildings and not be present for the ribbon cutting) and use it more to make personal connections that are fostered over time.

The SF principles I describe above are what is really at the root of the village stability operations, though everyone wants to focus on the security forces that we develop first to allow this reinforcing of governance to happen. Working everything from the selection of the security force members to the nature of development and the distribution of jobs and aid through the local governance (village, tribal and religious); and then, sometimes almost literally, dragging members of the official government out of the safety of the district centers and introducing them to their populace, and enabling them to extend official governance to the governance that is legitimate, while at the same time extending legitimacy up to the government that is official.

I am going to make an assumption that the government officials tend to be urban people not used to rural village existence or familiar with their lifestyle. I am also going to assume that the villagers see them as outsiders. If these assumptions are correct, is the "dragging" them out to the villages effective? Does the visit need to coincide with some "gift" to the village. Do they meet with just the local leader(s) or with the all the principles of the village (I am assuming these to be adult males)? Is this choice a matter of specifics of the village and their economic/value system?

I may be trying to categorize something that is too complex for simple solutions -- the value systems of the people and how it affect their decisions, especially those decisions as to whom to support where an insurgency exists. There is always the "outsider" element that an external force supporting another government has to deal with but I believe it can be overcome when working in small numbers and, more importantly, working within the parameters of locals value system (which may be significantly different than the value system of the legitimate government, which might be part of the problem). If this sounds like a "duh!" to you I am sorry, I am slow and my momma dresses me funny.

[Dayuhan]

This leads to a separate question. I see the word "tribal" bantered around quite a bit but are the terms "big man" or "chiefdom" ever used? I ask this because they are significantly different systems.

"Tribal" (like "insurgency") is a pretty loose word and people use it with a lot of different meanings. I think it would be fair to say that some, though by no means all, tribal societies display "big man" or "chief" systems. Certainly these structures are not characteristic of tribal societies.

I had some old stuff on them. Interesting group because they have a history of chiefdom (sultanate).

I'd describe the Tausug (casually) as a "little big man" system. The basic armed units are small groups, rarely more than a few dozen, loosely under the control of a leader who is expected to provide for the followers. Bigger big men may accumulate several (sometimes many) such groups, but loyalties are often fragmented and both individuals and groups are likely to move wherever opportunity is greatest. This creates what have been called "minimal alliance networks", in which alliances shift constantly and money, not ideology, drives group structures. The same groups may simultaneously be involved with transnational jihadists, secessionist insurgents, national military forces, organized crime gangs, and local officials loyal only to their own interests... all of whom are simultaneously involved with all the others. It gets messy.

Thomas Kiefer has some very good work on the Tausug.

This is a basic principle of SF engagement. Always work through and empower the local (legitimate) leadership at the populace level, and also bring in the official (though often sadly lacking in legitimacy) government that you are trying to support work through them as well as you bring these two governing structures together in the eyes of the populace through your engagement.

Isn't it dangerous to speak of "the populace" when so many problems trace back to conflict among various portions of a populace with radically different - sometimes mutually exclusive - concepts of legitimacy and acceptable governance?

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan - Obviously no nation's populace is a single entity. While some are more complex than others, all have distinct segments by region, by class, by ethnicity, by religion, by political orientation, hell, even by sexual orientation. No one disputes that.

I believe the biggest obstacle to understanding insurgency (or perhaps the second, the belief that COIN is Warfare rather than a Civil Emergency may well be number one), is the belief that insurgency is caused by some disgruntled segment of the populace. Insurgency is not caused by the populace, it is caused by the government. What we focus on are the reactions of the populace to that causation.

Dr. Kilcullen speaks of an "ecosystem"; I think one way to look at insurgency that may help appreciate the role of causation is to look at insurgency instead as a solar system. The Sun as the government, and all of the planets orbiting around it separately, yet together, as "the populace." Clearly in our own solar system the Earth perceives the effects of the sun far differently than Jupiter or Mars does. Same sun, different perceptions based on a variety of environmental factors. When the sun malfunctions, every planet feels the effects though, but the effects are perceived differently by each based on their unique perspectives.

Ok, back to a Nation, lets say a complex and troubled one like the Philippines. If the government in Manila is the heart of this solar system, the "planets" of populace in Northern Luzon where I believe you live perceive its effects in certain ways; as do those in Southern Mindanao. Some find it to be "good" (Legitimate, Just, Respectful, Hopeful) others do not. The causation remains in the sun, but the reaction is in the planets, or the segments of the populace.

To become overly focused on distractors such as ideology / radicalization is to take the position that an entire planet has a form of mental disorder that prevents them from thinking correctly. That it is some condescending BS there. As my wife has had to remind me on occasion when I think she is taking something the wrong way "don't tell me how I feel." We need to stop telling segments of the populace how they should feel about their governance. That belongs to them, as does (IAW U.S. principles in our own Declaration of Independence) the right and the duty to rise up in insurgency when they feel that the government's actions are despotic, or what I would call "poor governance."

The key to COIN is not to run around from populace to populace, planet to planet if you will, trying to convince them through violence, bribes, development, security or governance that how they feel is wrong; rather we must attempt to understand how they feel, why they feel that way, and then go back to the sun, the government, the core of the problem and make our corrections there.

Another problem with our COIN doctrine is that it is premised on success being rooted in sustaining the current government. Think about that. So the Sun increases its temperature in a way that changes perception on several planets by an 10 degrees. Is it cheaper to go around to each of those planets, convince them all that hot is great, and build AC systems for everyone, etc, etc; (incredibly expensive and doomed to fail); or to simply figure out why the heat went up 10 degrees at the source, and fix that? Good COIN should be rooted in understanding the perceptions of the populace, then in fixing the source of the problem in the government.

So, when we go out to villages around Kandahar to conduct Village Stability Operations, we do not go there to "fix" those villages or with the assumption that they have a mental illness that prevents them from thinking clearly. We go in as humble visitors with a deep respect for their customs, their culture, and their concerns. We sit down with their leaders, we talk to the man on the street, we play with their children, we share their meals, and even move into (upon their approval and invitation) one of their empty structures and share their same security and living situation. To quote Steven Covey, we "seek first to understand, then to be understood."

We help organize, train and equip a local security force, that is now paid for and fully answerable to the official government back at the "sun"; but is selected by and answer first to the local governance that draws its legitimacy directly from the populace. We don't foist projects on them, but we look for opportunities to assist them with their concerns. All of this essentially makes us value-added, builds trust, but in no way resolves the insurgency, because again, the insurgent causation lies in the government.

The key step is the connecting of the official government to the local governance and people; facilitating that dialog and enabling the growth of that relationship. Teaching government how to govern, rather than forcing /bribing populaces to accept poor governance.

SF efforts are not designed to cure the larger insurgency. They are designed to address critical locations for immediate effects, and also to be a kind of governance school house to demonstrate to the government that they become more effective and security becomes more stable by changing themselves, rather than striking out to change how the people feel about them. A good solid supporting effort. Main effort must be in Kabul for true success. Just as I would argue, that the main effort in the Philippines should be in Manila, not in Mindanao. Fix the sun or get a new one. Don't run around trying to fix all of the planets.

[Steve Blair]

Try the campaigns in the Sahara, historically by the French -v- the Tuaregs and contemporary incidents (partly reflected in the Mali thread).

Starting point:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuareg

Steve Blair may e along, but surely the native American conflicts will have example and be recorded in English (I fear the Tuareg material will be in French).

Spoils within the context of Native American conflicts is a tricky subject due in no small part to the great differences that often existed at the basic cultural level between many of the Plains Tribes. In some cases spoils did play a role, and indirectly they certainly did when it came to treaty negotiations (the "presents" provided by the U.S. negotiators usually played a major role in obtaining signatures). It was more common for it to come down to leaders jockeying for position by offering the opportunity for spoils (raiding parties and the like) rather that actually distributing the spoils themselves.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Spoils within the context of Native American conflicts is a tricky subject due in no small part to the great differences that often existed at the basic cultural level between many of the Plains Tribes. In some cases spoils did play a role, and indirectly they certainly did when it came to treaty negotiations (the "presents" provided by the U.S. negotiators usually played a major role in obtaining signatures). It was more common for it to come down to leaders jockeying for position by offering the opportunity for spoils (raiding parties and the like) rather that actually distributing the spoils themselves.

This leads to a separate question. I see the word "tribal" bantered around quite a bit but are the terms "big man" or "chiefdom" ever used? I ask this because they are significantly different systems.

[Steve Blair]

This leads to a separate question. I see the word "tribal" bantered around quite a bit but are the terms "big man" or "chiefdom" ever used? I ask this because they are significantly different systems.

Within the context of native American stuff, I haven't seen them used that much. Chiefdom is on occasion, but it varies depending on the context of the tribal organization in question. The Kiowa, for example, had a pretty developed political structure and you would see "peace" and "war" chiefs existing at the same time. The amount of pull or sway they had depended on how much council support they could garner. The Southern Cheyenne had to contend with a couple of strong warrior societies (as did the Kiowa), while most Sioux groups had warrior societies but they didn't tend to act as politically as the Southern Cheyenne did (the Dog Soldiers are the best-known example).

The "big man" idea might be best applied (and even here it must be used with caution) to the Apache. Mangas Coloradas maintained his authority through force of personality and careful marriage alliances (along with successful raiding into Mexico), and that pattern was carried on by Cochise as well. There was no strong hereditary leadership structure within the Apache culture, so the "big man" was more common there than elsewhere.

[TheCurmudgeon]

A bit farther afield, but you might want to look at the Tausug in the southern Philippines, a group that's often been involved in insurgency and general disorder. The description fits like a glove... it fits also in other conflict zones in the area, but the Tausug would probably be the group to start with.

Thanks,

I had some old stuff on them. Interesting group because they have a history of chiefdom (sultanate).