Bob,

I agree with you on more levels than I care to admit but I think there are important distinctions in our political aims and the causes and potential cures of an insurgency.

Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
I believe the biggest obstacle to understanding insurgency (or perhaps the second, the belief that COIN is Warfare rather than a Civil Emergency may well be number one), is the belief that insurgency is caused by some disgruntled segment of the populace. Insurgency is not caused by the populace, it is caused by the government. What we focus on are the reactions of the populace to that causation.
I agree completely, but in Afghanistan we created the government. It is molded in our own image with limited consideration for the values of the population or their interpretation of what it means to govern or be governed. That was a policy choice. In places like the Philippines things may be different. There, helping the government learn why their population are disgruntled enough to take up arms against them is a different matter. There again, as a matter of policy, certain viable options, such as allowing a section of the country to secede, may simply be unavailable.

This alone takes me to the edge of another rabbit hole I am trying to avoid -- As executors how far do we go to influence or educate policy makers? (There are a whole series of "what if" questions that follow this but I do not want to start down that road).

Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
The key step is the connecting of the official government to the local governance and people; facilitating that dialog and enabling the growth of that relationship. Teaching government how to govern, rather than forcing /bribing populaces to accept poor governance.

SF efforts are not designed to cure the larger insurgency. They are designed to address critical locations for immediate effects, and also to be a kind of governance school house to demonstrate to the government that they become more effective and security becomes more stable by changing themselves, rather than striking out to change how the people feel about them. A good solid supporting effort. Main effort must be in Kabul for true success. Just as I would argue, that the main effort in the Philippines should be in Manila, not in Mindanao. Fix the sun or get a new one. Don't run around trying to fix all of the planets.
My interest is not in fixing the planets but in understanding them. It is also in understanding the gulf between what Kabul sees as government and what villagers see as government.

So much more to say, but my day jobs calls...