Non-Violent Insurgency: How Smart Rebels Win small wars

[Bob's World]

Actually those of us who actually are in Special Forces, and work continually with varying aspects of Insurgency, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and Counterterrorism understand that this statement is both incorrect and infeasible:

"With some sense of irony, US Special Forces once had a de-facto mission to create violent insurgencies among populations who were not dissatisfied with their Government. - and they still should if that serves US policy. "

We understand that an outsider cannot create conditions of insurgency, only the government of that populace can. You can go in a put a spin on the facts, but a populace in conditions of "good governance" is largely immune to UW efforts to organize and incite insurgency. The populace may be the fuel of insurgency, and SF guys conducting UW may be able to organize the fuel for fire and provide a spark; but if the fuel is well dampened by a healthy government-populace relationship, it will never ignite into insurgency.

No the SF mission was, and still is, to understand this dynamic, and to conduct FID in countries where the US has a relationship with the government, but where we assess the government does not have a healthy relationship with its populace. To help prevent conditions from sliding into violent insurgency if they are still at peace, or to help restore conditions of peace if violent insurgency has already erupted. Similarly to conduct UW in countries where the US does not have a relationship with a government and knows they will never be granted one, but has interests that demand such a relationship. When, and only when, conditions of insurgency exist, and usually only if organized resistance organizations already exist, it is an option to employ SF to conduct UW. That is the mission. The focus is typically on violent insurgency, but SF guys being unconventional thinkers in general, may well pick up on the fact that they can employ the same skills and tactics to incite non-violent insurgency as well. To do so creates far less risk of negative blow-back in the court of world opinion and, as history shows, is far more likely to produce the desired result.

(Wilf, I am all about waging war when war is the mission, and when one does so to do so to the nth degree; but to confuse a mission for war that is not and to wage it regardless, is a tragedy of the highest order.)

[Bob's World]

http://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/home/ec...h/web/data.zip

This is the raw data compiled for their research, and while one can argue with their conclusions based on one's general understanding of history and insurgency; once one works through the excel spreadsheet one can see the detail of analysis behind this work.

One also sees that success or failure, violent or non-violent; invariably where insurgency erupts the governing authority being challenged lacks any true standing of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the populace being governed.

Well worth taking 5-10 minutes and scrolling through.

[William F. Owen]

One also sees that success or failure, violent or non-violent; invariably where insurgency erupts the governing authority being challenged lacks any true standing of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the populace being governed.

Well when the President tells you who is legitimate and who isn't you'll have the personal opinion that matters.

If the USG says they are legitimate, - as in the Saudi Arabian Royal Family, or the Hashemite throne, then that is the policy, and your job is to kill those trying to get rid of their King, appointed to rule over them by God!

[Joske]

so how about turning this discussion around, now we are saying why a movement should choose a non-violent path over a violent one.
So what about saying how a governement could make a violent movement turn into a non-violent one.

Off course a first possibility is to force them to become non-violent by using enough force to compell them abandon violence, but violence alone might not be the most effective way to do this in some cases.

A second option might be to make use of less force, and make use of other options than the military one.
So a first step by the government side is determine which of the enemies political goals can be negotiated about and which cant, and also determining what grievances excist that cause the movement to be popular in the first place.
(in afghanistan something that cant be negotiated about might be the implementation of sharia law, but certain other demands, demands that are more important to the rank and file taliban can be adressed, im thinking about things like poverty or corruption here)

A second step might be then to encourage/create non-violent protest and adopting a policy to negotiate only with the non-violent movements and not with the violent ones, and important thing here might be to grant the non-violent movement some consessions to show that a non-violent aproach actually works. What can also be considered is actually creating protests instead of waiting for them to actually happen, a bit like agent provocateurs but then in reverse.

Another important issue is the use of force in this strategy, force might be used to isolate and demoralize a violent movement and combined with an amnesty program, maybe using converted militants to denounce violence and dicredit the violent movement and praise the non-violent one.

Off course during the creation of the actual non-violent movement the government should be carefull about separating the more moderate and acceptable ideas (which should be encouraged) and the more radical and unacceptable ideas (which should be discouraged and marginalized as much as possible).

Important to note is that the now non-violent militants are not working for the government in an attempt to gain better governance but they are still working more or less against the government and thus could potentially count on more support and they could avoid getting the label of "traitor".
Off course it is still important to prevent the non-violent movement from leaning too much towards the violent one so a bit of covert guiding by the government might be usefull.

Also important is the fact that such an aproach should be adapted to the culture, political structure, social and economical situation..etc off a certain country/area.

[Bob's World]

My president can tell me who is "official" in the eyes of our government, but the "legitimacy" I speak of, the one that is essential in assessing insurgent situations only comes from one source: the governed populace in question.

Outsiders forget, ignore, or simply do not grasp this fact to their peril. (In a parallel, but separate track, the same situation is IMO a large part of Israel's challenge. Western powers facilitated their return to Palestine and granted them "legitimacy" as a state; when in fact all we could really do is recognize their officialness. It is the strong sense that they have no legitimate right to be there that far more than religious differences, fuels the persistence of that conflict. Once they accept that Israel stands on its own two feet and they can't make them budge, I believe the violence will begin to subside. Perceptions are so deadly. I am amazed at how many believe that the US is an agent of Israel. We don't appreciate how important perceptions are, and how to best target negative perceptions and promote positive ones through action and word)

As to a soldier's duty, it is to accomplish the missions he is assigned. "How" belongs to the executor, and if the mission is UW, then certainly non-violent tactics as well as traditional violent tactics, should be on the table.

[Rex Brynen]

Once they accept that Israel stands on its own two feet and they can't make them budge, I believe the violence will begin to subside.

This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.

To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)

[Bob's World]

This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.

To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)

If those same students believed that they could prevail over the Canadian government and its security forces, but for the support of the U.S. acting as a stooge of Canada and committed to protecting them; you would have a very different situation on your hands. Probably an insurgency (and they would then make a choice as to employ violent or non-violent means to illegally challenge that government).

But in fact, I suspect they believe that while they do not like the fact that they were defeated and now a new power reigns the land of their ancestors, they know they lost and that the new victor has a legitimacy borne of his power to win to begin with and to suppress any challenger of his own capabilities.

Israel may very well be able to ward off all challengers on her own as well; but it is the perception in the minds of many Arabs that she could not that fuels the conflict. I know from my own experience with the Egyptian Army in the first Gulf War that none of the officers I spoke to had ever been defeated by the IDF. I found this to be an interesting perception then, but I am only coming to appreciate the importance of that perception now.

[jmm99]

National Command Authority policy re: "stability operations" begins with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005 (in summary of 11 pages pertinent to this discussion):

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and
foreign forces.

(emphasis added)

2005 DoDD 3000.05 was, if anything, enhanced towards emphasis on the "non-military" aspects by Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009 (a 15-page policy statement):

1. PURPOSE. This Instruction:

a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5111.1 (Reference (b)) and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)).
....
3. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Instruction, stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. ....

(emphasis added).

Both the 3000.05 Directive and Instruction have to be read in conjunction with Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, December 1, 2008, re: Irregular Warfare (IW):

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy to:

a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.

b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).

(emphasis added).

I will stop beating this horse, unless someone wants to seriously argue that the US military has not been tasked with missions that, in a Wilfian world (which I think I understand), would be tasked to "politicians in suits" - i.e., "non-military" missions.

That 3000.05 tasking (and the 3000.07 IW tasking) become rather apparent factually when we consider (as of Jun 2010) approx. 100K US military in Astan, as opposed to approx. 1K of US civilian personnel engaged in CMO.

So, COL Jones' selected topic is well within the parameters of US National Command Authority policy, which frankly for a long time has rejected the much more restrictive policies of Wilf and Brig. "Trotsky" Davies (God bless him for "I'm a soldier, not a politician") as to what the military "should do".

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Harm is done as well when soldiers confuse a civil emergency with war; simply because an overwhelmed civil government called for their assistance, there is an identifiable opponent conducting acts of violence, and because their doctrine says "COIN is war."

War is War. COIN (as talked about today) is a pseudo-science constructed by people embarrassed by their connection with instrumental political violence.

Bob's World
Are you saying,

a.) US Military Officers should study non-violent protest?
b.) Non-violent protest should be re-sourced as an instrument of US Military Power?