Non-Violent Insurgency: How Smart Rebels Win small wars

[Bob's World]

In my own work on Insurgency I have come over time to the postion that Insurgency is much more accurately a condition rooted in the perceptions of a populace towards its governance than it is any specific family of actions or organizations. How those conditions manifest is a choice made by the rebelling segments of the populace; but the causation itself is rooted in the governance. This is why one may well have several pockets of subversion and insurgency with unique views on ideology, tactics, goals, etc all orbiting about one hub of "poor governance"

The goal of this thread is to look at the relative merits of Violent vs. Non-Violent approaches on the part of the insurgent.

There is a body of work that makes a strong case for the smart insurgent (who I hope are reading this thread) to abandon violent approaches and to embrace non-violent apporaches instead. Not just because we seek greater stability and security for the populaces that are affected by the condition of insurgency, but because the U.S. stands very much for the principle of "good governance."

Governments rarely change of their own accord, and often it is necessary for the populace to force change upon their government. While current "war-based" COIN is rooted in preserving the current government and convincing the populace to stand down; suggested here is that it may well be far more effective to instead focus on encouraging those same popualces to take non-violent approaches, while at the same time encouraging those poor governances to listen to their people and evolve.

I will post a variety of products to support this premise. This is a debate that needs to take place. We have been trapped by our doctrine and definitions into narrow lanes that tend to cast violence as warfare, and all populace violence as insurgency. I hope to explore new, and more effective ways to characterize these activities as a part of this thread as well.

[Bob's World]

What is Civil Resistance?

"The waging of determined conflict by strong forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and resourceful opponents who may respond with repression."
---G. Sharp

Has this approach been applied over the past century, if so, where?

Indians, ‘20s-40s
Salvadorans, ‘44
African-Americans, ’60s
Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
Chileans, ‘85-’88
Filipinos, ‘86
East Germans, ‘89
Mongolians, ‘90
Malians, 91
Russians, ‘91
South Africans, 92
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04
Lebanese, ‘05


What are some examples of non-violent approaches to Poor Governance?

I. Nonviolent protest and persuasion
Petitions, wearing symbols, vigils, marches, humorous skits, walk-outs, renouncing honors, mock awards

II. Non-cooperation
Boycotts, strikes, social ostracism, stay-at-homes, refusal to pay taxes, civil disobedience

III. Nonviolent Intervention
Hunger strikes, sit-ins, alternative institutions, blockades


What is the track record of taking such approaches?

Study comparing 323 violent and NV campaigns, 1900-2006, found that NV campaigns succeeded 53% of the time, compared to 26% success rate for armed struggles (Stephan/Chenoweth)

Why: Participation, Pressure, Legitimacy

50/67 transitions from authoritarianism from 1970-2005 driven by bottom-up nonviolent resistance (Freedom House, How Freedom is Won)

[Joske]

Here are some thoughts i have have about this subjects and your theories about them.

-To start of one of the points of critique i have towards your insurgency model is that you view insurgency as a product of bad governance which causes people to rise up against the government.
My view on the issue is that you can distinguish a two-part struggle within an insurgency (or rebellion or whatever you want to call it).
You got the actual war or conflict part which is fought between two or more parties, whose goals or views are total opposites of each other and thus require military force so that one side can impose his will on the other party.
And then you got the part of people rising up against the government (or some other actor), and this part is formed thanks to bad governance and not thanks to opposing political views.
So essentially i view insurgency as divided between the need of a political group to impose its political views on another group who has political views who are entirely different from those of the first group.
And in this process the first group enlist the help of the populance or atleast a part of the populance by attacking the bad governance of the opposing group and promising them good governance.

-Now about the point of the Non-violent completion of political goals, what about information campaigns that can sway the opinions of the population or the international community.
here's a potential example of this kind of aproach (the palestine-israel issue is full of examples of this sort of aproach)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_(ship)
another example could be the gaza flotilla or the Al-Durrah incident, wikileaks maybe?

-a possible counterpoint is of course that you would need more popular support to conduct mass-movement prostests then you would need to conduct a guerilla/terror campaign (albeit it might not be too succesfull) and thus it might not be too popular with certain groups.

So i hope you suceeded in comprehending what i was trying to say, and i hope i made a usefull contribution to the debate.

[Bob's World]

Joske,

Excellent points, and welcome to the SWJ!

All successful insurgencies require popular support; infact I see this as one of the key distinguishing points between what I would consider true conditions of insurgency and some other "less noble" form of populace-based turmoil. A criminal movement is profit motivated, and may morph into an insurgency, but is not one in of itself. Mexico is not, I believe, yet faced with insurgency from this element. Neither is a power-based grab, a Colonel who leads his BN to the capital building and grabs power, or some group seekin to grab control of some valuable resource for the money and power it provides.

As to information, effective use of information is essential for both preventing and promoting insurgency. The actions of the party will always be their loudest "voice"; all the more reason for the insurgent to employ non-violent tactics that lend greater legitimay to their complaints and are more likely to garner support from external (official and unofficial) parties to their cause.

[Joske]

what if a non-violent aproach does not generate attention in general, why would for example the UN care about a few thousand protesters somewhere in say india, why would even the governement themselves care if it happens somewhere far away from their seat of power in an area that is inhabited by an ethnic group that is too small to hold actual political power in a democracy, people who do suffer from bad governance but who might not be able to mount a massive strike or protest march big enough to actually get enough attention to their cause. This might result in those dissafected people to see a possibility in military measures.
So what if strictly non-violent measures alone fail?
also a while ago i watched a video about a social-movement in India composed almost entirely of women and besides building schools and generaly trying to build a bit of better governance, they where also known for beating up corrupt officials.
here's the link. as it might be something interesting
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXwH-kjSUSs

also one element that seems in common in several media actions that suceeded in completing political goals, is the ability of the "winning" side to portray themselves as victims.
in this way a protest against a certain issue is more likely to achieve its goal if they are for example shot upon by the governement, because it will generate more international and internal outrage.

[Global Scout]

I think once serious study is undertaken on this important topic, we'll discover that non-violent revolution or insurgency is more dependent upon international reaction, duration (if it gets crushed quickly it won't linger in the media long enough to make a difference), the degree of popular support, and the righteousness of the cause (as viewed by the global community and the affected nation).

Tiananmen Square failed because it was quickly quashed, even after receiving considerable media attention. China didn't care about world opinion on how it managed its internal affairs, and a year later it was as though it never happened. The example in Poland is an excellent example, because the Solidarity Movement had a degree of popular support (whether or not it a majority or not can be argued, but they did mobilize politically). The Soviets did care about world opinion, so they had limited options, and the movement lasted for several months and was tied into a global network (the Catholic Church).

It works in some conditions, in others it won't stand a snow ball's chance in hell. Definitely worth the discussion, but it won't completely replace armed conflict anytime in the near future.

[jmm99]

Here are some links:

Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (2008).

David Ackers, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Does terrorism work? (23 May 2007)

Véronique Dudouet, Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries (2008)

International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) - Resource Library. This is a huge collection of books (some online), monographs and other articles, etc.

Berghof Conflict Research (BCR) - Online Handbook:

Preface & Introduction
Section I: Concepts and Cross-Cutting Challenges
Section II: Analysing Conflict and Assessing Conflict Transformation
Section III: Third-Party Tools and Capacity Building
Section IV: Structural Reforms, Institution Building and Violence Control
Section V: Recovering from War – Post-Conflict Regeneration and Reconciliation
Glossary

BCR Dialogue Series:

No 9 - Human Rights and Conflict Transformation
No 8 - Building Peace in the Absence of States
No 7 - Peacebuilding at a Crossroads?
No 6 - A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation
No 5 - Social Change and Conflict Transformation
No 4 - New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)
No 3 - Transforming War Economies
No 2 - Security Sector Reform
No 1 - Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

Bob, this may be a worthy effort; but I'd suggest you link your resources so that we can read the originals.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

What are some examples of non-violent approaches to Poor Governance?

I. Nonviolent protest and persuasion
Petitions, wearing symbols, vigils, marches, humorous skits, walk-outs, renouncing honors, mock awards

II. Non-cooperation
Boycotts, strikes, social ostracism, stay-at-homes, refusal to pay taxes, civil disobedience

III. Nonviolent Intervention
Hunger strikes, sit-ins, alternative institutions, blockades

So Small Wars Journal has turned into Small Politics Journal. No Violence? Then it is simply not a military problem. It's Campus, Town-hall politics.

Moreover, a lot of the examples used were actually under-pinned by the option to use violence, and were used in direct co-ordination with armed violence.

[davidbfpo]

Wilf,

Rarely in my knowledge has the use of violence not been preceded by a non-violent phase, notably a public statement of the campaigns aims and so this thread addresses Small Wars in its widest application. I have recently read a book on the Baader-Meinhof gang / Red Army Faction and cite that as an example.

IIRC Frank Kitson's books also covered the pre-violent phase and that the military should stay away then.

So, SPJ it maybe Wilf and no harm is being done here. We are here to discuss and learn - within limits we know well.

Another time for a response to Bob's World.

[William F. Owen]

IIRC Frank Kitson's books also covered the pre-violent phase and that the military should stay away then.

So, SPJ it maybe Wilf and no harm is being done here. We are here to discuss and learn - within limits we know well.

I concur. Politics is the only cause of war. Most politics is non-violent.
So what? We know that. Thucydides and CvC observed that a very long time ago. Soldiers set forth policy using violence. They do not create policy, and they do not seek to apply non-violent means. Ethics is politics, and distinct from personal morality.

Harm is being done IF soldiers are confusing War with Warfare, and the fact that military force is merely instrumental. If people cannot understand that then they are set on a path to their own destruction and confusion, in woolly worded pseudo science. - Something I have witnessed all too often here on SWJ. I point this out in a commitment to the spirit of learning and discussion.

As an analogy, IMO, senior UK police officers are uniquely ill-equipped and unqualified to comment on what drugs should be legal and illegal. If they comment, while in uniform, they are bluffing above their pay grade, and are possibly doing massive harm to the moral of the officers under his command. They're job is to seek to convict those selling drugs, regardless of what drugs are legal or not. Are there some silly laws? Very much.

[Bob's World]

Harm is done as well when soldiers confuse a civil emergency with war; simply because an overwhelmed civil government called for their assistance, there is an identifiable opponent conducting acts of violence, and because their doctrine says "COIN is war."

military mission + violent enemy + doctrine = war. Simple.

The problem being that a study of the history of insurgency suggests that it is not.

It is not really a military mission, it is a civil mission that the military supports, like sending soldiers to a flood or hurricane disaster site.

There it no violent "enemy," it is a small segment of a nation's own populace, supported by a much broader base of the populace than what actually takes up arms, and related by blood and friendship to an even broader base of the populace. This is like dealing with a violent spouse as opposed to dealing with a violent neighbor; the acts may look similar but the consequences are far different.

Sometimes, just sometimes, doctrine is wrong.

But all of that aside, this thread is to assess the relative merits of populaces who take up non-violent approaches to address the condition of insurgency, and how that might be more effective than those who take up violent approaches. Both are in situations where they are forced to act out illegally, violent or non-violent; or it is not insurgency, it would be as Wilf says, just politics if they can simply act legally and peacefully to affect some change of government, large or small.

But to Wilf's credit he has pointed out one excellent reason for choosing non-violent approaches to act out illegally against one's own government to affect political changes based upon perceived conditions of insurgency by the populace:

The state won't be able to so easily call it "war," to brand the organized segment of the populace as "the enemy" or "terrorists" and in turn will not be able to sick the military on them without immediately losing the battle for which side is perceived as "right" or "wrong" in the court of world opinion.

[Global Scout]

Posted by Dayuhan,

Some dictatorial regimes (eg Philippines 86) collapse before non violent resistance because they have already decayed to the point where they no longer command the loyalty of their own armed forces.

I think you hit the nail on the head, another peaceful protest would have simply been crushed by Marcus if he believed he could control the military, but he knew his military was divided and the U.S. Government gave him and Imelda a comfortable exit. He didn't have to worry facing a violent end like like Mussolini did; otherwise he made have made a different decision.

Many of the examples given as noted by Wilf are not accurrate. King's Civil Rights Movement was NOT an insurgency, it was simply a political movement working largely within the established legal framework. There was no intent to overthrow the government.

Gandhi was NOT responsible for India's independence. Serious Indian and British historians will tell you that Gandhi's civil movement had minimal impact on Britian's decision to give up India. As a matter of fact, Gandhi's movement died 10 years before the British decided to leave. Several factors influenced their decision, but the main one according to knowledgeable historians was the revolts of Indian National Army led by Bose. Although the military revolts failed, the subsequent trial of the militants exposed that Britian lost control of Sepoy's and could not count on them to maintain order in India. Furthermore, not only didn't Gandhi's movement contribute in any significant way to India's liberation, it didn't stop Britian's decision to divide India and create a separate country for the Muslims (East and West Pakistan), which led to consider slaughter on both sides (Hindu and Muslim). Since the Hindu nationalist movement wouldn't support Britian during WWII, the Brits relied on willing Indian Muslims to do so, and in return for their support they were rewarded with Pakistan (a gift that just keeps on giving).

Violence or the threat of violence has always played a key role in these movements. In the case of the Philippines the critical role of the threat of violence was mitigated because Marcus's behavior alienated much of his military. The movement started by Aquino and supported by Cardinal Sin definitely set the conditions for this to happen, but if the military remained loyal to Marcus the movement would have failed.

[Bob's World]

Violence or the threat of violence has always played a key role in these movements.

Is this not also the case with Diplomacy? With Deterrence? Is not "the threat of violence" typically the forcing function behind much of the influence that governments wield?

Do not be distracted by that fact, the point is that insurgent movements may well set conditions for success through violence; but that they ultimately achieve their aims more effectively once they switch to non-violent tactics.

I was under the impression that this site was focused primarily on not how to go out and about the globe starting and winning small wars so much as it is about effectively preventing, or when that is not possible, prevailing when confronted with the same.

Currently there is tremendous unrest in many populaces around the world. They will act out. They have a choice, to do nothing and endure the unendurable; to act out violently; or, to act out non-violently. Insurgency is the condition among the populace that makes them feel this way. Violence is merely a tactic they employ to address that condition.

The point of this thread in not just to get those out there faced with this condition of insurgency to see that they have other options than to act out illegally to address such conditions when legal options are either denied or ineffective than to go straight to violent warfare against the state. The point of this thread is also to those in the Counterinsurgency business to see that COIN is not warfare per se, but rather that it is a condition that must be addressed, not an enemy defeated or war won. At times it will become just that, a bloody affair that must be dealt with. That won't resolve the conditions of insurgency, but if the populace goes down that route they need to understand that it will not end well for them.

For those who prescribe to "protecting the populace" as the primary tenet of COIN, why not make part of your campaign being to encourage the populace to switch to non-violent tactics to address their concerns? That is going to be far more acceptable to them than accusing them of having mass mental illness through "radicalization," or simply telling them through information campaigns that they are wrong about how they feel about there government. At times it might be better to simply say "you make a good point, but you are going about it all wrong." As has been pointed out, even the hardest, most warlike insurgents have found the success they seek in making such transitions from violence to non-violence.

For parties who are outside the "family" of the populace from which both the insurgent and government rise and compete for influence over, what does it matter who prevails so long as they represent the majority of the populace and are willing to join the global community and operate reasonably within the same? Every successful insurgent becomes immediately a struggling counterinsurgent unless they evolve to providing good governance to the populace they represent. If those foreign parties are focused on stability and securing their interests in a particular region first, and who actually governs second, they will be more successful.

This is one of the largest disconnects in US COIN doctrine. It makes the presumption that success requires sustaining the current government in power. Unless that government evolves in the process, all that does is reset the conditions of failure when an insurgent organization was merely defeated militarily. Once we retire the presumptions that COIN is war, and that sustaining a poor governance in power is success, we move to the next level in dealing more effectively with such situations.

[Bob's World]

"War is war. There are varying types of warfare, but defeating an irregular enemy is rooted in some fairly well understood methods of applying military force. What we see with "counterinsurgency theory" is a collection of fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason.
If you inflict military defeat on the enemy, you remove his ability to use violence as a political instrument.
You do not out-govern the enemy. You kill him." (Posted by Wilf on a different thread).

Ok, I think this quote represents fairly Wilf's point. It is a reasonable position, and one that is widely held. You don't have to knock on too many doors at the Pentagon to find someone who thinks the best response to illegal violence is a well applied dose of legal violence in kind.

But how does that resolve the underlying condition that gave rise to that violence? Suppression of insurgency works, granted. Tito's Yugoslavia, Stalin's Russia, Saudi Arabia, to name but a few. The examples are many. But in all of these the conditions of insurgency continue to smolder and fester, and once that suppressive force is removed, tend to explode in uncontrolled violence that no one wants (Balkans, Rwanda, and on and on...)

So, if insurgency is seen not as the violent response to these conditions, but rather as the condition itself, it opens up options to both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent as how to go about best resolving the problem. The military may well be given the task of violently suppressing some insurgent group; but that will not resolve the conditions of insurgency. It never has, and it never will. Just as the state must judiciously apply violence when necessary, but most often hold it back in the form of the threat of violence to impose it's will, so must a savvy populace when faced with conditions of insurgency.

Besides, sometimes the government yields its position when faced with non-violence because they recognize it is the right thing to do for everyone involved, and the actions of the insurgent have served primarily to accelerate the timeline. They are not faced with the potential loss of face associated with yielding to violent pressure, and they also have many sane and legal voices from respected organizations around the globe that often come on line supporting the position of the non-violent insurgent as well. Bottom line is that while they could win "the final argument of kings", they realize that doing the right thing is more important than proving one is more powerful. The U.S. Civil rights movement, the collapse of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, the independence of India, etc.

I suspect there are some timelines in the Middle East that could use a bit of acceleration as well. Better that is done non-violently than through the terrorist tactics espoused by Bin Laden and his AQ organization. The sooner the populaces of the Middle East come to recognize this, the sooner they can correct the conditions that they find oppressive. Bin Laden is not an insurgent, he is waging UW to leverage the conditions of insurgency that exist in these populaces. Once those populaces believe they have better options, Bin Laden becomes moot and his movement collapses. To simply destroy Bin Laden and AQ will open the door for the next generation to step forward, and they may well achieve levels of violence that Bin Laden only dreams about. That would be a major strategic error on our part to enable that to happen.

[UrsaMaior]

What is Civil Resistance?

Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
East Germans, ‘89
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04

Could you be more specific? While in Poland there was a non-violent resistance organisation called Solidarnosc, the same cannot be said of Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. If you say there was NV resistance against communist rule it is generally true for all eastern european countries like Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania too.

OTOH serb, georgian and ukrainian movements in th 21st century were much rather political than classical resistance to oppressive systems. Same can said of the african american movement in the USA. In that sense you can add the Tea Party or Greenpeace to the above NV movemenent list.

The selected and oversimplifying knowledge and usage of history is seriously limiting the NATO's capability.

[Bob's World]

So, if a military commander is given a mission, consisting of task, purpose and commander's intent to go to a foreign land to lead a coalition effort to help resolve an insurgency, he is limited to only violent approaches to addressing the insurgent organizations; or he is somehow muddling in "policy" if, as the only expert in COIN sitting around the Cabinet table he says:

"Mr. President, our initial assessment is that the current government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of their own populace, and our intervention will not only exacerbate that condition; but because of it we will likely end up in a campaign that could take years rather than months. Also, we need to consider that we are presumably looking at this intervention as a way of reducing the risk to the United States of Terrorist attacks, but because of the same legitimacy concerns that make COIN success unlikely, this intervention is likely to cause the insurgency to direct a portion of their effort to attacks designed to break our support to the government. We should not expect those efforts to be limited to being against our combat forces in country, but could well be against civilian targets anywhere in the world.

Finally, while I fully appreciate that your predecessor handed you a "war against terrorism" as you came into office, and I have been dutifully waging that war to the best of my ability; my Special Forces strategists have pointed out that what AQ is really doing is waging a very sophisticated campaign of unconventional warfare to leverage active and latent insurgent movements in populaces across the Middle East. Getting mired too deeply in any one of those insurgencies lends a lot of credence to AQ's sales pitch, and will distract thinking, resources and effort from where they really need to be applied. Our professional military opinion is that the best application of the military is to conduct CT directly against the core of AQ leadership and toward the disruption of critical nodes of the network they employ as a non-state entity to wage this UW campaign. Coupled with this we need to conduct a holistic analysis of each of the states where the majority of foreign fighters come from, where terrorists hail from, and where we see these AQ nodes operating to conduct UW. We then need to develop a comprehensive campaign plan that addresses everything from policy, to governance, military capacity that is focused not on the presumption of maintaining any particular government in power, and not on the defeat of any particular nationalist insurgent movement, no matter how in bed with AQ they are. It must be focused on bringing the parties together and enabling a more effective dialog between the parties, while at the same time disempowering AQ in their efforts to leverage these distinct movements to their larger purpose."

"Thank you general, that makes a tremendous amount of intuitive sense, and aligns very well with the published positions of my administration for how I wish to engage the world in general, and this challenging problem in particular. Why is it just now that the Pentagon is bringing me this course of action?"

"Well, sir to be fair, this is new for all of us, and DoD focus is on deterrence and defeat of military foes. We've had to make a lot of changes to adjust to this new mission and are proud of the flexibility that we have demonstrated as an organization and the efforts we have made to attempt to address this problem over the past 9 years. But our natural tendency to be careful to avoid what might be considered as policy by some has blinded us from fully considering every aspects of a problem that extends well beyond the simple military defeat of those who take up arms against us and our allies. We're working through that though and felt that it was important that we tried to lay out the big picture for you. As always, we stand ready to execute to the best of our ability any mission you hand us, and I can have the first significant push of SOF forces on the ground in 48 hours, with the elements of three BCTs beginning to flow in 24 hours after that. Air, Space, and Naval forces are repositioning as we speak."

[Dayuhan]

In the scenario suggested, the advice proposed above would probably be quite good. It's worth noting, though, that our current insurgency issues do not derive from similar scenarios, nor does the US face any situation where we are likely to have to send combat troops to defend an allied government against insurgency.

If we want to learn the lessons we need to learn from our current engagements, we need to see them for what they are. Our COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not derive from efforts to support an allied government against insurgency, they emerged from our belief that we could remove hostile governments and replace them with governments of our design.

I certainly don't think it's a good idea, in any but the rarest case, to send forces to defend an ally against insurgency... but that's not something we're doing, or that we look likely to do in the near future: what vital US ally now faces an existential threat from insurgency? What we need to be examining is not only how we support allies threatened by insurgency, but our misguided belief that we are capable of installing governments in places where we've seen fit to remove governments that we don't like. That's a somewhat different scenario, and one that we need to confront directly.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

Granted that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are unique. But you really need to step back from some of the labels that have been placed on the problems of other allies and take a fresh perspective. Consider the following article in Foreign Policy magazine:

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/pos...unterterrorism

Now, the article talks about the relative merits of Saudi approaches to "counterterrorism" versus the more aggressive approaches used by Egypt and Algeria.

Now, all three of these countries are allies of the US; all three are major sources of foreign fighters to places like Iraq and Afghanistan to support AQ's operations; and all three have elements of AQ operating within their borders conducting UW to incite and support insurgent efforts against those governments as well as recruit members to operate as foreign fighters or to conduct special missions employing terrorist attacks directed at Western targets.

The Intel community slaps a label on these organizations of "terrorist." Then they look at the AQ affiliation and slap an additional label on them of "AQ." Then, when those national governments take actions against those organizations we slap a label on those operations of "counterterrorism."

Great, we've labeled the problem. None of that, however, changes the reality of the situation that the primary objectives of all of those organizations are nationalist and political in nature. All are latent or active insurgencies. Merely because we have labeled them otherwise does not change what they are. Merely because governments that are essentially dictatorships can employ aggressive tactics that democracies cannot to keep such movements from picking up much steam, does not change the nature of the movements themselves.

We are blinded by our labels and the inertia of our operations and policy; we are also blinded by the narrow lanes that institutions and experts define problems within.

Ask a religious scholar about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of religion.

Ask a military expert about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of threat.

Ask a terrorism expert about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of terrorism.

Ask a governance expert and he/she will cast it in terms of form of government.

Ask a human rights expert and he/she will cast it in terms of the relative merits of western values over those of the country in question.

Ask a development expert and he/she will cast it in terms of infrastructure and services.

Ask a justice expert and he/she will cast it in terms of rule of law.

I would simply offer that they are all right in part and wrong in part; and that it is in looking at all of these factors collectively in the context of historical insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (both violent and non-violent) that one begins to sort out a clearer picture.

In my professional opinion, the three countries listed are/were conducting "COIN." Now, they take a very CT approach to COIN to be sure; and that is something that has implications that we really need to think about and appreciate more fully as we determine how to best help these allies move forward toward stability in a manner that does not increase the likelihood of acts of terrorism being directed against us in turn.