What is US policy ?
National Command Authority policy re: "stability operations" begins with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005 (in summary of 11 pages pertinent to this discussion):
(emphasis added)3. DEFINITIONS
3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.
3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.
4. POLICY
It is DoD policy that:
4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.
4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and
foreign forces.
2005 DoDD 3000.05 was, if anything, enhanced towards emphasis on the "non-military" aspects by Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009 (a 15-page policy statement):
(emphasis added).1. PURPOSE. This Instruction:
a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5111.1 (Reference (b)) and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)).
....
3. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Instruction, stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:
a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. ....
Both the 3000.05 Directive and Instruction have to be read in conjunction with Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, December 1, 2008, re: Irregular Warfare (IW):
(emphasis added).4. POLICY. It is DoD policy to:
a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.
b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).
I will stop beating this horse, unless someone wants to seriously argue that the US military has not been tasked with missions that, in a Wilfian world (which I think I understand), would be tasked to "politicians in suits" - i.e., "non-military" missions.
That 3000.05 tasking (and the 3000.07 IW tasking) become rather apparent factually when we consider (as of Jun 2010) approx. 100K US military in Astan, as opposed to approx. 1K of US civilian personnel engaged in CMO.
So, COL Jones' selected topic is well within the parameters of US National Command Authority policy, which frankly for a long time has rejected the much more restrictive policies of Wilf and Brig. "Trotsky" Davies (God bless him for "I'm a soldier, not a politician") as to what the military "should do".
Regards
Mike
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