Non-Violent Insurgency: How Smart Rebels Win small wars

[William F. Owen]

If you inflict military defeat on the enemy, you remove his ability to use violence as a political instrument.
You do not out-govern the enemy. You kill him." (Posted by Wilf on a different thread).

Correct. This is an immutable verity.

But how does that resolve the underlying condition that gave rise to that violence? Suppression of insurgency works, granted.

None of your business. The underlying causes of an insurgency are utterly irrelevant to you. As a US Army officer, it is absolutely above your pay grade and not your job to address these problems.- quite the opposite! You are an instrument of US Government Policy. You are not there to make the world a better place. Your job is to make the US President the most powerful man in the world, if that's what he wants.
You are their to lay the hard hand of war on who he tells you. He has other people to do the non-violent parts of diplomacy.

With some sense of irony, US Special Forces once had a de-facto mission to create violent insurgencies amongst populations who were not dissatisfied with their Government. - and they still should if that serves US policy.

[Bob's World]

Harm is done as well when soldiers confuse a civil emergency with war; simply because an overwhelmed civil government called for their assistance, there is an identifiable opponent conducting acts of violence, and because their doctrine says "COIN is war."

military mission + violent enemy + doctrine = war. Simple.

The problem being that a study of the history of insurgency suggests that it is not.

It is not really a military mission, it is a civil mission that the military supports, like sending soldiers to a flood or hurricane disaster site.

There it no violent "enemy," it is a small segment of a nation's own populace, supported by a much broader base of the populace than what actually takes up arms, and related by blood and friendship to an even broader base of the populace. This is like dealing with a violent spouse as opposed to dealing with a violent neighbor; the acts may look similar but the consequences are far different.

Sometimes, just sometimes, doctrine is wrong.

But all of that aside, this thread is to assess the relative merits of populaces who take up non-violent approaches to address the condition of insurgency, and how that might be more effective than those who take up violent approaches. Both are in situations where they are forced to act out illegally, violent or non-violent; or it is not insurgency, it would be as Wilf says, just politics if they can simply act legally and peacefully to affect some change of government, large or small.

But to Wilf's credit he has pointed out one excellent reason for choosing non-violent approaches to act out illegally against one's own government to affect political changes based upon perceived conditions of insurgency by the populace:

The state won't be able to so easily call it "war," to brand the organized segment of the populace as "the enemy" or "terrorists" and in turn will not be able to sick the military on them without immediately losing the battle for which side is perceived as "right" or "wrong" in the court of world opinion.

[Bob's World]

Actually those of us who actually are in Special Forces, and work continually with varying aspects of Insurgency, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and Counterterrorism understand that this statement is both incorrect and infeasible:

"With some sense of irony, US Special Forces once had a de-facto mission to create violent insurgencies among populations who were not dissatisfied with their Government. - and they still should if that serves US policy. "

We understand that an outsider cannot create conditions of insurgency, only the government of that populace can. You can go in a put a spin on the facts, but a populace in conditions of "good governance" is largely immune to UW efforts to organize and incite insurgency. The populace may be the fuel of insurgency, and SF guys conducting UW may be able to organize the fuel for fire and provide a spark; but if the fuel is well dampened by a healthy government-populace relationship, it will never ignite into insurgency.

No the SF mission was, and still is, to understand this dynamic, and to conduct FID in countries where the US has a relationship with the government, but where we assess the government does not have a healthy relationship with its populace. To help prevent conditions from sliding into violent insurgency if they are still at peace, or to help restore conditions of peace if violent insurgency has already erupted. Similarly to conduct UW in countries where the US does not have a relationship with a government and knows they will never be granted one, but has interests that demand such a relationship. When, and only when, conditions of insurgency exist, and usually only if organized resistance organizations already exist, it is an option to employ SF to conduct UW. That is the mission. The focus is typically on violent insurgency, but SF guys being unconventional thinkers in general, may well pick up on the fact that they can employ the same skills and tactics to incite non-violent insurgency as well. To do so creates far less risk of negative blow-back in the court of world opinion and, as history shows, is far more likely to produce the desired result.

(Wilf, I am all about waging war when war is the mission, and when one does so to do so to the nth degree; but to confuse a mission for war that is not and to wage it regardless, is a tragedy of the highest order.)

[Bob's World]

http://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/home/ec...h/web/data.zip

This is the raw data compiled for their research, and while one can argue with their conclusions based on one's general understanding of history and insurgency; once one works through the excel spreadsheet one can see the detail of analysis behind this work.

One also sees that success or failure, violent or non-violent; invariably where insurgency erupts the governing authority being challenged lacks any true standing of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the populace being governed.

Well worth taking 5-10 minutes and scrolling through.

[William F. Owen]

Harm is done as well when soldiers confuse a civil emergency with war; simply because an overwhelmed civil government called for their assistance, there is an identifiable opponent conducting acts of violence, and because their doctrine says "COIN is war."

War is War. COIN (as talked about today) is a pseudo-science constructed by people embarrassed by their connection with instrumental political violence.

Bob's World
Are you saying,

a.) US Military Officers should study non-violent protest?
b.) Non-violent protest should be re-sourced as an instrument of US Military Power?

[William F. Owen]

One also sees that success or failure, violent or non-violent; invariably where insurgency erupts the governing authority being challenged lacks any true standing of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the populace being governed.

Well when the President tells you who is legitimate and who isn't you'll have the personal opinion that matters.

If the USG says they are legitimate, - as in the Saudi Arabian Royal Family, or the Hashemite throne, then that is the policy, and your job is to kill those trying to get rid of their King, appointed to rule over them by God!

[Joske]

so how about turning this discussion around, now we are saying why a movement should choose a non-violent path over a violent one.
So what about saying how a governement could make a violent movement turn into a non-violent one.

Off course a first possibility is to force them to become non-violent by using enough force to compell them abandon violence, but violence alone might not be the most effective way to do this in some cases.

A second option might be to make use of less force, and make use of other options than the military one.
So a first step by the government side is determine which of the enemies political goals can be negotiated about and which cant, and also determining what grievances excist that cause the movement to be popular in the first place.
(in afghanistan something that cant be negotiated about might be the implementation of sharia law, but certain other demands, demands that are more important to the rank and file taliban can be adressed, im thinking about things like poverty or corruption here)

A second step might be then to encourage/create non-violent protest and adopting a policy to negotiate only with the non-violent movements and not with the violent ones, and important thing here might be to grant the non-violent movement some consessions to show that a non-violent aproach actually works. What can also be considered is actually creating protests instead of waiting for them to actually happen, a bit like agent provocateurs but then in reverse.

Another important issue is the use of force in this strategy, force might be used to isolate and demoralize a violent movement and combined with an amnesty program, maybe using converted militants to denounce violence and dicredit the violent movement and praise the non-violent one.

Off course during the creation of the actual non-violent movement the government should be carefull about separating the more moderate and acceptable ideas (which should be encouraged) and the more radical and unacceptable ideas (which should be discouraged and marginalized as much as possible).

Important to note is that the now non-violent militants are not working for the government in an attempt to gain better governance but they are still working more or less against the government and thus could potentially count on more support and they could avoid getting the label of "traitor".
Off course it is still important to prevent the non-violent movement from leaning too much towards the violent one so a bit of covert guiding by the government might be usefull.

Also important is the fact that such an aproach should be adapted to the culture, political structure, social and economical situation..etc off a certain country/area.

[Bob's World]

My president can tell me who is "official" in the eyes of our government, but the "legitimacy" I speak of, the one that is essential in assessing insurgent situations only comes from one source: the governed populace in question.

Outsiders forget, ignore, or simply do not grasp this fact to their peril. (In a parallel, but separate track, the same situation is IMO a large part of Israel's challenge. Western powers facilitated their return to Palestine and granted them "legitimacy" as a state; when in fact all we could really do is recognize their officialness. It is the strong sense that they have no legitimate right to be there that far more than religious differences, fuels the persistence of that conflict. Once they accept that Israel stands on its own two feet and they can't make them budge, I believe the violence will begin to subside. Perceptions are so deadly. I am amazed at how many believe that the US is an agent of Israel. We don't appreciate how important perceptions are, and how to best target negative perceptions and promote positive ones through action and word)

As to a soldier's duty, it is to accomplish the missions he is assigned. "How" belongs to the executor, and if the mission is UW, then certainly non-violent tactics as well as traditional violent tactics, should be on the table.

[Rex Brynen]

Once they accept that Israel stands on its own two feet and they can't make them budge, I believe the violence will begin to subside.

This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.

To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)

[Bob's World]

This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.

To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)

If those same students believed that they could prevail over the Canadian government and its security forces, but for the support of the U.S. acting as a stooge of Canada and committed to protecting them; you would have a very different situation on your hands. Probably an insurgency (and they would then make a choice as to employ violent or non-violent means to illegally challenge that government).

But in fact, I suspect they believe that while they do not like the fact that they were defeated and now a new power reigns the land of their ancestors, they know they lost and that the new victor has a legitimacy borne of his power to win to begin with and to suppress any challenger of his own capabilities.

Israel may very well be able to ward off all challengers on her own as well; but it is the perception in the minds of many Arabs that she could not that fuels the conflict. I know from my own experience with the Egyptian Army in the first Gulf War that none of the officers I spoke to had ever been defeated by the IDF. I found this to be an interesting perception then, but I am only coming to appreciate the importance of that perception now.

[jmm99]

National Command Authority policy re: "stability operations" begins with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005 (in summary of 11 pages pertinent to this discussion):

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and
foreign forces.

(emphasis added)

2005 DoDD 3000.05 was, if anything, enhanced towards emphasis on the "non-military" aspects by Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009 (a 15-page policy statement):

1. PURPOSE. This Instruction:

a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5111.1 (Reference (b)) and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)).
....
3. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Instruction, stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. ....

(emphasis added).

Both the 3000.05 Directive and Instruction have to be read in conjunction with Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, December 1, 2008, re: Irregular Warfare (IW):

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy to:

a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.

b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).

(emphasis added).

I will stop beating this horse, unless someone wants to seriously argue that the US military has not been tasked with missions that, in a Wilfian world (which I think I understand), would be tasked to "politicians in suits" - i.e., "non-military" missions.

That 3000.05 tasking (and the 3000.07 IW tasking) become rather apparent factually when we consider (as of Jun 2010) approx. 100K US military in Astan, as opposed to approx. 1K of US civilian personnel engaged in CMO.

So, COL Jones' selected topic is well within the parameters of US National Command Authority policy, which frankly for a long time has rejected the much more restrictive policies of Wilf and Brig. "Trotsky" Davies (God bless him for "I'm a soldier, not a politician") as to what the military "should do".

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

So, COL Jones' selected topic is well within the parameters of US National Command Authority policy, which frankly for a long time has rejected the much more restrictive policies of Wilf and Brig. "Trotsky" Davies (God bless him for "I'm a soldier, not a politician") as to what the military "should do".

Sorry, but this fundamentally misrepresents the issue. War is Politics. Col Jones should be very aware of the Politics, and use force in line with a Political objectives. He is told what the policy is, he does not get to decide.

...Col Jones does not hold elected office, and cannot know what is legitimate or ethical beyond his personal morality. He can have opinions, but his opinions are always irrelevant, in this context.

Ethics and legitimacy are subjective and emotional views based on a political view point. No entity on the planet has a political view they know or feel to be unethical or illegitimate.! - which is why we need war!

The US Army is told what is ethical and legitimate by the US Government. An Army is a political instrument, (as Mao pointed out) not a maker of policy. It is utterly irrelevant as to whether the policy comes from a King, a dictator or an "elected President."

Good soldiers can take any policy and set it forth, within the limits of strategy and tactics. - which is why the words are usually connected in this form!

Non-violence? Wake me up when they start being violent. You don't call the Fire service because your someone might be smoking in bed, or playing with matches.

[Bob's World]

I'm just wondering who is talking about setting policy?

All this thread is about is the (very sound) concept that "insurgency" is really a condition within a populace that can manifest itself in a couple of equally illegal ways when legal means of addressing such governmental changes are either not available or not effective (As is the case, by the way, in most of the Muslim countries where AQ conducts UW and where foreign fighters hail from)

1. It can be in the classic violent way, that is really waging war against the state. Typically states respond in kind by waging war back. Got it. I would recommend to my boss, as a member of the portion of the military that he has tasked to focus on such events, that waging war back is not the best way to manage our interests and present him options. That seeing COIN more as military support to civil authorities dealing with an overwhelming civil emergency is smarter than seeing it as war and putting the military in charge. I would also advise him not to see intervention operations as "COIN" as that creates a presumption of preserving the current government, which may make the results he seeks unfeasible in any reasonable period of time. That is not mucking around in policy, that is doing due diligence as a professional. As is saluting, and moving out smartly once the boss makes a decision.

2. The other way the populace can act out illegally when legal means ("politics") are either denied or ineffective is through non-violent tactics. This is what Dr.s Stephan and Chenoweth's work focuses on. Their research matches up with my far less sophisticated perception, that these tactics are historically more effective for a wide range of reasons that they explore.

A branch line of discussion off of this is for those who work the UW mission. UW typically focuses on fomenting and supporting violent insurgency. This is what AQ has been doing. If AQ were smarter they would pursue non-violent tactics. If we were smarter we would be a whole lot less focused on countering AQ and a whole lot more focused on addressing the underlying condition of insurgency that they are targeting, and then out-competing them for influence with those same populaces but with the promotion of non-violent tactics.

If history is any measure, then AQ ultimately will either evolve (though they have way too much blood on their hands to ever be accepted into the official political society, so they have really rendered themselves immaterial in the long run) or be replaced by a smarter, more sophisticated, more politically savvy organization that also conducts UW, but with the promotion of non-violent tactics as their approach, coupled with broader diplomatic efforts. Then our allies will be in real trouble.

[Dayuhan]

A number of thoughts on the topic…

First, I completely agree that insurgency is almost always rooted in popular disaffection stemming from perceptions of bad governance. I do not agree that popular disaffection stemming from perceptions of bad governance is necessarily insurgency, unless we expand the definition of insurgency to a point beyond any utility. I think it would be more accurate to say that insurgency is one of a number of actions that disaffected populaces use to address perceptions of bad governance. For example: before the last US election there was certainly a widespread disaffection among the American populace and a widespread perception of bad governance. Into the merits of this perception it is not here necessary to inquire, it suffices it to say that it existed. The response to this perception was to vote the other party into power. I do not see that this can usefully be called insurgency. I suspect that it’s more useful to say that popular disaffection may be expressed in legal political action, illegal but non-violent political action, and illegal armed action. I would only refer to the last of these as “insurgency”. I also suspect that the course adopted by any given political opposition is less a conscious choice than a reaction to the specific circumstances involved.

The apparent effectiveness of non-violent vs violent resistance assumes that a direct comparison is relevant. I’m not sure that it always is. I suspect that one reason for the high success rate of non-violent resistance is that these movements tend to rise as a government reaches a state of terminal decline. They often do not come about when a resistance movement makes a conscious decision to follow a non-violent path. The beginnings of a “color revolution” may be quite tentative, small rallies and small actions undertaken by fringe groups. If a broader populace sees that government is unable to effectively respond, and that security forces are not able to muster an effectively repressive response, the movement snowballs and the masses hit the streets. Really broad scale mass resistance is so effective because it doesn’t happen until the populace perceives that the Government is no longer able to effectively suppress it.

This is something we need to remember before we go about encouraging people to embrace non-violent resistance. If we do this at a time when government has full control of its security apparatus and has the ability to effectively suppress the movement, we may very well be encouraging people to undertake actions that are essentially suicidal. One might well ask what business we have encouraging people to rise against their governments (or for that matter to support their governments) in any event… in any but the rarest cases, it’s not our business, nor is it something we should be messing with.

I think it’s a wild oversimplification to assume that resistance movements simply sit down and make a decision about what sort of tactics they will adopt. These situations emerge as responses to conditions, and the tactics any given movement adopts are largely dictated by its circumstances, the location, commitment, and capacity of its support base, and the type of government it faces. Location is key. Nonviolent “color revolutions” may involve a very small percentage of the populace, but they can succeed with that if that portion is located in the capital, where they have the capacity to directly challenge government on its own turf under the eye of the media. A disaffected rural population spread over a wide area will have a much more difficult time making these tactics work: they simply can’t muster enough people in any one place and at any one time to get noticed fast enough, and it’s much easier for government to crack down on them before anyone takes notice. The same conditions that make a rural support base conducive to violent insurgency make it not conducive to non violent resistance.

While I think it’s accurate to say that insurgency requires a disaffected and angry populace, I don’t think it’s accurate to say that an insurgent movement necessarily represents or speaks for the disaffected populace. We often see the leadership of insurgent movements being co-opted by third party movements seeking to leverage that discontent for their own purposes, which may be quite disconnected from the interests or desires of the populace. While it is important to challenge these insurgencies by addressing the issues causing disaffection, it is not necessarily accurate to conclude that the agenda of the formal insurgent group is necessarily the agenda of the populace, or that the groups in question speak for the populace in any negotiation.

Bin Laden is not an insurgent, he is waging UW to leverage the conditions of insurgency that exist in these populaces. Once those populaces believe they have better options, Bin Laden becomes moot and his movement collapses.

It’s worth noting that the only “insurgencies” from which bin Laden has gained meaningful leverage were those that involved foreign occupation of Muslim countries: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts to inspire insurgencies against Muslim governments have so far been abject failures: populaces in many of these countries may not be enchanted by their own governments, but they show no evident desire to be ruled by bin Laden or anyone like him. Certainly he can rally support, financing, and followers, as long as he’s fighting foreign occupiers, but only then. This of course is why he needed so badly to goad the US into attacking and occupying Muslim territory: without an invader, there was simply no demand for the sort of jihad Osama offers.

I am not at all sure why so many Americans seem to feel that we have a growing problem with insurgency, or that we need to develop all sorts of new and better ways of countering insurgency. As far as I can see the only reason we're dealing with insurgency today is that we've adopted policies that are almost guaranteed to provoke insurgency. If we had refrained from trying to install governments in other countries, we wouldn't have to be fighting insurgencies. Maybe we need to think less about how to fight insurgencies and more about how to stay out of situations that require us to fight insurgencies.

[Granite_State]

Many on here have probably read T.X. Hammes' book, I thought the comparison between the success of the (largely non-violent) First Intifada with the failure of the bloody Al-Aqsa Intifada was the best section.

[jmm99]

from Wilf
The US Army is told what is ethical and legitimate by the US Government. An Army is a political instrument, (as Mao pointed out) not a maker of policy. It is utterly irrelevant as to whether the policy comes from a King, a dictator or an "elected President."

Good soldiers can take any policy and set it forth, within the limits of strategy and tactics. - which is why the words are usually connected in this form!

DoDD 3000.05 and 3000.07 are USG policy.

What do you do (as a USA COL) when ordered to execute that policy in a project that is outside the limits of military strategy and tactics ?

Perhaps, "Wake me up when they start being violent" would be accepted by your superiors, but I doubt it.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

Sorry, but this fundamentally misrepresents the issue. War is Politics. Col Jones should be very aware of the Politics, and use force in line with a Political objectives. He is told what the policy is, he does not get to decide.

What issue is being misrepresented? This forum isn't a military unit executing policy, it's a place for open discussion of all aspects of small wars, including policy and how it might be adjusted to make our current sort of military engagement, which might reasonably be thought ill advised on many levels, might be avoided in the future.

I've no doubt that when Col Jones and the other serving members of the military that post here put on uniforms and go to work, they execute policy to the best of their ability. If they come here in their spare time, why shouldn't they also discuss policy? A lifetime of executing policies, often less than intelligent ones, surely provides a sufficient background for relevant comment on policy, on a personal if not a professional basis.

As for speaking above the pay grade, there aren't any pay grades here. To the best of my knowledge, nobody's getting paid to post here (if anyone is, please let me know how to get in on that racket). In this place we're not executing or making or influencing policy, we're just a bunch of people talking about matters of mutual interest. I often don't agree with Col Jones, but I see no reason why he should refrain from discussing any subject within the rules of the forum.

[Global Scout]

Dayuhan,

Fully concur with your last post, and even agree with many of COL Jone's ideas, but I do have a rub. There are discussions on policy that should be identified as such to avoid confusion (and unintended insult). Too often the posts sound like the poster is accusing the military for policy decisions, and imply if the military would only implement this policy everybody could live in perfect harmony.

Recommendations for policy makers and recommendations for Soldiers asked to achieve the policy objectives are two separate discussions, and while I agree both should be discussed here by all who desire, even those of us in uniform, we need to better clarify when are discussing TTPs for achieving the given policy, and when we're discussing policy itself. Many of COL Jone's inputs are directed at the policy, not the military units involved in achieving the policy objectives, yet they read like the military developed the policy and the military needs to change it. He obviously knows that isn't the case, he is an experienced strategic planner, but his posts often read like the Bde or Bn Commander needs to change their political policies.

Just a simple change in writing style would alleviate much of the confusion.

[Dayuhan]

We should share the case with Wilf and the Col, the problems of the world might get solved. Or possibly not, but the effort would amuse.

Recommendations for policy makers and recommendations for Soldiers asked to achieve the policy objectives are two separate discussions, and while I agree both should be discussed here by all who desire, even those of us in uniform, we need to better clarify when are discussing TTPs for achieving the given policy, and when we're discussing policy itself. Many of COL Jone's inputs are directed at the policy, not the military units involved in achieving the policy objectives, yet they read like the military developed the policy and the military needs to change it. He obviously knows that isn't the case, he is an experienced strategic planner, but his posts often read like the Bde or Bn Commander needs to change their political policies.

I might be guilty of that myself at times; I tend to speak about policy more than about military matters. That's partly because i have no military background and have studied and observed policy a bit; it's also because I suspect that much of the difficulty now faced by our strategists and tacticians emanates from problems on the policy level. There are limits to what strategy and tactics can achieve in pursuit of policy goals that are vacuous, impractical, or uncertain.

[UrsaMaior]

What is Civil Resistance?

Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
East Germans, ‘89
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04

Could you be more specific? While in Poland there was a non-violent resistance organisation called Solidarnosc, the same cannot be said of Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. If you say there was NV resistance against communist rule it is generally true for all eastern european countries like Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania too.

OTOH serb, georgian and ukrainian movements in th 21st century were much rather political than classical resistance to oppressive systems. Same can said of the african american movement in the USA. In that sense you can add the Tea Party or Greenpeace to the above NV movemenent list.

The selected and oversimplifying knowledge and usage of history is seriously limiting the NATO's capability.