Non-Violent Insurgency: How Smart Rebels Win small wars

[Bob's World]

So, if a military commander is given a mission, consisting of task, purpose and commander's intent to go to a foreign land to lead a coalition effort to help resolve an insurgency, he is limited to only violent approaches to addressing the insurgent organizations; or he is somehow muddling in "policy" if, as the only expert in COIN sitting around the Cabinet table he says:

"Mr. President, our initial assessment is that the current government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of their own populace, and our intervention will not only exacerbate that condition; but because of it we will likely end up in a campaign that could take years rather than months. Also, we need to consider that we are presumably looking at this intervention as a way of reducing the risk to the United States of Terrorist attacks, but because of the same legitimacy concerns that make COIN success unlikely, this intervention is likely to cause the insurgency to direct a portion of their effort to attacks designed to break our support to the government. We should not expect those efforts to be limited to being against our combat forces in country, but could well be against civilian targets anywhere in the world.

Finally, while I fully appreciate that your predecessor handed you a "war against terrorism" as you came into office, and I have been dutifully waging that war to the best of my ability; my Special Forces strategists have pointed out that what AQ is really doing is waging a very sophisticated campaign of unconventional warfare to leverage active and latent insurgent movements in populaces across the Middle East. Getting mired too deeply in any one of those insurgencies lends a lot of credence to AQ's sales pitch, and will distract thinking, resources and effort from where they really need to be applied. Our professional military opinion is that the best application of the military is to conduct CT directly against the core of AQ leadership and toward the disruption of critical nodes of the network they employ as a non-state entity to wage this UW campaign. Coupled with this we need to conduct a holistic analysis of each of the states where the majority of foreign fighters come from, where terrorists hail from, and where we see these AQ nodes operating to conduct UW. We then need to develop a comprehensive campaign plan that addresses everything from policy, to governance, military capacity that is focused not on the presumption of maintaining any particular government in power, and not on the defeat of any particular nationalist insurgent movement, no matter how in bed with AQ they are. It must be focused on bringing the parties together and enabling a more effective dialog between the parties, while at the same time disempowering AQ in their efforts to leverage these distinct movements to their larger purpose."

"Thank you general, that makes a tremendous amount of intuitive sense, and aligns very well with the published positions of my administration for how I wish to engage the world in general, and this challenging problem in particular. Why is it just now that the Pentagon is bringing me this course of action?"

"Well, sir to be fair, this is new for all of us, and DoD focus is on deterrence and defeat of military foes. We've had to make a lot of changes to adjust to this new mission and are proud of the flexibility that we have demonstrated as an organization and the efforts we have made to attempt to address this problem over the past 9 years. But our natural tendency to be careful to avoid what might be considered as policy by some has blinded us from fully considering every aspects of a problem that extends well beyond the simple military defeat of those who take up arms against us and our allies. We're working through that though and felt that it was important that we tried to lay out the big picture for you. As always, we stand ready to execute to the best of our ability any mission you hand us, and I can have the first significant push of SOF forces on the ground in 48 hours, with the elements of three BCTs beginning to flow in 24 hours after that. Air, Space, and Naval forces are repositioning as we speak."

[Dayuhan]

In the scenario suggested, the advice proposed above would probably be quite good. It's worth noting, though, that our current insurgency issues do not derive from similar scenarios, nor does the US face any situation where we are likely to have to send combat troops to defend an allied government against insurgency.

If we want to learn the lessons we need to learn from our current engagements, we need to see them for what they are. Our COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not derive from efforts to support an allied government against insurgency, they emerged from our belief that we could remove hostile governments and replace them with governments of our design.

I certainly don't think it's a good idea, in any but the rarest case, to send forces to defend an ally against insurgency... but that's not something we're doing, or that we look likely to do in the near future: what vital US ally now faces an existential threat from insurgency? What we need to be examining is not only how we support allies threatened by insurgency, but our misguided belief that we are capable of installing governments in places where we've seen fit to remove governments that we don't like. That's a somewhat different scenario, and one that we need to confront directly.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

Granted that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are unique. But you really need to step back from some of the labels that have been placed on the problems of other allies and take a fresh perspective. Consider the following article in Foreign Policy magazine:

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/pos...unterterrorism

Now, the article talks about the relative merits of Saudi approaches to "counterterrorism" versus the more aggressive approaches used by Egypt and Algeria.

Now, all three of these countries are allies of the US; all three are major sources of foreign fighters to places like Iraq and Afghanistan to support AQ's operations; and all three have elements of AQ operating within their borders conducting UW to incite and support insurgent efforts against those governments as well as recruit members to operate as foreign fighters or to conduct special missions employing terrorist attacks directed at Western targets.

The Intel community slaps a label on these organizations of "terrorist." Then they look at the AQ affiliation and slap an additional label on them of "AQ." Then, when those national governments take actions against those organizations we slap a label on those operations of "counterterrorism."

Great, we've labeled the problem. None of that, however, changes the reality of the situation that the primary objectives of all of those organizations are nationalist and political in nature. All are latent or active insurgencies. Merely because we have labeled them otherwise does not change what they are. Merely because governments that are essentially dictatorships can employ aggressive tactics that democracies cannot to keep such movements from picking up much steam, does not change the nature of the movements themselves.

We are blinded by our labels and the inertia of our operations and policy; we are also blinded by the narrow lanes that institutions and experts define problems within.

Ask a religious scholar about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of religion.

Ask a military expert about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of threat.

Ask a terrorism expert about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of terrorism.

Ask a governance expert and he/she will cast it in terms of form of government.

Ask a human rights expert and he/she will cast it in terms of the relative merits of western values over those of the country in question.

Ask a development expert and he/she will cast it in terms of infrastructure and services.

Ask a justice expert and he/she will cast it in terms of rule of law.

I would simply offer that they are all right in part and wrong in part; and that it is in looking at all of these factors collectively in the context of historical insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (both violent and non-violent) that one begins to sort out a clearer picture.

In my professional opinion, the three countries listed are/were conducting "COIN." Now, they take a very CT approach to COIN to be sure; and that is something that has implications that we really need to think about and appreciate more fully as we determine how to best help these allies move forward toward stability in a manner that does not increase the likelihood of acts of terrorism being directed against us in turn.

[Global Scout]

Posted by Bob's World,

"Mr. President, our initial assessment is that the current government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of their own populace, and our intervention will not only exacerbate that condition; but because of it we will likely end up in a campaign that could take years rather than months.

Great advice that I hope the Secretary of State shares with the President, and I hope the CJCS concurs with her.

CJCS with SECDEF's concurance says to the President, "Sir, based on the Secretary's assessment I think the military role should be----------------------------, in order to achieve your political objectives. There are several risks that we'll face with this approach, and if the State Department fails to achieve its objectives of course the military will be left holding the bag, and then America will be looking for a military solution for a non military problem. I recommend we go back to the drawing board sir, and design a plan that minimizes our risk of getting stuck in a quagmire that will drain our miliary resources and increase our risk elsewhere in the world."

[Bob's World]

Yes, "it takes a village..."

[jmm99]

I've mentioned the Davies-Hoxha conversation more than once, but haven't quoted it in full. That classic quote seems appropriate here because it summarizes both sides of the debate re: in what activities a soldier should engage - and in what activities a soldier should not.

The time and place were WWII Albania. The characters were Brig. Edmund "Trotsky" Davies (SOE mission chief) and Enver Hoxha (then a leader of a communist resistence group). The conversation as reported by Davies (via Robert Asprey, War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla In History, p.545):

At his first conference with the Communist leader [Hoxha], he [Davies] refused Hoxha's request to review the present world political situation:

....Enver said, very pointedly, "The military situation depends entirely on the poltical situation, so why will you not first give us your impression of world politics.

I replied, "Because I am a soldier and not a politician" [35]

35. Brigadier Davies, Illyrian Venture - The Story of the British Military Mission to Enemy-Occupied Albania 1943-1944 (London: Bodley Head, 1952)

Of course, Hoxha went on to become Albania's Supremo; and Davies went on to be captured by the Germans.

Everyone here probably has different ideas about how much (if any) soldiers should become involved in the political side (non-violent) efforts in an armed conflict, on-going or threatened on the horizon. We could (and probably will) argue until the cows come home about the "correct" warmth of the porridge.

My very limited, but I think important, point is that the US (via DoDDs 3000.05 and 3000.07; and many other doctrinal publications) has moved away from the Davies position and toward the Hoxha position. One can also argue whether that movement is or is not wise.

However, if one accepts that it has occured (as the current policy pronouncements require, IMO), then the question becomes what to do with it. COL Jones has his own approaches; others (including me) have somewhat different approaches (but still using the military as an integral part of the political struggle).

Regards

Mike

PS: I've toyed with writing my own brief for POTUS, but they all end with my being fired.

[Dayuhan]

In my professional opinion, the three countries listed are/were conducting "COIN." Now, they take a very CT approach to COIN to be sure; and that is something that has implications that we really need to think about and appreciate more fully as we determine how to best help these allies move forward toward stability in a manner that does not increase the likelihood of acts of terrorism being directed against us in turn.

Certainly these countries have their own internal problems. Whether or not those problems constitute "insurgency" depends largely on how we define "insurgency". Whatever we call them, though, how are their problems our business? Why should we be meddling in their internal issues? What benefit would we get from telling them what we think they should do, and what would the likely consequences be... even in the unlikely event that the governments in question followed or even considered our advice?

Mucking about in other people's problems has not worked out terribly well for us in the past, not have I any reason to suspect that it will in the future. Certainly if these governments were asking us to send troops to defend them from insurgents it would become our business... but they aren't, nor are they likely to.

To get back to the example you gave above... I think there's something missing. The advice your hypothetical general gives to the hypothetical President is reasonable enough. What's not dealt with, though, is the absolute certainty that if a US President is considering sending troops to fight an insurgency somewhere, there must be some US interest at stake, and that interest must be perceived as vital. We are not going to send troops anywhere, or consider doing so, simply because an ally is threatened by insurgents. So when the hypothetical President weighs your advice, he will have to weigh it as part of an equation that also includes some American interest that is specific and immediate enough to warrant the expense and risk of deploying troops. How it would weigh out would of course depend on what that interest is, but we can't usefully imagine the situation without including elements that would necessarily be a powerful influence on whatever decision is being made.

[William F. Owen]

What issue is being misrepresented? This forum isn't a military unit executing policy, it's a place for open discussion of all aspects of small wars, including policy and how it might be adjusted to make our current sort of military engagement, which might reasonably be thought ill advised on many levels, might be avoided in the future.

Agree. But we have to differentiate between Policy and Strategy. That was my point. Discussion here often fails to differentiate the two, in a useful way.
Policy is not a plan. It's an objective. Strategy has to conform to policy, until it has cycled through tactics, which bear on the policy.

As for speaking above the pay grade, there aren't any pay grades here. To the best of my knowledge, nobody's getting paid to post here (if anyone is, please let me know how to get in on that racket).

Poor use of metaphor on my part.

[Bob's World]

I may have started this thread before most people were ready to look at such events with an open mind.

[Infanteer]

I've been coming back to your theories and the various critiques from time to time. I'll have to go through this thread again. I take it the bump was in response to situations in the Middle East?

Although I think you're apt to not allow walls to be built between politics, governance, violence and war, sometimes I find that the definition of insurgency gets stretched to the point of uselessness. We shouldn't let the similarities between political opposition in Egypt and say Afghanistan override the key differences. The Egyptians did not resort to violent, organized resistence to seize some form of political power - if they did, we could lump it into an insurgency.

When we keep the definition focused on armed resistance against the state (which we know is only part of spectrum of political opposition to governance) we keep it rooted on a portion most of us of a professional stake in.

When we let "insurgency" expand to the point where it takes up non-violent opposition to governance and beyond - and likewise consider counterinsurgency to be simply "good governance" - it ceases being useful. "Counterinsurgency" and "good governance" should not be confused; counterinsurgency doesn't always require good governance and good goverance doesn't always require counterinsurgency.

I think it is better to keep insurgency relagated to the specific context I mentioned above. I don't see value in expanding the realm of counterinsurgency and insurgency into situations like the alderman addressing the fact that I'm pissed off because my property taxes got raised and they won't extend garbage removal to my house.

[Infanteer]

When I look back through the thread, I say stuff that has already been said - apologies for the necro-parrot. However, this is a fundamental stumbling block I hit when trying to work through your ideas.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Infanteer,

When we keep the definition focused on armed resistance against the state (which we know is only part of spectrum of political opposition to governance) we keep it rooted on a portion most of us of a professional stake in.

When we let "insurgency" expand to the point where it takes up non-violent opposition to governance and beyond - and likewise consider counterinsurgency to be simply "good governance" - it ceases being useful. "Counterinsurgency" and "good governance" should not be confused; counterinsurgency doesn't always require good governance and good goverance doesn't always require counterinsurgency.

I agree with you for the most part, but non-violent movements have been part of many insurgencies (although I hate the term you can call it another line of operation). Sometimes they didn't know they were tools of the insurgents, but it was basically active PSYOP to create the perception that the government was illegimate to create doubt and hopefully reduce external support to the government. Especially effective if the government overreacts to these movements.

Bob is taking considerable liberty with definitions, but I think it is helpful. Are we going to develop strategy and doctrine for a particular set of tactics (insurgency), or are we going to develop a strategy that clearly identifies the desired strategic end state regardless of the tactics being employed, and then employ the talent of the Whole of Government as appropriate to achieve our objectives?

I'm not sold on Bob's expansion of the term insurgency and counterinsurgency, but on the other hand I'm beginning to see less utility for those terms to begin with.

[Dayuhan]

I may have started this thread before most people were ready to look at such events with an open mind.

Disagreement doesn't necessarily indicate closed minds. Quite the opposite, I'd think.

Looking back over the thread I can't think of anything I'd say differently.

Really important to recognize that this sort of mass-based non-violent action does not just take place because popular discontent has risen to critical mass. It also happens because the capacity of the Government to suppress popular action has been reduced, often because the coercive apparatus of the State refuses orders to act against the populace. Non violent action is so successful precisely because it doesn't gather impetus until the populace recognizes that the State no longer has the capacity to suppress it. In many ways this is how a Government dies of natural causes.

I'm all for non-violent change. The thought of the US - or anyone - trying to promote or encourage non-violent change, though, is a good deal more doubtful. If you start pushing mass action while a Government still has the capacity to crack down you're likely to send people out to die.

As is so often the case, just because a certain type of development is often positive doesn't mean that outside parties should be going out and trying to promote it.

Looking around at mass actions of this sort also suggests that this sort of action is often not the result of a conscious strategic choice by established opposition groups. In many cases (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the CPP/NPA in the Philippines) are caught by surprise and left behind when spontaneous mass actions emerge in spite of them.

[Bob's World]

I admit I take liberties with the current definition of insurgency. I do this for a variety of valid reasons:

1. The current definition demands the presence of violence, and sees insurgency as a form of war and warfare.

2. The current definition of COIN is written from the perspective of an intervening colonial military.

3. The focus on violent internal challenges to the state, regardless of purpose, leads to conflation of true insurgency with similar, but very different conditions, such as piracy, organized crime, civil war, etc. Each has a unique nature that demands a different category of engagement for best enduring effect. All, however, can be temporarily suppressed by brute military force.

4. The current definition of insurgency does not differentiate between one's role in their own country versus one's role intervening in some other country.

This is just off the top of my head, but these points go to the fine nuances that differentiate between success and victory.

I had the pleasure to attend the Rand COIN conference last week, and enjoyed a presentation by Dr. McCormick that was built upon his "Diamond" Insurgency model, but onto which he had applied a couple of new concepts. His proposal was that some situations are "State Heavy," where all of the conditions are in the favor of the state, so no insurgency has much chance. The Insurgent must "play uphill." Some are "Insurgent Heavy," where opposite conditions exist, and the State must "play uphill." Most are somewhere in between, where the insurgent and state compete until either the insurgent or the state reach the other's "break point."

Layered onto this is the perspective that the insurgent "must grow to win"; but that initially there is actually a sense of balance as the State "can hit, but cannot see"; whereas the Insurgent "can see, but cannot hit."

Good discussion, with Dr.'s John Gordon, Ahmed Hashim, Steve Metz and Peter Chalk all on the board.

As I listened, it struck me as to the similarities and difference of how Gordon and I look at insurgency. We both look for the commonalities in the pursuit of simple solutions to complex problems. At that point we then bifurcate, where Gordon's Diamond then lays out a clean model of "What" the dynamic of insurgency is between the State, the Populace, the insurgent, and the International actor; my model is more focused on the "why" of the interactions of these same actors.

This brings me to this point on why I think "violence" is such a poor defining characteristic for insurgency.

As Gordon was describing a "State Heavy" situation, I was thinking "Saudi Arabia and these many other Arab allies where such high conditions of insurgency exist, but any action is suppressed by the state so completely that no one dare act out." The example he gave, however, was Norway. A place where the populace is so content in their governance that no serious movement could possibly take root to begin with. This is the difference between a situation where there are high conditions of insurgency and the state must exert control (verb) and a state where there are low conditions of insurgency and the state enjoys control (noun) of the populace. One state spends its energy controlling the populace and spends little effort on the other essential elements of good governance. The other states are those who are so focused on providing good governance that little energy is required to "control" the populace's behavior.

On my model I have a space for those populaces where there are high conditions of insurgency, but no actual insurgency exists. Either the populace is effectively suppressed from action out by the state, or they have opted to employ non-violent tactics. (In such a situation our doctrine only recognizes the situation as insurgency once the populace decides both to act out AND to do so violently.)

Taking into account the velocity and acceleration from suppressed stability to the achievement of the government breaking point in Tunisia and Egypt, the concept that struck me was that of "Potential Energy." Where high conditions of insurgency exist, based upon the populaces perceptions of the poor governance (IAW my model), but where the state acts aggressive to compress and suppress that populace into submission, it creates a tremendous potential energy for rapid and powerful acceleration and velocity of popular action. Once ignited, these dynamic explode, and on Egypt's case, can achieve the government break point before the populace even has time to organize any true leadership organization to lead the movement (yes, the Muslim Brotherhood was there, but they were caught just as flat-footed as Mubarak, and did not cause or lead events there. They will however exploit to their purposes if allowed to).

Power = Force x Speed. When the potential energy is great enough it generates explosive speed, which can overcome previously overwhelming government force.

Of note, the state of insurgency in both Egypt and Tunisia still plot in the same place on my model. Nothing has been done yet to address the conditions of insurgency, so the plot is still far to the right, in Phase II "Strategic Stalemate". The only difference is that the populace has morphed from being "suppressed" to acting "non-violently". Such a movement can move quickly straight up into violence by the tactical choice of either the state or the populace. Moving the dynamic to the left, and into Phase 0 "peace/pre-insurgency" will take much time and government effort focused on the right aspects of governance. Focus must be on goodness over effectiveness to move the plot to the left.

This shows the plot for Afghanistan. Many of our Sunni Allies plot directly below this in the suppressed/non-violent category.

[Infanteer]

I agree with you for the most part, but non-violent movements have been part of many insurgencies (although I hate the term you can call it another line of operation). Sometimes they didn't know they were tools of the insurgents, but it was basically active PSYOP to create the perception that the government was illegimate to create doubt and hopefully reduce external support to the government. Especially effective if the government overreacts to these movements.

Maybe we stumble when we view insurgency as independant "thing" - "insurgencies have this" or "insurgencies do that". Perhaps it is more useful to conceptulize insurgency as another "tool" or (I hate the term as well) "line of operation". "Non-violent resistance" and "Insurgency" ("violent resistance"?) are tools that groups of people opposed to the government use to achieve their aims?

As for Bob's post, I read through it twice. I wish to digest it further before comment.

[jcustis]

We may split hairs over tools and framework, but wow, a lot of the current boing-on would have never registered with me as likely to happen.

Libya with reports of 40-50 shot dead by security forces.
Bahrain with reports of several killed dead in clashes with security forces, and the key terrain of the traffic circle seized again by the protesters.
Egypt at a low, slow simmer that has everyone watching...

What's next, and what the US does to try to steer the situation to an outcome that favors, will be terribly important, but I wonder just how important the five years after 2011 are in the minds of the people trying to forge a plan...and policy. The old ways of looking at things just a year ago seem to be changing at the rate of the microchip.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,

At that point we then bifurcate, where Gordon's Diamond then lays out a clean model of "What" the dynamic of insurgency is between the State, the Populace, the insurgent, and the International actor; my model is more focused on the "why" of the interactions of these same actors.

I think the Diamond Model definitely addresses why, it is assumed that any practicioner would conduct analysis to determine the why before he or she determines what strategy to implement. This post indicates he is addressing the why to me, the bold and underlined portion (I added) represent the why:

As Gordon was describing a "State Heavy" situation, I was thinking "Saudi Arabia and these many other Arab allies where such high conditions of insurgency exist, but any action is suppressed by the state so completely that no one dare act out." The example he gave, however, was Norway. A place where the populace is so content in their governance that no serious movement could possibly take root to begin with.

The diamond model makes sense to me, and I think it could be a unifying vision from the strategic to the tactical (something we don't have in Afghanistan). I have stared at your model for awhile and it isn't clear to me; however, what you wrote makes perfect sense, but in my opinion it isn't well represented in your graphic.

Posted by Infanteer,

Perhaps it is more useful to conceptulize insurgency as another "tool" or (I hate the term as well) "line of operation". "Non-violent resistance" and "Insurgency" ("violent resistance"?) are tools that groups of people opposed to the government use to achieve their aims?

I think that is very well put, and further defines why I'm opposed to our rigid doctrine (separate discussion on the blog). It frequently prevents us from becoming a learning organization. We're to quick to jump into mission analysis to solve a perceived problem (often defined by doctrine) than conducting the prerequisite analysis to truly define the problem.

I think Bob's World is evolving his thoughts into a coherent argument (after months of BW post bashing) now. There is a significant so what in his arguments that needs to be captured somehow. It doesn't necessarily fit into our curent doctrinal construct, but it needs to.

[Bob's World]

Bill, the part you highlighted was my assessment of why Gordon picked Norway, not a rationale that he offered. I want to be clear and not imply that any of my ideas are his.

But I agree, that his model is clean and helpful. It is a start point for identifying who the players are, and how they interact. I think the additional concepts he added were helpful as well. I was fortunate to host Gordon in Kandahar last year for a week or so, and had some great conversations.

Worth adding here is that he shared three kinds of wins:

1. A "Weak Win," where one side "breaks" the other side but fails to control the populace space.

2. A "Strong Win," where one breaks the other side and also gains control of the populace space.

3. A "Complete Win" where one breaks the other side, controls the populace space, and also addresses the issues of causation within the populace.

Afghanistan was probably a "Weak Win" in running the Taliban out. Sri Lanka is probably a "strong win", the insurgent is crushed, the government has access to the space, but has done nothing to address the underlying causation. On my model they crushed the problem straight down and now have it suppressed.

[Dayuhan]

On my model I have a space for those populaces where there are high conditions of insurgency, but no actual insurgency exists. Either the populace is effectively suppressed from action out by the state, or they have opted to employ non-violent tactics. (In such a situation our doctrine only recognizes the situation as insurgency once the populace decides both to act out AND to do so violently.)

One thing to watch out for here is the tendency to define "conditions of insurgency" in Western terms that emphasize democracy and liberty. In much of the world populaces are willing to trade off liberty for security and prosperity, and a government that provides security and prosperity is able to get away with conditions that might easily spark revolt where poverty is higher.

The absence of violent resistance to Government in places like China and Saudi Arabia is not simply a function of suppression: that's a facile explanation that fits the model, but it's not adequate or accurate. The Saudis are no more free than they were during the oil glut and attendant economic crisis, but they are a lot more prosperous, and popular dissent has declined accordingly. China's economic boom has done a great deal to mute dissent. In both cases, despite political conditions that would drive an American to revolt, large-scale populace resistance to government is not likely to happen unless a significant economic upheaval arrives.

Fear is a powerful motivator. When people are financially secure they have something to lose. If they fear that the collapse of the established order is likely to produce conflict and insecurity and to threaten what they have, they may opt to support the established order despite its drawbacks. In much of the Arabian Gulf common citizens support their governments not because they love them, but because they fear chaos more than they fear tyranny.

Not the only factors in play, of course, but factors that have to be considered.

Rigidity of doctrine is always a mistake, and any time we fit circumstances into doctrine rather than adjusting doctrine to fit circumstances we are doing ourselves harm. The old rigid doctrine deserves to be challenged, but replacing it with equally rigid and equally absolutist ideas would be a mistake, IMO.

We may split hairs over tools and framework, but wow, a lot of the current boing-on would have never registered with me as likely to happen.

Libya with reports of 40-50 shot dead by security forces.
Bahrain with reports of several killed dead in clashes with security forces, and the key terrain of the traffic circle seized again by the protesters.
Egypt at a low, slow simmer that has everyone watching...

What's next, and what the US does to try to steer the situation to an outcome that favors, will be terribly important, but I wonder just how important the five years after 2011 are in the minds of the people trying to forge a plan...and policy. The old ways of looking at things just a year ago seem to be changing at the rate of the microchip.

I wouldn't have called any of it "unlikely"... all of these (with the possible exception of Bahrain) were clearly unstable situations with high potential for rapid change. The timing of course is never predictable, and the rapid sequence of near-simultaneous outbursts does come across as a surprise. If any one of these countries saw a popular uprising it would not come as any special surprise, I think... they all had it coming.

Steering the situation to an outcome that favors requires a good assessment of interest. I hope we take a long-term view and try to foster real independence, even if it means dealing with people we're uncomfortable with and dealing with governments that perceive their interests as diverging from ours. I think, for example, that it would be a very bad idea for us to push openly or covertly for exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from governance in Egypt.

I suspect that the next 5 years will be very difficult ones in Tunisia and Egypt. It would be lovely to see a clean transition to democracy and prosperity, but it's not likely to be so easy.

[jcustis]

Steering the situation to an outcome that favors requires a good assessment of interest. I hope we take a long-term view and try to foster real independence, even if it means dealing with people we're uncomfortable with and dealing with governments that perceive their interests as diverging from ours. I think, for example, that it would be a very bad idea for us to push openly or covertly for exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from governance in Egypt.

This is precisely what I fear, that we won't have a long-term view that expands past the next sound byte.That's where wide misjudgments will be made...and the rest will be armchair hindsight.