Back to Basics…The Lost Art of Basic Combat Fundamentals

[Pete]

S.L.A. Marshall was definately a mixed blessing -- the firepower ratios he put in his book Men Against Fire were based upon his interviews with troops in the Normandy beachead who were relatively green at the time, but his statistic was probably a case of him exaggerating the problem to make a point that he believed was true.

I've never been in a firefight, but it seems to me that after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.

My last battalion commander in Germany in '81 said S.L.A. Marshall in Vietnam was a politician. Hackworth wrote something to the same effect. Marshall's books about WW II had turned him into a minor celebrity at Fort Benning and he milked it for all it was worth in his later life.

[Ken White]

...after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.

First, not an Officer's job -- they're supposed to be doing more important things like figuring out what to do next. Plus there are not enough of them around to provide 'instructions' to the Troops who should be too dispersed for even their Squad Leaders to really control their fire. Officers who try to interject themselves into the brouhaha often do as much harm as good and are not doing what they get paid for. So do some poorly trained NCOS do a bit of damage in that effort...

METT-TC of course applies.

The theory is -- and the doctrine says -- that the NCOs will control the fire. That is sometimes possible and it even happens occasionally. More often, there is an initial free for all and Joe has to KNOW what to do and nobody controls anything very well. The flaw is that only after he gets to a decent unit will someone possibly teach him what to do. Or he can partake of two or three firefights and figure out most of it. If he goes to a poor unit, no one will teach him and as the institution did not do it, he'll have a rough couple of fights initially. My estimate is that about half or more of the Troops did not really know how to react until they'd been in fights. Used to be that most didn't understand all they know about what they were doing. May be better now but I wouldn't bet on it...

Good units train on it and work at it and get a good system of individual fire discipline and control operating; the poor ones never do. There are a lot of poor units out there, thus the reputation of the US Army and Marines for being trigger happy. I enjoyed watching units from both organizations fire at each other a lot of places in the world. Fortunately, the fire was usually so poorly aimed that only rarely did anyone get hurt...

We simply do not train as well as we should. Our training and much of our doctrine is residual from WW I with a WW II overlay. The lessons of Korea and Viet Nam -- and Afghanistan and Iraq thus far -- are not allowed to move the Ark of the Covenant that is "mobilization of a big Army oriented training." Even though we don't have that large an Army...

[jmm99]

on this:

from Pete
If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.

but I do have a little vignette from Bill Lyman's history of the 1/117-30ID which illustrates Pete's point (.. "it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on..."). The "take charge PFC" is probably something that Ken and other combat vets here have seen more than once.

The tactical situation is from 2 Oct 1944 (breach of the Siegfried Line, where C-1/117 was the tip of the spear), which I described in this post, Mathematical models & reality, in another thread. While Charlie (and an attached HMG platoon of Dog) were the spear's tip, that tip was blunted by accurate German arty and mortar fires. The net result was that Charlie (coy +) sustained about 50% TOE casualties and its attack stalled out at the little river and railroad just West of the pillboxes.

The two platoon leaders (1 Johnson & 3 Stanley) at the river and railroad tracks managed to reorganize what was left of their units (27 soldiers) - 2 & 4 (weapons) platoons were knocked out of immediate action. Meanwhile, Baker was swinging South to attack the north flank of C's pillboxes and Able was advancing to join Charlie in a direct assault. The options for Charlie 1 & 3 were to sit and wait for the other two companies, or do something.

At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.

Heavy shell fire continued pouring on the depleted Company C platoons on the railroad track. The units were also receiving crossfire from two machine gun nests, one situated in the 119th sector at the right flank and the other close to the nearest pillbox at the left front.

In this situation, a First Platoon man performed in an exceptionally heroic manner. Private First Class Frank C. Brakefield asked Lieutenant Johnson, "Why don't we go up and take that pillbox where the machine gun fire's coming from?" The lieutenant explained that the platoon did not have enough men and equipment and also there was no way of knocking out the MG in the 119th's area.

"Somebody's got to get that pillbox," Brakefield persisted. Lieutenant Johnson continued to explain the folly of attempting it and pointed out that the outfit already had more than enough casualties for the day.

Despite the continued discouragement, Brakefield borrowed an extra grenade, wished everyone luck, and proceeded forward alone. Initially, he ran across the railroad track and paused for a moment in a trench there. Then he dashed out in the open and raced a couple of hundred yards to the pillbox. He threw a grenade in the embrasure, rushed to the rear door and found the structure empty !

He went back outside and, from a covered position, wiped out the MG nest that had been giving trouble. Inspired by Brakefield's action, the rest of the platoon moved up to the pillbox. Soon someone noticed fire coming from what appeared to be a barn nearby. Spearheaded by the indomitable Brakefield, a group moved forward to eliminate the fire and found the barn to be a camoflaged pillbox. It was captured with a combination of grenade and rifle fire and a number of prisoners were taken.

Now, all of this was only a small part of the 1/117th's attack on 2 Oct 1944; and it is quite possible that Able and Baker would have still breached the pillbox line, even if the remnants of Charlie 1 & 3 had huddled at the RR track. What we know is not the possible speculation, but the actual reality.

The net result (via Bill Lyman):

The First Battalion's assault on the Siegfried was exceedingly significant. Curlew was the only lead battalion in the division to accomplish its mission the first day. The outfit cracked the Westwall for the entire XIX Corps.

Cheers

Mike

[JMA]

on this:

[snip]

At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.

[snip]

Cheers
Mike

In my experience there are those more predisposed to bravery/gallantry/valour in battle.

He may have be offered the opportunity to display this as a 18 year old private soldier or as a 20 something young officer or maybe even as a hairy ass'ed sergeant in his 30's.

Seldom are these exceptional guys predictable and often it is that moment of action they carry out that is critical to the success of the battle.

Another thing is the emotional calmness of such actions (as I have noticed them)... just calmly rises up and does the business then settles back calmly into his normal position as if nothing has happened.