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Thread: Back to Basics…The Lost Art of Basic Combat Fundamentals

  1. #61
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    A guy I went to OCS with was in an Air Defense Artillery unit in Vietnam. He said the only time he was under fire was when the VC hit his base one night, and that he fired his M16 blind from the top of the berm. An actual percentage of the number of guys who might do that is hard to say, just like S.L.A. Marshall's assertions about the number of men who didn't fire their rifles. When non-Infantry types suddenly find themselves unexpectedly in combat odd things happen, like Jessica Lynch's Ordnance unit in 2003.

  2. #62
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Yep, I've noticed that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    ...When non-Infantry types suddenly find themselves unexpectedly in combat odd things happen, like Jessica Lynch's Ordnance unit in 2003.
    One of our many training flaws -- thankfully, that one's been fixed at least a bit for the kids today.

    Marshall was full of more BS than Ferdinand. Met him once, nice enough guy but none of his books stand close scrutiny.

  3. #63
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    S.L.A. Marshall was definately a mixed blessing -- the firepower ratios he put in his book Men Against Fire were based upon his interviews with troops in the Normandy beachead who were relatively green at the time, but his statistic was probably a case of him exaggerating the problem to make a point that he believed was true.

    I've never been in a firefight, but it seems to me that after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.

    My last battalion commander in Germany in '81 said S.L.A. Marshall in Vietnam was a politician. Hackworth wrote something to the same effect. Marshall's books about WW II had turned him into a minor celebrity at Fort Benning and he milked it for all it was worth in his later life.
    Last edited by Pete; 09-05-2010 at 01:16 AM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That's the theory -- and it's dangerously wrong

    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    ...after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.
    First, not an Officer's job -- they're supposed to be doing more important things like figuring out what to do next. Plus there are not enough of them around to provide 'instructions' to the Troops who should be too dispersed for even their Squad Leaders to really control their fire. Officers who try to interject themselves into the brouhaha often do as much harm as good and are not doing what they get paid for. So do some poorly trained NCOS do a bit of damage in that effort...

    METT-TC of course applies.

    The theory is -- and the doctrine says -- that the NCOs will control the fire. That is sometimes possible and it even happens occasionally. More often, there is an initial free for all and Joe has to KNOW what to do and nobody controls anything very well. The flaw is that only after he gets to a decent unit will someone possibly teach him what to do. Or he can partake of two or three firefights and figure out most of it. If he goes to a poor unit, no one will teach him and as the institution did not do it, he'll have a rough couple of fights initially. My estimate is that about half or more of the Troops did not really know how to react until they'd been in fights. Used to be that most didn't understand all they know about what they were doing. May be better now but I wouldn't bet on it...

    Good units train on it and work at it and get a good system of individual fire discipline and control operating; the poor ones never do. There are a lot of poor units out there, thus the reputation of the US Army and Marines for being trigger happy. I enjoyed watching units from both organizations fire at each other a lot of places in the world. Fortunately, the fire was usually so poorly aimed that only rarely did anyone get hurt...

    We simply do not train as well as we should. Our training and much of our doctrine is residual from WW I with a WW II overlay. The lessons of Korea and Viet Nam -- and Afghanistan and Iraq thus far -- are not allowed to move the Ark of the Covenant that is "mobilization of a big Army oriented training." Even though we don't have that large an Army...

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    Default I can't personally attest or improve ...

    on this:

    from Pete
    If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.
    but I do have a little vignette from Bill Lyman's history of the 1/117-30ID which illustrates Pete's point (.. "it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on..."). The "take charge PFC" is probably something that Ken and other combat vets here have seen more than once.

    The tactical situation is from 2 Oct 1944 (breach of the Siegfried Line, where C-1/117 was the tip of the spear), which I described in this post, Mathematical models & reality, in another thread. While Charlie (and an attached HMG platoon of Dog) were the spear's tip, that tip was blunted by accurate German arty and mortar fires. The net result was that Charlie (coy +) sustained about 50% TOE casualties and its attack stalled out at the little river and railroad just West of the pillboxes.

    The two platoon leaders (1 Johnson & 3 Stanley) at the river and railroad tracks managed to reorganize what was left of their units (27 soldiers) - 2 & 4 (weapons) platoons were knocked out of immediate action. Meanwhile, Baker was swinging South to attack the north flank of C's pillboxes and Able was advancing to join Charlie in a direct assault. The options for Charlie 1 & 3 were to sit and wait for the other two companies, or do something.

    At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.

    Heavy shell fire continued pouring on the depleted Company C platoons on the railroad track. The units were also receiving crossfire from two machine gun nests, one situated in the 119th sector at the right flank and the other close to the nearest pillbox at the left front.

    In this situation, a First Platoon man performed in an exceptionally heroic manner. Private First Class Frank C. Brakefield asked Lieutenant Johnson, "Why don't we go up and take that pillbox where the machine gun fire's coming from?" The lieutenant explained that the platoon did not have enough men and equipment and also there was no way of knocking out the MG in the 119th's area.

    "Somebody's got to get that pillbox," Brakefield persisted. Lieutenant Johnson continued to explain the folly of attempting it and pointed out that the outfit already had more than enough casualties for the day.

    Despite the continued discouragement, Brakefield borrowed an extra grenade, wished everyone luck, and proceeded forward alone. Initially, he ran across the railroad track and paused for a moment in a trench there. Then he dashed out in the open and raced a couple of hundred yards to the pillbox. He threw a grenade in the embrasure, rushed to the rear door and found the structure empty !

    He went back outside and, from a covered position, wiped out the MG nest that had been giving trouble. Inspired by Brakefield's action, the rest of the platoon moved up to the pillbox. Soon someone noticed fire coming from what appeared to be a barn nearby. Spearheaded by the indomitable Brakefield, a group moved forward to eliminate the fire and found the barn to be a camoflaged pillbox. It was captured with a combination of grenade and rifle fire and a number of prisoners were taken.
    Now, all of this was only a small part of the 1/117th's attack on 2 Oct 1944; and it is quite possible that Able and Baker would have still breached the pillbox line, even if the remnants of Charlie 1 & 3 had huddled at the RR track. What we know is not the possible speculation, but the actual reality.

    The net result (via Bill Lyman):

    The First Battalion's assault on the Siegfried was exceedingly significant. Curlew was the only lead battalion in the division to accomplish its mission the first day. The outfit cracked the Westwall for the entire XIX Corps.
    Cheers

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 09-05-2010 at 06:39 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    on this:

    [snip]

    At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.

    [snip]

    Cheers
    Mike
    In my experience there are those more predisposed to bravery/gallantry/valour in battle.

    He may have be offered the opportunity to display this as a 18 year old private soldier or as a 20 something young officer or maybe even as a hairy ass'ed sergeant in his 30's.

    Seldom are these exceptional guys predictable and often it is that moment of action they carry out that is critical to the success of the battle.

    Another thing is the emotional calmness of such actions (as I have noticed them)... just calmly rises up and does the business then settles back calmly into his normal position as if nothing has happened.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    One of our many training flaws -- thankfully, that one's been fixed at least a bit for the kids today.

    Marshall was full of more BS than Ferdinand. Met him once, nice enough guy but none of his books stand close scrutiny.
    In the 70's there were some of us out here in the colonies who read SLA Marshall and others. His Men against fire: the problem of battle command has some text preview on google books. Importantly in terms of this thread. The Inroduction by Russel W Glenn does deal with some of the "issues" relating to Marshall's sample size and methodology but the fact remains that his book has some merit.

    I read it and found that there were (other) areas in the book where my military experience led me to agree with what he wrote. There were others which did not resonate. I found the book useful.

    Now may I suggest that for a person without any war or combat experience the book may lead to some confusion or at worst the (unwitting) adoption of positions which in fact be wrong. I would therefore caution people with no personal frame of reference to dig too deeply into that book.

    All that said I accept that whatever the accuracy of what Marshall published about soldiers not firing their weapons in contact or as he said:

    ... I mean that 75% will not fire or will not persist in firing against the enemy and his works...
    So we see that no matter how poor Marshall's methodology was he has been unfairly criticised by people who have seized upon only half of what he said (that being that soldiers don't fire their weapons).

    The issue of the US soldier not firing seems to have been put to bed by Marshall himself (which his critics seem to have missed) as reported in this piece:

    Marshall himself visited Vietnam to conduct studies similar to those done during World War II and later emulated in Korea. He concluded that much had changed since those earlier conflicts and that it was not unusual for close to 100 percent of American infantrymen to engage the adversary during firefights in Vietnam.
    Can we move on from Marshall now please?

    Now I submit the question is what % of infantry soldiers fire aimed shots that the enemy or the likely positions the enemy are likely to be?

    There is the type of firing into likely cover where the enemy may be or in response to a fire control order being given. In the case of the former we refined the skill through the Drake shoot - firing aimed shots into likely cover at an unseen enemy. (For the record on the Drake/Cover shoot see at the end below)

    Now exactly how many of the soldiers actually fired aimed shots then and in combat situations I can't tell. What I do know is that where such prophylactic fire was used by a sweep line as it advanced we were seldom surprised by a gook popping up out of nowhere.

    This I submit is the easy part. Shooting at likely positions where unseen enemy may be. Perhaps there is a lot of blind firing in the general direction of the enemy as firing the weapon is expected and makes one feel good.

    Another factor is that this "feel good" firing of weapons could be the reason why it appears that so much more ammo is expended per kill these days.

    The next one is where the soldier actually sees the enemy. I accept that it is natural for a human to hesitate before firing on another human. How does one train for this?

    It is said that this comes with combat experience. So why then do modern armies continue to send raw troops into battle when there are other options?

    For the lack of military studies to hand look at this FBI study In it of the 54 agents killed they found:
    Only 8% of partner officers returned fire
    85% failed to fire their weapon
    I appreciate we need more info and context from each example of the FBI study but the point is made that the military needs to find a way to ensure that soldiers will instinctively use their weapons against both seen and unseen enemy without hesitation.

    Drake/Cover Shoot. A Major David Drake joined the Rhodesian Army in the late 60's from the Brit Army (he had served in Korea). It was he who dug the Cover Shoot out of the fieldcraft manual (I think) and refined it into what became known as the Drake Shoot in Rhodesia. The shoot went something like this. A section of recruits were each issued 10 rounds of ammo. They were arranged on a firing point looking at a treed and bushy rise. They were then instructed that there were enemy hiding out there and that they should fire at where they thought the enemy might be. Once all the ammo had been fired off instructors took off into the range area and exposed a number of figure 12 targets and counted the hits. It was normal that there would be few if any hits and if there were then they would be high up on the target. The instructor would then explain the need to 1) fire low and 2) carefully and methodically fire aimed shots into likely cover. The recruits were then turned around while the instructors repositioned the targets. The shoot was then repeated. The targets then typically have more and lower hits. This would be repeated regularly with trained soldiers in differing areas (quite often off the end of the airfield where we (the RLI) would be based. I would appreciate it if there was someone out there who has a copy of the pre-1960 Brit fieldcraft manual (I'm sure it was) which contained the detail of the cover shoot which can be reproduced here or sent to me.
    Last edited by JMA; 09-05-2010 at 01:16 PM.

  8. #68
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Some of the recent messages tie in with an earlier thread that touched upon the change from Known-Distance Marksmanship training to Trainfire in 1958. The following is from an article in Infantry Journal in July-August 2006 by David Linawag:

    WWII observations made by Colonel (later Brigadier General) S.L.A. Marshall, as he documented U.S. infantry fighting experience in Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, led the Army to change its training methods to get more infantrymen to fire their weapons during engagements. His analysis led him to several conclusions:

    * "What we need is more and better fire."

    * "What we need to seek in training are any and all means by which we can increase the ratio of effective fire when we go to war."

    * "... weapons when correctly handled in battle seldom fail to gain victory."

    * "... a highly proper doctrine which seeks to ingrain in the infantry soldier a confidence that superior use of superior weapons is his surest protection."

    * "The rarest thing in battle is fire in good volume, accurately delivered and steadily maintained."

    * The secret of mobility: "They moved faster because they could place their trust in the superior hitting power of relatively small forces."

    * "The soldier who learns and applies correct principles of fire will always move."

    * "The man who has the fire habit is looking always for forward ground from which to give his fire increased effectiveness."

    The Infantry School at Fort Benning converted these observations into the Trainfire marksmanship program. The Known Distance (KD) marksmanship training system to teach recruits was abandoned for Trainfire instruction on reactive popup/knock-down targets to 300 meters.

    General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General of the Continental Army Command (predecessor of FORSCOM and TRADOC), wrote an eight-page article in the July-September 1958 Infantry Magazine titled "Army Marksmanship Today," to answer questions and assuage institutional doubts about the new system.
    The entire article can be read by clicking here.

    Perhaps we've sorted out the issue of volume of fire, and now the challenge is to have unit SOPs so it will be aimed at the right places. This is mainly a unit training issue, not one to be to be taught at TRADOC schools, although the schoolhouse could help by developing and distributing generic Programs of Instruction for units in the field.

  9. #69
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Default Developing the Situation

    Speaking of fire contol, in 1945 men in my Dad's 105mm battery peppered a treeline in Germany with their M1 Carbines when they thought it was the source of German small-arms fire. They heard distinct reports of Mausers being fired, until someone noticed that two of the guys in the battery were firing K98 Mausers that they had picked up.

  10. #70
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default A twofer. Maybe a threefer...

    JMA:
    So we see that no matter how poor Marshall's methodology was he has been unfairly criticised by people who have seized upon only half of what he said (that being that soldiers don't fire their weapons).
    Nope. There are those who do not fire, no question -- the issue is in fact only the percentage who do not. Marshall may or may not have been correct for the units he interviewed, we have no way of knowing. He did upgrade his number considerably for Korea and even more for Viet Nam (It happens that my then Battalion was one he visited in writing 'Battles in the Monsoon.') . There are a slew on military studies -- citing the FBI is a pointless Apple to Baobab comparison. Google 'US army volume of fire studies.' There are several studies in those hits; if that's too much work, here's a good little synopsis of some collected results, not directly related but some bearing on the issue. LINK.

    Marshall did some good, no question but he also did a lot of harm. In addition to "Men against fire," he also wrote a number of columns in the late 40s and early 50s for the Detroit Free Press newspaper for whom he was military correspondent and for other US publications. The result was that US Army leaders bought his flawed tale and developed 'Trainfire' (discussed in Pete's link above). Trainfire accomplished its mission of getting more people to shoot more -- unfortunately, it taught them to pour a large volume of fire at short range easily seen targets. It did not teach them to shoot accurately. Worse, it did not teach them to locate obscured or difficult targets, to estimate range, to have their fire controlled and several other important things. There was supposed to be a Field Firing function and Range Estimation exercise that accompanied the range firing but it got ignored more often than not.

    Fortunately, the new Outcome Based Training methods in range firing fix many of the problems. (LINK), (LINK) That last says firing is limited to 300m, that's temporary due to a combination of ammo available and range limit, both are to be fixed and the intent is to go to 600m. Better late than never, I guess...

    You asked this:
    It is said that this comes with combat experience. So why then do modern armies continue to send raw troops into battle when there are other options?
    Because modern Armies have their training designed and approved by people who've seen little or no combat.

    Pete:

    Just four quotes from your link:
    Army assumptions that combined arms, crew-served weapons, and the infantry battalion's six organic snipers would dominate the infantryman's half kilometer have not proven true in recent mobile expeditionary warfare.

    Close-quarters combat rifle courses of fire can be conducted on existing 25-meter zero rifle ranges that are universal on Army posts.

    The Soldier's perceived limited effectiveness with his rifle has spawned the requirement for the Objective Individual Combat Weapon to compensate.

    The historic U.S. eight-man infantry squad was issued 384 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition for their M1 rifles (six 8-round clips per soldier. The traditional round count remains at 384 for today's MI6 or M4 match)...
    In order:

    The so-called Army assumptions are just that -- assumptions made by random Generals who thought they knew more than 200 years of experience or dozens of fairly good studies that produced sensible data. Anyone who thought along the lines of that first item had little to no front line infantry combat experience and predicated his or her assumption on idle hunches. Not one of those items is in any sense a substitute for fire in infantry combat.

    Anyone advocating 'close combat courses of fire on a 25m range is foolish. The KD stuff he advocates will work -- it is not the only way but it does work -- and then a field firing course is needed. We used to what JMA above called the "Drake/Cover Shoot" with semi to fully concealed silhouettes out to 600m and beyond -- but Willard Wyman and his minions sold 'Trainfire' -- which destroyed Army marksmanship. Trainfire dumped the old Field Fire Course (three days of it annually...). The location of concealed targets and determination of their range is a critical infantry skill. It is not taught in institutional training at all well mostly because it is difficult to teach and, far more to the point, has a low "Go" rate -- that makes Trainers and units look bad, so they avoid it. Benning is not the Army Infantrymans friend...

    He touts the OICW "to compensate" -- that's the American way : "...we have a significant training shortfall; lets spend a little money and time so we fix it" "NO! We can't do that, we need to improve the technology, Congress will buy stuff, they won't fund more training..." Not if you don't ask them and make a valid case they won't.

    The killer is the last item. The eight man squad existed right after WW I up until WW II only, been nine or more since -- and we're still issuing ammo predicated on something that's been gone since 1942 . One more example of my oft repeated comment that our training is based on WW I models and we've 'upgraded' it only incrementally if at all.

    So the author was out in left field. Not to knock AMU that hard, they have some good people and their mission is NOT to improve Army training...

    You said:
    This is mainly a unit training issue, not one to be to be taught at TRADOC schools, although the schoolhouse could help by developing and distributing generic Programs of Instruction for units in the field.
    Wrong. It is indeed a unit training issue but it also must be taught in the schoolhouse. It is a basic soldiering and survival skill and the TRADOC institutions have the resources and responsibility to teach it, not least because if they don't, it will get only lip service in poor units -- and, by definition, 50% of the units in the Army are less good than the top 50%. TRADOC has a responsibility to train the trainer. They could do a much better job of that.

    The POI you suggest out there right now for the required training, so TRADOC did their development thing -- then washed their hands of it. It is not getting done and a large part of that is the NCOs and LTs who should be teaching it don't know how because no one -- guess who failed to do their job -- trained them...

    It is yet one more item in the long list of shortcomings in our Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- and PME...

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    I'm hesitant to take my perceptions of my narrow experiences and assume that they are 1) correct and 2) apply equally to all or most of the force.

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    Well, that disclaimer having been said, tell us your perceptions. It need not be a general theory.

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    My perception:
    - Most of the skills that are lamented as having been forgotten/lost in the original post haven't actually been forgotten/lost.
    - Much of the use of current technology is more indicative of the greater availability of that technology than of a need to rely on it.

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    For the foreseeable future sorting out these basic kinds of Infantry things would have a more favorable impact on our military success than all of the high-tech and high-dollar wish lists of all three of the services put together. It might not take place because there's no big money behind it to make sure it happens. "Pick Up Your Weapon and Follow Me."
    Last edited by Pete; 09-06-2010 at 06:16 AM.

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    Default Times Change

    Times have changed a bit, so we're not completely locked into the past:

    276. Deploy Squads as Skirmishers. The platoon being in squad columns, the platoon leader may deploy squads as skirmishers by commanding: AS SKIRMISHERS. At this signal or command the squads deploy, retaining their relative positions within the platoon.
    Source: Infantry Drill Regulations, 1941 ("These regulations supersede those contained in Field Manual 22-5, July 1, 1939.")

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    Default True. However, while times and terms change the basics of combat do not.

    Quote Originally Posted by Pete View Post
    Times have changed a bit, so we're not completely locked into the past:
    That's an excellent example of a timeless and valuable technique and the training and drills required for units to do it almost automatically being eliminated due to obsolete terminology. Thus we cater to to perceived rather than actual obsolescence.

    Happens when your doctrine writers -- and leaders -- don't understand all they know about what they're doing.

    It's like the terribly flawed conversion to Trainfire; instead of using available increased knowledge and simply improving the wheel, we insist on reinventing it. Those square ones don't work too well...

    All so some General can get credit for being innovative.

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    If I'm not mistaken it was the 1941 revision of FM 22-5 that streamlined the drill and ceremonies taught to troops by eliminating much of it from doctrine. By then it was probably considered to be a non-essential use of training time, and it had been a long time since drill and ceremonies were used to deploy troops in tactical situations. (That being said, traveling formation is still column and fighting formation is still line.) I've read of Civil War versions of "Cannoniers' Hop," with its calling out of numbers and so forth.

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    This post is hypothetical, in the area of what might have been decades ago. When the Infantry Drill Regulations and FM 22-5 became relegated to tradition and the putting on of spectacles for the public rather than how units deploy to fight in the field, perhaps a manual with similar drills for companies and battalions in tactical situations should have been published to fill the void. Men wouldn't have to have been in step or have done things by the numbers, but after a command they would assume formations in a certain spatial relationship to each other, not as exact as dress and cover but something like it. I imagine there could be about 20 or 30 drills for different situations.

    No doubt things like this have been tried in the past, called "combat drills" or "unit SOPs." I was a Gunner myself, so during my day I was mainly concerned with quadrants and deflections.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Scroll through the first 30 or so pages of Chapter 3.

    It's still doctrine. Problem is few units teach and use it. We get in a real war, they will...

    LINK.

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    Ken we aren't in a real war now? Soldiers and civilians are fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan in real combat everyday.

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