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Thread: Back to Basics…The Lost Art of Basic Combat Fundamentals

  1. #101
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    Default Well, if we have to talk about music as a basic combat fundemental...

    The Red Hot Chilli Peppers? Nah!

    CCR when things get gloomy? That's a step in the right direction.

    Want 'em to march forever? This is what it sounds like done right.

    Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsIqEq9OFxE

    Slapout will appreciate that. It's right from his era and area. It's also the best rendition I've found.

    By the way, that's a '76 concert in the UK. Skynyrd opened for the Rolling Stones. Those people waving the Stars and Bars are a bunch a fish and chippers! Skynyrd was such a hit that the Stones delayed coming on stage because they didn't want to follow them to closely! The Stones never had Skynyrd open for them again after that! I guess Jumping Jack Flash couldn't compare.
    Last edited by Rifleman; 09-09-2010 at 07:13 PM.
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

  2. #102
    Council Member Pete's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I'll never understand the idea behind such formations.
    I think the main reason for having standardized formations and combat drills is so units can swiftly change course during rapidly changing circumstances without the need for lengthy conversations between leaders, either face-to-face or on the radio. I don't know how the Bundeswehr does it, but German soldiers were no slouches at it in years gone by.

    I was in Field Artillery, so putting perimeters around the battery and having a reaction force was about as "Infantry" as we got. We'd change position about two or three times a day, so our perimeters weren't very elaborate, just hasty positions that were enough to satisfy ARTEP evaluators. We rarely put the Traversing and Elevation Mechanisms on our MGs during static defense, but they would have been handy had we been hit at night by a real enemy.
    Last edited by Pete; 09-10-2010 at 01:23 AM. Reason: Add omitted word.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    It's still doctrine. Problem is few units teach and use it. We get in a real war, they will...
    Which was the last "real war" Ken?

  4. #104
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default There is no last...

    The Congo is ongoing.

    The far more important question is 'When and where will be the next and who will be involved...'

  5. #105
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The Congo is ongoing.

    The far more important question is 'When and where will be the next and who will be involved...'
    My prediction is that the next war could be messy. Saying where or when is nigh impossible (who really would have said Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11?), but describing what it could look like is.

    To borrow a poorly understood doctrinal term, the next war will likely be full-spectrum, from high intensity division fights to low intensity cleaning. There isn't a war we could fight that won't require us to win the peace afterwards. Failure to win the peace, as in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once, will cost us dearly.

    So this brings me to the original point of this post: we need to train an army prepared for high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict--and everything in between. We need leaders who are adaptable, but still knowledgeable in the core competencies of moving, shooting and communicating; then acting like diplomats, police and trainers.

    Are these skills limited by our current wars? I don't think so. My platoon in Afghanistan had a hundred time more live fire training exercises than a Ranger Battalion had in the entire 90s. We called for fire, maneuvered, linked in with air support and then, when the fire fights were done, sat down and drank chai with the locals. Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.

  6. #106
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    You make an assumption that may be self-evident in some countries, but history disagrees.

    A war doesn't need to end with an occupation - not even "successful" wars.


    In fact, it's most often better to negotiate an acceptable peace instead of going the whole distance to the enemy's surrender.


    No matter how much the world war and this "we've let Saddam escape once" thinking distorted many people's views; war does not need to be waged for maximal objectives.

    Romans fought their wars till their opponent was destroyed as a threat forever (and inevitably replaced by another one). Cato was the typical Roman in this regard.

    Americans have clung to this maximum objectives approach as well, but it's rarely advisable.



    So no, although you're probably right that the "next" war (for a major Western power) may include some classic manoeuvring and clashing of brigades - there's no inevitable occupation phase.

    In fact, this next war could very well be lost. Allies might find themselves in a INS situation instead of a COIN situation.

  7. #107
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Thumbs up You're correct on your major point -- but I still agree with Fuchs...

    Occupation is not only often unnecessary, it can be counterproductive. No question one needs to be prepared to do it but one should be prepared to do many things one hopes one will never have to do and one should actively seek to not do some of those things. I can recover some aircraft from a spin and do a fishhook turn in my car but I work at not having to do those things..

    Cases in point:
    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    ...who really would have said Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11?), but describing what it could look like is...Failure to win the peace, as in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once, will cost us dearly.
    I believe that to be a double misstatement of what actually occurred. First, both Afghanistan and Iraq were totally predictable and what in fact occurred (before, during and after...) had been predicted by many. Both nations as problems and the aftermath possibilities were well up on the radar screen. The difficulty was that no one involved in policy making at the national, DoD, HqDA and TRADOC levels (remember those last three for the future...) was remotely interested in hearing any of that. Domestic concerns took -- always take (remember that also for the future...) -- precedence.

    It's well known fact that Armed Forces do pretty much what they're trained to do. Conversely, they are unlikely to do what they are not trained to do. The force that went into Afghanistan did its job beautifully -- then we inserted forces we did not need there to do things that did not need to be done there and said Forces were not trained to do what was asked of them. That is at one time a policy, a military advisory and a training shortfall that created the situation that led to your unit being better trained and more capable than its predecessor was 12 years ago.

    That same cluster held true in Iraq; the initial entry and action was great; good people doing what they'd trained to do and doing it very well indeed. Then, the lack of training showed in the tolerance of looting, excessive reliance on force and the abject failure of the intelligence system -- and those forces and their commanders -- to predict Saddam's publicly announced initiation of an insurgency. The fact that all that was also eminently predictable is shown by the Franks deal with Rumsfeld -- "I'll take Baghdad for you but then I want to immediately retire..."

    Secondly, the initial failure in Iraq was one of political will and not of capability (more with Viet Nam experience about; plus I cannot see Norman Schwarzkopf ever tolerating looting...), the second failure was engendered by a good case of merited and desirable political will but a badly flawed assessment of capability; it also happens to not necessarily be a 'failure' -- too early to tell. Same thing is true of Afghanistan. However, failures or there is no doubt that both were and are extremely costly endeavors that did not have to occur. That fact remains true with or without our being better trained at the time than was the case.

    So even though it does reflect much current thought, your assessment of how we got where we are is, I believe, incorrect. The good news is that this comment by you, your bottom line, is totally correct and bears emphasis:
    So this brings me to the original point of this post: we need to train an army prepared for high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict--and everything in between. We need leaders who are adaptable, but still knowledgeable in the core competencies of moving, shooting and communicating; then acting like diplomats, police and trainers. (emphasis add / kw)
    I totally agree and have been banging on that drum for almost 45 years of service and work and the fifteen years since I've been fully retired. You are correct. That is an achievable goal.

    IF...

    We scrap our flawed personnel and training processes and do not delude ourselves that everything in Afghanistan and Iraq would have been alright had we simply been more proficient in actions after the attack, COIN efforts and FID skills -- that is a very dangerous over simplification of the problem. Hubris can be its own worst enemy.

    For example:
    Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.
    I agree that you and we are better for it but I also submit that by pegging it against the Army of the 90s you are setting a pretty low standard. Nor is a Ranger Bn anything special -- if you had their selectivity and their money, you might well be able to do a better job than can they.

    More apt comparison might be the less 'well trained' but slightly more all round capable Army of the early and mid 60s before the late 1967 Viet Nam malaise set in and led to the Army of the 70s through the 90s, the Army that created Ranger Bns to fill an obvious shortfall in Infantry capability induced by a deeply flawed training strategy and a culture of risk aversion that was developing. The capability of the Infantry has been regained in part, the risk aversion is a societal thing and will be more difficult to dispel.

    Never forget that same 70 to 90s Army made Tommy Franks a four button...
    Last edited by Ken White; 09-10-2010 at 07:39 PM. Reason: Typos

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I'll never understand the idea behind such formations.

    A platoon should march separately in order to retain the freedom of movement for at least a part of itself in the event of a contact. Even a whole infantry platoon can easily get pinned down - fixed - if it marches as a whole in one body.

    Military history knows incidents of whole companies being temporarily fixed by a single sniper.

    It's absolutely crucial to move in separate groups of minimum capability each if that's possible at all (communication, coordination).
    Essentially I am in agreement with you.

    I taught this basic stuff once to a series of officer cadets/trainees.

    I made a point of stating that such text book diagrams were illustrative. That platoon commanders allow individual section commanders to call their formations according to the terrain and likely enemy tactics and only to intervene when there is really a problem (which would be best solved by sending the platoon sgt across to sort it out).

    Secondly the distance between the sections and platoon HQ would be what we termed "a tactical bound". (This would be learned during practical training on the ground.)

    It would take a pretty elaborate ambush with heavy machine guns to pin a platoon down when on patrol. Can't think of how a company can be pinned down.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    Are these skills limited by our current wars? I don't think so. My platoon in Afghanistan had a hundred time more live fire training exercises than a Ranger Battalion had in the entire 90s. We called for fire, maneuvered, linked in with air support and then, when the fire fights were done, sat down and drank chai with the locals. Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.
    Why does this "over simplification" not ring true?

    How much combat does it take for a raw platoon to reach the level of arrogance that they believe they have become the single greatest soldiers since the Spartans?

  10. #110
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    It would take a pretty elaborate ambush with heavy machine guns to pin a platoon down when on patrol. Can't think of how a company can be pinned down.
    There was a time and a front where both smoke grenades and armour as well as trees, ditches and settlements were so much in short supply that infantry had to attack on open plains with nothing but some mortar HE fire support...

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    LINK. As in 'Movement to contact' (LINK) .pdf). Or this Video (LINK). Or the US DoD Dictionary (LINK) under 'M' for Movement to contact...

    Any contact involving an exchange of fire or direct combat, ranging from hand to hand all the way indirect as in an Artillery duel. It can be at close or long range, with or without visual acquisition. That can and does include meeting engagements, static defense, tank on tank fights, ambushed patrols, aerial combat between fighters, bombers dropping bombs...
    I would qualify that with the term "effective fire". If you come under effective fire, or you exchange effective fire or you deliver effective fire in the enemy.

    There is all this talk about long range "contacts" (500-900m) in Helmand. This can not be effective fire for most platoon weapons. Does one even bother to take cover?

    ...ah but as per my many previous comments about strolling around over open ground I guess the soldiers led into harms way by and idiot officer will probably feel a little vulnerable.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    There was a time and a front where both smoke grenades and armour as well as trees, ditches and settlements were so much in short supply that infantry had to attack on open plains with nothing but some mortar HE fire support...
    I qualified my comment with "when on patrol." But yes a Normandy beach scenario could be problematic for a brigade let along a company.

  13. #113
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    Default You may qualify it any way you wish.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I would qualify that with the term "effective fire". If you come under effective fire, or you exchange effective fire or you deliver effective fire in the enemy.
    However, if one has seen a few people killed by random, even unintended, fire one will probably look at a definition of 'effective' in a different light than others.
    There is all this talk about long range "contacts" (500-900m) in Helmand. This can not be effective fire for most platoon weapons. Does one even bother to take cover?
    Depends on the weapons. If the opponents have SVD(s), any of the PK series or even old Nagants or Enfields -- even an RPK -- much less a Dshk, they can bring very effective (by any reasonable definition) fire on you at those ranges. Conversely, the M-14 series, the M240/MAG 58s and the various other long range weapons can initiate or return effective fire at those ranges. So whether one even bothers to take cover is -- as always -- situation, state of training and / or experience and all that METT-TC stuff dependent. The only rule in combat is that there are no rules...
    ...ah but as per my many previous comments about strolling around over open ground I guess the soldiers led into harms way by and idiot officer will probably feel a little vulnerable.
    Or the Soldier led into harm's way by a quite competent officer or NCO not by strolling -- as you so repetitiously, drolly and ignorantly put it -- but by crossing open areas that are forced upon them by the situation in as tactically sound a manner as is possible.

    The good news is that you don't have to worry about any of that, you can just fulminate at length over the internet while a lot of others ranging from more competent than you or I ever were to those incompetents you seem to see everywhere get on with business...

  14. #114
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I qualified my comment with "when on patrol." But yes a Normandy beach scenario could be problematic for a brigade let along a company.
    ...always these Western Allies countrymen!

    I thought of the Eastern Front which had incredibly featureless plains, and most of the forward movement had to be done dozens if not hundreds of km away from the next armour battlegroup.

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    Default Mission of the Infantry

    In these discussions about getting back to basics we have to remember what the missions are of the different branches of the combined arms team. In his article "The Secret of Future Victories," available at this link, General Paul F. Gorman states the following:

    IIn 1971, Lieutenant General W.E. DePuy, in a lecture at Fort Benning, took issue with the standard formulation of the mission of infantry pointing out that in World War II, per his recollection, what an infantry company really accomplished on any given day was not to 'close with and destroy the enemy,' but rather to move its artillery forward observer to the next hill. His views were not well received by his audience, but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique.
    On another note, I wish the forum had a "Devil Grin" emoticon, but in lieu of that this one will have to do.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    ...always these Western Allies countrymen!

    I thought of the Eastern Front which had incredibly featureless plains, and most of the forward movement had to be done dozens if not hundreds of km away from the next armour battlegroup.
    I can only use a example I have some knowledge about (through reading).

    You don't find too many insurgents on open rolling plains. Closest you get to that around here is northern Namibia where Koevoet used to ride SWAPO down in their vehicles. (If Koevoet had been soldiers rather than policemen they probably would have got a lot more for less - if you know what I mean.)

  17. #117
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    @Pete:

    The U.S. infantry was a bit extreme in this regard, likely due to the personnel system and the abundance of fire support.
    The infantry of other nations behaved mostly different.

    It'll be interesting (and sad) to see how infantry behaves in the next modern vs. modern major conflict. It might very well follow the FO model - not the least because infantry quantity will be very insufficient at the beginning of such a conflict and the average competence would drop quickly.

    My take on infantry is difficult, though:
    Infantry should dominate closed terrain, repel attackers inside it.
    It should attack into closed terrain preferably by infiltration.
    Infantry on mountains will most likely follow the FO model, no matter what else is being attempted (this will be valid till we get some rapid individual movement capability in mountaineous terrain.)


    New slogan for infantry:
    Infantry - the invisible sovereigns of closed terrain.

  18. #118
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    Default Closed Terrain

    Fuchs, what's your definition of closed terrain and how does it differ from the open kind? Do you mean urban, wooded, or otherwise compartmented?
    Last edited by Pete; 09-12-2010 at 10:52 PM. Reason: Add last sentence.

  19. #119
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    I used an often-read term to make communication non-ambiguous and this is the result...I wasn't understood.


    I usually call this kind of terrain "infanteriefreundliches Gelände" (infantry-friendly terrain) or "infanteriegünstiges Gelände" (infantry-favouring terrain) in German because the Bundeswehr doesn't seem to have such a summary term. The German field manuals are full of more detailed terrain categories (mountainous, forests, settlements, movement-impairing terrain) instead.

    A simple definition would be the relationship between tanks and infantry; terrains that allow tanks to exploit their strengths (range of guns and sensors, firepower, speed) and best tactics (tanks supporting each other) is tank-friendly, open terrain.

    This is about relative combat strength, not so much about mobility (tanks can drive through settlements and many forests just fine).

    An exact definition would depend on the forces involved; especially on the man-portable anti-tank weapons and tanks involved.

    --------

    I do sometimes call an intermediate form "mixed terrain":
    Enough opportunities for concealment of static infantry (not necessarily enough concealed routes for infantry movements), and few route options for vehicles that avoid the fields of fire of such hidden infantry forces. It could also be understood as a patchwork of closed and open terrain.

    Belarus has much terrain of this kind (if you assume weapons such as Javelin for the infantry) and the Central European landscapes with the many dispersed settlements fit as well.
    Mixed terrain and its associated challenges is probably the most important and most interesting terrain category for Europeans.


    edit: A quick search yielded "closed terrain" being mentioned in FMs 17-18, 17-98 and 1-112. I remember it mostly from books, though.
    Last edited by Fuchs; 09-12-2010 at 11:09 PM.

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    Maybe the Bundeswehr approach makes more sense. Differentiating between close/open terrain may be a bit too stark, i.e. black/white to be truly useful in all of those intermediate situations. Basing doctrine upon it may leave too little (perceived?) flexibility, also considering all other factors. So I’m wondering if it may be one of those areas where an attempt at strict classification and categorising can sometimes be more limiting/confusing than helpful.
    Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)

    All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
    (Arthur Schopenhauer)

    ONWARD

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