Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites

[Pete]

I was field artillery, so my main things as a lieutenant were quadrants and deflections, not leading a platoon. At the time the Army general Don Starry made a big thing about how lieutenants should "Listen to their NCOs." Great advice, as far as it went, but the U.S. Army underwent a sea change in 1965 when the last of the WW II veterans retired. In spite of Don Starry's good intentions many of the NCOs circa 1978 were fairly half-assed minimum-effort type of guys as well. I wasn't that great an officer, but I was honest about my deficiencies, and I refused to throw up a facade of "excellence" to fool people into thinking how great I was.

Aside for Ken: I might not have been a great officer, but I truly love the Army.

[Pete]

I don't think the comeback of the Army during the 1980s can be neatly characterized as the restoration of high standards versus entrenched mediocrity. It was more complicated than that -- it was a sincere effort to improve things as well as a return to eyewash and covering things up. Up to a point that's okay, I always liked being spitshined and starched rather than the alternative. When 60 percent of the M16s in Jessica Lynch's Ordnance Company failed to function in 2003 it was something I might have predicted would happen in 1984. I guess the short answer, career-wise, is to keep your mouth shut, stay in your lane, and do your job to the best of your ability.

[JMA]

When 60 percent of the M16s in Jessica Lynch's Ordnance Company failed to function in 2003 it was something I might have predicted would happen in 1984.

Why was that?

[Pete]

When the war began in 2003 many people in the combat service support branches probably regarded small arms as impedimentia they had to take with them when they went to the field, not things they'd actually have to use. Attitudes have probably changed since then.

[TAH]

Why was that?

Little/no attention on the part of the indivisiual Soldier and lack off supervision on the part of the unit leadership, including the commander who clearly could not read a map at all.

As an aside, I seem to recall in the aftermath of TF Smith in Korea in 1950 that a significant number/% of their weapons malfunctioned also. Poor maintenace and incorrect assembly were two of the main causes as I recall.

So, garrison life in occupied Japan had the same impact on line units 60 years ago (only 5 years after the end of WWII!)

BTW, cannot speak for the other reserve forces, but the Army reserve has taken hugh steps since then to correct the situation.

Perhaps too far. There is a concern out there now that we have spent so much time/effort/resources on "Warrior Training" that these folks are no longer at the job/mission/tasks they were put their in the first place to do.

Does not do a Patriot Missle Maintenace Company like the 507th to survive the convoy in and then not know how to fix a Patriot Missle System.

Have to be able to find a balance point between force protection ability and technical proficiency.

[JMA]

Have to be able to find a balance point between force protection ability and technical proficiency.

I guess that sums it up pretty well.

[Pete]

It wasn't only the retirement of the World War II NCOs circa 1965 that changed the Army as an institution -- more broadly it was the retirement of the 1940s-50s generation of NCOs that changed things. They could be compared to Blanton's Sour Mash, " ... aged in one barrel, and unlike most others, never blended with any other bourbon."

[Pete]

When I served in Germany in '78-'81 unit-level training was a big deal. One of the things that discouraged an enthusiastic attitude about presenting it was inspectors coming around with clipboards with checklists.

For example:

Did the instructor have training aids?

Did the instructor present "Task-Condition-Standard" as presented in the manual?

Well, the long and short of it is that our NCOs got stage fright about presenting instruction, after their good-faith efforts were criticized.

When I PCSed back to the States in 1981 I asked my Dad about common-task training in his 105mm battery during World War II -- he said the individual training ceased as soon as they were in the battery, that everything after that was unit training.

I guess that this unit-level training thing goes way back, before Ken was a corporal.

[VileEvilDoer]

Have to be able to find a balance point between force protection ability and technical proficiency.

The irony is that the NCO Creed specifically states: "I will strive to remain technically and tactically proficient." Unfortunately, in the support branches we tend to overemphasize technical proficiency at the expense of tactical proficiency. This has a secondary effect in that it creates a cultural rift between combat arms and support. I like the Marine ethos of "Every Marine a rifleman."

In a larger sense, the Army must now find a way to achieve balance between Big War and Small War proficiency.