Army Cancels GCV Competition

[Pete]

These early capitalist manufacturies were not comparable to General Dynamics or Boeing ...

When they placed the contract for the Signal Corps Radio 300 "Walkie Talkie" that came into service in 1943 who would have thought all that spending on communications and electronics technology would have led to the computers and internet we're talking on now ...

[Cole]

The fuel consumption of a MBT (and there are much more fuel-efficient ones than Abrams) is operationally of lesser importance than the its practical range, which in turn depends on consumption+tank size. The practical road range can actually increase with weight if you change a design to accommodate greater fuel capacity.

Now wait a minute. You seem to assume a single fill up and its resulting range is all that is important. Isn't that synonymous with President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" when we reached Baghdad? What about the other 7+ years and required stability ops? What about initial heavy fuel consumption every few hours over hundreds of miles whether moving or not to power the electronics and sensors?

As for fuel under armor to achieve range, divide 500 gals x 7.4805 to calculate how many cubic feet of fuel tank under thick armor is required. It's about 67 cubic feet requiring armor.

Deployment sorties and fuel consumption of two alternative combat equipment partial packages for early air-deployment:

First option (current CAB maneuver cross-section with 53-ton GCV):
2 Armor companies with 14 tanks each + 1 for CAB Cdr = 29 tanks
2 Infantry companies with 14 each 53-ton GCV = 28 GCV
2 M-ATV in each Infantry company = 4 M-ATV
11 HEMTT fuel tankers

29 M1A2 x 500 gals = 14,500 gals
28 53-ton GCVs x 300 gals = 8,400 gals
4 M-ATV x 40 gals = 160 gals
Total = 23,060 gals every 8 hours?
11 HEMTT fuel tankers carrying 2250 gals = 24,750 gals carried
63 C-17 sorties required

2nd Option (air-deployable smaller CAB with 40-ton GCV)
One Armor company with 4 platoons (16 tanks) + 3 in Co HQ (1 for CAB Cdr) = 19 tanks
Two Infantry companies with 11 each 40-ton GCV + 11 each M-ATV = 28 GCV + 22 M-ATV
7 HEMTT fuel tankers

19 M1A2 x 500 gals = 9,500 gals
22 40-ton GCV x 240 gals = 5,280 gals
22 M-ATV x 40 gals = 880 gals
Total = 15,660 gals every 8 hours
7 HEMTT fuel tankers carrying 2250 gals = 15,750 gals carried
39 C-17 sorties required

Note the substantial difference between 39 and 63 C-17 sorties meaning ample supporting equipment/supplies could augment the 2nd alternative before reaching a 63 sortie total approximating that at Bashur over 5 nights in northern Iraq during the 173rd ABCT airdrop and airland.

Note the addition of far more M-ATV in the Infantry companies of the smaller air-deployed task force to assist in securing perimeters, moving light troops of the heavy-light task force, conducting patrols and stability ops, and providing for sustainment using inbound C-17s as the supply source.

Most WW2 bridges in Europe were limited to 26 tons - even a T-34 faced bridge troubles. Most rivers weren't as tamed as they are today and had offered the alternative of fording in some places.
Recovery of heavy tanks was a problem, but this was obviously overcompensated with battle performance, from the total loss ratios (tanks lost vs. tanks killed) were still great, even superior to 25 ton tanks while taking into account per unit costs.

In Iraq, then LTC Marconi, the lead armor TF commander for the 3rd ID advance on Baghdad had problems at bridge locations at two separate locations. Marines had problems at An Nasiriyah with tracked AAVs getting stuck in mud on the far side of a bridge when trying to avoid taking big vehicles through a narrow city road. They eventually had to assault through the city street and were fortunate to make it through fierce fighting...and those were lighter but still quite long and wide AAV.

Heavy tanks always had their issues, but both the positive and negative myth-spinning around the German ones of WW2 was very distorting.

Unless fuel trucks have the same mobility and speed over terrain as the combat vehicles they are supporting, there is a potential problem during the first and subsequent refuelings, i.e. horses and lesser armored trucks trying to support tanks and IFVs moving cross-country at speed. Few U.S. advances involve just a single refueling and short capitulation which is why the lessons of other countries involving shorter lines of communications and no intertheater deployment do not apply to U.S. GCV requirements, IMHO.

Not the historical record, but today's technology, threats, mission profiles and operational doctrine decide on the optimum weight range of combat vehicles. I say everything from 40 to 70 metric tons is debatable, and I personally prefer 40-50 metric tons for many reasons.

Threats tend to get exaggerated relative to U.S. and allied capabilities. Hezbollah is not a typical threat having years to prepare covert defenses and infiltration of weapons. The U.S. generally gets involved defending other nations that have been invaded. That gives the enemy less chance to prepare his defenses in a newly secured location if we can air-deploy credible forces within 100 miles of the enemy within days rather than months. With sufficient warning, we can airland forces prior to any threat border or amphibious crossing thus precluding any need for forcible entry. In other scenarios, ABC/CBS/CNN/FoxNews/NBC could be showing C-17s on the ground at Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska carrying both Strykers and heavy-light task forces ready to roll down the runway within minutes. That could be new doctrine...a joint Army and Air Force contribution to AirSea Battle perhaps, IMHO.

The use of mines to secure roads would immediately kill the war effort politically, it's therefore a self-defeating idea.

Good point about allied and Karzai resistance, but was not talking about roads. Maybe the mountainous portions of the border. Maybe adjacent to a concrete wall built around Kandahar with concertina and signs warning civilians.

I've noted far fewer civilian suicide attacks and problems of Palestinians infiltrating into Israeli areas since the wall was constructed in the West Bank and around Gaza. Similar lessons were learned in Baghdad...until the walls started coming down.

[Fuchs]

Now wait a minute. You seem to assume a single fill up and its resulting range is all that is important.

Yes, and I can elaborate on why this is the case.

The sad historical truth is that combat service support rarely if ever catches up with armoured spearheads to supply them unless they rest for a day or two. This means that the tactical if not operational culminating point of attack of a heavy brigade is defined by its vehicles' practical driving range (ammunition consumption is typically rather low on very mobile ops).

The fiscal aspect is unimportant in comparison. Capabilities have their price.


1,000 km road range MBTs are actually feasible (refitting Western MBTs with EuroPowerpack and using the freed two cubic metre space for fuel tanks already does the trick!) and this could (in my opinion) revolutionise armoured warfare more than Chobham armour and 120mm smoothbore combined.
1,000 km road range is even more easily feasible with soft vehicles (excluding motorcycles of course), only light and medium AFVs would have trouble to meet that road range.

Maybe the mountainous portions of the border. Maybe adjacent to a concrete wall built around Kandahar with concertina and signs warns civilians.

Nice. Now you add all smugglers on the list of your enemies. And many traders. And you strangle the economy, making mercenary jobs and drug economy even more attractive. Concertina wire and minefields are obstacles. Obstacles that are not at least observed by troops are useless. So you need to add incredible quantities of troops to make your questionable obstacles work in that huge country.

[Fuchs]

Your calculations are misleading because they only look at the weight of the tip of the spear, not at the whole spear's weight:

Article: Breaking the Tether of Fuel
http://www.army.mil/professionalwrit...07/4_07_3.html

Excerpt:

The most telling characterization of fuel usage came from the Marine
Corps 2003 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Study. This study showed
that almost 90 percent of the fuel used by MEF ground vehicles would accrue
to tactical wheeled vehicles (TWVs), including HMMWVs, 7-ton trucks,
and the logistics vehicle system. Moreover, the study showed conclusively
that combat vehicles (e.g., M1A1 tanks, light armored vehicles, and assault
amphibious vehicles), although fuel guzzlers individually, as a fleet consume
a relatively minor fraction of the fuel.

[SethB]

End use efficiency is the best way to save money. The fuel isn't that expensive. The infrastructure and personnel are.

In 2001, the United States had 60,000 personnel dedicated to POL activities. That doesn't include the "snowball" of people that train and support them.

ETA: That logic is terrible. Much of that is fuel. The Army calculated that 50% of what it moved in 2001 was fuel. By extension, a 50% reduction in consumption would result in a 25% reduction in the need for transport as a whole.

By that metric, a new engine for the Abrams starts looking like a pretty good deal.

[Cole]

Yes, and I can elaborate on why this is the case.

The sad historical truth is that combat service support rarely if ever catches up with armoured spearheads to supply them unless they rest for a day or two. This means that the tactical if not operational culminating point of attack of a heavy brigade is defined by its vehicles' practical driving range (ammunition consumption is typically rather low on very mobile ops).

The fiscal aspect is unimportant in comparison. Capabilities have their price.

1,000 km road range MBTs are actually feasible (refitting Western MBTs with EuroPowerpack and using the freed two cubic metre space for fuel tanks already does the trick!) and this could (in my opinion) revolutionise armoured warfare more than Chobham armour and 120mm smoothbore combined.
1,000 km road range is even more easily feasible with soft vehicles (excluding motorcycles of course), only light and medium AFVs would have trouble to meet that road range.

Good point, but Army's require fuel trucks anyway because eventually you hit 1,000 kms and you still have years left to fight. Even if you got down to 1 mpg that would be 620 gallons to move 1,000 kms (or so many hours of idle) which is lots of weight of fuel and armor protecting fuel tanks on a GCV or tank. More fuel trucks at risk please, so that heavy forces never want to dismount?

Plus don't recall that the OIF tactical refueling pauses were unreasonable or resulted in a different outcome. But that was with lighter Bradleys.

Nice. Now you add all smugglers on the list of your enemies. And many traders. And you strangle the economy, making mercenary jobs and drug economy even more attractive. Concertina wire and minefields are obstacles. Obstacles that are not at least observed by troops are useless. So you need to add incredible quantities of troops to make your questionable obstacles work in that huge country.

Wasn't talking about the valleys. Just the peaks that air Volcano could lay with built-in timers that could be adjusted for longer durations...say at the start of the fighting season along North Waziristan? Shouldn't the Pakistani Army be overwatching? Oh wait, they aren't in North Waziristan.

In Gaza, the Israelis have robotic .50 cal towers overwatching their barriers. Stateside Soldiers could handle that duty the same way the USAF Predator/Reaper drivers do.

[Fuchs]

Do you have current data on M1A2 practical fuel consumption?

The old data from competition trials in Europe (twice as thirsty as Leopard2) became obsolete with the introduction of the APU.

[Cole]

End use efficiency is the best way to save money. The fuel isn't that expensive. The infrastructure and personnel are.

In 2001, the United States had 60,000 personnel dedicated to POL activities. That doesn't include the "snowball" of people that train and support them.

ETA: That logic is terrible. Much of that is fuel. The Army calculated that 50% of what it moved in 2001 was fuel. By extension, a 50% reduction in consumption would result in a 25% reduction in the need for transport as a whole.

By that metric, a new engine for the Abrams starts looking like a pretty good deal.

Agree with your points SethB but fuel has been estimated to cost as much as $48 per gallon if conveyed via aerial tanker, or flown by helicopter to COPs/FOBs. It's some lesser but still outrageous amount when trucked in via Pakistan/Kunduz.

[Pete]

Herr Oberst Fuchs has no patience for small talk.

[SethB]

The FBCF factors in structural costs associated with transportation and storage. The DLA price is the actual price. So while we can forecast with the FBCF it isn't the appropriate tool to determine an actual cost.

More to the point, it is a number that helps illustrate the costs of delivering fuel on the battlefield. We use several gallons for every gallon that we deliver. Thus a 50% reduction in end use would result in a much more significant reduction overall.

Is such a reduction possible? The LV 100-5 reduces consumption by 33%, the MTU 890 would probably reduce consumption by about 50%, and an APU by about the same amount, although I don't know what the two would do, in combination.

So it is conceivable that a lighter Abrams (with a rewire, an M360 cannon, etc) with a new engine and APU could be 75% more efficient. That would mean an immediate reduction in the number of fuel trucks needed for resupply and by extension the number of trucks needed to supply mechanics, security and life support for those personnel.

[Fuchs]

Good point, but Army's require fuel trucks anyway because eventually you hit 1,000 kms and you still have years left to fight.

I doubt that modern warfare against real threats might last for years, but if it did, a farther culminating point might save a year. The Soviets didn't arrive in Berlin in 1944 because the culminating point of their offensives wasn't very far forward. They lacked trucks, reliability, survivability and on-board supplies (especially on their IS series heavy tanks). They demonstrated the importance of a far culminating point of attack very much on the Eastern Front, and Rommel did the same. He might have captured Suez if he hadn't run out of power after a few hundred km each.

One of the most important challenges in operational art is to push the culminating point farther. Operational art should inform tactics and training, and all three should inform equipment designers.

[gute]

To clarify this topic I started, the FCS was cancelled and the GCV competition was put on hold for another six months. According to the Army there is not enough agreement on GCV capabilities. I think General Casey had a lot to do with this because he has questioned why the GCV will weigh close to 70 tons and not be much lighter. The Brits have signed on for the ASCOD which seems to be a capable vehicle.

One of the requirements for the GCV is the ability to carry nine troops. I am only speculating, but is it possible that the U.S. Army would go with three vehicle mech platoons because the vehicle carries more troops? PL in one vehicle, PltSgt in another with the master gunner in the third. That would give the platoon 29 dismounts which is about the same number now.

[tankersteve]

Interesting discussion and I have been lurking in the back listening in. Two minor points I would like to add.

Stryker fuel consumption gets much, much higher when the vehicle actually moves cross-country, rather than on semi-improved surfaces. Its actual range is significantly less if you are not moving along road systems.

M1-series tanks get fueled twice a day not just because they desparately need fuel - most are well over 1/2 full on each top off - but because the crews don't trust the fuel transfer pumps to get the fuel from the front cells to the back. Thus, half the fuel is sitting there, not used and the average operational range is significantly diminished while the fuelers are making double the daily runs actually needed.

Tankersteve

[Tukhachevskii]

Stryker fuel consumption gets much, much higher when the vehicle actually moves cross-country, rather than on semi-improved surfaces. Its actual range is significantly less if you are not moving along road systems.

Isn't that the case for all vehicles, armoured or not?

[Cole]

To clarify this topic I started, the FCS was cancelled and the GCV competition was put on hold for another six months. According to the Army there is not enough agreement on GCV capabilities. I think General Casey had a lot to do with this because he has questioned why the GCV will weigh close to 70 tons and not be much lighter. The Brits have signed on for the ASCOD which seems to be a capable vehicle.

ASCOD seems kind of light at 31 tons if Wikipedia is correct. And it is 3 crew + 8 dismounts. Think I read something since the announcement that weight was not the reason...hope that was wrong.

One of the requirements for the GCV is the ability to carry nine troops. I am only speculating, but is it possible that the U.S. Army would go with three vehicle mech platoons because the vehicle carries more troops? PL in one vehicle, PltSgt in another with the master gunner in the third. That would give the platoon 29 dismounts which is about the same number now.

Nine troops + crew of three. Don't believe the three-man crew would dismount. So doesn't that mean the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant would be vehicle commanders and normally not dismounting if there were just 3 vehicles per platoon? That's another reasons to add M-ATVs.

The other reason to have M-ATVs or a 4th GCV per platoon is to carry future unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, unattended sensors, the RTO, machine guns, Javelins, and their operators....plus any extra supplies in the truck bed. Alternately, you could have a common Army and Marine GCV carrying 13 to fit the extra guys and gear.

[Cole]

Interesting discussion and I have been lurking in the back listening in. Two minor points I would like to add.

Stryker fuel consumption gets much, much higher when the vehicle actually moves cross-country, rather than on semi-improved surfaces. Its actual range is significantly less if you are not moving along road systems.

M1-series tanks get fueled twice a day not just because they desparately need fuel - most are well over 1/2 full on each top off - but because the crews don't trust the fuel transfer pumps to get the fuel from the front cells to the back. Thus, half the fuel is sitting there, not used and the average operational range is significantly diminished while the fuelers are making double the daily runs actually needed.

Tankersteve

That still implies greater quantities of less-armored fuel trucks and crews are driving around twice a day waiting to get blown up by North Korean or fill-in-the-blank stay behind forces....just so combat arms guys can remain in an over-armored and soon stationary cocoon when the fuel trucks are blown up.

Might point out that the now defunct FCS BCT design had just 10 tanks in its armor companies. That is another alternative for an air-deployed combined arms battalion with 14 tanks still in the sea-deployed companies. But adding the armored reconnaissance squadron, you still have the same number of HBCT company commands for armor officers if you have just one large tank company...thus saving and diverting one armor Co's HQ personnel.

Plus with four platoons of four tanks in a single armor company, you could task organize one platoon to each infantry company and still have two platoons for an armor-heavy reserve.

[tankersteve]

Isn't that the case for all vehicles, armoured or not?

Yes, to an extent, but the Stryker actually needs refueling at levels similar to heavy armored vehicles when moving cross-country. Tanks and Bradleys combat radii are based on X-country moves.

Tankersteve

[Cavguy]

Yes, to an extent, but the Stryker actually needs refueling at levels similar to heavy armored vehicles when moving cross-country. Tanks and Bradleys combat radii are based on X-country moves.

Tankersteve

Not quite Steve. It needs at about the same interval but nowhere near the same quantity .... because of the much smaller fuel tank.

[Tukhachevskii]

The Brits have signed on for the ASCOD which seems to be a capable vehicle.

Ascod has not been selected for the MICV (IFV) role as a replacement for the Warrior. It's been chosen as the basis for the recce/scout vehicle under the FRES (Future Rapid Effects System, excuse me while I vomit) programme. There are no plans to replace Warrior as yet, instead the UK gov is focusing on the WLIP programme to replace the 30mm rarden with a 40mm case telescoped cannon. Carrier priorities are focused on the Piranha Mk V (again for the FRES requirement) but with the recession this may be cut. Like a lot of other better informed than myself, I don't buy into the whole Light/Medium/Heavy divison of forces or the Medium Weight Capability mythos. Far better to train heavy and light forces to be interoperable and become "medium" weight after ditching a few kilos (leaving un-necessary equipment at home that is) rather than consign the heavy weight programmes to the dustbin of history.

I can only second what Agatha de la Boulaye's character Adele Rousseau says in that god aweful monstrosity of a film, Aliens V Predator;

"Alexa 'Lex' Woods: [Rousseau is loading a pistol] Seven seasons on the ice, and I've never seen a gun save someone's life.
Adele Rousseau: I don't plan on using it.
Alexa 'Lex' Woods: Then why bring it?
Adele Rousseau: Same principle as a condom. I'd rather have one and not need it, then need it and not have one".!!!

Anyway, FRES has thankfully been cut down to size.

Oh, and as for the ACOD being a capable vehicle (which makes a mockery of the "medium weight" and "wheeled" requirement) see, FRES Scout- Spot the Diference