Army Cancels GCV Competition

[Fuchs]

If it is joint, there is probably less probability of calls for upgraded Bradleys and AAVs. Don't know anything about European, BMP-3, or even Bradley designs other than cursory research...except they all are much, much lighter than 53 tons.

The German Puma and the 90's Marder 2 prototypes went beyond 40 (metric!) tons already. Eastern Europeans developed some MBT/APC crossbreeds and the Near East seems to like the heavier HAPC (APC on MBT chassis, no turret) idea.

The weight by itself isn't the problem in my opinion; the concept as a whole made no sense.



IFV development is a bit on autopilot; armies forget to think about the basic idea of an IFV. The original, WW2-derived idea of an IFV is long since obsolete, as is the Russian idea of a ICV that rides through nuke-devastated terrain.

We're left with moderately armed vehicles with a mixed vehicle combat and infantry transport role that close in with MBTs (100% fighting machines) in regard to sensors and other gadgetry.
In the end, both Western and Eastern heavy brigades and divisions have only IFVs as infantry transports. These infantry transport vehicles have few seats, so our divisions and brigades lack the infantry for more than providing security to MBTs.

We can improve the firepower element of the IFV (=rapid fire + ATGMs) very much and improve the dismount strength very much by separating them into a combat vehicle like BMP-T and a HAPC. Add some classic APCs for additional infantry and you might end up with a much better heavy formation both in versatile firepower and infantry strength.

The IFV compromise has become way too elaborate and is no good choice any more. The GCV all-eggs-in-one-gold-plated-basket approach was in(s)ane.

[Cole]

Sounds like some of the exercises we had in Northern Australia. The SAR chopper was always busy picking up the enemy who had come down with heat stress.

More importantly, and meant as no criticism, Cole your idea sounds very similar to what Richard Simpkin was advocating in the late 1970s/early 1980s with his modular AFV concepts. From my translation of a recent article, the Chinese are impressed with the German Puma IFV, especially with its armament and protection levels.

GI Zhou, it would be cruel of Aussies to shoot down bad guys over the desert or ocean so the great whites or box jelly fish got them.

Not familiar with Simpkin, but sounds like a smart guy. As you may know FCS was a family of vehicles as is Stryker. Find it interesting that an original full family of replacements and promises of full funding of an alternative, has evolved to just a much larger infantry GCV replacement, an M109 upgrade, and now even talks of upgraded Bradleys. Yet if a stateside heavy force is solely sea-deployable, it rapidly loses relevance to lighter options like Marines and double-hulled and possibly up-gunned Stryker. So if upgraded Bradleys remain under 80,000 lbs, maybe they are a viable alternative with some other organizational and equipment changes.

Thought I read something about moving to as many as 13 Stryker BCTs. From that, you quickly envision a near equal number of Stryker BCTs, Infantry BCTs, and Heavy BCTs. With ARFORGEN rotations, that leaves about 3-4 of each BCT type available to deploy dependent on how much you continue to deploy Army Soldiers...and some of those are advise and assist brigades. Is air deployment of 2-3 heavy combined arms battalions unrealistic? It certainly would be a deterrent with parked C-17s sitting loaded with heavy gear on Guam and elsewhere during periods of tension.

With M-ATVs, and smaller number of GCVs and tanks in the air-deployed HBCT MTOE, you are well on your way to a wide area security force with an organic stability ops and self-sustainment capability to carry extra fuel, food/water, and ammo, or relief supplies. You also can carry augmenting light infantry fire teams and unmanned systems for distributed noncontiguous ops with heavy-light task forces. And M-ATV can deploy via 747-400s.

[Cole]

The German Puma and the 90's Marder 2 prototypes went beyond 40 (metric!) tons already. Eastern Europeans developed some MBT/APC crossbreeds and the Near East seems to like the heavier HAPC (APC on MBT chassis, no turret) idea.

The weight by itself isn't the problem in my opinion; the concept as a whole made no sense.



IFV development is a bit on autopilot; armies forget to think about the basic idea of an IFV. The original, WW2-derived idea of an IFV is long since obsolete, as is the Russian idea of a ICV that rides through nuke-devastated terrain.

We're left with moderately armed vehicles with a mixed vehicle combat and infantry transport role that close in with MBTs (100% fighting machines) in regard to sensors and other gadgetry.
In the end, both Western and Eastern heavy brigades and divisions have only IFVs as infantry transports. These infantry transport vehicles have few seats, so our divisions and brigades lack the infantry for more than providing security to MBTs.

We can improve the firepower element of the IFV (=rapid fire + ATGMs) very much and improve the dismount strength very much by separating them into a combat vehicle like BMP-T and a HAPC. Add some classic APCs for additional infantry and you might end up with a much better heavy formation both in versatile firepower and infantry strength.

The IFV compromise has become way too elaborate and is no good choice any more. The GCV all-eggs-in-one-gold-plated-basket approach was in(s)ane.

I've read that blitzkrieg was largely a product of getting the war over with before logistics ran short. The WWII Germans were hindered by lots of horse-drawn logistics and had special brigades designed to seize enemy supplies. Well both strategies and huge tanks didn't work too well on the eastern front or eventually in the Ardennes. Even our smaller tanks had logistics problems straining the Red Ball Express. And we want even more behemoths?

Whatever happened to the old saying about amateurs and logistics...and trust me I'm an amateur, but still am mindful of the loggies who are going to need to be more plentiful and vulnerable to protect combat arms guys with excessive armor.

Pete mentioned earlier, and you touch on it here that heavy forces are ideal for nuclear and chemical warfare. MAD fortunately precluded that in the Cold War. But today's risk of small scale nuclear employment and terrorism is very real from rogue states and stateless entities with unstable or misguided leadership. HBCTs become the sole means of cleaning up afterwards because heavy armor and elevation off the ground to protect against IEDs also protects against radiation.

BTW, in the eighties, I volunteered for an unclassified chemical warfare research project (to get necessary flight time) that had researchers injecting 12 of us with atropine and sending us out flying instruments and navigating NOE. Raises body core temps, makes you blind close up and in need of your shaded visor, and two injections make you nauseous-feeling yet you can't throw up. One injection did not seem bad but I'm perpetually around 245 lbs. Two injections ruins your day. It was a blind study that included a placebo but it was obvious which was which.

[Fuchs]

The heavy tanks actually worked out greatly. The kill ratios were beyond impressive, even the supposedly failure behemoths such as Elefant/Ferdinand were huge successes and many copies survived very long in the war.
The insanity began only beyond 70 tons (British, French and Americans also had too heavy tanks under development).

Blitzkrieg is an operational concept that works out very well if you have a qualitative edge. The ultimate failure was rooted on the strategic level and the gradual loss of this qualitative edge (the latter in part because truck production never caught up with at least the peacetime attrition rate!).


I am personally no fan of very heavy tanks, but modern technology pretty much requires 40, maybe 50 metric tons weight for a combat vehicle that move intentionally against the enemy. Another (support) vehicle family that is not meant to move voluntarily into duel situations can be built at much lower weight - comparable to Strykers.

Both depends on the expectations. You can go up to 70 tons if you decide not to tolerate this or that threat and cannot resist the urge to protect your combat vehicle against a few more threats. Alternativel you could aim at the lower 4x metric ton rnage as did Germany with the Puma and Japan with tis newest MBT.
Even non-combat vehicles can go beyond 30 metric tons if you don't tolerate certain vulnerabilities (as happened with the GTK/Boxer project, which has to satisfy protection requirements in excess of many IFV protections). The lower end for this is well below 10 metric tons, CVR(T), for example.


Armoured vehicles are after all never invulnerable - it's all about a compromise. You look at the different threats and choose the ones the vehicle has to be protected against. You need to make this list rather long to make it viable as a combat vehicle, for commanders will otherwise either lose their combat AFVs real quick or not dare to use them in brazen actions.


edit: German heavies had a suspension design with overlapping/interleaving road wheels that distributed the pressure better on the ground than the fewer road wheels of modern MBTs. The consequence of this and the great track width was a very low peak ground pressure (mean maximum pressure index) and as a result to real problem with ground pressure.
The durability of some components was a dynamic system problem, though.

[Infanteer]

[QUOTE=Fuchs;105765]The armament is nothing special, rather weak indeed. A CV9035 has clearly superior firepower.
The MK30-2 uses only two cartridges;
* ABM, air burst munition - AHEAD type. Minimal bursting charge.
* APFSDS
There we have two munitions, both with serious issues. ABM has no explosive power to eat its way through a wall, for example. It can only defeat exposed soft targets.
APFSDS has the old problem of discarding sabot ammunition for IFVs; the discarded SABOTs create a dangerous zone, so it's tricky to have infantry ahead.[QUOTE]

We use a third type, FAPDS, as a middle ground. It still has the discarding sabot but it can eat through things.

[gute]

A double v-shaped hull Stryker with tracks instead of wheels might be something to consider for a future GCV.

A heavy-light mix, air deployable HBCT consisting of the CV90 family of vehicles, namely CV90120, CV9030, and CV90 APC Armadillo.

Sea deployable HBCT with M1, M2 and the Namer. A mech infantry platoon would have two brads and three Namers.

It seems to me we are trying re-invent the wheel and/or a one size fits all - the capabilities are out there and can be had now. Unless the future GCV has a cloaking device, we should look at Brad upgrades, CV90, and the Namer.

Question: Can older M1 tank chasis be utilized to build something like the Namer or is this prevented by the location of engine?

I really like the idea of a tracked Stryker - a design that is battle tested.

[Fuchs]

A real HE-frag with electronic time fuze and with point detonation (enough delay for 5cm of wall), similar to the OCSW ammunition would have been more versatile.

That Ahead design seems to be optimised against exposed soft targets, including probably small UAVs. The ammunition load isn't great either - it restricts to a kind of 30mm sniping if it needs to last for a whole day of fighting.

Question: Can older M1 tank chasis be utilized to build something like the Namer or is this prevented by the location of engine?

The Jordanians converted rear engine vehicles to HAPCs, but the amount of effort you need to put into rebuilding would likely not be affordable in the U.S..

[Pete]

Some 1930's armoured cars were superior to most Stryker versions in vehicle/vehicle combat.

That reminds me of the old days:

Vor der Kaserne
Vor dem großen Tor
Stand eine Laterne
Und steht sie noch davor

[gute]

Let's open the GCV to a nationwide design competition - make it the GCV Idol. I bet that will produce a GCV with a cloaking device, transporter, kitchen sink, and starboard and port attachments.

[gute]

A real HE-frag with electronic time fuze and with point detonation (enough delay for 5cm of wall), similar to the OCSW ammunition would have been more versatile

That Ahead design seems to be optimised against exposed soft targets, including probably small UAVs. The ammunition load isn't great either - it restricts to a kind of 30mm sniping if it needs to last for a whole day of fighting.



The Jordanians converted rear engine vehicles to HAPCs, but the amount of effort you need to put into rebuilding would likely not be affordable in the U.S..

We could outsource it to China and India like everything else. Or, we can build Mexican laborer armament factories. I know that was not pc.

[Fuchs]

You could do a lot. You could also simply employ some unemployed directly or even send unnecessary staff members to an army depot for a course in welding and for rebuilding those vehicles.
That's not how things work, though. Profit-driven companies would attempt to suck as much money out of the system for some welding works as possible, and they would succeed. It's the American (Western) way of military procurement.

[Pete]

Sometimes industry comes up with revolutionary innovations, such as this. The Spencer rifle and carbine were the first magazine-fed small arms in the U.S. military inventory. The inventor Christopher Spencer also invented the pump-action shotgun after the war.

[Fuchs]

I wouldn't call that "industry".

[gute]

You could do a lot. You could also simply employ some unemployed directly or even send unnecessary staff members to an army depot for a course in welding and for rebuilding those vehicles.
That's not how things work, though. Profit-driven companies would attempt to suck as much money out of the system for some welding works as possible, and they would succeed. It's the American (Western) way of military procurement.

You do realize I was kidding.

Nothing on my idea of a tracked Stryker - a no go?

[Tukhachevskii]

Question: Can older M1 tank chasis be utilized to build something like the Namer or is this prevented by the location of engine?

I wouldn't worry about the position of the engine as much as the engine itself. The Temsah's engine was so complex (due less to sophistication and more extant the level of technology) that they simply decided to turn the rear into the front. The Temsah essentialy drives backwards. What concerns me more (yes I have thought about the idea myself) is the type of engine installed. The choice of a turbine was, IMO only, plain dumb but understandible. US doctrine saw tanks making rapid tactical advanced from potion to position rather than operational movement (strategic movement was essentially a question about sealift). A gasoline guzzling engine was thus een a s a favourable tradeoff for the tactical manouevrability it afforded the M1. You don't need that now (didn't even need it then IMO). You can talk about armour and armament all you want (I have and do, more so when slightly inebriated) but it's the powerpack and drivetrain that are as, if not more, important. Remember the trinity , no not Clausewitz' although one could spin it that way philosophically speaking, for armoured (indeed most warfare); Protection, Mobility, Firepower. The Leo 1 traded (physical) protection for mobility on the (correct) assumption that moving about the battlefield was a better idea than sitting around presenting a large target (it was a dual purpose decision and highlights the relationship between the "armour trinity" and doctrine/employment). Nowadyas there is really only one calibre (120mm) for tanks (140mm being a still immature round in all but conventional for which there are 120mm rounds than can match it).

For a HAPC I can't see why the conversion of an M1 into a HAPC with a RCWS could be done but with the U.S. Congress penetrated by vested industrial interests and congressmen on the payroll I don't see that happening anytime soon. Sorry, if this post rambles, just had chocolate bar and got all tingly at the thought of armour (are tankers the armour encased equivalent of leather-clad fetishsists?)

[Pete]

I wouldn't call that "industry".

I don't know what else to call it. They were made by the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company of Boston, Massachusetts. Some were made under a subcontract to the Burnside Rifle Company of Providence, Rhode Island, owned by the Union general for whom "sideburns" are named after.

[Cole]

Blitzkrieg is an operational concept that works out very well if you have a qualitative edge. The ultimate failure was rooted on the strategic level and the gradual loss of this qualitative edge (the latter in part because truck production never caught up with at least the peacetime attrition rate!).


I am personally no fan of very heavy tanks, but modern technology pretty much requires 40, maybe 50 metric tons weight for a combat vehicle that move intentionally against the enemy. Another (support) vehicle family that is not meant to move voluntarily into duel situations can be built at much lower weight - comparable to Strykers.

I'll take your word for the ground pressure and wear on vehicles. I'm thinking more about the fuel consumption, HETs, vehicle recovery, wear on roads, and difficulty finding strong enough bridges. We all know who ends up paying for road/bridge repairs after the war.

When you think 500 gallons a fill-up for a 2 gallon per mile Abrams, a 2 mpg/175 gallon tank Bradley starts looking pretty darn good to the fuel truck driver...and a 5 mpg/60 gallon tank Stryker looks even better. Gotta figure a 53 ton GCV would be no bettter than 1 mpg, requiring a 300 gallon fuel tank. Multiply those figure by 58+ tanks/GCVs in a combined arms battalion and the brigade support company is in a world of hurt every few hours.

Blitzkrieg also had an air component that Germany had and did not face at first, but did face later in Russia and with the P-51 etc. Today's opponent attempting blitzkrieg would be constrained by F-35s and F-22s, AH-64D/Cobras, eventually A-10s, MLRS, blown bridges, and Volcano mines before encountering the first tank/GCV.

It puzzles me that with the lessons learned from threat use of IEDs, that we don't consider using cheap timed mines and MARKED, registered minefields in places like Afghanistan to canalize the Taliban. Smart mines had been planned for FCS and still should have a place on our future battlefield, IMHO.

[Cole]

I wouldn't worry about the position of the engine as much as the engine itself. The Temsah's engine was so complex (due less to sophistication and more extant the level of technology) that they simply decided to turn the rear into the front. The Temsah essentialy drives backwards. What concerns me more (yes I have thought about the idea myself) is the type of engine installed. The choice of a turbine was, IMO only, plain dumb but understandible. US doctrine saw tanks making rapid tactical advanced from potion to position rather than operational movement (strategic movement was essentially a question about sealift). A gasoline guzzling engine was thus een a s a favourable tradeoff for the tactical manouevrability it afforded the M1. You don't need that now (didn't even need it then IMO). You can talk about armour and armament all you want (I have and do, more so when slightly inebriated) but it's the powerpack and drivetrain that are as, if not more, important. Remember the trinity , no not Clausewitz' although one could spin it that way philosophically speaking, for armoured (indeed most warfare); Protection, Mobility, Firepower. The Leo 1 traded (physical) protection for mobility on the (correct) assumption that moving about the battlefield was a better idea than sitting around presenting a large target (it was a dual purpose decision and highlights the relationship between the "armour trinity" and doctrine/employment). Nowadyas there is really only one calibre (120mm) for tanks (140mm being a still immature round in all but conventional for which there are 120mm rounds than can match it).

For a HAPC I can't see why the conversion of an M1 into a HAPC with a RCWS could be done but with the U.S. Congress penetrated by vested industrial interests and congressmen on the payroll I don't see that happening anytime soon. Sorry, if this post rambles, just had chocolate bar and got all tingly at the thought of armour (are tankers the armour encased equivalent of leather-clad fetishsists?)

How realistic is this? I envision a transverse-mounted 4'x 8' diesel engine compartment in front. Behind it would be batteries, electric engine, fuel tank, and driver sitting in the next 3' x 8' behind the diesel engine. So with 7' of vehicle length accounted for, you now decide how big a turret you want. Obviously a 4' turret with just a gunner is adding less length to the vehicle than a 6' or bigger turret...and much less turret armor weight.

So engine(s), driver, and turret in my assumed GCV are just 11' in length with a four foot turret. Because the interior is 8' wide, you have space to put a vehicle commander and dismount squad leader next to the offset 4' circumference turret to share common displays/radios and plan where to dismount. Now add 6' to 8' of length for dismounted troops dependent on the 3-row Marine or Army version and you have a 17' to 19' long vehicle.

Where did I err? Why does this vehicle need to be even the 21+ foot length of a Bradley let alone the 30' foot of an EFV?

The other reason a Abrams made sense was multiple forward-positioned divisions and infrastructure in Germany and equipment/supplies for many more in POMCUS and in bunkers. Same thing in Iraq the second time around with equipment in Kuwait. Where is that equipment going to be in the future? My bet is it will be both in the U.S., Diego Garcia, and other places pretty far from the battlefield. Facing unreal numbers of Soviet tanks, nobody decided the Bradley needed to be tank-sized.

[SethB]

Regardless of the decision to design the M1 with a turbine, the more recent failure is that of not replacing it. We have turbines (LV 100-5) and diesels (MTU 890) that are more than capable of doing the job. In fact, they can do the same job for less money, and they are about half the size and weight. Buying any of these engines and phasing them in at Anniston when the M1 undergoes its periodical refurbishment makes a lot of sense.

At the same time, we never bothered to purchase a light tank, instead buying the MGS...

[Fuchs]

I don't know what else to call it. They were made by the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company of Boston, Massachusetts. Some were made under a subcontract to the Burnside Rifle Company of Providence, Rhode Island, owned by the Union general for whom "sideburns" are named after.

These early capitalist manufacturies were not comparable to General Dynamics or Boeing which would likely get a complex tank reworking contract.
That's why I'd call them manufacturies to avoid misleading about their nature.


The fuel consumption of a MBT (and there are much more fuel-efficient ones than Abrams) is operationally of lesser importance than the its practical range, which in turn depends on consumption+tank size. The practical road range can actually increase with weight if you change a design to accommodate greater fuel capacity.

Most WW2 bridges in Europe were limited to 26 tons - even a T-34 faced bridge troubles. Most rivers weren't as tamed as they are today and had offered the alternative of fording in some places.
Recovery of heavy tanks was a problem, but this was obviously overcompensated with battle performance, from the total loss ratios (tanks lost vs. tanks killed) were still great, even superior to 25 ton tanks while taking into account per unit costs.

Heavy tanks always had their issues, but both the positive and negative myth-spinning around the German ones of WW2 was very distorting.


Not the historical record, but today's technology, threats, mission profiles and operational doctrine decide on the optimum weight range of combat vehicles. I say everything from 40 to 70 metric tons is debatable, and I personally prefer 40-50 metric tons for many reasons.


----
The use of mines to secure roads would immediately kill the war effort politically, it's therefore a self-defeating idea.