Iraq education and training (merged thread)

[GorTex6]

In Iraq the winning at the moral level needs to be defined, and not by Sun Tsu, but by someone familiar with the world we live in today.

While the classical three levels of war carry over into the Fourth Generation, they are joined there by three new levels which may be more important. Colonel Boyd identified these three new levels as the physical, the mental and the moral. Further, he argued that the physical level -- killing people and breaking things is the least powerful, the moral level is the most powerful and the mental level lies between the other two. Colonel Boyd argued that this is especially true in guerilla warfare, which is more closely related to Fourth Generation war than is formal warfare between state militaries. The history of guerilla warfare, from the Spanish guerilla war against Napoleon through Israel's experience in southern Lebanon, supports Colonel Boyd's observation. This leads to the central dilemma of Fourth Generation war: what works for you on the physical (and sometimes mental) level often works against you at the moral level. It is therefore very easy in a Fourth Generation conflict to win all the tactical engagements yet lose the war. To the degree you win at the physical level by pouring on firepower that causes casualties and property damage to the local population, every physical victory may move you closer to moral defeat. And the moral level is decisive.
-FMFM-1A, 4GW

[zenpundit]

Check slides 105 -111 with emphasis on 108

Patterns of Conflict:

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for the patterns of conflict of brief. I read the biography on Boyd a little over a year ago, and only wish I had read it sooner. I still wonder how such a profound thinker came out of the seat of fighter jet, but the answer was in his bio, he applied the principles of physics to war and sociology.

I understand the the concept behind your argument that we must win on the moral level, but remain sceptical that removing our Strykers and Armor will put us on the moral high ground. Regrettably I have to over simplify your arguments to keep this short. The question I asked before remains unanswered, how do we win the moral battle in Iraq?

Using Boyd's three forms of conflict, I think it is safe to say we won the maneuver fight, and we're now waging a war of attrition and a war on the moral front. The war of attrition doesn't need explanation, it may or may not be decisive.

The moral war is extremely challenging on at least three different levels: the moral war with the homefront, a moral war with the global audience, and most importantly a moral war with the Iraqi people (or more accurately peoples/tribes).

I won't belabor our challenges for gaining the moral high ground on the home front and with the global audience when the alleged reasons we went to war didn't bear any fruit yet. This is an extremely difficult obstacle to surmount, and the only mitigating factor may simply be time.

Winning the moral war with the Iraqi people is just as, or more, challenging outside of Kurdistan, as winning the moral war on the home and global fronts. We destroyed the Iraqi government and put a band aid in its place, and then we wonder why they can't respond to a crisis that is much more significant in scale than Huriccane Katrina? That is why I argue that OIF isn't a true counterinsurgency; furthermore, if this is true, then it is probable that strictly counterinsurgency strategies will probably fail to get us to the endstate we desire. Regime change requires a doctrine that is separate from counterinsurgency, even if many (if not most) of the lessons from previous counterinsurgencies are relevant.

Winning the moral war with Iraqi people will be extremely challenging when we attempt to establish a political system that flies in the face of their culture and history. Radical changes probably requires radical supporting actions like Mao and Lenin implemented. Obviously we don't want to go down that route. To compound the matters you have several different ethnic groups that do not trust one another, almost as bad as the Democrats and Republicans.

In the end I agree with the concept of winning on the moral level, but I think we better find other viable options in the meantime until we figure out how to achieve this concept on the ground.

On a happy note, I believe that if we stick with it we'll triumph, because our enemy is his own worst enemy. While we're struggling to define and obtain the moral high ground, our enemy doesn't even understand the concept. In time the Iraqi people will see this, and we'll have a cascading success.

[CPT Holzbach]

I agree that the Army is not fighting a counterinsurgency here in Baghdad. There is most certainly an insurgency going on, but much of what we do isnt aimed at defeating it, just protecting ourselves. The use of tanks and Bradleys is necessary in some situations, and I wouldnt remove them from theatre, but I would greatly scale back their use. However, this would require drastic changes in the way the Army conducts operations here, changes that arent going to happen. Here's the problem: IEDs are far and away the biggest killers of Coalition and Iraqi troops. Where are most of the IEDs? On the MSRs. What do we INSIST on using to get around Baghdad? The MSRs. And this is why we use tanks and such here: route security. Because HMMWVs dont fare as well as a tank in IED attacks. So we use tanks and Bradleys to patrol routes and find IEDs.

Why don't we just stop using the MSRs? Hell if I know.

Are there any aviation knowledgable people here who can tell me why we cant move people and stuff by helicopter, like in Vietnam? We move a little by air, but not much. (Rather ignorant of this aspect, really. Please correct me if Im wrong.)

In the urban environment, I believe the Bradley to be the ideal vehicle. Lighter and more maneuverable than a tank. The tank has more firepower, but very rarely do you need 120mm sabot rounds on the flimsy structures here. The 25mm rounds are quite sufficient, and cause vastly less collateral damage. Best of all it carries it's own dismounts ("dirtmounts" according to one of my old section sergeants...). For these reasons, I'd keep at least some Brads around for heavy street fighting occasions, and some tanks too, in smaller numbers.

But a change in the way we operate would largly eliminate our need for them. We would stay off the MSRs almost entirely. My battalion has proven this works. Our LTC said "No more route security on this route. So, no driving on this route, except in an emergency or with my personal approval." Lo and behold, we freed up half the battalion for other things, there has been no interference with our operations, and no one's been hurt on that route since. Would this not work on a larger scale with a guy wearing stars making the same proclaimation? I think it would.

[Martin]

Winning on the moral level in regards to armor is a matter of perception and feelings. Besides the possible consequences of how a civilian Iraqi perceives a war machine of steel and cannons in their streets, patrolling the streets on foot does not only eliminate such aspects - if not completely, so at least partially. It also moves it in the other direction as you have a much better opportunity to interact with the people on their level. Continuing this train of thought, you're signalling security and self-confidence, among other things.

Staying off MSRs... how about rolling out armor to staging points, which are changed to keep from ambush (would it be intelligent to ambush a heavy armor column?) and mining at its opening. Troops could then patrol from there or be inserted by chopper. Or with only heli/air support.

I don't know if that's possible or smart, but it's pretty interesting pondering what the insurgents would do if they have far fewer targets for their IEDs. Maybe more VBIEDs, or attacks on population, or they might be drawn out into the open - forced to fight to have effect.

Just another perspective... interesting discussion.

Martin

[GorTex6]

While we're struggling to define and obtain the moral high ground, our enemy doesn't even understand the concept. In time the Iraqi people will see this, and we'll have a cascading success.

At the ground level(E-1 to E-6), we do not want to understand the concept Pop culture demands it !

The enemy exploits it

[CPT Holzbach]

Mr. Moore said:

our enemy is his own worst enemy.

Indeed. We will win (or the Iraqis will) because the insurgents really are monsters. Many more people understand that then is recognized in the media.

Mr. Tex 6 said:

At the ground level(E-1 to E-6), we do not want to understand the concept

I find this to be one of the biggest tactical level problems over here, which can have strategic reach a la the "strategic corporal" effect. The soldiers and junior NCOs are not trained at all in this kind of war. My old unit (mortar platoon) really believed that hammering certain bad neighborhoods with HE rounds until the locals dropped dime on the bad guys would be an effective way of winning in Baghdad. I constantly had to tell them that such methods have never worked and wont work here either. Some of them just couldnt believe that. It revealed a drastic lack of training where it is (as always) needed most: at the soldier level.

Hysterical humor item: an ad by the United Nations Foundation in Foreign Policy magazine boasted that the UN "helped 8.2 million Iraqis make it to the polls" in 2005. Yeah...not so much. I dont remember seeing many blue helmets on the streets. The shamefully under-reported truth is this: the amazing turn out and security of the referendum was 99% the accomplishment of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Army and Police.

[GorTex6]

It revealed a drastic lack of training where it is (as always) needed most: at the soldier level.

Training is not the problem in this area; it is the socialization of the particular age/generation/era.