Iraq education and training (merged thread)

[Martin]

Could there have been a larger force? Perhaps initially, but the services are incredibly taxed already as it stands today. You see it in stop-loss, contracting, etc.

Sometimes when the people in charge are saying that the generals did not ask for more troops, I wonder if long-term sustainability and possibly the alleged discussion climate at the Pentagon may have something to do with it.

[Merv Benson]

Someday Gen. Abizad is going to have to explain why he did not request additional troops. When the issue was raised early on, both the President and the Secretary of Defense said that if the commanders say they need additional troops we will see that they get them. Yet, everytime Gen. Abaizaid was given the opportunity at congressional hearings and in interviews he said he did not need them. Early on the explanation was that they did not need more troops they needed better intelligence. The fact is they probably needed both, and they did not get both until the new Iraqi army forces were trained. There still seems to be some reluctance to admit the importance of force to space ratios in counter insurgency operations, but if you look at the impact of additional troops brought into Baghdad in the last few weeks, it is pretty clear that it works.

It also saves lives, since you do not have to buy the same space more than once.

The fear of being seen as an occupying army also seems over blown by the proponents of the small foot print strategy. It is clear now that the Iraqis in Baghdad were happy to see the US forces come in to protect their neighborhoods. It could be that this is just the results of the enemys campaign against non combatants waged for the last two years, but at this point the Iraqis know who is the bigger threat to non combatants and it is not the US troops.

Too much of the debate on this issue has been politicized by the media, war opponents and former generals. The man who was ultimately reonsible for the decision on force levels was the Centcom commander and he still needs to do a better job of explaining his decisions.

[jcustis]

Slapout,

That's a good statement at the end, 'Boots on the ground, eyes on the population, mind on the mission." I may reference that in the future, attributed to you of course.

[slapout9]

jcustis,thanks for the compliment. Send me of a copy of what ever you use it for if you can. All the way,Sir

[Ironhorse]

Heard this analogy, loosely paraphrased here, by Tim Russert in his teaser interview on this morning's local CBS new radio statio...

• Republicans are trying to make the case to the public that the war in Iraq is central to the GWOT. Parallel to Berlin/Moscow in the Cold War.
• Democrats are trying to make the argument that the war in Iraq is a distraction from the GWOT, sort of like Vietnam in the Cold War.

Forget the political parties for a second and consider from the warfighter's perspective -- which do you think? What would GWOT look like if we weren't in Iraq? Would we be better off? Take it from now going forward...should Iraq be the GWOT Main Effort, or shift to a Supporting Effort, in which case where would the Main Effort be?

I believe Iraq may have started as a distraction but has grown to the point where it is now central. Some folks have attributed a certain Machiavellian wisdom to it all, like that was the plan all along. I think imperial hubris is at least as likely. But that was then, this is now, and it is as core to GWOT as core gets. Main effort.

[UCrawford]

Bill,

I'd argue that the war in Iraq is a distraction from the War on Terror simply for the reason that the President has yet to define a comprehensive strategy for what we hope to achieve there. Are we aiming for stability in the region? Are we attempting to democratize the area? What are our goals? Who are our enemies and our allies in the region? What resources are we willing to commit to achieve our goals? Are our military forces being used to further some greater purpose, or are they merely being used as bait to draw terrorists to Iraq?

None of these questions has been seriously answered by the administration and without a true strategy the war in Iraq serves no real purpose of any kind. It's just a conflict without an agenda. You could also make the argument that the insurgency in Iraq isn't actually about attacking America either, but is more about merely filling the power vacuum left when Saddam Hussein was removed...a vacuum we quite frankly didn't do a great job of filling after we removed him. In that scenario the killing of Americans is more of a secondary goal than a primary one.

-UCrawford

[Ironhorse]

First, I promise not to stalk this thread and reply to every single reply like an incessant nag.

Second, excellent point re absence of clarity, a winning strategy, and a vision of what winning means. I think that rings as true for GWOT as for the War in Iraq as you stated.

I'd argue that the war in Iraq is a distraction from the War on Terror simply for the reason that the President has yet to define a comprehensive strategy for what we hope to achieve there...

My claim that I believe they are now inextricably linked (whatever they are) does not mean that either are being prosecuted with WWII clarity strategically. With the water that is under the bridge, though, I do claim that we can not now "lose" Iraq without a fatal body blow to the broader GWOT.

[UCrawford]

True, but with the War on Terror as it existed before Iraq, the mission was to remove direct threats against the U.S. (al-Qaeda) and capture the leaders responsible for 9/11. We're further from that goal than ever before right now.

Iraq is an irrelevant sidebar into interfering with Middle Eastern politics. I agree that we can't immediately cut and run from Iraq and just let the country fall apart. But I disagree with the idea that we can somehow force them to adopt Western democracy like communists attempted to force communism on other countries during the Cold War. True democracy comes from internal desire of the people, not because another country invades and tells you that you're now a westernized republic with a market economy. The smarter move, I'd argue, would be to stabilize the area enough for the Iraqi military and police to control it themselves, then leave the Iraqis to find their own path. If you do that a fundamentalist failed state in Iraq, such as the one that existed in Afghanistan, is unlikely due to Iraq's geographic location, demographic makeup and its utility as an oil producer (all very different than Afghanistan's). If the country fragments after stabilization, it will likely do so in a much less disruptive fashion, and if it succeeds the Iraqi people would be more likely to appreciate us for letting them find their own way, rather than forcing our ways upon them. At least we wouldn't be throwing money and troops' lives down an unproductive hole like we are right now.

The biggest threat to us is independent non-nation affiliated players like al-Qaeda anyway, not state-sponsored terror groups.

[cmetcalf82]

True, but with the War on Terror as it existed before Iraq, the mission was to remove direct threats against the U.S. (al-Qaeda) and capture the leaders responsible for 9/11. We're further from that goal than ever before right now

The arguement for the original invasion was that Iraq possessed WMD and connections to terror groups. If the administration belived this intelligence than it acted in such a manner as to further the GWOT. There is much debate about their actual beliefs but their perception is what mattered.

I also agree with Bill that the war in Iraq is now central to the WOT. Iraq continues to feed Islamic resentment of the U.S. and limits our ability to pursue other areas of the WOT because of resource constraints but losing now would provide the Islamic insurgency a victory of immense significance. So regardless of the original motivations or wisdom of the War in Iraq it is now central to the U.S. WOT for as long as it continues it breeds more terrorists and limits the U.S. ability to utilize resources on other targets.

[marct]

....So regardless of the original motivations or wisdom of the War in Iraq it is now central to the U.S. WOT for as long as it continues it breeds more terrorists and limits the U.S. ability to utilize resources on other targets.

I'm afraid I have to agree with you on this. In my darker and somewhat more paranoic moments, I really couldn't think of any US action that would be better suited to al Qaeda's needs except, possibly, a US led assault on Iran .

As far as the GWOT is concerned, at least at the level of grand strategy, Iraq has, unfortunately become central to all sides. The frustrating thing about it is not only the mismanagement and blunders involved in OIF, many of which are being corrected, but also the shifts in international diplomatic perceptions resulting from the flawed reasons for the invasion in the first place.

Bill's phrase "imperial hubris" really captures what I am getting at here - the US has lost a lot of face (and diplomatic credit) in the international scene as a result of starting the war using flawed intel, and is loosing more credit based on poor overall operations. One of the effects this is having is making it harder in the future to put international coalitions together while, at the same time, making it easier to split the existing ones.

Marc

[marct]

Yesterday, the Senate Intelligence Committee released their report on "postwar findings about Iraq's WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with pre-war assessments." http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf

In today's CBC story on the report(http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/nation...ia-report.html, Senator Kit Bond is quoted as saying

Yet to make a giant leap in logic to claim that the Bush administration intentionally misled the nation or manipulated intelligence is simply not warranted.

My initial reaction to that quote was something along the lines of "never ascribe to malice what can be explained by stupidity". Then I started to get really scared....

Marc

[Merv Benson]

There are still some undeniable facts about what led the US and its allies to war in Iraq. Saddam was required by his cease fire agreement and 17 UN resolutions to account for his WMD. It was his burden and not the CIA or US intelligence's burden to account for his WMD and have the weapons inspectors supervise their destructions.

He wholly failed in this obligation and played a cat and mouse game with the inspectors and thumbed his nose at his obligations under the cease fire agreement and the UN resolutions. He could have avoided the war simply by complying. While the post war analysis could not find most of his WMD what it really means is that much of it is still unaccounted for. This should be a bigger worry than the political second guessing of those who did not want to use force in Iraq to make him comply with his obligations.

He also brutalized his own people in violation of his obligations under the UN resolutions and paid money to the families of terrorist Palestinians. Many of the thugs that he used to brutalize the population of Iraq are still doing it under different management.

A non politicized look at intelligence failures is worthwhile, but this second guessing and name calling is not productive to dealing with our foreign enemies and it should not be used to make bad faith charges against political opponents in this country.

[SWJED]

I agree with those of the opinion that while Iraq may not have been central to our successful prosecution of the GWOT in 2003 and earlier - it is now. Cutting our losses and pulling out would be perceived as an enormous victory to the extended Islamist terrorist network; provide yet another terrorist 'safe haven' (failed-state) for planning, training and logistical support; and further destabilize a region vital to our national security interests. Yet another vacuum would follow a withdrawal and most certainly this vacuum would be filled by Iran, Syria and non-State actors hostile to the West.

I also have to agree with Merv, if not for the same reasoning, that a 'healthy’ look at our past mistakes to enable needed adjustments in strategy and TTP is desirable – an ‘unhealthy’ look for simple political gain in an election year is borderline treason and does much to further potential defeat in Iraq and elsewhere. While the Democrats seem more prone to using the GWOT as a political tool there is enough blame on both sides of the aisle to go around.

While I am on the soapbox - I am also miffed about criticism heaped on those who have written about our strategic, operational and tactical mistakes in Iraq. In some cases their patriotism has been questioned and to put it bluntly that is a bunch of bull.

I concede that there are many of the 24-7 anti-U.S. crowd who revel in our mistakes to justify their misguided notions; but I will also offer that there are many who look at those mistakes as lessons learned, relearned and unlearned. These are lessons that must be addressed to enable successful operations in the future.

[marct]

Hi Merv,

There are still some undeniable facts about what led the US and its allies to war in Iraq. Saddam was required by his cease fire agreement and 17 UN resolutions to account for his WMD. It was his burden and not the CIA or US intelligence's burden to account for his WMD and have the weapons inspectors supervise their destructions.

True, at least as far as it being his burden to account for his WMD according to both the cease fire agreement and the UN resolutions. I would certainly not argue that he acted in "good faith" in the matter at all .

As to the CIAs analysis or, rather, the one that was used as the justification to the war, I would certainly argue that it was both the CIA and the Bush administration's burden to make sure that they had the most accurate analysis available. The problem I was trying to point out was that using that analysis as a causus belli and, most importantly, having it publicly proven that the analysis was slanted, has

1. reduced the credibility of similar claims in the future;
2. led to a lot of international questioning of the motives of the administration; and
3. has squandered a lot of international, grass roots support for the GWOT.

He wholly failed in this obligation and played a cat and mouse game with the inspectors and thumbed his nose at his obligations under the cease fire agreement and the UN resolutions. He could have avoided the war simply by complying.

Sure he did - and so have North Korea and the Sudan to name just two other countries. In and of itself, that is not an internationally recognized justification for war that has the effect of binding international allies.

While the post war analysis could not find most of his WMD what it really means is that much of it is still unaccounted for. This should be a bigger worry than the political second guessing of those who did not want to use force in Iraq to make him comply with his obligations.

Hmmm, that's the logic of the excluded third . I certainly remember coming across rumours that a fair number of WMD raw materials and components had been smuggled out via Syria to the Sudan. Should it be a major concern? Yup, no question about it.

He also brutalized his own people in violation of his obligations under the UN resolutions and paid money to the families of terrorist Palestinians. Many of the thugs that he used to brutalize the population of Iraq are still doing it under different management.

Again, I really have to respond with a "so what?" So do the North Koreans, the Sudanese and a whole host of other countries including China. Would you argue that that is enough justification for an invasion and occupation in and of itself? I would agree that it is a good secondary claim - more of a secondary justification really - but it certainly isn't enough in and of itself.

A non politicized look at intelligence failures is worthwhile, but this second guessing and name calling is not productive to dealing with our foreign enemies and it should not be used to make bad faith charges against political opponents in this country.

I certainly agree that a non-politicized look at intel failures is quite worthwhile - no question about that . I would argue, however, that one of the effects of this particular intel failure has been a series of political repercussions at the international level and that is also worth looking at. The sheer fact that there are questions being asked both inside the US government and by other governments and media outlets about whether it was an "intelligence failure" or a case of slanting available intel to meet pre-existing administration desires impacts on the international perceptions of both the credibility and effectiveness of US intelligence and any claims that may be made stemming from that intelligence.

Is it a "bad faith charge" when you examine why your allies question the validity of your intelligence and start questioning the motivations behind your requests?

Merv, in order to effectively pursue the GWOT, we have to think about it as a global form of counter-insurgency warfare, and part of what that means is that there has to be a fairly high level of international trust in US intelligence and in the motivations behind suggested opperations. That means that an intelligence "failure" of this type has an importance far beyond the borders of the USA.

I think Bill hit the nail on the head in his first post of this thread when he said

I believe Iraq may have started as a distraction but has grown to the point where it is now central (to the GWOT).

Part of the centrality I see centers around the justifications based on the "intelligence failure" and the public administration responses to the increasingly public, at least internationally, belief that it wasn't a failure but, rather, a purposive slanting of available intelligence. *That* really concerns me and, in truth, I think that the loss of international credibility and trust is much more important than finding the location of any remaining WMD. I'm certainly not advocating that we stop looking for them, but I think claims that since we haven't found them they must be hidden even better than we though are pretty damaging.

Personally, I don't believe what most politicians say anyway (although there are a few exceptions to that). I do, howver, find the idea of a Republican senator implying that it was stupidity on the part of the Bush administration to be very worrysome - certainly that was how I interpreted the remark of his that I quoted.

Marc

[aktarian]

• Democrats are trying to make the argument that the war in Iraq is a distraction from the GWOT, sort of like Vietnam in the Cold War.

I fail to see how Vietnam was a distraction from Cold War. If one defines US mission as preventing communists from coming to power in non-communist countries then Vietnam was exactly that. If US mission was to prevent spread of Soviet influence then vietnam was that as well.

That those missions weren't accomplished is irrelevant here, Vietnam fitted neatly into US policy during cold war.

To invest my own €0,02 into Iraq/GWOT, I think it's a distraction. That it's now portraited as important part of GWOT shouldn't hide the fact that it's not the only one and it was an addition to existing ones. Unecessary opening of another front when original one (Afghansitan and capturing OBL) is far from quiet.

[Uboat509]

My .02 cents,

I do believe that Iraq is very important to the GWOT. To begin with, I think that the whole argument that Iraq is a distraction from our efforts in Afghanistan or that it is draining resources that could be better used in the hunt for UBL, is a straw man. First of all, more troops wandering around the mountains isn't going to make much difference, numbers will not take the place of reliable intelligence. We need to break the code on how to win hearts and minds, particularly along the border with Pakistan. We can send all ten divisions and all the reserves and national guard but until we can make some headway in the populace it won't matter a hell of a lot. In any case more troops in Afghanistan won't help in the search for UBL anyway because all the data that we have (open source anyway) suggests that he is not even in Afghanistan anyway. And unless we are contemplating invading Pakistan and either forcing Musharef to fight against us or fomenting a coup that would depose Musharef and probably put nuclear arms in the hands of Islamic hardliners, then the rhetoric about not doing enough to find UBL is a bit disingenuous.

As for Iraq, I believe we were in the position that we had to demonstrate our resolve. The President laid out who the enemy with the Axis of Evil. Afghanistan was a reaction to a direct attack on our soil, it is hardly a test of national resolve. To prove to our enemies as well as our allies that we can be proactive as well as reactive we had to take action against one of the members of the Axis of Evil. The UN has repeatedly proven that talk is cheap. Dictatorships and Islamic fundamentalists are not impressed by talk or weak measures like sanctions. America needed to act and the President had given us three possible targets. Iraq was the obvious choice. We had legal grounds, we had experience fighting the Iraqis and we had already weakened the Iraqi army significantly. I suppose that an argument that we should have gone to Iran first but that would have been much harder to justify legally and I have yet to hear any military person suggest that we should have gone to North Korea first.

In any case, as has been stated elsewhere, whether or not we should have gone to Iraq is moot. To fail now would be a huge victory for the enemy. The enemy deals in perceptions and the perception that we are weak would be nothing more than blood in the water.

SFC W

[Stu-6]

Iraq is obviously a distraction, since the so called war on terror is war against the global jihadist movements of which the Iraqi government was never apart of, furthermore the war in Iraq not only took away US resources from the war against the jihadist it alienate allies and became a recruiting tool for the jihadist. The catch is due to our poor persecution of the war we have created a situation where our withdraw could very easily lead to large uncontrolled section of country which could the become operating areas for the jihadist (though it might be fair to argue that this has already happened)

[Jimbo]

Today a JAG and I had a debate over wording in Descision Support Matrix (DSM) he used the phrase pre-conflcit leaders, and argued that it should say legitimate "host nation" leaders. The scenario was based on the U.S. providing assistance to a country threatened by a neighbor that utilized an internal gurilla movement as well to try and grab territory from our ally. I contended that in "Phase IV" of a conflcit where there is an existing central government, that the governement is going to have the say so on who the regional and governmental officials are, and that they might not be the guys who had the job before hostilities broke out. My armor compadre pointed out that this wasn't an Iraq scenario, and we, as a military, had to understand that in many situations where we might execute COIN/FID/SRO/SASO (it's a small war, regardless of what letters you call it) that we would not be starting with either blank slate or blank slate that we as the U.S. are creating. He pointed out that we had to respect the wishes of the government we are supporting. Only about 3 or 4 out of 10 really understood what the tanker was saying initially. As he and I headed to the parking lot, he opined to me that he felt the U.S. Army was to wrapped around the axle with Iraq, and that we were developing a whole crop of leaders and staff officers who just "weren't going to get it" the next time we have to fight a small war. I agreed whole heartedly with him.

What is the opinion that you guys have or are seeing out there?

[Steve Blair]

I would say he's correct, and it's a trend that historically we've seen before. All too often these things fall into either an ideal state discussion (such as the NTC/Fulda Gap type scenarios) or the current situation discussion (such as we saw during Vietnam and then again with Iraq. Back "in the day" you saw Army officers more concerned with refighting the Civil War instead of focusing on the situation they had at hand (the Indian Wars in this case).

It's a difficult trend to overcome, but it's one that we need to tackle.

[SWJED]

... As he and I headed to the parking lot, he opined to me that he felt the U.S. Army was to wrapped around the axle with Iraq, and that we were developing a whole crop of leaders and staff officers who just "weren't going to get it" the next time we have to fight a small war. I agreed whole heartedly with him.

What is the opinion that you guys have or are seeing out there?

From what I have gathered Ricks' quote in Fiasco may be very close to the mark...

One senior officer in Iraq told me earlier this year that about one-third of his subordinate officers "get it," one- third are trying but not really getting it, and one-third just want to kick a little butt. That means your force is probably less than half effective, and part of it is counterproductive.

Lots of stuff to think about here: (1) How do we ensure the one-third who get it are empowered; enabled to influence plans, policy, doctrine, training and TTP and how do we retain this one-third? (2) How do we train and educate the one-third trying to get it and how do we keep them out from under the influence of the one-third who just want to kick a little butt? (3) How do we get rid of the butt-kicking third who need to find a new line of work.