Iraq education and training (merged thread)

[CaptCav_CoVan]

I go back to my good friend Andy Krepinevich's book The Army in Vietnam describing the blind adherence to the "Army Concept" and I still belive that most of our military is paying lip service to the insurgency, while tucked in the back of their mind is the idea that this is a blip and they should still be preparing for the "big one' with all of its toys and technology.

Perhaps we need to take a part of the Marine Corps and train it as a constabulary/civil action/antiguerrilla force to focus on the small dirty wars that will be the main action for the foreseeable future.

To see what a good job we are doing winning the hearts and minds in Iraq, I direct you to the Brookings Institue briefing, "Iraq Public Opinion Amidst Increasing Violence."

[SWJED]

They are experienced, studied and motivated. The problem set is how to keep them and ensure they move up the food chain. I am talking about the "one-third" company and field-grade officers and NCO and SNCO's that get it. They are our best and brightest and can find success in any field they choose. How do we ensure they choose our line of work - for the long-term?

[Jimbo]

Thanks for the replies so far. When I referred to wrapped around the axle with Iraq, what I am seeing is that alot of field grade officer's want to apply Iraq as a cookie cutter solution to other small war scenarios. What myself and a few others were pointing out, that each situation has to be evaluated on it's own merits, and that policies utilized in Iraq might not be feasible or acceptable in a different secnario. The funny thing is that the split was a breakdown between Combat Arms guys(it ain't Iraq) and CS/CSS guys.

[SWJED]

The funny thing is that the split was a breakdown between Combat Arms guys(it ain't Iraq) and CS/CSS guys.

That is interesting as Combat Support and Combat Service Support have a huge part to play in the successful prosecution of COIN operations. Any more on this that you might like to share here on the Council?

[marct]

They are experienced, studied and motivated. The problem set is how to keep them and ensure they move up the food chain. I am talking about the "one-third" company and field-grade officers and NCO and SNCO's that get it. They are our best and brightest and can find success in any field they choose. How do we ensure they choose our line of work - for the long-term?

Well, there is a model for retaining them. Put simply, you create a new service which specializes in Small Wars. If you look at the historical evolution of the military in the West, we have tended to build our institutions around particular technologies of combat - e.g. infantry, cavalry, artillery, air, etc. Sometimes, mainly due to politics, a particular technology-oriented group becomes powerful enough to grab an institutional monopoly on some aspect of combat. Anytime when reality impinges on these institutional monopolies, we find them creating "special units" which are under their institutional control to handle reality.

The process of how this happens is, actually, quite simple and predictable. If anyone is interested, it was worked out by Andrew Abbott in his The System of the Professions - a truly brilliant work. While Abbott does not deal with the military, his analysis of the medical profession is a very good analog.

So, back to the retention question - create a service that owns an institutional monopoly on small wars with its own promotion ladders, etc. By basing a service on a task set or conflict type rather than on a technology, you can avoid the idiocies that come from an institution defending a clearly useless technology. Of course, given the current climate, I doubt that you would get much political support for this idea...

Marc

[Jimbo]

Well, to sum up the combat arms vs. CS/CSS guys has to do with experience and organizational cultures. These are all majors in this group. In my experience, CSS guys are focused on process over product while Combat Arms guys are focused on the end product. Experience in regards to fighting the war in Iraq/Afghanistan was pretty even, however, all of the combat arms guys had alot of deployment experience, independent of OIF/OEF, and had served in OC and AC/RC trainer roles. The CSS guys with the exception of one have been either in DC or advanced civil schooling.

Retention, everybody in my peer group is pretty much in for the long haul, and I have seen alot of positives. There is still huge institutional bias in the militayr. The Army has jumped on the small war bandwagon, but what happens when the level of operations drops off. Hopefully, we do not do the boneheaded things we did in the 1970's; call it an aberration and forget it.

[MASON]

Tech based units and professional skills based units work really well for what they were designed to do but often they are called to do other things. And due to the ubiquitus use of individual augmentee and frequent rotational nature of these deployed units they are handicapped when the mission changes they handle transitions particularly poorly. At best they rise to the occasion and at worst effectively degrade their capability from lack of cohesion and risk aversion. Instead support units should see their role as adapting apporpriate skill sets to conditions as percieved in order to achieve mission accomplishment for the combat commander.

It seems when the line asks the CSS to provide expertise for a job other than logistics the response is fine we will assemble a new team or create a new unit for the task. The strategic leadership in the subgroup professional fields thinks its job is to merely identify skill sets and assign and train the individuals in question in fairly traditional civilian professions. It seems that the applied use of the skill sets is left entirely up to the professionals sent, few guidlines are given verbally and no formal critique of unit performance is undertaken during or after deployment. Before doctrine or even guidlines for how units might deal with changing battlefield conditions are developed the unit configuration is changed.

by institutional design these CSS subcomponents rarely get it and when they do the experience is lost.

The professionals within the community as a result often see the whole deployment as an aberation in an otherwise standard career tract. Rather than asking themselves how can I help this or the next combat commander they support achieve his goals many are asking themselves how do I get through this. Consequently they by decision narrow the scope of capabilities they offer the supported commander. From the subgroups view risk is also controlled by this measure of limiting scope. I fear this is not unique to my field and as a result opportunities for success and support of mission goals are too often lost.

The Small Wars Manual stresses CSS generally but remains thin on practicle applications when looking at subgroups in CSS. Does the Army have anything in this regard or is there another source on CSS subgroup management? I am particularly interested in Medical/Surgical unit support and civil affairs roles And Casualty Evacuation management.

[Jimbo]

I agree, I actually alot of the Army is "getting it" at the tactical level. The problem is when you get into the operational and strategic levels. The problem I am observing with my CS/CSS peers doesn't have to do with these guys and their core competencies, it is their understanding of the big picture and how little things can lead to major failures. IMSAO, I feel that the Army as organization traditionally put the "big picture" understanding on the Combat Arms guys. I feel that the CS/CSS branches have got spend more time preparing their officers for life after battalion staff time. My $.02