The Battle of Baghdad

[Merv Benson]

CNN:

Iraqi troops Wednesday uncovered a kidnapping ring, seized weapons -- including three rockets -- and defused two roadside bombs after beginning a security clampdown on the often lawless streets of Baghdad.

In the first day of the new government's push to restore order in the capital, Iraqi troops also enforced a curfew from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. and issued a weapons ban for civilians.

Four insurgents were detained at one checkpoint after three people emerged from a car "screaming for help," said Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad.

"We found eight people that had been kidnapped now for four days that we were able to return back under control of the Iraqi government," Caldwell said. "They worked for an electrical company down south of Baghdad."

...

I think it will have an effect. Whether 80,000 is enough may be a question, but I don't think Saddam needed more than that to keep control. His methods were, however, much more brutal and terrifying.

[Jedburgh]

I think it will have an effect. Whether 80,000 is enough may be a question, but I don't think Saddam needed more than that to keep control. His methods were, however, much more brutal and terrifying.

Saddam had a much stronger security forces-to-population ratio, which consisted of concentric rings of watchers watching watchers. Each ring consisted of a blend of military, "law" enforcement and intelligence elements. Not to mention the ranks of informants, which, although they may not have reached East German levels, was still a formidable operation. I had the very interesting opportunity to view Saddam's Baghdad up close when I worked with UNSCOM in the mid-'90s. Think of Moscow under Stalin.

Having so many individuals with a depth of experiencing in running HUMINT and technical collection ops against their own people in their own country certainly provided the Sunni Arab insurgents with a certain advantage from the get-go. The Kurds, having essentially fought a vicious CI battle with the Mukhabarat since gaining autonomy during Provide Comfort, have developed a significant degree of expertise within their AO at foiling their ops. The Shi'a, having been constantly under the thumb of Saddam until OIF, never developed an equivalent CI capability. The new Iraqi regime still faces a significant challenge in developing an integrated CI capability that can meet the insurgent threat, but is still suitable for an emerging democracy. In fighting off the threat, we don't want to end up recreating the building blocks of dictatorship.

[S-2]

The sunni insurgent leadership will certainly take measures to "go to ground". However, their "soldiers" will have a much harder time doing so, I would think, if faced by the appearance of strong Iraqi Army/U.S. Army forces in their neighborhoods. If the checkpoints are indeed pervasive, coupled by our active patrolling of these neighborhoods, combat should ensue.

Moreover, while the Sunni insurgency is a long term endemic issue, which means that their forces and key operatives may do as much as possible to avoid combat, I can't imagine the same for Sadr City, nor it's militias, who derive their power by their open control of this huge ghetto. Both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades must be confronted and fought. They will, no doubt, lose and attempt exfiltration from Baghdad if confronted. This means following them south to Najaf and Basra.

My expectation is for this to happen. I can't imagine a facade of control existing for long in any circumstance short of bringing the militias, who are much more visible, to battle. High time it occurs, should it finally happen. Otherwise our commanders are kidding themselves on this latest endeavor.

[Jedburgh]

Item: - Phasing the operation and dealing with the militias:...Prime Minister Maliki has been very clear about the need to bring militias under control, and their has been some discussion of relocating some elements, giving them jobs, disarming them, etc. They cannot be treated in the same way as the insurgents, but they must be dealt with. Moreover, the clear litmus test is Sadr City and the Mahdi militia. Any operation that does not deal with this problem cannot bring security or stability to Baghdad.

BBC: Dozens Killed in Baghdad Attacks

Gunmen in the Iraqi capital Baghdad have killed at least 40 people at a fake police checkpoint, in an apparent sectarian attack against Sunni Muslims.

Police say Shia militants stopped cars in the western Jihad district, separated Sunnis and shot them...

Al Jazeera: Shia militia kills dozens in Baghdad

...The victims were gathered together, Sunnis were then separated according to the names on their identity cards and killed after about an hour, said Maitham Abdul-Razzaq, an Iraqi police lieutenant.

An Iraqi interior ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, said Shia militiamen wearing masks and black uniforms also roamed through the area, grabbing people from the street...

We are very damn close to the tipping point between fighting the insurgency and the outbreak of full-fledged sectarian warfare. Although both the coalition and the nascent Iraqi government have taken measures to interdict this drop into the abyss, too many missed opportunities and a lack of operational focus continues to channel actions in that direction.

If you haven't give it a read already, I recommend a once-over of Dr. Terrill's Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq, published last Feb by SSI.