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Thread: Military-led Development Efforts

  1. #21
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    First, three kinds of aid, not to be confused: relief, reconstruction, development.
    Although—and I'm sure you recognize this—the dividing lines between these are far from clear, and in many cases don't exist at all.

    The challenge with relief is to provide it in a way that addresses immediate humanitarian need without creating structural dependencies (reshaping human geographies through refugee camps, depressing local agricultural production through food aid, etc) or aggravates existing tensions (looting and taxing of relief supplies by combatants). Reconstruction almost always involves the sort of political and social challenges you discuss under the heading of development.

    As for development, I absolutely agree. However, credit where credit is due—there are a lot of folks in the development community (although certainly not all) who recognize that politics permeates everything, and unless you have a very good sense of the stakeholder dynamics (and some genuine local buy-in) you're not going to go anywhere.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  2. #22
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Although—and I'm sure you recognize this—the dividing lines between these are far from clear, and in many cases don't exist at all.
    Certainly true. There are many devils in many details, and the distinctions are often not clear... the transition from relief to reconstruction and development is particularly challenging and particularly complex.

    I do think, though, that from the point of view of an amateur development practitioner, such as a military officer with CERP funds at hand, the distinctions form a framework for beginning to understand the challenges.

    One thing that often creates problems, particularly with action-oriented foreigners with little time in an area and a problem-solving mentality, is the tendency to arrive at quick diagnoses and quick prescriptions. This can have exceedingly disruptive and sometimes disastrous consequences. I can't count the number of times I've seen a basically competent (and usually Western) outsider walk into a new environment, look around in a full circle, and declare that it makes no sense for everyone to be doing something this way when it could be done that way, which is so much better. I also can't count the number of times I've reminded people that if the way things are working doesn't make any sense to you it doesn't mean the people involved are stupid or irrational... it means there's probably something in the picture you don't know about.

    Of course nobody listens, but I repeat it anyway, at every opportunity...

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Reconstruction almost always involves the sort of political and social challenges you discuss under the heading of development.
    Also true... but fixing something that was there before and was destroyed has less inherent disruptive potential than trying to introduce something new. It can of course be argued (and has been) that disruption is at times desirable... but that road can lead to a lot of places, some of them very complicated indeed.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    credit where credit is due—there are a lot of folks in the development community (although certainly not all) who recognize that politics permeates everything, and unless you have a very good sense of the stakeholder dynamics (and some genuine local buy-in) you're not going to go anywhere.
    Very true... and very often folks in the development community end up taking directions their judgment tells them to avoid. That happens for a lot of reasons, not least the reality that agendas in the aid industry are often set by donors and funders, not by practitioners or intended beneficiaries.

    A very good sense of the stakeholder dynamics is very useful... but that can be many years in coming and a practitioner forced by circumstance to work in an unfamiliar environment often has to do without it. Coming from the perspective of the guy who went native, I think sometimes the rank novice to an area has an advantage over the guy with a mere 2-3 years in. At least the rank novice knows he's ignorant. The guy with only 2-3 years is still ignorant but thinks he's not... that's when it gets really dangerous!

    Genuine local buy-in is also good, but it's often hard to know when it's genuine, and it is wise to remember this (again assuming the pose of the old man on the mountaintop, preaching to the sky):

    When the local buy-in comes quick and easy and seems ever so genuine, and when the locals buying in tell you exactly what you most want to hear... beware, for you are probably being worked.

  3. #23
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    What I see that far too many see development (military or USAID or NGO led) in a community and also capacity building with security forces as an end unto themselves. As in, if I develop enough, the insurgency will end. If I build enough capacity, the insurgency will end. This misses some nuances that are critical for achieving effectiveness with such engagement, as both of these activities, if executed well, but in the wrong way can actually make the insurgency worse.

    Better to see development (and capacity building) as Ways, and I think it is fine for the military to be the Means for the engagement, but again, the critical point is in the 5Ws and H of the execution.

    I believe that the best way to look at such engagement is as a vehicle or perhaps an excuse, or what we called in our UW training back in the Q-course, one cover for action.

    This raises the question of, if development and capacity building are primarily my cover story for being in a community, or working with a security force, what is my primary reason for being there, and how do I go about moving that reason forward in the course of my engagement?

    For development, what one is trying to do is mend the damaged relationship between a populace and its government. A neutral third party bringing the two together over the excuse of some development project to help move the healing process forward in addressing the condition of insurgency that exists in that community. Sometimes it is getting the government officials out of their offices and out to meet their constituency; always it should be shaped so that the selection of the projects and the provision of the engagement reinforces the roles and authorities of local and higher level leaders. (Too often we are worried about getting credit for what we do, or show up with our own ideas of what needs to be done, or either purposely or inadvertently insult, embarrass, or dis-empower the leaders of the very relationship one is seeking to heal).

    Same with capacity building. Conventional forces given a mission to go teach BRM and tactical movement techniques see the measure of success being to build mirror image skills to their own in this unit. They focus on the training itself, and see the engagement as a failure if the skills are not developed, and will crush any relationship building in their disdainful, judgmental attitudes when the unit fails to meet the standards they see as "success." Our Regulars do this when the train with our own RC units as well, BTW. What they fail to grasp far too often, is that the real purpose of the engagement is to build this relationship, not some particular skills. Then, once a relationship is established, to subtly shape perspectives as to how this unit goes about engaging and interacting with its own populace as they go about their business of countering an insurgency. (This has paid tremendous benefits in the Southern Philippines, a primarily SOF effort, that has made visible, positive, differences in the relationship between the largely Muslim populace and the largely Christian security forces over the past 8 years).

    Just a couple of thoughts. Focus on the right thing for best effects.
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  4. #24
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    (This has paid tremendous benefits in the Southern Philippines, a primarily SOF effort, that has made visible, positive, differences in the relationship between the largely Muslim populace and the largely Christian security forces over the past 8 years).
    I have some doubts about whether the changes in the relationship between populace and security forces in that environment is going to last. People I talk to from that region uniformly state that while the perception of US forces is very good, the perception of Philippine forces remains dubious at best. The positive perception of US forces is less related to development projects, which are willingly accepted but seen as payoffs, than to the perceived ability of US forces to act as a restraint on Philippine forces: apparently the Philippine forces tend to behave better when Americans are around. This is not expected to last.

    The general expectation, as far as I can tell, is that as soon as the Americans leave it will be business as usual: the Philippine government will neglect the area unless someone else is putting up the funds, and the military will get back to their old ways.

    We'll see. I hope to be surprised, but I have to expect that it will go on. I don't think there's any real will to address the core issues in the Philippine government, military, or the majority Christian population. We often forget (they generally don't) that the core conflict is not insurgents vs government, but settlers vs indigenous inhabitants. The settlers are politically potent (in much of the area they are a majority) and pose a major constraint on the government's ability to negotiate or to effectively manage core issues. Much of the Christian populace harbors a quite extreme level of prejudice against the Muslims, is opposed to any concession, and would prefer to see them crushed by force.

    I'll be very curious to see what evolves in the Zamboanga/Basilan/Jolo area. The MNLF is I suspect terminally compromised, and since '94 Abu Sayyaf has been less a political movement than a criminal enterprise with a very nominal political facade. The criminal side has certainly cooperated with political elements, but it's been the criminal side - and the financial interests it represents - that drive the popular appeal, and that drive the long standing and thinly concealed relations between ASG and the government and military. ASG endured because it made money and distributed some of it, not because it represented the political aspirations of the populace.

    In some ways the expansion of the MILF as representative of the entire Muslim populace would be the logical development, but Tausug antipathy toward the Maguindanao/Maranao leadership of the MILF is a major obstacle.

    We'll see. Not to dismiss or demean the US efforts there, but I really don't see them doing more than scratching the surface, and the reports of epic success seem to me well exaggerated.

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