Peru & Sendero Luminoso (merged thread)

[SteveMetz]

What do you think of Steve Stern? Just got it from Amazon

[John T. Fishel]

it is a mixed bag of authors. A number of them are academics of both the left and the right. Among the better ones are Enrique Obando (former civilian #3 man in the Peruvian Defense Ministry) and Carlos Ivan DeGregori. The latter is also in Scott Palmer's Shining Path of Peru. Renique's writing on SL is incompetent and an ideological apology. Palmer's book is, i think, the definitive work - Scott was a Peace Corps Volunteer in the Unversity of Huamanga when Guzman was founding SL and teaching there. Guzman mounted a campaign to force Scott to be transferred.

I think that Max and my analysis is probably the best (and really the only) one to focus on the Peruvian COIN ops with good coverage of both SL and GOP strategy.

[SteveMetz]

it is a mixed bag of authors. A number of them are academics of both the left and the right. Among the better ones are Enrique Obando (former civilian #3 man in the Peruvian Defense Ministry) and Carlos Ivan DeGregori. The latter is also in Scott Palmer's Shining Path of Peru. Renique's writing on SL is incompetent and an ideological apology. Palmer's book is, i think, the definitive work - Scott was a Peace Corps Volunteer in the Unversity of Huamanga when Guzman was founding SL and teaching there. Guzman mounted a campaign to force Scott to be transferred.

I think that Max and my analysis is probably the best (and really the only) one to focus on the Peruvian COIN ops with good coverage of both SL and GOP strategy.

I'll pull it up. The Maxster is off on some boondoggle in Kingston, ON right now.

[slapout9]

Steve, are you going to let us read your paper here?

[bourbon]

This story may be of some use, its about the team that captured Abimael Guzman:

'Superman' Meets Shining Path: Story of a CIA Success, By Charles Lane. The Washington Post, December 7, 2000 ; Page A01.

[John T. Fishel]

reflects the bias of the sources (as does most good journalism).

CIA did play an important role in the fight against SL - even as far back as 1986. In the first Alan Garcia administration Peru was getting very little US assistance because of anger with Garcia's economic policies (debt service in particular). We, in Southcom, could do a few things - Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, occasional combined military exercises, and IMET training and education for individuals when Peru was in an open window from Brooke sanctions. CIA was not so limited and was able to build a relationship with the SIN and DIRCOTE (DINCOTE's predecessor) which the article makes clear was maintained after Fujimori became President.

Generally, the article underplays the role of Vidal and overplays that of CIA making no mention of other USG efforts. In short, it was a much more complex situation that the brief article suggests. For example, one of the keys to success was the Peruvian Army decision to support the development of the Rondas Campesinas (peasant militias) in the mountains. Another was the Army effort to go after SL and not the drug traffickers in the coca growing areas of the high jungle - the Upper Huallaga Valley - to the consternation of the US DEA which sabotaged the most effective COIN commander in the region with a major campaign of slander against him. (So the elements of the USG were working at cross purposes - what else is new? )

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

John, Steve or anybody else with a background on SL

I'm working on a short paper discussing the decline of SL. Basically I'm arguing that

1. The removal of Guzman was critical in the defeat of SL

2. This was only possible because SL was a highly organized "spider organization"

3. This is not common among most insurgencies because they operate under a "starfish" structure in which is not easily decapitated. Therefore a comprehensive strategy to secure the population is preferred to enemy focused targeting.

My question is...do you think removing Guzman was the silver bullet that caused the decline of Sendero or do you think the Rondas Campesinas and other initiatives by GOP were the real reason for their success.

[William F. Owen]

Another was the Army effort to go after SL and not the drug traffickers in the coca growing areas of the high jungle - the Upper Huallaga Valley - to the consternation of the US DEA which sabotaged the most effective COIN commander in the region with a major campaign of slander against him. (So the elements of the USG were working at cross purposes - what else is new? )

That's very interesting. Former DEA guys I knew back in the late 1990's basically held the view that the DEA Ops in the Upper Huallaga valley were in fact a cover activity for "other" Intel operations to target SL, and that not everyone got onside. - That reflects your view.

Having examined the DEA and other "Tros Lettros" activity in Bolivia, inter agency friction seems to disproportionate to efforts actually involved.