What have we learned (2000-2010)?

[jcustis]

I think we learned that we need to organzie our efforts better along a variety of Lines of Operation, as opposed to thinking in terms of simple kinetics.

[Global Scout]

I'll be the naysayer and argue most of what we learned since 2010 needs to be unlearned quickly.

Bad ideas that won't go away:

So called effects based operations continues to pollute our staff modus operandi resulting in multi slide briefs that have little to do with achieving our military or strategic objectives. There has never been a military operation conducted throughout history that didn't intend to achieve desired effects. Now we're foolishly trying to measure the results of our operations, while missing the large collective picture. The commander that relies on his intuition will defeat the commander who relies on his daily stats brief.

Lines of operation, effort, etc. are also a farce that have done more to enhance disunity of effort than any other CONOP. They are a very poor substitute for a real operational/strategic strategy and appropriate objectives. Yet again they look very pretty on a powerpoint slide and create the false perception that we actually know what we're doing.

Good governance and economic development first, then focus on defeating the enemy by offering ice cream and other nice incentives, while ignoring a credible coercive element. We have wasted billions of tax payers dollars in failed economic development projects, largely because we attempted to substitute economic development for fighting. We embrace these ideas with great faith despite the facts pointing to opposing conclusions.

While technology has always played a role in war, and sometimes a decisive role, it does not eliminate the human element of war. One lesson we claimed to learned is we now do a better job of understanding the populace, but I think the reality is quite different. Despite the hoards of social scientists now roaming the battlefield, we still don't seem to understand how to influence the local populace as effectively as our foes. Learning about the local culture is not a new idea, and I would argue we probably did a better job of it prior to 9/11.

Excessive use of contractors and private businesses has resulted in a corrupt wartime/conflict economy where there is now financial incentive to continue the conflict. How many millionaires/billionaires were created since 9/11 based on providing services and equipment to the war effort? How much of them really contributed something worthwhile to the fight.

I hope we learned that half stepping doesn't work, and it still isn't clear to me why we had to wait for several years to implement a surge in Iraq? I remember, our economic development efforts were supposed to take the wind out of the insurgent's sails.

The military was not wrong to focus on winning the big wars, but they were wrong for largely ignoring the unique characteristics of irregular warfare. However, it can be argued that they're learning the wrong lessons now based on political correctness versus what actually works.

As for conventional forces getting involved in training local forces, I think the results speak largely for themselves. Our conventional force training efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely a failure (we generated large numbers of troops that couldn't and / or wouldn't fight). Just recently we started making the advisor positions command select positions (a lesson learned that good people are required to do this).

The list could go on for two pages, but since we're overly focused on force protection (JIEDDO), we have focused a good portion of our efforts/investment in developing a force that is IED proof, and less effort in actually defeating the enemy.

I would be very careful in identifying which lessons we learned since 2000 that are worth keeping.

[Ken White]

He essentially has written what I have not because am too concerned -- and disgusted with respect to our direction as I see and hear of it -- to write. Any attempt now would be little other than a rant. I think he's quite correct in his assessment and if I get to the point where I can write constructively, I may add some more...

We are losing the bubble.

He's quite correct in his summation -- we need to be extremely careful in identifying which lessons we learned since 2000 that are worth keeping. We retained mostly wrong lessons from Viet Nam and appear about to do that again...