I think another important question is "how much of this will we REALLY learn?"

I've always looked at this conflict through a slightly different lens when it comes to the inevitable Vietnam comparisons. In this conflict, the military certainly adapted on the battlefield much faster than they did during Vietnam. But I still question how lasting the adaptation was the further away from the battlefield (and the higher in rank) one was.

The Army learned a great deal in Vietnam (some good, some bad...but that's another question for another time), but what was truly fascinating was how quickly those lessons were either shed or buried in obscure training manuals. Even leaders who should have know better turned the majority of their training focus away from the lessons of Vietnam (in terms of small unit tactics and operational practices) and started focusing on Central Europe. This quickly became something of a doctrinal stampede, and we ended up having to relearn everything the hard way (again).

We've also learned (yet again) that some of our core personnel and training systems simply don't work with an all-volunteer force. Will we actually fix it this time?

The interesting thing, to me, is that most of the lessons you've summarized, Mike, could have come from Vietnam as well. The more things change...