Appropriate investments in the small unit leader, in the way of training, equipment, and education, can make him a force multiplier beyond our wildest imagination. I have seen it in some of the young men who fill billets that I had direct command over during the invasion of Iraq. There is a definite difference between the strategic corporal of then, and now. Can't quite put my finger on exactly what, but it's there.What should we learn from the last decade?
I think another important question is "how much of this will we REALLY learn?"
I've always looked at this conflict through a slightly different lens when it comes to the inevitable Vietnam comparisons. In this conflict, the military certainly adapted on the battlefield much faster than they did during Vietnam. But I still question how lasting the adaptation was the further away from the battlefield (and the higher in rank) one was.
The Army learned a great deal in Vietnam (some good, some bad...but that's another question for another time), but what was truly fascinating was how quickly those lessons were either shed or buried in obscure training manuals. Even leaders who should have know better turned the majority of their training focus away from the lessons of Vietnam (in terms of small unit tactics and operational practices) and started focusing on Central Europe. This quickly became something of a doctrinal stampede, and we ended up having to relearn everything the hard way (again).
We've also learned (yet again) that some of our core personnel and training systems simply don't work with an all-volunteer force. Will we actually fix it this time?
The interesting thing, to me, is that most of the lessons you've summarized, Mike, could have come from Vietnam as well. The more things change...
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
The Army is built on people
This is what I hope will be the enduring lesson. I fear however because it is neither sexy in terms of procurement nor revolutionary in its inherent truth it will be shelved as too obvious and too simple to excite the collective id of the Big Army.Originally Posted by jcustis
Tom
I really hope you're wrong, Tom, and that they do learn that lesson. However, if history is any guide I think it's very likely that they won't.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I just read this from Andrew Bacevich in a blog post on The New Republic.
The United States leaves Iraq having learned nothing.
As i see it both are possible ways to accomplish the goal of defeating an enemy, and the decision on which one to use should be decided by the specific circumstances of an individual conflict and according to what will be the best and most effective option according to the pre-stated political objective.- "Good" Governance versus "Military" Solution
So both methods should be studied and particularly when looking at an insurgency both options should be kept in mind.
I'd suggest ...
"Political Solution" and "Military Solution", if you use the latter; or perhaps better, in the terms used by brothers Mao and Giap, "Political Struggle" and "Military Struggle". The appropriate mix of the "Political" and the "Military" in a given situation is really the graduation question, isn't it.
One point of confusion regarding the "Political Struggle" is that its "politics" are not necessarily the same as the "politics" that drive the "policy" - of which, the "Military Struggle" and the "Political Struggle" are continuations.
E.g., In both China and Vietnam (I and II), land reform was the major component of the anti-feudal "Political Struggle"; and would have resulted in a vastly increased number of independent farm owners. However, the Communist politics and policy required ultimate collectivization of farming, with "land reform" being only an intermediate step (sufficient to bring the communists to power).
We (US) are far from integrating the "Political Struggle" and the "Military Struggle" into our doctrines concerning armed conflicts.
Regards
Mike
HBO Documentary To Air September 11, 2010
I was going to post this on my thread about the second american revolution because it is probabaly one of the most important documentaries I have ever seen. With the recent events about book burning and mosque building it is more important than ever. It origanlly aired September 7, 2010 so I could not post it on the other thead but it will air again on September 11,2010 check local HBO listings. It is the story of a reporter/writer/producer who tried to understand AL-Qaeda and find out why they attacked out country and what we need to learn about it. And yes he uses good old police methodsso you know it is good stuff! A link to the short conclusion is below. His conclusion is so important I will write it out even though I kant spel stuff two good.
http://www.lawrencewright.com/scripts.html
"The country that we were is being sucked inside. Al-Qaeda cannot destroy our country only we can do that to ourselves!"
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