The neglected stuff

**Fuchs** · 03-16-2010

This forum has - on average - a strong interest in what's happening, understanding the enemy and in combat troops (or patrol troops or actively policing troops, or whatever).

I wonder a bit whether this neglects too much.

The logistics and tooth-to-tail ratio problems are crying out loud in AFG and de facto everywhere in NATO forces.
Imagine the ISAF and OEF troops needed only one quarter as much fuel and half as much other supplies per day. Imagine also that the share of troops who are meant primarily for off-base duties was 50% bigger.

Many other problems - such as road security and low force density - would be drastically reduced and the force in-country as a whole would be much more oriented in its minds at what happens outside of the camp.

Here's an article on differences in efficiency in different countries (ignore the title):
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php...60&c=EUR&s=TOP

Armies are huge bureaucracies. You need to shake them badly in order to keep the wastage in check.

**davidbfpo** · 03-16-2010

Fuchs,

I recall the UK only now considers such issues when "cuts" arrive or a defence review before "cuts".

There have been many comments on how top heavy the UK military are; the latest being this:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6969921.ece

Which cited:

The Army is weighed down with top brass, according to figures showing that the number of generals and brigadiers has risen since Labour came to power in 1997.

Although the size of the trained Army has shrunk to about 100,000 soldiers, there are now 255 members with the rank of brigadier or above — or one for every 400 service personnel.

The issue has re-appeared on KoW as a cut will end a prized think tank:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/03/mod...nose/#comments

I have asked before how will we, the UK & USA, deploy truly 'light' and particularly when far inland or with no friends nearby.

As for:

You need to shake them badly in order to keep the wastage in check.

Our history shows I fear that this only occurs after a defeat and when some insiders realise change is needed, e.g. after Dunkirk.

**Fuchs** · 03-16-2010

It's politically incorrect, but I admire the potential that the Reichswehr built and kept with a minimum budget and terrible legal restrictions.

Cuts are indeed the way to go if you want efficiency (unless you're busy occupying some place - that could end up terribly as with the U.S.Army of the late 40's).

This is actually the freaky part. There are many armies out there with small budgets. They know about the economic principle; given resources, maximum output. They can ask for more, but they won't get more - unlike some Western forces.
Some of them didn't procure much recently and won't be loaded with 90's technology in the 2020's because they had to replace some 70's technology with 2000's technology in the 2010's (remember the French arsenal of soixante-quinze modèle 1896 guns in 1940 while the Germans instead had new 105mm howitzers developed in '29 as standard artillery).

The lavish budgets inside NATO are probably more a threat to our security than lower budgets would be. This reminds me remotely of the laffer curve and other theoretical models with marginal rates turning negative (such as the exogenous growth model). We may have gone not only well past the optimum; we may also have gone beyond the maximum.

**Firn** · 03-16-2010

There are certainly some good points, but I'm a bit sceptical about some claims and premises of this article. It is pretty difficult to figure out how they defined the parameters.

Take the following:

McKinsey researchers conducted the study by analyzing publicly available records "on the quantity and type of military equipment, number and general classification of personnel, annual defense budgets disaggregated into key spending categories," the report states. Data was then converted into a series of ratios that measured actual outputs in the three areas.

"The United States and Australia are the lowest performing countries with regard to equipment output for every dollar spent," McKinsey concludes.

Washington and its Down Under ally both tallied scores of 17, worst among the 33 nations McKinsey examined.

Brazil gets the most military output per dollar spent, racking up a study-best 330 points, followed by Poland's 287 and Russia's 253.

How did they value the quality of the equipment? A pretty difficult task and a main variable. It is interesting how high Russia is in this category, and this shows IMHO a lot of leeway for the reviewers.

Perhaps even more difficult is the evaluation of the personnel.

The McKinsey study also determined that militaries that do things across their various armed services scored higher.

Within the 33-military sample, the highest level of "joint spending" was 68 percent (South Africa) and the lowest was 3 percent (Brazil, Portugal and Greece).

The United States ranked toward the low end on a chart in the report, with 16 percent joint spending. France, Taiwan and Australia were all midpack, with about 30 percent.

Also here there are a couple of things to say. What is "joint spending" and which variables influence this calculation? A hard look at South Africa's military could answer perhaps why it is a "pocket of best practice".

Tooth-to-Tail

On personnel, the study examined the nations' so-called tooth-to-tail ratios. The tooth is defined as the military strength "in the front lines." Non-combat tasks such as procurement, maintenance, accounting and others were placed in the tail category.

Norway had the largest tooth-to-tail ratio, with its personnel breaking down as 54 percent tooth, 36 percent non-combat and 11 percent combat support. The United States was second-to-last with 84 percent of its personnel in non-combat or combat support positions.

The average was 26 percent tooth, 63 percent non-combat and 11 percent combat support.

In this case you can see that it also heavily depends on the tasks and roles the polititics defines for it's military.

Once again numbers without context. However such a study can trigger closer looks at the bureaucracies called armed forces.

Firn

**Fuchs** · 03-16-2010

Studies are never perfect, and short articles about studies even worse - nevertheless there's food for through in it.

Originally Posted by Firn

In this case you can see that it also heavily depends on the tasks and roles the polititics defines for it's military.

Probably to a lesser degree than you think.

An expeditionary ground force doesn't need to have a worse tooth:tail ratio than a home defence militia. The former merely needs to learn how to get what it needs locally.

**Kiwigrunt** · 03-16-2010

We touched on the officer to enlisted ratio here, starting post 62.

Half the reason for excessive spending is probably the fact that many of these high ranking officers need to justify their existence by creating ‘stuff’ that doesn’t need to exist……….(the other half would be the officers themselves

). We see a lot of that outside of the military as well, just replace Fuchs’ ‘armies’ with ‘bureaucracies’, and ‘huge bureaucracies’ with ‘self-expanding’:

Armies are huge bureaucracies. You need to shake them badly in order to keep the wastage in check.

And add this quote that someone recently posted (can’t remember who):

Bureaucracy expands to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy. (Oscar Wilde)

Question is, when caught in that spiral, who’s gonna do the shaking?

As davidbfpo says:

Our history shows I fear that this only occurs after a defeat and when some insiders realise change is needed, e.g. after Dunkirk.

And provided that those insiders can put the ‘common good’ above their egos and agendas (which may include greed).

**Dayuhan** · 03-16-2010

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Cuts are indeed the way to go if you want efficiency (unless you're busy occupying some place - that could end up terribly as with the U.S.Army of the late 40's).

I've noticed that in civilian government agencies the response to a budget cut is generally not to trim fat and increase efficiency, but to cut the most important, popular, and visible programs. The managers who pull this stunt are not interested in increasing efficiency, they want to generate protests and build pressure to get "their" budget restored.

Does this also occur in military organizations? I'd almost be surprised if it doesn't, it seems a well-entrenched feature of the bureaucratic mind...

**SJPONeill** · 03-17-2010

My gut response is 'whatever' and more so after seeing the rating that Russia got in comparison to the US and Australia. A 'study' like this has limited value unless directly related to how those forces actually perform in their core roles i.e. war-fighting...I don't think that anyone is exactly quivering in their ballet pumps at the thought of taking Brazil on...

This study and its ilk will be seized upon by the bean-counters in their ongoing mindless drive for efficiency and with total disregard for the effectiveness of the force. Yes, outsourcing MAY save money right up to the point where you need something now, now, now and find yourself at the back end of a six month waiting list - what are you going to do? Ask the bad guys to take a break while you resolve your supply/maintenance/distribution issues...?

The simple fact is that we all know that we could outsource every competency that is not purely military which would leave us just with the combat arms and maybe one of two specialists wandering around the missionspace...OK, show of hands now...a. who would want to be in that uber-efficient force? and b. who thinks it could beat any force larger than the Cook Islands?

**William F. Owen** · 03-17-2010

The tooth-tail ratio is nothing to do with need or operational requirements. It's a choice to be inefficient, so as to build resistance into the system, and to keep the budget flowing in the right way. It's not just S4 functions but HQs as well. If you have lots of base rats, you get to build big bases.

If you designed units and formations from the ground up, based on what we actually know, they would look very different.

**Firn** · 03-17-2010

I like that Wilde quote.

Half the reason for excessive spending is probably the fact that many of these high ranking officers need to justify their existence by creating ‘stuff’ that doesn’t need to exist……….(the other half would be the officers themselves). We see a lot of that outside of the military as well, just replace Fuchs’ ‘armies’ with ‘bureaucracies’, and ‘huge bureaucracies’ with ‘self-expanding’:

There is a lot of sad truth in that. It should even happen somewhere in Europe that army helicopters are used as personal taxis for the families of generals rather than training for a certain conflict. Surprise, surprise

But other nations show that a lot can be done to reign things in. But it is a hard and never-ending battle.

@Wilf: I think a better word would be redundancy.

@Fuchs:

The logistics and tooth-to-tail ratio problems are crying out loud in AFG and de facto everywhere in NATO forces.

Imagine the ISAF and OEF troops needed only one quarter as much fuel and half as much other supplies per day. Imagine also that the share of troops who are meant primarily for off-base duties was 50% bigger.

I think that some members here raised already such points. The effects of reduced (fuel) consumptions could ripple powerful through the supply system.

Firn

**Fuchs** · 03-17-2010

Raised - yes.

We just seem to spend more energy and letters on small arms, indirect fire, information ops and the like than on logistics, force structure and the likes.

**SethB** · 03-18-2010

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Raised - yes.

We just seem to spend more energy and letters on small arms, indirect fire, information ops and the like than on logistics, force structure and the likes.

On the contrary. The US spends about $13B a year on fuel, most of it for the Air Force.

But even in the Army, there are 60,000 fuelers spread out over the active and reserve components. In 2001, 50% of what was moved, by weight, was fuel. By OIF 1 bottled water was right at 30% of the load.

We spend a hell of a lot of money on logistics.

**M-A Lagrange** · 03-18-2010

Originally Posted by Fuchs

We just seem to spend more energy and letters on small arms, indirect fire, information ops and the like than on logistics, force structure and the likes.

Interresting. There is actually a debate inside the french army on the infantry the compagny composition. The troops are trained on a 3 section configuration and the HQ wants a come back to the 4 section configuration.

May be not that neglected by some.

**Fuchs** · 03-19-2010

Originally Posted by SethB

On the contrary. The US spends about $13B a year on fuel, most of it for the Air Force.

But even in the Army, there are 60,000 fuelers spread out over the active and reserve components. In 2001, 50% of what was moved, by weight, was fuel. By OIF 1 bottled water was right at 30% of the load.

We spend a hell of a lot of money on logistics.

I meant the forum.

**GI Zhou** · 03-19-2010

The bloody obvious needs to be stated here. Both the Australian and the US have different type forces for different missions so support will naturaly be different for these brigade sized battle groups. They are not all the same but as both countries have huge land masses by European standards they all requireg inordinate logistics support, comnpoared to a small country like Norway for even small forces to survive in many areas (especially Australia). Most importantly both forces are fighting as opposed to swanning around providing rear area security, thus they require wartime logistcs support. Fuchs, trying to get all your goods and services locally doesn't work in many parts of the world and who is the idiot that said maintenance personnel aren't combat troops. Imagine trying to change a tank engine or performing repairs to armoured vehicles just behind the FEBA. People who criticise all the logistics personnel also marvel why those same forces can deploy long distances, into areas of poor or non-existent infrastructure, set up hospitals, fresh water, feed the population and repair the infrastructure after a natural disater; or enable forces to fight in inhospitable terrain and keep them supplied with the necessities of combat. It is because of those same REMFs I mean loggies. Amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics.

**SethB** · 03-19-2010

GI, nothing that you just said was incorrect, but at the same time the tooth to tail ratio keeps getting worse. In 1918, 80% of the AEF was organized into combat units.

100 years later, the statistics are inverse and getting worse.

And to a large extent that is optional.

**Ken White** · 03-19-2010

other than that military forces capable of large, out of area deployments require massive logistic and sustainment support. Currently, the only Armed Forces truly capable of such deployment are the US, France, the UK and Australia in that order. The Japanese could but have generally elected to not do so thus far. A few others, including Denmark, China, Germany and India are working up to it. Russia is a unique case with some capability.

The US Army that fought in WW I was essentially the old Indian fighting Army with a thin veneer of Philippine and Caribbean experience. It learned from that war that a larger tail ratio was needed for worldwide commitments and began an expansion of that tail. It was further developed after WW II due to worldwide commitments and has increased in proportion ever since because the basic support requirements for a given amount of geography and missions can only go so low, thus any cuts in force structure must disproportionately come from the tooth. Teeth? Tooths?

Also recall that all the Global Hawk, Predator and such operators are part of that support package as is the massive amount of manpower to keep a humungous number of airplanes and helicopters flying...

Paying much attention to bean counters is not conducive to fighting wars.

**GI Zhou** · 03-19-2010

SethB in 1918 to a large extent the US bludged off the French and British for a lot of its logistic support. The teeth to tail ratio would have been a lot different in 1919.

**Fuchs** · 03-19-2010

Originally Posted by Ken White

other than that military forces capable of large, out of area deployments require massive logistic and sustainment support.

...only if you expect them to be like they are.

I've thought for years about the scenario of Rwandan genocide, assuming that political decision to intervene came obviously late and left mere days for effective deployment - with little transport capacity.

My answer is to send in soldiers (infantry) with compact emergency food rations, water purifiers, personal equipment, some money that's of use in the region - and to fly them to two airports in the region. They would then proceed to "organise" their transportation and food.

No logistical vanguard team, no establishment of a foothold as first step, no construction of a field camp - just send platoons in and into the landscape with their general orders. The overhead necessary for the optimisation of effect/volume is likely less than 10%.

Their personal equipment plus a handful of mortars suffices to win firefights even in numerical inferiority. If civilians can live off the land, so can soldiers (although foreigners may have problems till their bodies adapted).

Sure, army logisticians and generals would need to survive heart attacks in the process, but it's possible if your junior leadership is good enough.

The logistical tail is in great part a result of equipment complexity and of "force multiplication" reasoning. It is neither always necessary nor is it always advantageous. Force multipliers are context-dependent variables, not constants. Complex equipment varies in its utility a lot (depending on circumstances s well).

A 20% tooth + 80% tail force is a CHOICE - it is NOT A NECESSITY.

Almost everyone got used to business as usual (plenty support and supplies as usual). That's a self-inflicted limitation. The options are much more diverse.

Look at the stupidity of "pirate"-hunting with warships. The same could be done with some improvisation off some converted auxiliaries (including helicopter operations; a hangar is no technical miracle, after all!).