I also have to disagree to some extent.

Choice of ROEs is situational (and also depends on the Laws of War, Laws of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the intervening force or forces). If an "armed conflict" exists (under Geneva), then it is possible that a "status" ROE (in addition to the always in effect "self defense" ROE) will apply.

However, even if only "self-defense" ROEs were in force, one cannot remove the use of deadly force from the intervenor's table. By doing so, one could easily get into this situation from Sierra Leone, which I cited in this thread, U.S. troops face Afghan enemy too young to kill (3 pages):

On Friday, 25 August 2000, British Major Alan Marshall, stationed at Benguema Training Camp decided to make a visit to one of UNAMSIL’s battalions near the town of Masiaka, about 65-kilometers east of Freetown. Marshall and his men were part of the stay-behind British training contingent. Accompanying him on this visit was an SLA liaison officer and 11 soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment. After visiting with Colonel Jehad al-Widyan, commander of the UNAMSIL battalion, he decided to take his patrol to the WSB base in nearby Magbeni. Marshall received an intelligence report that only a few rebels were present at the base and he wanted to check out the situation. His three Land Rovers were armed with .50-caliber heavy machine guns and the soldiers with SA80 rifles. As the patrol approached Magbeni, located 50 miles east of the capital in Freetown, the WSB blocked the road and denied them movement. Major Marshall tried to reason with them, but they insisted that he wait until their leader, 24-year old “Brigadier” Foday Kallay arrived.

As they waited, Major Marshall carried on a conversation with the boys and offered them cigarettes. Communication with the base at Benguema Training Camp was established via radio and the base camp was informed that the patrol was being detained. Once Kallay arrived, the situation turned tense. Kallay began issuing orders to his armed soldiers, became angry with Marshall for entering an unauthorized area without coordination, and surrounded the patrol with soldiers and a captured SLA truck mounted with a 14.5-mm heavy machine gun. As Marshall made attempts to reason with the WSB, he was physically beaten. Within 5 minutes, the rest of the Royal Irish soldiers were overwhelmed, disarmed, stripped, and taken by canoes upstream, across Rokel River, to Gberi Bana, Kallay’s headquarters.
From Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State (The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 28, CSI Press 2008) pp. 77-78 pdf.

Not a good use of my Mick cousins; and the rescue (p.83) probably led to much more loss of life than if the challenge had been met head on to begin with.

I recognize the need for restraint (that is, to use the methods you suggest); but too much emphasis there can lead to bad situations. The Beirut Marine barracks bombing was another example of overly cautious application of the ROEs (which were not the model of clarity down at the sentry level).

Regards

Mike