Specially Protected Persons in Combat Situations (new title)

[JMA]

During a humanitarian intervention, the only appropriate use of deadly force would be for self-protection. Given that other means are available to preclude the use of deadly force, the ROE ought to be to use such means whenever possible.
I'd suggest that those involved in a humanitarian intervention be primarily (perhaps exclusively) equipped with incapaciting agents/devices. Chemical examples can be found here. Other items that are capable of causing incapitation are available. Some examples include electromuscular incapacitating devices (EMD), AKA stun guns or Tasers®, and high intensity noise generators.

As others have noted, a vigorous information operations (IO) campaign, one that pre-empts the opponent's PR strategy is also required. Such a media campaign must alert the world to the possibility of engagement by "child soldiers" and and explain the intended responses to be used should such engagements arise. The IO campaign needs to be initiated prior to deployment and continued at least until the intervention force redeploys, if not longer.

Hang on a minute. Humanitarian intervention is mere the basis/reason for the intervention. Those whose actions have led to the intervention need to be engaged in no uncertain military terms.

Humanitarian intervention refers to armed interference in one state by another state(s) with the objective of ending or reducing the suffering of the population within the first state. That suffering may be the result of civil war, humanitarian crisis, or crimes committed by the occupied nation (such as genocide). The goal of humanitarian intervention is neither annexation nor interference with territorial integrity, but minimization of the suffering of civilians in that state.

Engage and kill the perpetrators and thereby protect the people.

[jmm99]

I also have to disagree to some extent.

Choice of ROEs is situational (and also depends on the Laws of War, Laws of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the intervening force or forces). If an "armed conflict" exists (under Geneva), then it is possible that a "status" ROE (in addition to the always in effect "self defense" ROE) will apply.

However, even if only "self-defense" ROEs were in force, one cannot remove the use of deadly force from the intervenor's table. By doing so, one could easily get into this situation from Sierra Leone, which I cited in this thread, U.S. troops face Afghan enemy too young to kill (3 pages):

On Friday, 25 August 2000, British Major Alan Marshall, stationed at Benguema Training Camp decided to make a visit to one of UNAMSIL’s battalions near the town of Masiaka, about 65-kilometers east of Freetown. Marshall and his men were part of the stay-behind British training contingent. Accompanying him on this visit was an SLA liaison officer and 11 soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment. After visiting with Colonel Jehad al-Widyan, commander of the UNAMSIL battalion, he decided to take his patrol to the WSB base in nearby Magbeni. Marshall received an intelligence report that only a few rebels were present at the base and he wanted to check out the situation. His three Land Rovers were armed with .50-caliber heavy machine guns and the soldiers with SA80 rifles. As the patrol approached Magbeni, located 50 miles east of the capital in Freetown, the WSB blocked the road and denied them movement. Major Marshall tried to reason with them, but they insisted that he wait until their leader, 24-year old “Brigadier” Foday Kallay arrived.

As they waited, Major Marshall carried on a conversation with the boys and offered them cigarettes. Communication with the base at Benguema Training Camp was established via radio and the base camp was informed that the patrol was being detained. Once Kallay arrived, the situation turned tense. Kallay began issuing orders to his armed soldiers, became angry with Marshall for entering an unauthorized area without coordination, and surrounded the patrol with soldiers and a captured SLA truck mounted with a 14.5-mm heavy machine gun. As Marshall made attempts to reason with the WSB, he was physically beaten. Within 5 minutes, the rest of the Royal Irish soldiers were overwhelmed, disarmed, stripped, and taken by canoes upstream, across Rokel River, to Gberi Bana, Kallay’s headquarters.

From Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State (The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 28, CSI Press 2008) pp. 77-78 pdf.

Not a good use of my Mick cousins; and the rescue (p.83) probably led to much more loss of life than if the challenge had been met head on to begin with.

I recognize the need for restraint (that is, to use the methods you suggest); but too much emphasis there can lead to bad situations. The Beirut Marine barracks bombing was another example of overly cautious application of the ROEs (which were not the model of clarity down at the sentry level).

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Well, I have to disagree also and support Mike approach and understanding of humanitarian interventiuon.
The guy in front is not a nice guy and even if it's a child, he is using deadly force in some occasions.
ROE and TOE must be looked at with a practical point of view. Being deterent is often the best first step, even in "humanitarian operations".

The main question being how much weight 10 dead US soldiers against 10 kids of 12 to 15 years old.

[JMA]

Well, I have to disagree also and support Mike approach and understanding of humanitarian interventiuon.
The guy in front is not a nice guy and even if it's a child, he is using deadly force in some occasions.
ROE and TOE must be looked at with a practical point of view. Being deterent is often the best first step, even in "humanitarian operations".

The main question being how much weight 10 dead US soldiers against 10 kids of 12 to 15 years old.

Lets try this... if the bad guys providing the justification for the humanitarian intervention are all 20-30 year olds I suppose a shoot on sight / shoot to kill policy would be fine?

Now what changes if they, knowing the great concern among western countries (but probably not among most their combat soldiers) about ensuring they don't get drawn into combat with child-soldiers, push some kids into the front line?

Why only on a humanitarian intervention? Why not in Afghanistan also?

[jmm99]

not quite this as stated:

from JMA
... if the bad guys supplying the reason the humanitarian intervention are all 20-30 year olds I suppose a shoot on sight / shoot to kill policy would be fine?

although one might end up with something like that policy in practice.

To get to a "shoot anyplace, anytime" rule (a "status" ROE), one has to have:

1. A designated hostile force. Not that hard to pass that step if the hostiles are at least semi-organized (LRA, WSB, etc.)

2. The person whacked must be positively identified (PID in US ROE jargon) as a member of (part of) that hostile force. Passing that step is more difficult with irregular forces, especially under the Geneva Additional Protocols requiring the "whackee" to be "directly participating" in the armed conflict when whacked.

So, in many irregular warfare situations, PID comes about only because the person presents a hostile, armed threat - and the rule becomes just about the same whether one is under the Laws of War or the Rule of Law.

That is the theory - repeat, theory.

I can't see anything more strict than probablilities playing a role in reality - unless the soldier has a strong death wish. Is it more probable than not that the person in your sights is the enemy ?

What is the real "standard" for employing less definite tactics (than a person in your sights); such as, recon by fire. A probability (possibility ?) that enemy might be in that patch of thorn bush ? Or, for that matter, H & I arty, which is even less definite ?

Combat does not seem a good place to employ complicated legalisms.

Regards

Mike

[Kiwigrunt]

Lets try this... if the bad guys providing the justification for the humanitarian intervention are all 20-30 year olds I suppose a shoot on sight / shoot to kill policy would be fine?

Now what changes if they, knowing the great concern among western countries (but probably not among most their combat soldiers) about ensuring they don't get drawn into combat with child-soldiers, push some kids into the front line?

Why only on a humanitarian intervention? Why not in Afghanistan also?

A ‘shoot on sight’ policy is not necessarily the same as a ‘shoot to kill’ policy. In low intensity operations it is not about killing or wounding but about neutralising the treat. To paraphrase our shoot on sight policy in Timor 10 years ago (and we never needed to use it….once we had it):
• You must positively identify the target as being militia,
• He must be armed with his weapon ready for immediate use,
• He must be moving in a tactical manner,
• The situation must be such that giving a warning is likely to cause undue danger to yourself or to those you are there to protect,
• It must be a chance encounter,
• You (or his target???) must be within the maximum range of his weapon.

In anything beyond low intensity this kinda goes out the window. I suppose the trick for the policy makers is to determine this tipping point and to communicate that clearly to the troops. Kinda like the blind leading the experts?

Now where kids come into this, well, I think I’d have to agree with some above in saying that it ‘should’ be irrelevant. Technically and legally anyway. How we deal with it morally is less clear cut.

I should think that putting age limits in place is silly and counter productive. M-A Lagrange mentioned up-thread that a 7 year old is not supposed to be able to carry a gun. What if you encounter a 6 year old who is? Be forced to allow him to shoot you because he’s only 6? The moral issue remains. But taking it beyond that through ROE etc. may have an adverse effect in that it gives the enemy something to play with, as JMA point out.

[JMA]

A ‘shoot on sight’ policy is not necessarily the same as a ‘shoot to kill’ policy. In low intensity operations it is not about killing or wounding but about neutralising the treat. To paraphrase our shoot on sight policy in Timor 10 years ago (and we never needed to use it….once we had it):
• You must positively identify the target as being militia,
• He must be armed with his weapon ready for immediate use,
• He must be moving in a tactical manner,
• The situation must be such that giving a warning is likely to cause undue danger to yourself or to those you are there to protect,
• It must be a chance encounter,
• You (or his target???) must be within the maximum range of his weapon.

In anything beyond low intensity this kinda goes out the window. I suppose the trick for the policy makers is to determine this tipping point and to communicate that clearly to the troops. Kinda like the blind leading the experts?

Now where kids come into this, well, I think I’d have to agree with some above in saying that it ‘should’ be irrelevant. Technically and legally anyway. How we deal with it morally is less clear cut.

I should think that putting age limits in place is silly and counter productive. M-A Lagrange mentioned up-thread that a 7 year old is not supposed to be able to carry a gun. What if you encounter a 6 year old who is? Be forced to allow him to shoot you because he’s only 6? The moral issue remains. But taking it beyond that through ROE etc. may have an adverse effect in that it gives the enemy something to play with, as JMA point out.

Lets keep this in the context of a shooting war which is a more likely scenario to provoke a humanitarian intervention.

These RoE seem to be designed to make the soldier's work more difficult than it already is.

If he is armed... you shoot him. Those 6 points are the stuff that gets soldiers killed and teaches them to be passive. Can't believe any self respecting general would inflict that upon his soldiers. We spoke about this before. This kind of work is for police, military police and paramilitaries not soldiers.

One minute we were talking about 12-15 year olds and now we are down to 6-7 year olds. How do they get these kids to stay and fight? Drugs? So it would be difficult to walk up to these kids and give them a smack behind the ear and take their weapons away.

But what of women and girls? Bumped into a few of them in my time. So I guess it is all about age then we accept that women can be combatants (why we now have them ourselves).

Again there is a difference between returning fire or firing into likely areas and later finding you killed some kids and actually lining a kid up in your sights and pulling the trigger.

I hate it when people are unable to provide anything but some vague wishy washy answer so I will give it a try to do beter...

1. It makes a difference whether you come up against a unit which has a few kids mixed in or one totally made up of kids.

2. If battle has already been joined and it appears that the kids are also firing their weapons.

3. If you have some knowledge and understanding of what these kids have done or are capable/likely to do makes a difference. (Here I will differentiate between the German kid and his grandfather trying to defend Berlin against the Russian advance and some stoned kid in Sierra Leone wearing a necklace made from human ears - the Russians didn't care but we do - you go figure).

4. And unofficially you put the word out that if your forces come across a unit which includes kids it will be "unlikely" that any of the older soldiers and leaders will be taken prisoner. (let them figure that out).

Now to implement (broadly) what I state above you clearly can't use forces from most western nations. That is why I suggest that if progress is to be made use of proxy AU troops must be made. The UN agrees to the intervention and appoints the commander etc. No western angst and hand-wringing... you can just blame the UN for any excesses (like there certainly were under the Nigeria led ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone).

Sri Lanka understood this in their preparation for the final push. They got economic support from China (who doesn't give a rats a... about human rights anyway) as insulation from western criticism. They also know that when dealing with the West give it a year or so and then every thing will be forgiven and forgotten.

[M-A Lagrange]

Now where kids come into this, well, I think I’d have to agree with some above in saying that it ‘should’ be irrelevant. Technically and legally anyway. How we deal with it morally is less clear cut.

I should think that putting age limits in place is silly and counter productive. M-A Lagrange mentioned up-thread that a 7 year old is not supposed to be able to carry a gun. What if you encounter a 6 year old who is? Be forced to allow him to shoot you because he’s only 6? The moral issue remains. But taking it beyond that through ROE etc. may have an adverse effect in that it gives the enemy something to play with, as JMA point out.

Kiwi,

The point in age limit is for the criminal who recruites children, not for the one confronted to them. A child soldier is a child but and ALSO a soldier.

The age limitis first a "natural thought": a 3 years old kid cannot be used as child soldier. Even, he is extremely vulnerable.
Secondly it is a legal tool: recruiting child soldiers is an offence. Recruiting below 7 years old kid is a graver offense.
Finally, it's biological: it's a question of muscles being developed enough to resist to the backfire from shooting gun.
No one said that you have to get killed or wounded first. If he is 6 and strong enough to shoot with an AK... Then he is a combattant.

As JMM noted, child soldiers are combattants by GV and ICRC criterias, same rules for them.
Setting TOE and ROE just for child soldiers is a nonsense. (Prisonners prefered could be the best input.)

[jmm99]

with this:

from JMA
If he is armed... you shoot him.

Lots of folks run around armed in many areas of the world; e.g., Pashtunistan, Dayuhan's Mountain Province and even Michigan. So, some indicia of hostility must be present.

Now, if where you are people are not armed (unless they are good guys or bad guys), being armed is itself an indicia of hostility. Also, if the person is PID'd as a member of a designated hostile force, whether he is armed or unarmed, hostile or not hostile himself, are not material to the shoot.

As to dealing with war criminals in the field, I'd much prefer on-site military tribunals over not taking prisoners. Once upon a time (through WWI per our Articles), the field commander could convene a board (usually 3 or 5 members) and try war criminals on the spot.

Regards

Mike

[wm]

Hang on a minute. Humanitarian intervention is mere the basis/reason for the intervention. Those whose actions have led to the intervention need to be engaged in no uncertain military terms.

I also have to disagree to some extent. Choice of ROEs is situational (and also depends on the Laws of War, Laws of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the intervening force or forces). If an "armed conflict" exists (under Geneva), then it is possible that a "status" ROE (in addition to the always in effect "self defense" ROE) will apply.

Guys,

Thanks for the rehearsal of the jus ad bellum point about humanitarian interventions (i.e., it can be a just cause for engaging in war). However, I took the fact that the original post put humanitarian in quotation marks as implying that the intervention was being conducted in a humanitarian way. On that understanding, the claim is about jus in bello, which is, to some degree, analogous to Mike's claim that ROE choice is situational. I am sure we all realize that jus in bello and jus ad bellum are logically dictinct.

I believe the scenario as originally described is more concerned with an appeal to emotion rather than an appeal to reason. Although the letter of the law and morality of war both would allow one to kill the evil doers and their proxies regardlkess of age and gender, the fact that CNN and others will broadcast the war around the globe in near real time would suggest that an alternative option be undertaken. That was why I suggested that deadly force was not an option in an interventiuon being conducted in a humanitarian fashion, that is, humanely.

One other point in response to the following:

If he is armed... you shoot him. Those 6 points are the stuff that gets soldiers killed and teaches them to be passive. Can't believe any self respecting general would inflict that upon his soldiers. We spoke about this before. This kind of work is for police, military police and paramilitaries not soldiers.

A hard truth is that, morally, soldiers must endure more risks because they get a significant exception to the rules of everyday living--the approval to kill for reasons other than self-defense. In exchange, soldiers must accept the fact that they are also more likely to be killed. I equate that higher likelihood of being killed to a requirement upon soldiers to take more risks to ensure non-combatants are not harmed. Being empowered to kill others that may not be a direct threat to themselves means that soldiers must take more risks to ensure that only appropriate targets are engaged. By the way, the 3 other categories of personnel in the above quotation who could be doing the work have the same restrictions placed on them.

[M-A Lagrange]

Guys,

I believe the scenario as originally described is more concerned with an appeal to emotion rather than an appeal to reason. Although the letter of the law and morality of war both would allow one to kill the evil doers and their proxies regardlkess of age and gender, the fact that CNN and others will broadcast the war around the globe in near real time would suggest that an alternative option be undertaken. That was why I suggested that deadly force was not an option in an interventiuon being conducted in a humanitarian fashion, that is, humanely.

First I would like to ask why should you assume that CNN will advertise the fact that you killed child soldiers and not respond to unfriendly opponents using deadly force?

Many of the wars I have been in are/were conducted mainly by child soldiers and this has never been the angle used by media. In Sierra Leone, when the british interviened, they had to face forces composed for some up to 60% of child soldiers. And the media coverage was all about stabilising the place and freeing some UN peace keepers...

The second point is that it is also a "media" tool for your own propaganda. If you fight warlords using child soldiers and "only child soldiers" then you are the good guy per definition. Look at Khony and the LRA. Nobody is following them now. Yes, it has more to see with their political utility than the use of child soldiers but still... In the end the use of child soldiers is an aggraving fact against you.

In that case, the moral dimension of "child soldier" will bring media easily on your side. Do you really think that home opinion will be supporting an opponent that would send children to be killed by "peace keepers forces"?

ROE must remain situationnal and the use of non deadly force remains situationnal. But I tend to agree with the idea of take prisonners rather than kill every children is a best practice.
It also helps you in your counter propaganda. The UPDF is using that argument against the LRA: if you surrender and you are an abducted child forced to becaume combattant. Then you are covered by the child act and amnesty law.

Finally, to support somehow JMA point. In DRC, the Pakistany forces used to act as you describe: shoot first; ask how are you and shoot again if someone answers. Then go to the spot. Nobody did really react. The point was clearly, even in the "civilian f#&@% humanitarian" community that there were more benefits in saying nothing than screaming and have nothing done.
But still, this is a desperate solution. An effective one but better options can be found.

Mike,

I am quite interrested by the question of military tribunal.
First, I would say (As you know me, I start as the devil advocate) that there is room for on "the spot justice of the winner". Which is not a problem when the "winner" is a force respecting Law and acting according to it. But in other cases...

Seccondly, I am interrested because of the Thomas Lubanga case at The Haye. Thomas Lubanga was charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes and child soldiers recruitment. He has been released because of procedures. There was good chances he would have been found guilty and sentenced immediatly if this had been done during Operation Arthemis by the EU forces.

[JMA]

Finally, to support somehow JMA point. In DRC, the Pakistany forces used to act as you describe: shoot first; ask how are you and shoot again if someone answers. Then go to the spot. Nobody did really react. The point was clearly, even in the "civilian f#&@% humanitarian" community that there were more benefits in saying nothing than screaming and have nothing done.
But still, this is a desperate solution. An effective one but better options can be found.

Its only a major problem if you keep pushing raw 18-19 year olds into high stress (combat) situations and then tie their hands with hugely restrictive RoE.

There is an easy solution. Conscription.

Target universities where the commentators and analysts (who come up with the crazy ideas) reside and conscript them. Then watch and learn.

[Adam L]

Conscription isn't a bad idea!

Adam L

[jmm99]

JMA:

Given a compliant indigenous folk with an underwhelming ability to resist, your suggestions and your multi-national force would probably be quite effective as you say:

I would suggest under circumstances where the situation requiring humanitarian intervention bring troops from many countries all across the world the word needs to be spread to any Crockett, Bowie. Boone or Carson types running around in the woods armed that the carrying of weapons for the duration will be problematic as the soldiers will not wait to be shot at but rather enforce the peace and reduce the number of weapons carried by the citizenry which could potentially confuse matters.
....
I tend to go with and thorough prep-fire of the objective followed up with prodigious levels of prophylactic fire while sweeping through and clearing the objective. Not likely to find a living thing there when you arrive.

Solitudinem facient et pacem appellant. (Tac.)

I fear I am a better Celt than a Roman.

--------------------------
MAL (mon "jumeau mal" ! )

A large recent literature exists on military commisions; but that is mostly in the context of the Gitmo MCs, which are very close to formal courts-martial. Besides the 1953 JAG School article I cited above, I've found , e.g., recent articles on the use of US field MCs in the Mexican War and Civil War.

Myers, Conquering Peace: Military Commissions as a Lawfare Strategy in the Mexican War (2008)

Vagts, Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction Chapter (2008)

The use of field-expedient military tribunals goes well back in time. You might be especially interested in this example, since it involved the "Colonial Troops", 1684: Indian murderers punished by Du Luth (starting at p.114 - 12 pages; you can check out the original when you are next in Paris). This is a translation of his 1684 report, which illustrates the use of diplomacy and smarts over brute force (which "Du Luth" didn't have anyway).

"Du Luth" was really Daniel Greysolon-Delhut, who was a talented officer and above average in Canada (bios in French and English). He could have treated the murders of the French-Canadian fur traders as a native uprising or as a law enforcement matter. He selected the latter approach and did not simply execute the murderers.

From the English bio, a brief summary of this case:

He commandeered the services of licensed traders to help fortify Michilimackinac, reprimanded the Potawatomis for their lukewarm attitude toward the French, and renewed his peace-making efforts among the Foxes, Sioux, and Chippewas. The last of these nations was especially difficult to manage as was demonstrated in 1684 when four of its warriors murdered two French traders. When one of the culprits appeared at the Jesuit mission of Sault Ste Marie the staff of 12 on duty there did not dare to arrest him, fearing the reprisals of his tribe. Dulhut, as soon as he learned of the incident, hurried to the mission [JMM: with 6 troopers], rounded up the suspects, including the chief Achinaga and his two sons, and put them on trial. Achinaga was acquitted and his younger son pardoned, but the two others who had been found guilty were executed before 400 Indians. By coldly meting out this punishment, Dulhut taught the natives that the French were a people to be respected and feared.

This is a good case study in how to handle situations when your force is underwhelming.

I can see the murder scene from this room when the leaves have fallen. One of the six troopers with Greysolon-Delhut, when the principal murderer was arrested at Sault Ste. Marie (about 250 miles from here) (see p. 115), was one "Le Mire" (prenom: Joseph - one of my many TdMs in Canada).

The suggested use of military commissions in the field may well find few advocates. That despite the fact that it could provide prompt justice as an alternative to either "justice" delayed (as at the Hague; and hence, in reality, often denied) - or to shooting prisoners, which even if effective leaves no honor as recompense for the shooters.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

JMA:

Given a compliant indigenous folk with an underwhelming ability to resist, your suggestions and your multi-national force would probably be quite effective as you say:

I suggest that the force level required and the type of forces be selected on the dynamics on the ground. What type/quality of combatants are you likely to come up against and what is the expected reaction of the population under threat.

If you have a small group of perpetrators inflicting misery on a largely passive population then a reasonably competent paramilitary force followed up by police action should do the business. (A bit like Timor)

The suggested use of military commissions in the field may well find few advocates. That despite the fact that it could provide prompt justice as an alternative to either "justice" delayed (as at the Hague; and hence, in reality, often denied) - or to shooting prisoners, which even if effective leaves no honor as recompense for the shooters.

I am not against tribunals at all but I do see claims of "jungle justice" and "kangaroo courts" being raised and even to a more shrill level if the death sentence is dished out. You are talking about a form of martial law right?

I do not advocate shooting prisoners but I am not a proponent of taking prisoners (if you know what I mean) unless they are really needed for intel gathering purposes. As I said before a difficult subject to deal with in the public domain.

[JMA]

Conscription isn't a bad idea!

Adam L

Especially when you are looking for people in a non-soldier type role. Somewhere between the Military Police and the Peace Corps. People who can be taught a different approach to such matters (as advocated university based think-tanks and assorted analysts). Then when you have to evacuate them from the country Dunkirk style you ask them "OK, so what went wrong smart guys?"

[jmm99]

are a "form of martial law" - governed by the Laws of War (or more quaintly, the "laws of honest warfare").

And, yes, I do "know what you mean"; but fail to see why it's a difficult topic to discuss in the public domain. No one is asking anyone to lay bare what they have actually done. The issues hinge on who should be killed in armed conflicts and under what circumstances - not an unknown public discussion topic by any means.

The basic question is what alternatives one can present (if one so believes) to the conduct exemplified by and to Anne de Batarnay de Joyeuse, Baron d'Arques, Vicomte then Duke of Joyeuse (d. 20 Oct 1587), who massacred 800 Huguenots at Saint-Eloi, Poitou, 21 June 1587; but who lived by that sword, died by that sword, at Coutras:

The Catholic line was shattered into fragments and rolled up from the flank; Joyeuse took to his heels and was cornered by a group of Huguenot cavalry. He threw down his sword and called: "My ransom is a hundred thousand francs!" His reward was a shot in the head: for the commander who had ordered Huguenot wounded to be killed on the field and who had butchered garrisons that had surrendered relying on the laws of honest warfare, there could be no quarter.

Those particular and other incidents in the "Wars of Religion" started folks thinking about the "laws of honest warfare" (that is, warfare with honor). The irregularities of the next subsequent Thirty Years' War further exemplified the need for what are in effect "honor codes".

Like other "honor codes", they can be bypassed by winks and nods, as illustrated by this example of convoluted logic:

from JMA
I am not against tribunals at all but I do see claims of "jungle justice" and "kangaroo courts" being raised and even to a more shrill level if the death sentence is dished out. You are talking about a form of martial law right?

I do not advocate shooting prisoners but I am not a proponent of taking prisoners (if you know what I mean) unless they are really needed for intel gathering purposes.

Like giving only limited quarter is not a form of "jungle justice".

Those "laws of honest warfare" also do not operate so well where "insiders" and "outsiders" are involved, and where reciprocity does not exist.

[JMA]

A hard truth is that, morally, soldiers must endure more risks because they get a significant exception to the rules of everyday living--the approval to kill for reasons other than self-defense. In exchange, soldiers must accept the fact that they are also more likely to be killed. I equate that higher likelihood of being killed to a requirement upon soldiers to take more risks to ensure non-combatants are not harmed. Being empowered to kill others that may not be a direct threat to themselves means that soldiers must take more risks to ensure that only appropriate targets are engaged.

Morally? What on earth are you talking about?

Thankfully you are not a soldier otherwise there would be great concern that soldiers somewhere may be at risk of having their lives played with like a game of chance. Thank heavens for small mercies.