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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by SJPONeill View Post
    This is a great thread and one of the most challenging, and relevant I have come across...

    In regards to CPT Semrau, would his offence have been the same had he:

    done nothing and just let him expire in his own time i.e. an act of omission?

    rendered first aid, prolonging the Taliban's life and pain in the knowledge that he would die anyway?

    rendered first aid but OD'd the PW on morphine, thus also wasting an asset he or his troops might need later? Ditto for caring for him and calling in a casevac in accordance with the letter of the 'law'?

    double-tapped him on his way past as a potential threat?

    In at least two of those options, one might argue that the pain and suffering of the wounded Taliban would not only have been greater but that the Canadian soldiers would have known that to be the case. Perhaps there lies the rub between a moral offence and a legal one?
    As a young man I faced these type of decisions too often. There must be hundreds of thousands if not millions since then who have been in the same position.

    At the time I did not think much about it. I understand that there are many out there whose consciences worry them to a greater or lesser extent over the things they did or may have allowed to happen. Looking back it now seems bizarre that I was asked on occasion whether or not someone could be put out of his misery. As if I had that authority.

    One thing for sure is that Semrau if he had his time over again would not do what he did. And I guess his prosecution is more to send a message to the rank and file of the Canadian army than to crucify Semrau.

    The line is often blurred and the areas are often shades of grey.

    How much things have changed over the past 30-40 years I don't know but I would suggest that each army should deal fairly and unequivocally with such matters to prevent the outside law fraternity getting involved and forcing the issue. Cover ups and white-washes are what keeps the door open for the prosecutors who want to make a name for themselves at the expense of the respective army.

    1. make it clear to all what the "laws" are.
    2. deal effectively with all and any infractions.

    ... doing this will keep the vultures at bay!

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    Hello Mike,

    What we do not want to see is "legal battles on how to understand one word that has several meanings and various translations." Nobody is going to be looking up variant legalisms in the middle of a firefight.
    Part from being the devils advocate (in a white suite of the stupid angel of humanitarian laws), I am also a practical man with boots on the field and I do agree with you on the fact that GC were not written to have legal battle on one word during operations.

    Unfortunately, those legalisms (as applied to the gray areas) become personally important to combatants if they find themselves being prosecuted before the ICC, before a domestic court (in lieu of the ICC, as the Australian spokesperson said), or before a military court, because they chose a different interpretation of a legalism, or did not know that legalism existed.
    That’s why, in my opinion, it is needed to have a clear understanding of GC and Hague Convention interpretation by your commandment and legal body before. And that’s also the challenge of everyone involve: take the right decision at a moment you have too many other things to think of. (And I support you 200% on that).

    Pink and cheesy understanding would define the black area as: during combat and the white one any times everyone stopped firing… This also has to be put in regard with the type of engagement those rules were designed for: regular wars between 2 conventional armies battling in open ground involving a large number of combatants… The 1st and 2nd WW battle type.

    We do agree that it does not apply to most of irregular engagements.
    Now the question of pursuit is important as in a court, it will be difficult to put in balance a military objective against a one man life, especially in a civilian court. (Well, I know some military judge who can be harsher than civilian judges…)

    One could introduce both legalism and dogmatism into the scope of the clause "... particularly after an engagement ..." ("... notamment après un engagement ...") - that is, when does an engagement end ?

    I doubt that anyone would contend that it ends when the objective is taken and firing dies down or stops, and contact is broken. At that point, the primary circumstances are what the enemy will do - e.g., some "maybes": (1) enemy counterattacks (requiring your prompt reorganization and consolidation); (2) enemy occupies a new fighting position (should the unit advance to attack this new objective); (3) enemy retreats (should the unit pursue). Those post-contact actions will interfere to a greater or lesser extent with care of the wounded.
    There has been some legal decision make by the TIPY on what a conflict is and what the “duration/life time” of a conflict is. Have to look for details. The Karadzic trial in particular if I do not mistake.

    The "circumstances" in irregular warfare are difficult, especially where the irregular force sets up a situation (e.g., involving wounded as one example) believing that the regular forces' probable application of its rules will be to the regulars' disadvantage.
    Also, the rules are made for to mitigate the sufferings and avoid excessive use of violence. If the military necessity is taken in account, it is not an argument to pass over the obligations to the wounded.
    I also do believe that the interpretation of the necessity VS obligation will differ from country to country and from court to court.
    As example, I will use the Nuremberg case used by Michael Walzer in just and injust wars (sorry I do not have the book with me so it is from the top of my mind). In his example, the Allies accused the German navy to have assassinated and not rescued sailors. It appears that the German navy started to rescue the Allies sailors but when the Allies forces arrived on the spot, they attacked the German. (to make the story short)
    The court found that it was the Allies who were in fault (and the German not guilty by the way) for having attacked while opponent was conducting a rescue mission.

    Does that mean that you have to put you self in danger under the « protection » of a rescue/humanitarian mission? Definitively not. (That’s the job of the stupid relief workers; my job to put you in danger because I did exactly that and now I am in deep #### and need armed rescue )

    To come back to our context, the point is: you have an obligation to act accordingly to the rules.
    - You cannot attack opponent when they do conduct a “rescue” mission (Many comments from French troops in Astan on the fact that we let the Taleb go with their dead while they do not let us take care of our wounded).
    - You have to provide relief and aid to wounded opponent as soon as possible.
    - Primary responsibility to assist wounded falls under each side: you take care of your wounded, I take care of mine. The GC bottom line is just: if I find one of yours wounded, I take him prisoner and I heal him.

    Now, you have crushed the enemy and they are fleeing… What is left is wounded they did not take with them. Well… Hard to said. Will very much depends on you assets, your capacity to conduct your mission, the objective of your mission, your opponent capacities…
    I do also believe that in such a case, you take orders from your commandment. They are the ones qualified to determine if you keep on your mission or you have to stop. SOP for such situations should be issued before as well as what to do with the wounded.

    Will take time to look at your synopsis in details.

    I do also agree with JMA and hope it is done for that reason:
    One thing for sure is that Semrau if he had his time over again would not do what he did. And I guess his prosecution is more to send a message to the rank and file of the Canadian army than to crucify Semrau.
    It is important for the regular forces to also show that they do play by the rules (for the public ad the enemy) and are not affraid of taking the black sheep out of their ranks (with all respect for Semrau that I do not know personnaly).

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    Default Change thread title?

    Perhaps the editors should rename this thread? Might be easier for people to find later on who may not get the gist of its contents from the title. IMO a lot of what has been dicussed, though sometime over my miniscule head, is of great import.

    p.s. Keep it coming, I suspect there is much of great value here that lawyers as well as laymen could learn. Cheers
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-01-2010 at 08:54 PM. Reason: Thread title changed October 1st 2010 and note added in first post

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    Default Sorry,

    I was wrong. The correct jurice prudence is from the following trials:
    ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, para. 561-568;
    ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 84.
    ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Judgment, IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005, para. 135-170.

    Plus the definition from GC.

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    Default Change the title to?

    Quote Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii View Post
    Perhaps the editors should rename this thread? Might be easier for people to find later on who may not get the gist of its contents from the title.
    Any suggestions for the title welcome! Children in conflict: legal and other points?
    davidbfpo

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    Default Specially Protected Persons in Combat Situations

    Hi David,

    My suggestion would be along the lines of "Specially Protected Persons in Combat Situations" (as titled above).

    So far a number of those "special protectees" have been mentioned:

    1. child soldiers
    2. children in general
    3. civilians in general
    4. persons held under a belligerent's power (de hors rule #1)
    5. persons wounded (de hors rule #2)
    6. persons surrendering (de hors rule #3)
    7. medical rescuers (military & civilian)

    We might subtitle it:

    "How honest, law-abiding regular forces are getting their arses shot off because a cloud-cuckoo-wunderland morass has been imposed on them to create criminal sanctions against dishonest, law-shirking regular and irregular forces who could care less because the Hague is too remote."

    with credits to Tukhii and NZ O'Neill.

    The subtitle is too long, but I'll pick up the theme in my next post.

    Cheers

    Mike

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    Default The loss of military necessity in the balance - part 1

    The references cited below in this part are linked at ICRC, International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents. The relevant documents re: Protection of Cultural Property are:

    Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The Hague, 14 May 1954. ... [State parties - 123][State signatories - 4]

    Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The Hague, 14 May 1954. .... [State parties - 100][State signatories - 1]

    Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict The Hague, 26 March 1999 ... [State parties - 56][State signatories - 18]
    The Convention and Protocols are relevant to this thread only insofar as they represent a definite shift away from the doctrines surrounding military necessity between 1954 and 1999 (the Second Protocol, which became effective in 2004).

    Please note that 127 states were parties to the 1954 Convention; and that only 74 states are parties to the 1999 Second Protocol. That latter document has not been accepted by such states as: Russia, China, India, US, France, UK, NZ, Australia, Israel.

    The purpose of the 1999 Second Protocol was a radical revision of the original 1954 Convention and First Protocol, as its Introduction makes clear:

    Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict The Hague, 26 March 1999
    Introduction
    State parties (56) / State signatories (18)
    Forum of adoption - Diplomatic Conference on the Draft Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention
    In force - yes
    Entry into force - 9.3.2004

    1. Basic protection: The 1954 Convention was adopted well before the 1977 Protocols. It was drafted against the background of the Second World War at a time when it was still considered inevitable that entire cities would be attacked. In the midst of such a war, the 1954 Convention sought to protect valuable cultural property. It provides that cultural property can only be attacked in case of "imperative military necessity" without defining this exception. In 1977, Protocol I did away with this approach. Henceforth, only military objectives - more clearly defined and more carefully selected - should be made the object of attack. It appeared self-evident that any improvement of the 1954 Convention should reflect this modern approach: cultural property is civilian property and it should not be attacked unless when it becomes a military objective. In addition, cultural property can only be attacked when there is no other feasible alternative. The updating of the 1954 Convention in light of Protocol I also led to the inclusion of rules concerning precautions in attack that found in Protocol I.

    2. Enhanced protection: Given that the 1954 system of cultural property under special protection never worked, the Second Procotol establishes a new system. Cultural property of the greatest importance for humanity can be placed under enhanced protection provided it is adequately protected by domestic law and not used for military purposes or to shield military sites. Enhanced protection is granted from the moment of entry in the List of Cultural Property Under Enhanced Protection. This decision is taken by the Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, an intergovernmental committee established under the new Protocol.

    3. Enforcement: Another development reflected in the new Protocol is the increased effort to fight impunity through effective criminal prosecution of war criminals. The Protocol specifically defines five serious violations for which it establishes individual criminal responsibility. States undertake to adopt appropriate legislation to make these violations criminal offences under domestic law, to provide appropriate penalties and to establish jurisdiction over these offences, including universal jurisdiction for three of the five serious violations. The list of serious violations goes well beyond existing law.

    4. Scope of application: The Second Protocol applies equally to international and non-international armed conflicts. The extension of the application of the Second Protocol to non-international armed conflicts is essential.
    Note in para #3 the emphasis on war crimes prosecutions as a major (primary ?) enforcement tool. I'll get back to that later.

    Now, I think it fair to say that Russia, China, India, US, France, UK, NZ, Australia and Israel did not reject the Second Protocol so that they could run wild destroying cultural property.

    The problem with the Second Protocol is that it goes far to remove military necessity as a standard; but, if military necessity falls by the wayside in this limited area (of cultural property), the same logic permits its demise in other more critical areas - i.e., those of specially protected persons. Thus, the relevance to this thread.

    The ICRC article cited by MAL deals with military necessity as it is defined in the 1999 Second Protocol - and rejected by many nations. The process by which military necessity was limited is described in the ICRC article:

    In February 1994 a group of experts, invited in their personal capacities, put together the so-called Lauswolt document containing draft provisions aimed at improving the Convention. The Lauswolt document did not, however, deal with the problems raised by the notion of military necessity.

    The second meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Convention (Paris, 13 November 1995) invited all the States to submit to the Secretariat written comments on the substantive proposals for improving the Convention. Several replies commented on the military necessity issue. Some wished to remove completely the exception of military necessity (Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia), others proposed modifications (Belgium, and an alternative proposal from the Czech Republic), still others suggested reconsidering the issue (Kuwait and Poland). [15]

    The March 1997 meeting of governmental experts on the review of the Convention resulted in a redrafting of the Lauswolt document. The issue of military necessity was again barely mentioned in the revised text. It was, however, pointed out that “certain military legal advisers favoured including such a phrase in the new instrument because, according to their views, such a concept has been a part of international customary and treaty law of armed conflicts and the exclusion of this concept would not be accepted by their military. Those observers pointed out that there were close links between the ‘military necessity’ and the corresponding obligation not to use cultural property for military purposes” [16]. In particular, the Israeli observer suggested that the following provision be inserted in the new draft: “The provisions of this instrument shall not prejudice or derogate from accepted customary principles of the Laws of War, including, inter alia, the principles of proportionality, distinction and military necessity”. [17]

    During the third meeting of the States party to the Convention (Paris, 13 November 1997), representatives of several countries (e.g. Argentina, Austria, France and Israel) defended the value of this notion, asserting that it expressed one of the basic rules of international humanitarian law. They agreed, however, to define it more precisely and narrowly.

    Finally, during the May 1998 (Vienna) meeting of governmental experts on the revision of the Convention the majority of participants speaking on this point favoured retaining the notion in the proposed new instrument. However, in accordance with the views expressed, its definition should include elements which would indicate the circumstances in which this exception to the obligation to protect cultural property may be invoked.
    .....
    As during the 1954 Intergovernmental Conference, the notion of military necessity was one of the most hotly debated issues during the recent Diplomatic Conference which resulted in the adoption of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Convention (The Hague, 15-26 March 1999). Two opposing tendencies appeared, both during the plenary debates and in the working group on this matter: the attempt of military participants (both lawyers and operational staff) to broaden the scope of the definition of military necessity, and the attempt of cultural heritage protection experts to narrow the scope of this definition so as to limit potential abuses and loose interpretation.
    ....
    Before concluding this note on the meaning of “military necessity” in the 1954 Convention, it should be recalled that the notion appears in a number of other treaties on different aspects of the law of armed conflicts, such as the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (e.g. Art. 8, 34 and 50 of the First Convention; Art.126 of the Third Geneva Convention; Art. 49, 55, 108 and 143 of the Fourth Convention) and Additional Protocol I of 1977 (Art.54, para 5, 62, 67 and 71).
    As noted, the radical definitional shift caused Russia, China, India, US, France, UK, NZ, Australia and Israel to reject the Second Protocol.

    (cont.)

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    Default The loss of military necessity in the balance - part 2

    Canada accepted the 1999 Second Protocol with substantial reservations:

    Canada

    Ratification / Accession - 29.11.2005
    Reservation / Declaration - 29.11.2005

    Reservation / Declaration text

    The statement of understanding reproduced below was annexed to the instrument of accession :

    "STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING

    1. It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that the definition of a military objective in Article 2(f) is to be interpreted the same way as Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

    2. It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that in relation to Article 6(a)(ii), 6(b), 7(a), 7(b), 8, 13(2)(a) and 13(2)(b) the word "feasible" means that which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.

    3. It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that in relation to Article 6(a)(ii), 6(b), 7(c) and 7(d)(ii) that the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the attack.

    4. It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that any cultural property that becomes a military objective may be attacked in accordance with a waiver of imperative military necessity pursuant 10 Article 4(2) of the Convention.

    5. It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that a decision to invoke imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 6(c) of this Protocol may be taken by an officer commanding a force smaller than the equivalent of a battalion in size in circumstances where the cultural property becomes a military objective and the circumstances ruling at the time relating to force protection are such that it is not feasible to require the decision to be made by an officer commanding a force the equivalent of a battalion in size or larger.

    6. It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that under Article 6(a)(i), cultural property can be made into a military objective because of its nature, location, purpose or use."
    With so many reservations, perhaps it would have been better to simply reject the protocol.

    What is really going on here ?

    To answer that question requires reference to some history. Fortunately, we have a very recent law review article that is on point, Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance (VJIL, Vol. 50:4, 2010, p.795 et seq - 45 pages). The author's background is:

    Chair of Public International Law, Durham University, United Kingdom; General Editor, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. The author, a retired U.S. Air Force judge advocate, was previously Dean, Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany; 2007-08 Charles Stockton Visiting Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College; and 2006 Sir Ninian Stephen Visiting Scholar at Melbourne University Law School.
    His BLUF (p. 796)

    INTRODUCTION

    No principle is more central to international humanitarian law (IHL), nor more misunderstood, than that of military necessity. It has been proffered both to justify horrendous abuses during armed conflicts and to impose impractical and dangerous restrictions on those who fight. Contemporary conflicts, as well as ongoing efforts to clarify IHL’s application therein, have further muddied the waters.

    This Essay examines the principle of military necessity and its current trajectory. In IHL, the principle appears in two guises: justification for normative deviation, and as an element of the lex scripta. The first notion will be quickly dispatched, for the law surrounding military necessity as a justification for violating IHL is well-settled. With regard to the latter, military necessity appears as both a specific element and a general foundational principle. Although the catalogue of direct references to military necessity in IHL is slim, the principle pervades the entire body of law by undergirding individual rules. In this central role, military necessity exists in equipoise with the principle of humanity, which seeks to limit the suffering and destruction incident to warfare. This symbiotic relationship determines in which direction, and at what speed, IHL evolves. It also determines the manner of its application on the battlefield.

    The orderly development of treaty law by states over time allows for equilibrium in the legal system, since states must be responsive to both military and humanitarian interests. Yet, as this Essay will demonstrate, various external pressures have fueled a gradual shift in emphasis toward humanitarian considerations. Although the trend may represent one form of “progress,” it equally risks destabilizing the delicate balance that preserves the viability of IHL in a state-centric normative architecture.
    I'd suggest this article as textbook #1", which gives a flavor of the international politics involved - and they are involved with a vengence. The second "textbook" is also recent and is a longer thesis on the 1977 APs. Rex A. Childers, THE RATIONALITY OF NONCONFORMITY: THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO REFUSE RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL I ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 (2008, 123 pages).

    (cont.)

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    Default 1949 GC Commentary

    Rule 109 refers to AP II, Art. 8 and its commentary, which in turn refers to the 1949 GCs and their commentaries. Here, from the commentary to GC I, Art. 15 (the most relevant snip I could find) (emphasis added):

    Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949.

    Commentary

    Chapter II : Wounded and sick

    [p.150] ARTICLE 15 -- SEARCH FOR CASUALTIES. EVACUATION

    With Article 15 the Convention quits the terrain of general principles, and enters the new domain of practical realization. Having proclaimed the inviolability of the wounded and sick, having defined who they are and given them a legal status, the Convention now proceeds to lay down the actual steps to be taken for their benefit from the moment they fall on the battlefield.

    In this connection Articles 15, 16 and 17 may be said to form a single unit, covering as they do the search for casualties and for the dead, their removal, and the recording and forwarding of information about them. The 1929 Convention had already attempted, for the sake of clarity, to draw a distinction between these different stages by dealing first with the operations taking place at the front, and then with those in the rear where it is possible to have recourse to installations of a more permanent character. The 1949 Convention maintained this distinction, and at the same time dealt more fully with the whole subject, adding a considerable number of useful details.

    Article 15 applies exclusively to operations which take place at the front -- namely, the search for the wounded and dead and arrangements for their protection and evacuation and the possible exchange of the wounded.

    PARAGRAPH 1 -- SEARCH, PROTECTION AND FIRST AID

    The wounded and dead lying out on a field of battle or between the [p.151] lines must all be searched for, collected and protected, and the wounded must receive attention. That is a bounden duty, which must be fulfilled as soon as circumstances permit.

    A. ' Extent of the obligation. ' -- The 1929 Convention made the obligation applicable only "after each engagement", and imposed it only on "the occupant of the field of battle", whereas henceforward both belligerents are required to comply, or to attempt to comply, with it ' at all times. ' The paragraph actually begins with the words: "At all times, and particularly after an engagement...". This wording is adapted to the conditions of modern war, in which hostilities are more continuous in character than they were in the past. The effect is to increase the obligations of the belligerents in respect of the wounded. Indirectly the task of the medical personnel may be rendered more arduous, and also more dangerous.

    But there are times when military operations will make the obligation to search for the fallen impracticable. There will be cases which exceed the limits of what the medical personnel can be expected to do, however great their courage and devotion. It was not possible, therefore, to make the obligation absolute. It was accordingly provided that "Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures..." The obligation to act without delay is strict; but the action to be taken is limited to what is possible, and it is left to the military command to judge what is possible, and to decide to what extent it can commit its medical personnel.

    B. ' Search. ' -- The search for the fallen combatants and their collection may present different aspects according to circumstances. The commonest and the most important case will be that of enemy troops retiring in the face of an attack. The occupant of the battlefield must then, without delay, make a thorough search of the captured ground so as to pick up all the victims.

    The dead must also be looked for and brought back behind the lines with as much care as the wounded. It is not always certain that death has taken place. It is, moreover, essential that the dead bodies should be identified and given a decent burial. When a man has been hit with such violence that there is nothing left of him but scattered remains, these must be carefully collected.
    In all these different operations it is the undoubted duty of the combatants [p.152] themselves to give the medical personnel all possible assistance.

    When picking up the wounded and dead, care should be taken to collect all their belongings (which may be scattered about); for such objects may inter alia be of assistance in establishing their identity (1).

    C. ' Protection. ' -- It will not always be possible to evacuate the wounded at once, and it will be necessary to protect them in the meantime against pillage and ill-treatment, and also to prevent despoiling of the dead.

    The purpose of this paragraph was not to assert the principle of the respect and protection of the wounded. That had already been done by Article 12 . But provision had to be made for the effective application of the principle. Pillage of the dead had also to be prohibited (2). In other words, the wounded and the dead must be guarded and, if necessary, defended against all parties, whether military or civilian, who may seek to lay hands on them. Combatants, like medical personnel, are called upon to prevent this, going, if necessary, to the length of using their arms for the purpose (3).

    The presence of hordes of pillagers, who used to be called the "hyena of the battlefield" may not seem likely today; but the possessions of the wounded and dead are still liable to excite the greed of soldiers or unscrupulous civilians. Such hateful spoliation must be prevented.

    D. ' First aid. ' -- The general obligation to care for the wounded irrespective of their nationality arises out of Article 12 of the Convention. The reason for repeating this idea in the present paragraph of the 1949 [p.153] Convention was to emphasize the necessity of immediately giving first aid to the wounded on the battlefield.

    Recent developments of medical science have clearly shown that first aid, if given by qualified personnel and with the least possible delay, may exercise a preponderating influence on the cure of the patient. New techniques of a quick and simple character have been perfected, which not only induce a physical condition on the part of the wounded enabling them to support evacuation, but above all increase their chances of survival and even of complete recovery to an extent which even at the beginning of the Second World War would never have been thought possible (4). The work of medical personnel in and near the front line thus assumes added importance. It will no longer be merely a case of moving the wounded to the rear in the condition in which they are picked up. They will have first to receive medical attention -- blood transfusions, injections, etc. Medical Services will consequently have to give medical orderlies working in the front, who hitherto have often been no more than stretcher-bearers, a more advanced professional training of a semi-medical character.
    This commentary generally employs a standard of reasonableness and practicality - allowing judgment to be exercised by the millitary command ("... it is left to the military command to judge what is possible ..."); but then, at times, lays down standards that are not practical, if read literally (e.g., the bolded language in B. ' Search. ' above).

    The Canadian "rule book" may be based on that bolded language - any Canucks aboot ?

    One must then ask whether these conventions look more at the short-term, first order effects, rather than considering longer-term, higher order effects.

    E.g., I can save 5 wounded (no distinction as to "whose wounded") at the locus of contact; but, by doing so, give up the ability to pursue the enemy who then will go on to kill 100 civilians - and Lagrange's UN CMO team to boot.

    If the GCs, APs and CIHL can only be interpreted to require that result, they are extremely bad law and even worse from a humanitarian standpoint.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 09-30-2010 at 08:50 PM.

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    Default Mike you beat me on that one.

    I was going to come with Art15.
    Anyways, I still post my comments:
    On engagement definition... (un dahu as we say, we froggies)
    Actually it's the ICRC and the TPI who are chasing a wild goose. It appears that the definition of conflict has a variable geometrical dimension. From what I understood from the jurisprudence issued by the TPIY, an armed conflict qualifies a situation in a localized geographical area as much as what is happening in a “country” or large geographical area. What makes a conflict is the intensity and the duration. The term of armed conflict is used to qualify the situation in various municipalities during the Yougoslavia war. And prosecute some of the war criminals based on the fact that the situation was an armed conflict and therefore the IHL did apply.
    An engagement being one event during a conflict. Even an engagement, in an area qualified as a conflict can be qualified as a sub sub armed conflict taking place in a larger armed conflict. (But such definition is not easy the life of anyone)

    An important remark is to be made also.
    Previously, an attempt to use the term armed conflict was made to qualify a terrorist attack to the US embassy in Peru (If I do not mistake). The same arguments were brought to the table: use of military armament, intensity of the violence... But what was rejected to qualify the situation as an armed conflict was the notion of duration (4 hours of exchange of fire). So the qualification of armed conflict was rejected. But we do have here a definition by default for an engagement. According it is taking place during an situation qualified as armed conflict.
    (I definitively have to find back that trial statement references)

    I do believe that Yugoslav war jurisprudence have interest for Astan as the main defense line was that it was “police operations” and therefore IHL did not apply (As in the Peru case). And therefore even while using military assets, the GC did not apply but solely national criminal laws. Also the similar nature of the opponent, a non state actor against a state actor/force.

    Also, I would use JMA testimony, despite it is “anecdotes” (in the literal sense of the word: a short story). It appears clearly in his post that engagements have a beginning and an end mainly defined by the use and cessation of use of force.

    But in the end you are right in the fact that engagement is never clearly defined.

    So I will use and abuse of the 1954 The Hague Convention on Cultural properties:

    a) Military necessity in respect of cultural property under general protection
    1. Measures undertaken by a military commander to obtain, as quickly as possible, the complete surrender of the enemy must be lawful and in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international humanitarian law, both of treaty and customary nature, such as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, proportionality and the prohibition of reprisals against protected categories of persons and objects.

    2. Those actions must be limited as to the time, purpose and object of military operations.

    3. No other feasible alternative was available at the moment of the operation.

    4. The assessment of the situation by a commander was made from all sources reasonably available to him/her at the moment of the operation.

    5. Imperative military necessity may be established only by the officer commanding a force the equivalent to a battalion unless the circumstances of the military engagement do not allow this.

    6. If possible, a warning shall be communicated to the opposing party a reasonable time in advance.
    http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0...9?opendocument

    Paragraph 1 is the best and closest definition I have found yet of what can qualify an engagement: Measures undertaken by a military commander to obtain, as quickly as possible, the complete surrender of the enemy.

    Point nb 5 is interesting cause it defines who can make the decision of an imperative military necessity.
    I believe that in the field, it's not always easy to contact your battalion commander to know what to do. And he probably does not give a dam about the guy dying at your feet. But still, it is important to know that he is the one who has to make the decision in last resort. But there is always an officer in command of the operation. He is the one who has to make the last resort decision to evacuate wounded or to proceed with the operation.
    Also, it is interesting that military necessity is clearly defined only when it comes to cultural assets and not human beings.

    About the comments, and that's where we can find real gray areas:
    4650Article 15 of the first Convention provides that the Parties to the conflict must take all possible measures "at all times, and particularly after an engagement"; Article 18 of the Second Convention contains the same obligation, though it is limited by the words "after each engagement".
    The first convention is the one closest to the spirit: must take all possible measure at all time.
    Which differs from your “interpretation”. Obviously, the reduction to whenever it is feasible is also due to the need to have rules and laws which match with reality. But it is also driven by the concept of imperious military necessity. After all, we are talking about how to make war in the end.

    And naturally, I will take the following comments to cover the gray areas:
    4654 Victims must be protected against pillage and ill-treatment and they must receive adequate care. Such protection measures are particularly important during the period before the victims are able to be evacuated, when they are especially vulnerable.
    I also chose to be nice, pink and cheesy and sacrifice my self as a martyr and have a almost dead opponent being rescued while I am under attack.

    Despite this being a patch and glue from various treaties, laws and customary laws, there is a wide understanding that basically as long as someone is not dead, you try to save him. And when he is dead you do respect him. The idea/concept is to place human being before military necessity. The bottom line question is much closer to who takes the decision that what decision to take.

    And finally some links about children and child soldiers. (to link up with the initial subject of the threat)
    1) Captured child soldiers#
    http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0...a?opendocument
    2) Involvement of children in conflicts#:
    http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0...t?opendocument
    Last edited by M-A Lagrange; 09-30-2010 at 09:46 PM.

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