Intro to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars

[SWJED]

I was saving this article for Volume VI of the Small Wars Journal - but thought there would be some interest here on the SWC in regards to opinions concerning the conduct of Small Wars by those who preceded us...

As always, we thank the Marine Corps Gazette for their permission to reprint these blasts from the past here.

An Introduction to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars by Major Harold Utley, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, May 1931.

It is obvious that this subject is of prime importance to officers of the Marine Corps, and Naval officers since they may, either as commanders of squadrons and ships supporting such operations or as staff officers of such commanders, find it necessary to pass judgment upon plans for this type of operations, should likewise have more than a hazy knowledge of what has occurred in the past; and finally, it is believed that officers of the Army cannot afford to wholly disregard this subject even though it is fundamentally a function of the Marine Corps, although it is true that the landing of a single armed soldier on foreign soil constitutes an act of war, whereas sailors and marines can operate all over the same country and suffer a considerable number of casualties while the nation concerned and our own are still at peace.

This very fact-that no state of war exists-coupled with that mentioned before-that only a portion of the inhabitants are hostile-frequently gives to the operations a character differing radically from that where a formal state of war exists, they complicate the situation immeasurably.

Although each situation presents its own peculiar problems, they all have certain characteristics in common, and these can be studied and prepared for. The frequency with which they have occurred emphasizes the importance of making careful studies, of selecting most appropriate organization and equipment, and of undergoing adequate training, in order that we may be properly prepared when we encounter them.

This type of operations has been designated by many writers by the title "SMALL WARS," a term which has no connection whatsoever with the size of the force involved, the extent of the theater of operations, nor the length of time required to bring the operation to a close. In spite of its rather general use, the choice of the term does not appear to be a particularly happy one. Colonel C. E. Callwell, British Army, whose book, "Small Wars, Their Principles and Practices," has been a standard text on the subject for over a quarter of a century, says that the term is used "in default of a better one." In some cases it appears difficult to define precisely the line of demarkation between "Small Wars" and major conflicts, but generally speaking Small Wars are those operations in which a trained regular force is opposed by an irregular and comparatively untrained enemy. All of our campaigns against the Indians, the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916, and the numerous campaigns and expeditions of the Marine Corps-except when serving with the Army in the Mexican and World Wars-fall under this category...

[slapout9]

Dave, change the date of the article to current and call it SWJ 5.5 warfare. My point is this, we are not being beat by the enemy we are beating ourselves. This is not a new kind of warfare they are just damn good at it, and we have forgotten how good we can be at it, if we choose to commit as a nation to winning it. As for quotes how about FDR when he decided to mobilize the entire nation to fight a war. "We have nothing to fear but fear itself!!"

[SWJED]

Dave, change the date of the article to current...

That's why I enjoy reading the "old stuff" from the 20's, 30's and 60's...

[Jedburgh]

Dave, change the date of the article to current and call it SWJ 5.5 warfare. My point is this, we are not being beat by the enemy we are beating ourselves. This is not a new kind of warfare they are just damn good at it, and we have forgotten how good we can be at it, if we choose to commit as a nation to winning it. As for quotes how about FDR when he decided to mobilize the entire nation to fight a war. "We have nothing to fear but fear itself!!"

That's why I enjoy reading the "old stuff" from the 20's, 30's and 60's...

I heartily concur with slapout; in fact, I think that this is a key point that is borne out by many of the discussions on this board.

I also really enjoy finding some of the "old stuff" in digits - even more when I can find an original hard copy to add to the library. (I recently picked up Campaigning in the Philippines, by Karl Irving Faust, published in 1899. Great detail on the shift from the conventional fight against the Spanish to dealing with the outbreak and the early part of the Philippine Revolt. For a book of that period, it includes a lot of photographs, as well as detailed OB breakdowns of the forces involved.)

As an aside, a significant difference between the "old stuff" and what is being published these days is that the older material was written in a straightforward manner that was easily digestible by all. Too many military authors today get wrapped up in "doctrinese" that is vague and open to differences in interpretation - and thus ends up being meaningless pseudo-intellectual babble that talks at the issue rather than being truly insightful.

[SWJED]

As an aside, a significant difference between the "old stuff" and what is being published these days is that the older material was written in a straightforward manner that was easily digestible by all. Too many military authors today get wrapped up in "doctrinese" that is vague and open to differences in interpretation - and thus ends up being meaningless pseudo-intellectual babble that talks at the issue rather than being truly insightful.

I could not agree more. I've been reading a lot of the older Marine Corps Gazette articles lately - especially those of post-WW I - pre-WW II and of the War in Vietnam. They most certainly are more straight-forward (and less PC) than some (if not many) of our current mumbo-jumbo concepts.

Of course there are exceptions (Military Review is but one example) and I detect a trend towards professional journals and official concept and doctrine writers "telling it like it is". Nothing like being in a fight of your life to get people thinking along a reality-based line.

[Jedburgh]

....Of course there are exceptions (Military Review is but one example) and I detect a trend towards professional journals and official concept and doctrine writers "telling it like it is". Nothing like being in a fight of your life to get people thinking along a reality-based line.

I think that is what is so frustrating to those of us in the small community that has been deeply immersed in the reality of small wars since long before OEF/OIF - that it takes this extreme of an event to trigger modes of thought in the conventional army that is focused on operational realities rather than ideals and preconceived notions.

...I have to confess feeling outright anger when reading some of these more recent articles - even those written clearly and concisely - when they are presenting fundamentals as if the author experienced an epiphany. Which, to be fair, may actually be happening - but only because they've never been presented the true fundamentals in a professional setting pre-war.

And, although we are fortunate that many are now "getting it" - especially at the tactical and operational levels - there are still too many at the key decision-making levels who do not....and who still focus on technological solutions to many problems. Or focus on quantitative as opposed to qualitative answers. On the other hand, I admire those who continually fight against the use of "statistics" to define ops and work to provide more meaningful assessments.

Of course, the same problems exist in national LE in their continuing struggle to define how they approach the GWOT. In my perception, they are far more heavily burdened with the evil of statistics that inhibit effective ops.

I guess I'm rambling a bit, and I'll stop here. In many ways this topic is very near to me, but I don't want to discuss views on current training and ops in too much detail on an open board.

[SWJED]

A large part of my day job involves all aspects of the Joint Urban Warrior program. A "take-away" from the JUW 05 War Game evolved from discussions and centered on a lack of common language or understanding of operational terms among the Services and multinational partners. This is exacerbated by the absence of many relevant terms in Joint Publication 1-02, and a common PME program amongst the Services.

To quote one participant:

We continue to struggle with creating a common language that all can understand in its relevant operational context. Multinational coalitions encounter problems with different terms or conflicting usage of similar terms. This problem is often exacerbated by inadequate pre-war planning, and by translating from one language to another. As examples, participants (JUW 05) struggled to delineate among Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Stability Operations, Stability and Support Operations, Other Expeditionary Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).

This particpant's recommendation was:

Since all will agree “words have meanings,” it is essential that Joint Publication 1-02 be revised to incorporate the following terms: Defeat, Irregular Warfare, Combined Operating Area, Critical Vulnerability, Critical Requirement, Rule of Law, Legitimacy, Credibility, Asymmetric Warfare, Influence Operations, Pattern Analysis, and Stability and Support Operations in order to remove operational and planning friction and allow Joint Force Commanders to more easily convey their intent to subordinate commanders/leaders.

The bottom line is we need to be on the same sheet of paper when it comes to operational terms and the best place to start is JP 1-02.

[Bill Moore]

First, I relieved to find I have a brother somewhere who understands me, even if Martin, RTK, and and slapout didn't.

Second, there is no overarching term to describe what we're dealing with, so does each type of warfare or conflict require its own doctrine, or should we identify the common underlying principles that are applicable to most if not all? For now we'll call it small war doctrine. Then attempt to find out what is different with each conflict or in Iraq's case in each region?

I Marine's Small Wars Manual was a great start, on par with Clausewitz's "On War" (so it must have been written by an Army Officer? lol), but we can't let doctrine fossilize, we must constantly evolve it to fit current and projected reality.

I don't have the answer, I just like being the critic.

[RTK]

A large part of my day job involves all aspects of the Joint Urban Warrior program. A "take-away" from the JUW 05 War Game evolved from discussions and centered on a lack of common language or understanding of operational terms among the Services and multinational partners. This is exacerbated by the absence of many relevant terms in Joint Publication 1-02, and a common PME program amongst the Services.

To quote one participant:

We continue to struggle with creating a common language that all can understand in its relevant operational context. Multinational coalitions encounter problems with different terms or conflicting usage of similar terms. This problem is often exacerbated by inadequate pre-war planning, and by translating from one language to another. As examples, participants (JUW 05) struggled to delineate among Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Stability Operations, Stability and Support Operations, Other Expeditionary Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).

This particpant's recommendation was:

Since all will agree “words have meanings,” it is essential that Joint Publication 1-02 be revised to incorporate the following terms: Defeat, Irregular Warfare, Combined Operating Area, Critical Vulnerability, Critical Requirement, Rule of Law, Legitimacy, Credibility, Asymmetric Warfare, Influence Operations, Pattern Analysis, and Stability and Support Operations in order to remove operational and planning friction and allow Joint Force Commanders to more easily convey their intent to subordinate commanders/leaders.

The bottom line is we need to be on the same sheet of paper when it comes to operational terms and the best place to start is JP 1-02.

I do not disagree at all. In fact, a bone of contention in the school houses right now is the conflicting doctinal terms we constantly throw around. For instance, what the artillery community regards as "destroyed" is abut 40% more "living" equipment than what a cavalryman considers destroyed.

Further, FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A, Operational Terms and Graphics, needs to reflect the exact same definitions as JP 1-02. Unfortunately, even in FM 1-02 there are 3 different definitions for a plethora of terms depending on if you're looking at it from a DOD, Army, or USMC perspective.

[slapout9]

Bill Moore, I am not sure why I was associated with the other two posters yesterday concerning the type of war, but I was serious about undeclared war and here are my reasons.

1-We are not a Democracy! We our a Constitutional Republic, ruled by laws. We use democracy (voting! only as part of our election system) not as a form of government. Under this form of government we have two types and only two types of wars. Declared and Undeclared. Through our history because of something known as the De Facto standard the USMC had and I believe does have primary jurisdiction far any undeclared war. Because they have always been air,land,sea forces they should be as joint as they see fit based upon their mission and the situation.

2-We are confusing types of war with types of combatants!! Guerrillas,Partisans,Terrorism, etc.

3-Types of combatants are like types of criminals and require different force response levels based upon there degree of violence. As such like law enforcement you must have a force continuum (which the USMC does)to respond to the type of criminal/combatant you are facing. But all take place under the legal framework of declared or undeclared war and who has jurisdiction to handle the situation.

4-As for this Robb individual, I don't know much about him and I don't believe in this 4GW business. I do know the Marines that died in Iraq were not playing and if you could ask them and they could respond I bet they would say they were fighting at a "Systems Level".

[Bill Moore]

I think your comments on democracy could be argued to a point, but I understand your premise. Yes, I thought you were joking originally when you posted it. John Robb didn't acuse any warriors of "playing at war", he accused the state, and I think that is a fair assessment. You're playing at war if you don't have clear and achievable military goals. In Iraq I'll argue we're playing at war. If we were serious we would mobilize our population, greatly increase our combat power, and deny safe havens (Syria and Iran). We would do what was necessary to achieve the goal, if we're not prepared to do that, then we shouldn't get involved. As Robb stated we're playing a balancing game to maintain market health and to support some ambiguous moral objectives (always gray).

I want to hear more about the so what factor of undeclared war. How does it change our response options (doctrinal approaches) to solving the problem at hand or achieving our national security objectives? How do you sell an undeclared war to the American public? Maybe you're on to something, but I'm not completely sold on there are only two types of war as you stated, but I'm definitely going to think about it.

I think what we're attempting to get at is clarity of definitions not just in the joint world, but in the interagency, and I would coalition to ensure we're all directing fires from the same map. This clarity of thought will help us get to a collective strategy.

[RTK]

I think your comments on democracy could be argued to a point, but I understand your premise. Yes, I thought you were joking originally when you posted it. John Robb didn't acuse any warriors of "playing at war", he accused the state, and I think that is a fair assessment. You're playing at war if you don't have clear and achievable military goals. In Iraq I'll argue we're playing at war. If we were serious we would mobilize our population, greatly increase our combat power, and deny safe havens (Syria and Iran). We would do what was necessary to achieve the goal, if we're not prepared to do that, then we shouldn't get involved. As Robb stated we're playing a balancing game to maintain market health and to support some ambiguous moral objectives (always gray).

I want to hear more about the so what factor of undeclared war. How does it change our response options (doctrinal approaches) to solving the problem at hand or achieving our national security objectives? How do you sell an undeclared war to the American public? Maybe you're on to something, but I'm not completely sold on there are only two types of war as you stated, but I'm definitely going to think about it.

I think what we're attempting to get at is clarity of definitions not just in the joint world, but in the interagency, and I would coalition to ensure we're all directing fires from the same map. This clarity of thought will help us get to a collective strategy.

My response, as well, was tounge in cheek, as I agree that we've had a tough time catagorizing the war for what it is. So far, I have had not a lot of response to Bill Moore's posts as I don't necessarily disagree with the fundamentals.

You bring up the issue of how we sell the populace on the war. You also correctly state that we have not put the country on a war footing. Of the 4 economic elements of a national war stance we have conducted none of them (to include rationing, draft/mobilization, and mass production).

As for the so-what factor? Most, if not all of us in this discussion group, have jobs that directly tie to what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contrary to Bill Odom's article in Foreign Policy earlier this year, cutting and running is not a feasible option at this time due to the investments made, monetarily and personnel, in Iraq. At what time are we as a country and military going to say "well, we may have screwed up going into Iraq in the first place, but what are we going to do now?"

We won't leave Iraq as the pundits want us to at least until the next election. Until then, what do we do? Failure in this arena is a bad precedent.

I agree that the military is not playing, but the government as a whole is not necessarily doing all it can to win.

Ultimately, I work off commander's intent. If I don't know what the definitive end state is supposed to be, I'm destined to shaping the battlefield into what I think the best course of action is. At this point in time, the best thing I can do is bolster the training and equiping of indinginous security forces, to support the local political systems as much as I can, and help local security forces subvert and disrupt as many insurgent cells as I can.

Above the tactical level, the government needs to take these three principles to the nth degree on a national level. Until we can accomplish this collectively, we're going down a bad path.