Intro to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars

[Bill Moore]

First, I relieved to find I have a brother somewhere who understands me, even if Martin, RTK, and and slapout didn't.

Second, there is no overarching term to describe what we're dealing with, so does each type of warfare or conflict require its own doctrine, or should we identify the common underlying principles that are applicable to most if not all? For now we'll call it small war doctrine. Then attempt to find out what is different with each conflict or in Iraq's case in each region?

I Marine's Small Wars Manual was a great start, on par with Clausewitz's "On War" (so it must have been written by an Army Officer? lol), but we can't let doctrine fossilize, we must constantly evolve it to fit current and projected reality.

I don't have the answer, I just like being the critic.

[RTK]

A large part of my day job involves all aspects of the Joint Urban Warrior program. A "take-away" from the JUW 05 War Game evolved from discussions and centered on a lack of common language or understanding of operational terms among the Services and multinational partners. This is exacerbated by the absence of many relevant terms in Joint Publication 1-02, and a common PME program amongst the Services.

To quote one participant:

We continue to struggle with creating a common language that all can understand in its relevant operational context. Multinational coalitions encounter problems with different terms or conflicting usage of similar terms. This problem is often exacerbated by inadequate pre-war planning, and by translating from one language to another. As examples, participants (JUW 05) struggled to delineate among Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Stability Operations, Stability and Support Operations, Other Expeditionary Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).

This particpant's recommendation was:

Since all will agree “words have meanings,” it is essential that Joint Publication 1-02 be revised to incorporate the following terms: Defeat, Irregular Warfare, Combined Operating Area, Critical Vulnerability, Critical Requirement, Rule of Law, Legitimacy, Credibility, Asymmetric Warfare, Influence Operations, Pattern Analysis, and Stability and Support Operations in order to remove operational and planning friction and allow Joint Force Commanders to more easily convey their intent to subordinate commanders/leaders.

The bottom line is we need to be on the same sheet of paper when it comes to operational terms and the best place to start is JP 1-02.

I do not disagree at all. In fact, a bone of contention in the school houses right now is the conflicting doctinal terms we constantly throw around. For instance, what the artillery community regards as "destroyed" is abut 40% more "living" equipment than what a cavalryman considers destroyed.

Further, FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A, Operational Terms and Graphics, needs to reflect the exact same definitions as JP 1-02. Unfortunately, even in FM 1-02 there are 3 different definitions for a plethora of terms depending on if you're looking at it from a DOD, Army, or USMC perspective.

[slapout9]

Bill Moore, I am not sure why I was associated with the other two posters yesterday concerning the type of war, but I was serious about undeclared war and here are my reasons.

1-We are not a Democracy! We our a Constitutional Republic, ruled by laws. We use democracy (voting! only as part of our election system) not as a form of government. Under this form of government we have two types and only two types of wars. Declared and Undeclared. Through our history because of something known as the De Facto standard the USMC had and I believe does have primary jurisdiction far any undeclared war. Because they have always been air,land,sea forces they should be as joint as they see fit based upon their mission and the situation.

2-We are confusing types of war with types of combatants!! Guerrillas,Partisans,Terrorism, etc.

3-Types of combatants are like types of criminals and require different force response levels based upon there degree of violence. As such like law enforcement you must have a force continuum (which the USMC does)to respond to the type of criminal/combatant you are facing. But all take place under the legal framework of declared or undeclared war and who has jurisdiction to handle the situation.

4-As for this Robb individual, I don't know much about him and I don't believe in this 4GW business. I do know the Marines that died in Iraq were not playing and if you could ask them and they could respond I bet they would say they were fighting at a "Systems Level".

[Bill Moore]

I think your comments on democracy could be argued to a point, but I understand your premise. Yes, I thought you were joking originally when you posted it. John Robb didn't acuse any warriors of "playing at war", he accused the state, and I think that is a fair assessment. You're playing at war if you don't have clear and achievable military goals. In Iraq I'll argue we're playing at war. If we were serious we would mobilize our population, greatly increase our combat power, and deny safe havens (Syria and Iran). We would do what was necessary to achieve the goal, if we're not prepared to do that, then we shouldn't get involved. As Robb stated we're playing a balancing game to maintain market health and to support some ambiguous moral objectives (always gray).

I want to hear more about the so what factor of undeclared war. How does it change our response options (doctrinal approaches) to solving the problem at hand or achieving our national security objectives? How do you sell an undeclared war to the American public? Maybe you're on to something, but I'm not completely sold on there are only two types of war as you stated, but I'm definitely going to think about it.

I think what we're attempting to get at is clarity of definitions not just in the joint world, but in the interagency, and I would coalition to ensure we're all directing fires from the same map. This clarity of thought will help us get to a collective strategy.

[RTK]

I think your comments on democracy could be argued to a point, but I understand your premise. Yes, I thought you were joking originally when you posted it. John Robb didn't acuse any warriors of "playing at war", he accused the state, and I think that is a fair assessment. You're playing at war if you don't have clear and achievable military goals. In Iraq I'll argue we're playing at war. If we were serious we would mobilize our population, greatly increase our combat power, and deny safe havens (Syria and Iran). We would do what was necessary to achieve the goal, if we're not prepared to do that, then we shouldn't get involved. As Robb stated we're playing a balancing game to maintain market health and to support some ambiguous moral objectives (always gray).

I want to hear more about the so what factor of undeclared war. How does it change our response options (doctrinal approaches) to solving the problem at hand or achieving our national security objectives? How do you sell an undeclared war to the American public? Maybe you're on to something, but I'm not completely sold on there are only two types of war as you stated, but I'm definitely going to think about it.

I think what we're attempting to get at is clarity of definitions not just in the joint world, but in the interagency, and I would coalition to ensure we're all directing fires from the same map. This clarity of thought will help us get to a collective strategy.

My response, as well, was tounge in cheek, as I agree that we've had a tough time catagorizing the war for what it is. So far, I have had not a lot of response to Bill Moore's posts as I don't necessarily disagree with the fundamentals.

You bring up the issue of how we sell the populace on the war. You also correctly state that we have not put the country on a war footing. Of the 4 economic elements of a national war stance we have conducted none of them (to include rationing, draft/mobilization, and mass production).

As for the so-what factor? Most, if not all of us in this discussion group, have jobs that directly tie to what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contrary to Bill Odom's article in Foreign Policy earlier this year, cutting and running is not a feasible option at this time due to the investments made, monetarily and personnel, in Iraq. At what time are we as a country and military going to say "well, we may have screwed up going into Iraq in the first place, but what are we going to do now?"

We won't leave Iraq as the pundits want us to at least until the next election. Until then, what do we do? Failure in this arena is a bad precedent.

I agree that the military is not playing, but the government as a whole is not necessarily doing all it can to win.

Ultimately, I work off commander's intent. If I don't know what the definitive end state is supposed to be, I'm destined to shaping the battlefield into what I think the best course of action is. At this point in time, the best thing I can do is bolster the training and equiping of indinginous security forces, to support the local political systems as much as I can, and help local security forces subvert and disrupt as many insurgent cells as I can.

Above the tactical level, the government needs to take these three principles to the nth degree on a national level. Until we can accomplish this collectively, we're going down a bad path.

[Merv Benson]

For those that have been searching for a more descriptive term to fit wars like that in Iraq I offer "semi kinetic warfare." It involves a enemy who uses a raiding strategy which implies intermitant kinetic activity, combined with a political and media component. The enemy in Iraq has said that half the battle space is in the media, and he uses his kinteic operations to feed his media strategy. The Palestinians have a similar kinetic/media stratey and when the Hezballah war sucked the oxygen out of their media battlespace they reduced their rocket attacks because they lost PR traction. It might be described as a continuation of PR by other means.

[slapout9]

Bill, here is some more.

1-The definition of undeclared war should be more like the definition of a crime?? By that I mean the unlawfull use of force or "FRAUD" which threatens life or property. In most war definitions the fraud aspect is eliminated. This eliminates the concept of mental force (propaganda, IO,etc.) which in many societies verbal or mental violence is as much an act of war as shooting or bombing. Merv came up with a new term that describes what has always been part of most criminal codes in the USA but was never integrated into our war concepts. Is this the missing gap in Clausewitz statement war is politics by other means??

2-How does this affect doctine? I think we are approaching the concept of WAR in DEGREES!!! much like crimes are 1st,2nd and 3rd degree. Judged based upon the degree of violence or destruction.

3-Finally does the war in Iraq have terrorists, insurgents, civil war fighters, criminal gangs, religious gangs? Yes!!! they have all of those types of combatants/criminals at the same time in close proximity to each other. Which leads me to believe we are approaching combatant classification just like criminals. We have robbers,armed robbers,murders,gangs and depending on there proper classification based upon Intelligence it will help determine the most appropriate tactics to use at the point of engagement.

4-Is any of this new?? No. Is it 4gw? No. Is it a war at a systems level? You bet it is. Most of what I have said is in the article Dave posted at the beginning of this thread only slightly updated.

5-Questions,discussion??