Sep 2010 TRADOC Senior Leader's Conference

[Ken White]

I'm not saying this is wrong because we obviously have to do this in order to ensure we prevail in today's fights. #The question I'm struggling with is how do we restore some balance between the two? #How do we ensure proficiency in the Military-Technical field while simultaneously prioritizing the Human Development field to continue developing our leaders for tomorrow's fight(s)?

Emphasis on filling every space in the TOE with a 'qualified' individual leads to sort circuiting professional development to place persons by rank and specialty in every deploying unit. That those individuals may actually be less qualified than their apparent rank indicates is overlooked. We promote individuals to various ranks based on time in service, not actually tested and / or proven qualification. In many cases, a LT XO who's been there would be a better choice than a brand new CPT for Co cmd -- but we elect to opt for the CPT. Not enough CPTs? Reduce the time in service and ed requirements to produce more rapidly.

That really makes little sense. Can the young folks handle it? Sure -- but we aren't doing them any favors. They are being denied proper training an education to fill a perceived need. I suggest that perception is incorrect. Squads lead by Specialists. SGTs as PSGs. SSGs as acting Platoon leaders -- none of those are ideal; all work and have worked in prior wars.

Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO -- so people have to learn on the job. Then we move them from job to job to rapidly so they never really master the jobs; they just do them "good enough." That can work in a major, existential war, however, it does the service, its people and the Nation no favors in peace time or in quasi peace as now. That needs to be fixed and we need to spend more time on Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- get the basics right and it's like riding a bicycle; one does not forget. One also acquires a sound foundation on which to build...

However, to get training and education fixed, a workable personnel system that supports the Army in the field instead of itself has to exist. Good luck with that...

Oh -- and cut the size of Staffs. Significantly...

[ChipColbert]

KEN White quote:

Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO

I'm interested in hearing more about why you see it as a trade and not a profession.

[ChipColbert]

While I agree with much of what you posted, I see that as being a much larger issue than the one I'm thinking of. Reframing how we view our challenges and how we see military force being employed to meet them is vitally important for the debate. However, while I can see how that process may alleviate optempo and may decrease our role and rate of employment, I don't think it changes the fact that - IMO - the Army still needs to reassess how much emphasis we place on tactical and operational assignments vice broadening and educational experiences.

In a recent interview with American Interest, Eliot Cohen said the Army is doing a good job of producing "capable brigade commanders" but that doesn't mean we're developing the next generation of strategic thinkers and general officers. I think this is due in large part because we are so focused on tactical assignments. Link to the interview is here:
http://www.the-american-interest.com....cfm?piece=857

[Hacksaw]

Chip the dynamic of which you speak has very little to do with the Army's current OPTEMPO and the subsequent focus on tactical/operational assignments. While that may accurately describe the current atmospherics (not sure it does - but I'll accept it because it doesn't matter).... it has little to do with why the Army isn't producing "strategic thinkers"

Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m...

Don't get me wrong, those types of assignment and that type of focus is important... but it was virtually the only path to greater levels of responsibility...

I'll defer to some of our more "seasoned" members, but it is not uncommon to refer to a LTC/COL who couldn't get promoted as too smart for their own good.

That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers...

Get past the organizational bias that you have to have been IN/AR/Arty to be able to think big thoughts and you might find you have a whole lot more strategic thinkers that may seem appearant...

Thoughts?

[Old Eagle]

Hacksaw --

Target hit.

Chip --

TRADOC and HRC (along with their co-defendants on the Army Staff) need to try to find a way to address this. There is currently no way to identify and use the great tacticians (and reward them for their talents) and to identify and use great strategists AND to identify and use those rare few who can do it all at the gold medal level.

I did a study once for a very high ranking officer that basically identified the problem as this (Readers Digest version): Among the embedded study questions from the general were 1) where do CAT IV generals come from? 2) why do the other Services hand us our butts at the strategic level? and 3) should there be a mechanism to identify and promote "late bloomers", big idea guys, and others who could fill critical GO positions even if you wouldn't want them commanding divisions and corps.

All the key senior positions and promotions go to former battalion commanders (affectionately known as FBCs back in the day.) This is particularly true in the combat arms.

AARs from bn cmd selection boards reported that the overwhelmingly most important selection criterion for bn cmd was success in company command. That was followed by completion , of what I think you now call a KD position at the field grade level.

Therefore, the senior leadership of the Army were great company commanders. Their ability to succeed at GO levels didn't always pan out, sometimes with embarrassing or even tragic consequences.

The study was obviously much deeper and broader than I have portrayed here, but we keep seeing similar problems everyday. I found other ramifications, too, such as "distributing" KD positions "fairly" rather than based on past performance or impact on the units involved. There was a proliferation of bn cmd equivalencies, not to reward good officers, but to produce more FBCs for the personnel mill. And on it went.

For my efforts, I got handed my backside, and Big Green just keeps rollin' along.

[Tom Odom]

OE

This relates to the FAO question as you know quite well. The FBC obsession a mental blinder, one that is welded to Big Green's psyche.

Why in the devil do we need POLADs from State when we have FAOs who are better qualified, already green dipped, by the time they are qualified as 48s, defacto strategists?

Best
Tom

[Old Eagle]

The answer probably lies at several levels:

1. The Army is enamored with outsiders
2. There is also a liaison function between Army & State (which we've both done as Army guys, but their guy somehow has more street cred with our uniformed bosses)
3. It keeps State pregnant with the small wars issue

POLADs & PRTs also appear to be redefining how FSOs see their functions. I served with a coupla Vietnam Era CORDS grads who were very activist in their outlook on their role in the host nation. The following generation appeared to me to be much more constrained. They wanted to conduct structured meetings with appropriate officials and write cute cables back to feed the info monster in DC. I'm getting anecdotal evidence now that some of the POLAD & PRT FSOs are now buying back into the activist role.

That said, there is still a lot of irony in the fact that State hires vets right out of the service on short term bases to fill some of their deployed commitments. Where is the civilian expertise in that deal?

[SJPONeill]

Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO -- so people have to learn on the job. Then we move them from job to job to rapidly so they never really master the jobs; they just do them "good enough." That can work in a major, existential war, however, it does the service, its people and the Nation no favors in peace time or in quasi peace as now. That needs to be fixed and we need to spend more time on Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- get the basics right and it's like riding a bicycle; one does not forget. One also acquires a sound foundation on which to build...

Is there also an element of expectation management that needs to be looked at as well i.e. has there now been created as career progression expectation that a successful twenty year career should put into a LTC/COL or senior soldier position. Once a upon a time, you could retire at twenty as a Sgt or Maj and that was considered a good productive career - it also meant that the pools of experience at every level were far greater and almost every NCO and officer could 'step up' if required because of that depth of experience. Those who were being groomed (hopefully on ability and not family or other connections) were fast-tracked but even then there was a big enough pool to sustain the fast-tracked if some, for one reason of another, departed that track...

Developing senior officers is a bit out of my area but from a view looking upwards, command and leadership ability should always outscore big thinking i.e. a good leader/commander can always tap into big thinkers in their staff; it less easy for a big thinker to tap into leaders/commanders in their staff...

[Ken White]

Hacksaw and Old Eagle and I are about 90+ diverse years of cumulative military experience -- and essentially are saying the same thing. This from Hacksaw identifies a significant long standing problem:

"Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m..."

I submit that is the case not because it makes sense but because it worked in WW I (a brief war...) and again in WW II (a relatively brief war...) and we have not really modified our personnel or training policies significantly since 1917. The really sad thing is that penchant for muddy boots is effectively undermined by the current training and education regimens and the flawed personnel system.

It's far easier on the Personnel system to play that one size fits all game than to do what's really needed. Have a Command track and a Staff track. That works. The main reason we don't do it is simply because we didn't invent the process. As SJP Oneill said:

"a good leader/commander can always tap into big thinkers in their staff; it less easy for a big thinker to tap into leaders/commanders in their staff... "

Add this, also from Hacksaw:

"That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers..."

True. Part of the problem is that due to DOPMA and OPD and Congressional; pressure, we insist every LTC who's an Infantryman, a Ranger and Airborne School graduate and 'qualified' can command a parachute infantry battalion. Partly true; the law says they can -- but even my six year old Granddaughter is smart enough to know that some of them will do very well, others very poorly and most will just be acceptable. I'm with Old Eagle:

"Therefore, the senior leadership of the Army were great company commanders. Their ability to succeed at GO levels didn't always pan out, sometimes with embarrassing or even tragic consequences."

You can put a round peg in a square hole -- but you have to use a smaller peg...

Is that really good enough?

Chip Colbert:

I contend it's a trade based on the Webster's definition
"3.
a : the business or work in which one engages regularly : occupation
b : an occupation requiring manual or mechanical skill : craft
c : the persons engaged in an occupation, business, or industry."

I base that primarily on the parameters in sub paragraph b. above -- I think manual and mechanical skills are required (if often absent...), that Soldiering is work in which one should engage regularly and that it is an occupation that requires physical abilities and shrewdness but not necessarily superlative intellectual abilities for the majority of the practitioners.

I'm aware that it 'profession' is preferred for the social cachet and that Soldiering also meets the Webster definition for a profession:

"4.
a : a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation.
b : a principal calling, vocation, or employment c : the whole body of persons engaged in a calling ."

IMO, the specialized knowledge aspect is a requirement and the "long and intensive academic preparation." that is now seen as de rigeur is actually a requirement only for a few -- those strategic thinkers (more about them in a bit) but is effectively wasted money for the tactical mission requirements of an Army at War (yes, I know we are not at war more often than we are -- perhaps...). I also acknowledge that for some in the Army, another definition of Professional applies "3. an avowed religious faith ." Kidding, there are a few who elevate it to that level of commitment; most do not. That, too points toward the trade aspect...

Back to the strategic thinkers; we need a few, they should be in the right places and we should realize that we will not be able to make everyone a good strategic thinker. Just as not every LTC can become a good Bn Cdr, not every LTC can become a good strategic planner -- yet we insist that we can do that...

This, I realize falls afoul of OPD directives but the issue becomes fairness and objectivity or subjectivity and competence. I contend the Army could win that argument in Congress but the Per community has convinced the senior leadership not to do that. I would really like to be proven wrong...

Back on track. We call ourselves a Professional Army and the definitions of Professional justify that apellation:

"2.
a : participating for gain or livelihood in an activity or field of endeavor often engaged in by amateurs <a professional golfer>
b : having a particular profession as a permanent career <a professional soldier>
c : engaged in by persons receiving financial return <professional football>."

Thus I contend we can be -- we are -- Professionals -- and really are but, like Professional Football Players, we do not 'belong' to a profession.

It is said of Professions that they must possess certain characteristics, here's a typical list: (LINK). Note the first item. Much of this thread revolves around that attribute. My personal quite strong belief is that in an effort to do what that characteristic imputes we have lost much ability in the physical plane...

That is true to the extent that we Professionals are being put through hoops by a bunch of amateurs in several places in the world today...

It is noteworthy that two characteristics of professions that we respectively eschew and embrace are "testing competency" which we try to avoid like the plague and "specialized vocabulary or jargon" which we not only embrace but literally have fallen in love with. Of those two, my belief is that in demonstrating that we are a profession, the former is of far more importance than the latter, yet on which is our emphasis...

It is equally noteworthy that the characteristics of a Profession that the US Army does possess have in all our major wars, immediately gone by the wayside and the aspects of teaching the trade is immediately adopted for all ranks.

Those ranks are part of the problem. Just as the Medical Technician who takes your blood pressure and temperature is a Health Care professional, he or she is not part of the Medical Profession, so the EM and NCOs who comprise the bulk of the Army are Professional Soldiers but they do not belong to a profession (I could get really snippy about the Sergeant Majors Academy but I won't...). We have an organization wherein the bulk of the workers are in effect, tradesmen, plying their trade -- that is true, in combat, of all ranks. That advanced and specialized education for many of the staff members and a few leaders of that organization is desirable and needed is unquestioned; the such education aimed at most or all of a subset of the organization and a specialized vocabulary make the members of the organization members of a profession is, at a minimum, suspect. It is also of questionable benefit on cost and effectiveness ground, though the recruiting and social engineering aspects are admittedly good.

I submit that desire to be recognized as a 'profession' is a root cause of some of our problems of competency and misplaced priorities.

Nope, we're professionals, practicing a trade that requires a great deal of physical effort, cognitive and experentially derived ability in an organization that has attempted to substitute more and more varied classroom effort for that experience in an effort to convince the vales of Academe that we are individuals in a profession. That really has not worked at all well on several levels...

[Jason Thomas]

Since the discussion of the profession has obviuosly (and rightly) started a great debate. I would ask that we move the discussion to the new thread: The Profession of Arms that Dave so kindly set up for us. I'm truly interested to hear professional Soldiers, both active and retired, opinions on what makes us "professionals".

Jason