Sep 2010 TRADOC Senior Leader's Conference

[Hacksaw]

Jason and/or Bill,
having spent time in the basement across the street from the Chamberlain... I'm curious... what are the objectives/deliverables of the TSLC? I know the purpose of the TSLC in general, and you've kindly informed us of the theme... but beyond the bumper sticker... what is going in outcomes CG, TRADOC is looking to accomplished beyond a bogsat?

Signed,
A veteran of TRADOC sojourns to Opryland

[Jason Thomas]

Hacksaw,

Sorry I'm slow to respond. I'm pulling on oars right now. In answer to your question these are the four outcomes that the CG is trying to take away from the TSLC:

Discuss and study historical examples that demonstrate similar challenges and opportunities that we are confronting today.

Establish a common understanding of our Army’s conceptual foundation and how it will drive and inform our core competencies within TRADOC.

Identify and discuss our Warfighting Functional Concepts’ baseline capabilities and first order gaps/redundancies derived from the Army Operating Concept.

Conduct a substantive review and discuss what 9 years of war and modularity have done to our professional ethic.

All of these are closely linked and are designed to generate discussion on the future of our Army as an organization in a competitive security environment.

Hope this answers the mail. If not let me know. I'm happy to keep up the dialogue.


Jason

[Hacksaw]

Understand the rowing requirement...
Mostly answered my question... let me see if I can interpret and you can confirm or deny...

1. Identify relevant historical examples/vignettes that TRADOC should consider incorporating/using to inform training, leader development and doctrine development (I guess that means an annotated list)?

2. A white paper/info paper that crosswalks key themes of the Army Operating Concept into WfF concepts and subsequently into TRADOC Core Competencies as defined by TR 10-5?

3. Follow-on to #2, maybe an EXSUM of conversations that captures gaps and redundancies identified in the earlier discussion, for use / response from the appropriate CoE/CDID that either confirms or disputes the TSLC findings?

4. White Paper describing situation, challenges, proposed solutions with proposed leads, recommended taskings for proposed leads to respond back to CG TRADOC/the next TSLC?

I suggest the above only because unless products are produced, taskings assigned, progressed tracked, etc etc... a TSLC becomes a BOGSAT (which has value in terms of CG, TRADOC clarifying his intent to subordinate School/Center leaders, building the team, etc) and a golf outing...

Live well and row brother

[Jason Thomas]

Hacksaw,
I think you've hit the nail on the head. Speaking only for myself, I'll be waiting on the direction that conversation ends up going. What ends up shaking out and what we end up actioning could be different than what is initially proposed. Since this is my first time at the rodeo I can only guess at what I think will be the big take aways. However, Bill and I intend to feed it (whatever comes out) to the group for input.
Jason

[Hacksaw]

we could ask for nothing more, and are owed less...
enjoy the conference...

[Bill Jakola]

We want to ignite a discussion across the Army and beyond to take stock after nine years of war of where we are as a profession of arms and draw lessons to better prepare for future challenges.

When I listen to General Dempsey, I hear him lay out this discussion as a way to drive a series of cascading concepts that informs development and execution across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTML-PF) domains.

The newly published Army Operating Concept (AOC) 2016 -2028 will drive our vocabulary to get beyond defining ourselves by what our enemy, opponents, or adversaries are doing to us, e.g., COIN in counterinsurgency we are defining ourselves by how we react to the insurgent.

FM 3-0 and the Tennessee chart depicting full spectrum operations (FSO) tends to constrain thinking into thematically exclusive bins of Offense, Defense, Stability and Civil Support Operations. However, the AOC now provides further expansion of FSO with the addition of two roles--Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). WAS is providing security, over wide areas so as a progenitor or condition setter of other missions e.g., COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, Counter Terror, or Humanitarian Operations. CAM is familiar to most as the archetypical Fulda Gap Army the U.S. possessed in the 1980s; but we may need to update this view in light of both technological and organization changes we have made specifically the interconnectivity, transparency, and speed of information and all the tools we now possess to collect, manage, and employ data, and the development of the modular Brigade force.

So our intent for this TSLC is to advance this discussion based on our experiences over the last nine years. We want to help answer what these changes mean to us as a Profession of Arms; what are we doing about them; how are we going to educate the next generation of Army leaders.

[Jason Thomas]

Bill and I will be heading out to TSLC. As I said before, we will provide information as important discussion topics fall out. If anyone has a question about what is currently going on at the TSLC send us the question(s) and we will try to run it to ground for you.
Jason

[SJPONeill]

FM 3-0 and the Tennessee chart depicting full spectrum operations (FSO) tends to constrain thinking into thematically exclusive bins of Offense, Defense, Stability and Civil Support Operations. However, the AOC now provides further expansion of FSO with the addition of two roles--Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). WAS is providing security, over wide areas so as a progenitor or condition setter of other missions e.g., COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, Counter Terror, or Humanitarian Operations. CAM is familiar to most as the archetypical Fulda Gap Army the U.S. possessed in the 1980s; but we may need to update this view in light of both technological and organization changes we have made specifically the interconnectivity, transparency, and speed of information and all the tools we now possess to collect, manage, and employ data, and the development of the modular Brigade force.

Do we need two more roles in the FSO, let alone two new terms? Constantly changing the terminology, when it's not really broken is a real pain, creates a ton of extra work updating publications and makes the teaching side of the house harder than it needs to be.

I much prefer CAM over warfighting which I think is a little narrow but does WAS add any value over the broader definition of Stability. Stability is those actions/operations conducted in order to maintain a stable environment from the point of view of domestic/national self-interest/objectives - what the UK have been calling countering irregular activity; CAM/warfighting crosses a line where the primary tool in use is the application of military force. Within either of these, you can have offense/defensive actions - I really don't like the depiction of off/def/stab as different functions i.e. stab being on a par with off/def.

I really look forward to the insights bound to come out of the TSLC.

[BobKing]

We want to ignite a discussion across the Army and beyond to take stock after nine years of war of where we are as a profession of arms and draw lessons to better prepare for future challenges.

GEN Chiarellia, the Army's VCSA, asked a very similar question on the CAC blogs back in February of this year.

In Provide Me Your Perspectives he wrote:

In the past eight years plus our Army has transformed its organization, how it fights across the spectrum of conflict, and how we create and define mission success. From where I sit, it has been an amazing performance, but I wonder about the long term impact persistent conflict is having on our Army, our shared values, and our professional military culture.

I am interested in gaining your perspectives on how eight years of war, modularity, decentralized operations, and ARFORGEN have affected our core leadership attributes. I believe that a professional dialogue is essential to clarifying the issues we need to address to ensure the future health of our Army.

GEN Pete Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

Between February and early September his query drew over 70 public comments.

The distribution of the comments is very interesting and, in my opinion, very enlightening as to the relative acceptance of open and transparent communication methods.

I broke the respondents down into five general categories: Civilian, Officers 1 (CW1 through O-5), Officers 2 (O6+), Enlisted, and Indeterminate/Anonymous.

Civilian - A handful of comments (less than 10 or so)

Enlisted - Several comments - ranging from SSG to CSM - about a dozen total.

Officers 1 - 30+ (Several warrant officers, a few Captains, mostly Majors [or equivalent] and a few Lieutenant Colonels)

Officers 2 - Five responses. Four Colonels and a follow-up comment, on Feburary 19th, from the VCSA.

In that comment he thanked everyone that had responded thus far and encouraged readers to continue spreading the word.

Analysis

This blog article and solicitation of comments is public facing and not restricted to CAC only. Across the entire Army, when solicited directly by the VCSA for feedback, only four Colonels responded and no general officers.

On March 1st BG Cardon, in his capacity as then acting CAC CG, initiated a CAC tasker "Encourage participation in VCSA blog post" which sent out to all organizations within CAC. In that tasker he did not direct participation, stressing that partication was encouraged but not mandated. At the same time, he emphasized that the Directors of the subordinate organizations should be leading by example.

Anyone caring to examine the comments in the article referenced above will readily note that tasker and the associated encouragement to partcipate provided no measurable results.