Sep 2010 TRADOC Senior Leader's Conference

[ChipColbert]

While I agree with much of what you posted, I see that as being a much larger issue than the one I'm thinking of. Reframing how we view our challenges and how we see military force being employed to meet them is vitally important for the debate. However, while I can see how that process may alleviate optempo and may decrease our role and rate of employment, I don't think it changes the fact that - IMO - the Army still needs to reassess how much emphasis we place on tactical and operational assignments vice broadening and educational experiences.

In a recent interview with American Interest, Eliot Cohen said the Army is doing a good job of producing "capable brigade commanders" but that doesn't mean we're developing the next generation of strategic thinkers and general officers. I think this is due in large part because we are so focused on tactical assignments. Link to the interview is here:
http://www.the-american-interest.com....cfm?piece=857

[Hacksaw]

Chip the dynamic of which you speak has very little to do with the Army's current OPTEMPO and the subsequent focus on tactical/operational assignments. While that may accurately describe the current atmospherics (not sure it does - but I'll accept it because it doesn't matter).... it has little to do with why the Army isn't producing "strategic thinkers"

Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m...

Don't get me wrong, those types of assignment and that type of focus is important... but it was virtually the only path to greater levels of responsibility...

I'll defer to some of our more "seasoned" members, but it is not uncommon to refer to a LTC/COL who couldn't get promoted as too smart for their own good.

That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers...

Get past the organizational bias that you have to have been IN/AR/Arty to be able to think big thoughts and you might find you have a whole lot more strategic thinkers that may seem appearant...

Thoughts?

[Old Eagle]

Hacksaw --

Target hit.

Chip --

TRADOC and HRC (along with their co-defendants on the Army Staff) need to try to find a way to address this. There is currently no way to identify and use the great tacticians (and reward them for their talents) and to identify and use great strategists AND to identify and use those rare few who can do it all at the gold medal level.

I did a study once for a very high ranking officer that basically identified the problem as this (Readers Digest version): Among the embedded study questions from the general were 1) where do CAT IV generals come from? 2) why do the other Services hand us our butts at the strategic level? and 3) should there be a mechanism to identify and promote "late bloomers", big idea guys, and others who could fill critical GO positions even if you wouldn't want them commanding divisions and corps.

All the key senior positions and promotions go to former battalion commanders (affectionately known as FBCs back in the day.) This is particularly true in the combat arms.

AARs from bn cmd selection boards reported that the overwhelmingly most important selection criterion for bn cmd was success in company command. That was followed by completion , of what I think you now call a KD position at the field grade level.

Therefore, the senior leadership of the Army were great company commanders. Their ability to succeed at GO levels didn't always pan out, sometimes with embarrassing or even tragic consequences.

The study was obviously much deeper and broader than I have portrayed here, but we keep seeing similar problems everyday. I found other ramifications, too, such as "distributing" KD positions "fairly" rather than based on past performance or impact on the units involved. There was a proliferation of bn cmd equivalencies, not to reward good officers, but to produce more FBCs for the personnel mill. And on it went.

For my efforts, I got handed my backside, and Big Green just keeps rollin' along.

[Tom Odom]

OE

This relates to the FAO question as you know quite well. The FBC obsession a mental blinder, one that is welded to Big Green's psyche.

Why in the devil do we need POLADs from State when we have FAOs who are better qualified, already green dipped, by the time they are qualified as 48s, defacto strategists?

Best
Tom

[Old Eagle]

The answer probably lies at several levels:

1. The Army is enamored with outsiders
2. There is also a liaison function between Army & State (which we've both done as Army guys, but their guy somehow has more street cred with our uniformed bosses)
3. It keeps State pregnant with the small wars issue

POLADs & PRTs also appear to be redefining how FSOs see their functions. I served with a coupla Vietnam Era CORDS grads who were very activist in their outlook on their role in the host nation. The following generation appeared to me to be much more constrained. They wanted to conduct structured meetings with appropriate officials and write cute cables back to feed the info monster in DC. I'm getting anecdotal evidence now that some of the POLAD & PRT FSOs are now buying back into the activist role.

That said, there is still a lot of irony in the fact that State hires vets right out of the service on short term bases to fill some of their deployed commitments. Where is the civilian expertise in that deal?

[Tom Odom]

The answer probably lies at several levels:

1. The Army is enamored with outsiders
2. There is also a liaison function between Army & State (which we've both done as Army guys, but their guy somehow has more street cred with our uniformed bosses)
3. It keeps State pregnant with the small wars issue

POLADs & PRTs also appear to be redefining how FSOs see their functions. I served with a coupla Vietnam Era CORDS grads who were very activist in their outlook on their role in the host nation. The following generation appeared to me to be much more constrained. They wanted to conduct structured meetings with appropriate officials and write cute cables back to feed the info monster in DC. I'm getting anecdotal evidence now that some of the POLAD & PRT FSOs are now buying back into the activist role.

That said, there is still a lot of irony in the fact that State hires vets right out of the service on short term bases to fill some of their deployed commitments. Where is the civilian expertise in that deal?

And that was what was happening across the board in Iraq in 2009 or they just didn't fill it (as in MND-B) so yours truly went.

I can't say on the activist aspects--I saw way too much bureaucratic thinking from PolMil in the embassy and OPA as a regional coordinator for PRTs.

Best
Tom