Quote Originally Posted by ChipColbert View Post
OK, so here comes the question. Our Army is faced with the dual challenge of winning our current wars while simultaneously preparing for future armed conflict. #Due to the past nine years of war, we've obviously and necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis and priority on tactical and operational assignments and experience - or to use this lexicon, the military-technical field of knowledge. Accordingly, I think we've devalued our professional military education system, ACS opportunities, and other broadening experiences that take people out of the fight - the Human Development field.
Try looking at the past nine years as:
1. Not being war, and
2. Not being a problem that can be "won" through military action.

Then re-look both of your stated problems of dealing with the here and now while preparing for the potential armed conflicts of the future.

If not war, what is this and what should he military role be, and how should that role be framed?
- How can changing the context lead to shaping more effective engagement rather than simply simplifying the problem so that I can quit and go home?

What are the potential challenges that could both truly threaten us and be either deterred or defeated by military action?
- What threats can we deter, and how must we posture to do so?
- How does the military contribute to deterring those that are currently seen as "non-deterable" by most? Are there indirect ways that rob such organizations of the base of their support that can mitigate the problem? Conversely, are there ways that though well intended, will actually exacerbate the problem through engagement?
- What threats must we be prepared to defeat if not deterred, and are we postured to defeat those threats?
- What problems are cast as threats currently, but really don't pass the common sense test in today's environment? Are there policy solutions? If yes, come up with COAs and take them to the policy guys to consider. Use design to develop your position.
- What programs are crushing us with their cost, or diverting funding from programs that are arguably more important? Are there policy positions such as those described above driving these programs? Don't argue programs, assess policy.

The army is in the middle of a very tough problem-set. Being saddled with a large family of expectation driven by out-dated Cold War policies; along with a family of poorly conceived GWOT policies makes the problem-set tougher yet. Assess both, and then go back to higher and demand that they clarify what they really want, and what they really need you to do. We can't do it all, we can't buy it all. So lets buy and do what we really need.