Options
Today American strategy has hit the wall, crumbling in the face of growing public hostility toward Islam. There are only two solutions. One would be to try and re-cage the tiger by constraining domestic mistrust and hostility toward Islam at least enough to sustain the global strategy. This would require Republican leaders in particular to return to the messages of the Bush administration--that extremism does not represent or reflect Islam in general, and that despite recurrent anti-Americanism, U.S. partnerships in the Islamic world are making progress and can be sustained. Republican leaders, in other words, would have to abandon a theme which energizes and excites their political base, and give up on the notion of reviving the emotions of September 11 as elections approach. This is unlikely. Equally importantly, leaders and publics in the Islamic world would have to control anti-Americanism. Countries like Pakistan would have to recognize that they cannot be shrilly anti-American while expecting massive U.S. assistance. Again, this is unlikely since anti-Americanism in Pakistan and across the Islamic world has become legitimate and institutionalized. It sells papers and attracts viewers for the media. It makes politicians popular. Ironically for Americans, the growth of a free press and the process of democratization in the Islamic world has fueled and will continue to fuel anti-Americanism.
The alternative is to accept the notion that irresolvable differences exist between the United States and the Islamic world and that the clash of civilizations is a reality. Americans could stop ignoring blatant hypocrisy such as criticism of opposition to the Cordoba House at the same time that Islamic nations prevent the building of Christian churches, or vehement anti-Americanism combined with a demand for more American assistance. Americans could stop ignoring the misinformation which abounds in the Islamic world where any conspiracy theory about the perfidy of the United States, no matter how bizarre, finds a ready audience, even among the educated.
If this happens, the United States would be forced to craft a new global strategy based on at least a major if not a total disengagement from the Islamic world, shifting to a close rather than forward defense against terrorism. In the rubric of the Cold War, the United States would substitute roll back with containment, mirroring decisions made in the 1950s when the infeasibility of roll back became clear. While a solid argument can be made for this, it is important to think it through. It would, for instance, require disengagement from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan and Iraq might remain democracies, but would certainly become intensely anti-American, their leaders recognizing that public support is more important to the retention of political power than U.S. assistance. Iran--as the modern founding father of anti-Americanism--would certainly become more influential (although not hegemonic, given the Sunni-Shiite and Persian-Arab divisions).
Most nations in the Islamic world would be officially anti-American. A few, particularly those facing a major threat to the regime and able to disregard public opinion (i.e. closed political systems) might sustain some type of cooperation with the United States, but it would be tenuous. Even this would undercut the basis of American strategy since even though al Qaeda needs some sort of sanctuary or base, it does not need any particular sanctuary or base. It could simply move to nations which heed the demands of their publics to end cooperation with the United States. Some of these would allow an al Qaeda presence, whether openly or clandestinely. Across the Islamic world, Al Qaeda would grow in prestige and popularity claiming, whether rightly or wrongly, that it drove the United States out of the Islamic world. Much of the public there would believe it. Al Qaeda would welcome many new recruits eager to be part of the perceived victory. In such a strategy, the United States would "fight them here" because it could not "fight them there."
Ultimately this might prove better than the current American strategy. The consideration which long inspired American involvement in Southwest Asia--concern for access to oil--now seems obsolete. Oil will be available at market prices no matter how anti-American the governments in producer nations. Disengagement from the Islamic world would allow the United States to make major cuts in the size of the military and the defense budget, thereby providing an opportunity to lower taxes, pay down the national debt, or invest in infrastructure and education. The United States could fend off even a strengthened al Qaeda. After all, America's vigilance and defenses are far superior to what they were in September 2001. Every indication is that these things rather than involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan are what has prevented another terrorist attack in the United States. The United States could launch long range spoiling attacks against known al Qaeda bases or sanctuaries. While these might not be as effective as having allied governments controlling extremists for the United States, they might suffice. And, if the close defense was effective, it would not matter whether anti-Americanism reached new peaks in the Islamic world. Disengagement would be a risky strategy but, potentially, one with significant payoffs.
This is, however, speculative. Still, a few things are clear. American domestic hostility toward Islam will grow, particularly in the electioneering leading up to 2012. Hostility toward Islam has fused with political opposition to President Obama. (Hostility toward Islam is highest among Americans who oppose Obama.) Hostility toward Islam has become an integral part of the political battle between the left and right. But it is also clear that the American public cannot be anti-Islamic and expect Islamic nations to serve allies in the fight against extremism. This dissonance cannot be ignored or wished away. It cannot be papered over it with a bit more foreign assistance and more adept strategic communications. This is akin to painting a rusting hulk.
Albert Einstein once said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. Whatever the context of his statement, he might well have been commenting on current U.S. strategy. Reality now calls. If a clash with Islam is inevitable, then current U.S. strategy is paralyzingly flawed. A new strategy must reflect the inherent antagonism. This would represent the greatest shift in American strategy since the emergence of the Cold War. Unfortunately, neither of the feasible strategic options--continuing on with a deeply flawed strategy or totally abandoning it--is appealing. Both abound with risk. But the rising tide of domestic hostility toward Islam will soon force the United States to choose. Americans have ignored the fissures and dissonance in their global strategy for nearly a decade now. Now that time has passed. Dangerous times lie ahead.
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