The Forward and Indirect Strategy

For a while after September 11, American politics did stop at the water's edge; public anger and fear dampened partisanship. But it did not last long. As Iraq slipped into protracted and bloody counterinsurgency President Bush's opponents understood that the conflict there was his greatest political vulnerability. They had no qualms about using it against him despite the effect that their criticism had in Iraq or elsewhere in the Muslim world. Ironically, though, even while attacks on the Bush handling of Iraq intensified, there was consensus on his broader strategy for dealing with al Qaeda and Islamic extremism. Partisan disagreement focused on the the execution of the strategy rather than its foundation and assumptions. Both Democrats and Republicans agreed that the conflict with Islamic extremists would be won or lost in the psychological realm--in the complex, shadowy world of attitudes and perceptions. Both agreed that a forward defense was best--that extremism should be stifled at its source. And both agreed that the best way to do this was by mobilizing support and strengthening partners in the Islamic world. Direct American action, including the use of military force, was sometimes necessary but ultimately victory would come when partner states were stable, prosperous, and capable and thus could control extremism on their own. Hence the strategy was both forward and indirect.
"Success," as the Bush counterterrorism strategy stated, "will not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong, united international front against terrorism." In addition to building partner law enforcement, intelligence, and military capacity, this included altering "the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit." The essence remained psychological. "In the long run," the Bush strategy added, "winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas. Ideas can transform the embittered and disillusioned either into murderers willing to kill innocents, or into free peoples living harmoniously in a diverse society." President Obama, while committed to changing some of Bush's methods, largely adopted this strategy. The 2010 National Security Strategy stated:

Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.

But this was a peculiar consensus. Even though the basic contours of the strategy against terrorism and extremism were accepted by both a Republican and Democratic administration and had wide support from Congress and the American public, it was precarious largely because it was constructed on questionable assumptions formed in the traumatic months after September 11 and never seriously analyzed. For instance, the strategy assumed that most governments and publics in the Islamic world shared the American threat perception, believing that extremism was inextricably related to terrorism and hence illegitimate. The strategy assumed that Islamic governments and publics saw the American role much as Americans themselves did. The United States, Americans believed, wanted only to see extremism controlled and terrorism extinguished. Certainly, they thought, Muslims must understand this. And, perhaps most importantly, the strategy assumed that what Americans consider misperceptions common in the Islamic world--that the United States primarily sought to exploit the Islamic world's resources, to impose its values, or to promote Israel's security--could be changed by "strategic communications" and assistance. Differences were simply misunderstanding. Americans, in other words, saw their power as benign and their motives as pure, and believed others did as well.

These assumptions, having been formed in haste during a time of deep national trauma, were deeply flawed. Partners in the Islamic world have steadfastly demonstrated different priorities than the United States, often tolerating extremism that only threatened America (or Israel, Europe, Australia, Russia, or India) rather than themselves. Witness Pakistan's tolerance of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and Saudi Arabia's acceptance of extremists, at least until they threatened the regimes in Islamabad and Riyadh. Much of the Islamic world rejected terrorism which targeted other Muslims, but did not automatically associate what Americans consider extremism with terrorism. Many Muslims distinguished legitimate extremism, even extremist movements which used violence, and illegitimate extremism. American strategy did not. The assumption that anti-Americanism could be fixed by strategic communication and assistance has not proven true. It resists strategic communications and foreign assistance. While the Obama administration has been able to moderate some of this, it remains a powerful force, particularly in Pakistan, the most important Islamic nation in the struggle with violent extremism and a major recipient of U.S. assistance. And counter to American assumptions that closed political systems spawn anti-Americanism, the more democratic a government in the Islamic world, the more it reflects and responds to the deeply anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments of its public and the less likely it is to attack extremism directed only against outsiders. A closed political system like those in Egypt or Saudi Arabia can, to an extent, ignore public opinion. They normally exercise control over their military and intelligence services. More democratic states like Pakistan cannot, thus making them vulnerable to the whims of public opinion and willing to overlook any relationship that their militaries and intelligence services has with extremists.

The notion that public diplomacy and strategic communication would address these problems also proved false. Ultimately it does not matter whether the perceptions of the United States which are common in the Islamic world--that Washington is in the thrall of Israel, deliberately seeks to keep Islamic nations weak by any means available, and wants to politically dominate the Islamic world so as to exploit its resources--are accurate. The naive American trust in the power of objective truth does not work in a deadly struggle with extremism. Beliefs matter more than reality. Hostility, anti-Americanism, and misperception are simply parts of the strategic terrain, as immutable as mountains or swamps. Changing deep set perceptions and attitudes is like changing physical terrain: it may be possible over an extended period of time and at great cost and effort, but is normally not the wisest course of action. Yet the United States continued to rumble along with a strategy based on wishful thinking rather than cold reality.

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