Shariah is coming! Shariah is coming!

[SteveMetz]

Undercutting the Strategy

For a few years after September 11, the fissures and faulty assumptions in America's global strategy were papered over and held in check. Islamic partners were willing to cooperate to a point given the benefits involved. This gave Americans the impression of progress. But cooperation was fragile and thin, based more on an expectation of material gain than shared priorities and perspectives. And the United States was able to teeter along with a flawed strategy because because opposition from the element of the American public most likely to oppose the partnerships in the Islamic world--the political right--was held in check by Republican control of the White House. As long as it was George W. Bush and his administration arguing that extremists were not representative of Islam--something that President Bush stated often--the right muted its anger and hostility. Criticism would only strengthen Bush's critics. But with a Democratic president, the gloves came off. Politicians and pundits on the right found that public anger and hostility toward Islam was a useful tool to mobilize their constituency and attack a president whom a significant portion of Americans believed to be a secret Muslim. Just as Iraq was President Bush's vulnerability, Islam is President Obama's.

Before the 1970s, the vast majority of Americans thought or knew little about Islam. Most probably did not have an opinion one way or the other. But two things changed that. One was the Iranian revolution and its vociferous hatred of the United States. Seeing Iranian clerics hissing that the United States was "the Great Satan" while hypnotized crowds screamed in assent was an eye opener for Americans. Second was the adoption of terrorism by the Palestinian movement and Hezbollah. For many Americans, including a number of fundamentalist Christians, opposition to Islam because a component of the support for Israel which, they believed, the Bible required.

These things sparked a distrust, apprehension, and outright fear of Islam which, of course, grew immensely after September 11. In the anger of that time, hostility began to move from the political fringe toward the mainstream, and to grow in power. In recent years this has taken a number of forms. One end of the spectrum is inhabited primarily by people driven by the psychological need to hate something, whether propagandistic bloggers, talk radio hosts who stoke fear and anger to boost ratings and income, or small-time fundamentalist ministers who believe they are implementing divine writ. These people are simply hard-wired to hate. With the demise of the Soviet Union, they had no bete noire until what they saw as dangerous and aggressive Islam emerged to replace godless communism.

The other end of the spectrum was at least more sophisticated in its thinking. Probably the best known example was the "clash of civilizations" argument of the imminent Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington. Huntington contended that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global security system would be dominated by conflict between Islam and the Christian West rather than between competing ideologies both originating within the West (communism versus democratic capitalism). Huntington argued that the conflict between Islam and the Christian West was not a transitory phenomenon or the result of a fixable misunderstanding, but flowed "from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them." With the end of the Cold War and, importantly, the resurgence of Islam, it developed into an "intercivilizational quasi war." America leaders, Huntington wrote, "allege that the Muslims involved in the quasi war are a small minority whose use of violence is rejected by the great majority of moderate Muslims. This may be true, but evidence to support it is lacking." His own position was clear: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." While Huntington's position was attacked virulently within academia, it demonstrated that hostility toward Islam was not limited to America's political fringe. Just as anti-communism had its hate-fueled John Birch wing and its intellectual advocates from Paul Nitze to Ronald Reagan and William Buckley, hostility toward Islam has a populist component and an intellectual one.

Admittedly, Americans remain divided on their attitude toward Islam. Polling data shows that 49% of Americans now have a negative view of Islam--the highest number on record. Of course, Americans themselves would say that means that a majority does not. But ultimately what matters for the U.S. global strategy is whether the publics and elites in Islamic countries believe that Americans are hostile toward Islam, not polling percentages. Given the psychological dynamics of the situation, all it takes is periodic outbursts of anti-Islamic sentiment, particularly those with support from American elite figures, to sustain the impression of hostility by Muslims abroad. Call it the Abu Gharib syndrome--one negative event can counteract dozens of positive ones or majority support. This is unfortunate, but it is the reality of cross-cultural communication.

But despite the perception of growing American hostility toward Islam, U.S. strategy persists in assuming that there is no basic incompatibility between Islam and Western civilization, only misunderstanding. Policymakers have not come to grips with the dissonance between domestic hostility toward Islam (whether real or perceived) and a global strategy based on winning support and building partnerships in the Islamic world. Now with extensive and opposition to the planned Cordoba House Islamic center in New York City, demonstrations against mosques across the country, and Koran burning ceremonies by fundamentalist ministers, passions are boiling. Muslims abroad are well aware of this. In September 2010, for instance, Afghans demonstrated to protest the highly publicized planned burning of Korans by the Gainesville, Florida-based Dove World Outreach Center. Even General David Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, warned that this threatened American service members. It all undercuts the idea that America's war is only with terrorists and not all Muslims. They feed the narrative of al Qaeda and its sympathizers that America and the West are at war with Islam itself. Condemnation of the Cordoba House by well known figures, including a number of prominent political leaders with electoral ambitions, mosque attacks, and Koran burning make a major contribution to the strategic communication of al Qaeda and other extremists.


 

(continued)

[SteveMetz]

Options

Today American strategy has hit the wall, crumbling in the face of growing public hostility toward Islam. There are only two solutions. One would be to try and re-cage the tiger by constraining domestic mistrust and hostility toward Islam at least enough to sustain the global strategy. This would require Republican leaders in particular to return to the messages of the Bush administration--that extremism does not represent or reflect Islam in general, and that despite recurrent anti-Americanism, U.S. partnerships in the Islamic world are making progress and can be sustained. Republican leaders, in other words, would have to abandon a theme which energizes and excites their political base, and give up on the notion of reviving the emotions of September 11 as elections approach. This is unlikely. Equally importantly, leaders and publics in the Islamic world would have to control anti-Americanism. Countries like Pakistan would have to recognize that they cannot be shrilly anti-American while expecting massive U.S. assistance. Again, this is unlikely since anti-Americanism in Pakistan and across the Islamic world has become legitimate and institutionalized. It sells papers and attracts viewers for the media. It makes politicians popular. Ironically for Americans, the growth of a free press and the process of democratization in the Islamic world has fueled and will continue to fuel anti-Americanism.

The alternative is to accept the notion that irresolvable differences exist between the United States and the Islamic world and that the clash of civilizations is a reality. Americans could stop ignoring blatant hypocrisy such as criticism of opposition to the Cordoba House at the same time that Islamic nations prevent the building of Christian churches, or vehement anti-Americanism combined with a demand for more American assistance. Americans could stop ignoring the misinformation which abounds in the Islamic world where any conspiracy theory about the perfidy of the United States, no matter how bizarre, finds a ready audience, even among the educated.

If this happens, the United States would be forced to craft a new global strategy based on at least a major if not a total disengagement from the Islamic world, shifting to a close rather than forward defense against terrorism. In the rubric of the Cold War, the United States would substitute roll back with containment, mirroring decisions made in the 1950s when the infeasibility of roll back became clear. While a solid argument can be made for this, it is important to think it through. It would, for instance, require disengagement from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan and Iraq might remain democracies, but would certainly become intensely anti-American, their leaders recognizing that public support is more important to the retention of political power than U.S. assistance. Iran--as the modern founding father of anti-Americanism--would certainly become more influential (although not hegemonic, given the Sunni-Shiite and Persian-Arab divisions).

Most nations in the Islamic world would be officially anti-American. A few, particularly those facing a major threat to the regime and able to disregard public opinion (i.e. closed political systems) might sustain some type of cooperation with the United States, but it would be tenuous. Even this would undercut the basis of American strategy since even though al Qaeda needs some sort of sanctuary or base, it does not need any particular sanctuary or base. It could simply move to nations which heed the demands of their publics to end cooperation with the United States. Some of these would allow an al Qaeda presence, whether openly or clandestinely. Across the Islamic world, Al Qaeda would grow in prestige and popularity claiming, whether rightly or wrongly, that it drove the United States out of the Islamic world. Much of the public there would believe it. Al Qaeda would welcome many new recruits eager to be part of the perceived victory. In such a strategy, the United States would "fight them here" because it could not "fight them there."

Ultimately this might prove better than the current American strategy. The consideration which long inspired American involvement in Southwest Asia--concern for access to oil--now seems obsolete. Oil will be available at market prices no matter how anti-American the governments in producer nations. Disengagement from the Islamic world would allow the United States to make major cuts in the size of the military and the defense budget, thereby providing an opportunity to lower taxes, pay down the national debt, or invest in infrastructure and education. The United States could fend off even a strengthened al Qaeda. After all, America's vigilance and defenses are far superior to what they were in September 2001. Every indication is that these things rather than involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan are what has prevented another terrorist attack in the United States. The United States could launch long range spoiling attacks against known al Qaeda bases or sanctuaries. While these might not be as effective as having allied governments controlling extremists for the United States, they might suffice. And, if the close defense was effective, it would not matter whether anti-Americanism reached new peaks in the Islamic world. Disengagement would be a risky strategy but, potentially, one with significant payoffs.

This is, however, speculative. Still, a few things are clear. American domestic hostility toward Islam will grow, particularly in the electioneering leading up to 2012. Hostility toward Islam has fused with political opposition to President Obama. (Hostility toward Islam is highest among Americans who oppose Obama.) Hostility toward Islam has become an integral part of the political battle between the left and right. But it is also clear that the American public cannot be anti-Islamic and expect Islamic nations to serve allies in the fight against extremism. This dissonance cannot be ignored or wished away. It cannot be papered over it with a bit more foreign assistance and more adept strategic communications. This is akin to painting a rusting hulk.

Albert Einstein once said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. Whatever the context of his statement, he might well have been commenting on current U.S. strategy. Reality now calls. If a clash with Islam is inevitable, then current U.S. strategy is paralyzingly flawed. A new strategy must reflect the inherent antagonism. This would represent the greatest shift in American strategy since the emergence of the Cold War. Unfortunately, neither of the feasible strategic options--continuing on with a deeply flawed strategy or totally abandoning it--is appealing. Both abound with risk. But the rising tide of domestic hostility toward Islam will soon force the United States to choose. Americans have ignored the fissures and dissonance in their global strategy for nearly a decade now. Now that time has passed. Dangerous times lie ahead.

[Bob's World]

So much of the current American angst with Islam is rooted in Cold War strategies as implemented in those Islamic states seen as critical hedges against Soviet expansion due to their location; those seen as critical suppliers of oil; and those seen as occupying key terrain along critical LOCs. The wild card in this mix was/is our commitment to sustaining Israel as a nation. It has created a witches brew.

We now find ourselves in bed with some of the shadiest dictators and monarchs on the planet; who have come to act with ever increasing impunity under the umbrella of U.S. protection and enriched with foreign aid or petro dollars. At the same time we find ourselves at odds with those Islamic states that have had the fortitude to either resist or throw off our influence. Countries like Iran or Libya. Added on to all of this is this growing trend of individuals and organizations rising from Muslim populaces to challenge poor governance at home and also to attack those who work to keep such poor governance in place.

If our populace mis-understands the problem it is because our leaders do as well, and this is equally true on both sides of the aisle.

Al Qaeda is a symptom, an organization for their times. They are political opportunists with an agenda to advance and a willingness to employ any degree of illegal violence necessary to achieve it. They also are empowered by the tools of globalization to enable a networked approach to global unconventional warfare and sustained by a rich base of poorly governed populaces. These populaces do not have to stretch their imagination too far to buy into the linkages of Western manipulation and influence to their current challenges of poor governance at home.

For the US., playing the political blame game won't help; and neither will aggressively attacking the symptoms of the problem with a mix of counterterrorism and nation building tactics.

The U.S. must restate the problem. The U.S. must take responsibility for the effects of its role in the Middle East over the past 60+ years. Once we have that cathartic moment, not unlike step one in 12-step program, we can begin to get better.

We can employ our influence to encourage meaningful evolution of government where such is required (on local terms, not ours)

We can become the champion of the oppressed people of these regions, standing on the principles contained within our Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights rather than more recent corruptions of that founding Ethos to justify our behavior. We can implement a form of "soft-UW" that encourages very effective non-violent approaches; over the violence offered by AQ. By out-competing AQ we render them moot. By attacking them we validate and strengthen them at the same time. (Like cutting up starfish and throwing them back in the ocean...it makes sense, but the actual effects are the opposite of those intended)

Or, placed in the terminology of my community: We must put the Liber back in De Oppresso Liber.

[J Wolfsberger]

...

Al Qaeda is a symptom, an organization for their times. They are political opportunists with an agenda to advance and a willingness to employ any degree of illegal violence necessary to achieve it. ...

Which agenda, to bring this back to the original post, is their own, radical version of Sharia.

There have been a lot of good points raised on this thread, but one that should be added is that Nations (in the capital letter sense) have interests. They also have culturally determined morals and ethics to govern how those interests are pursued. For all the talk of "international community," there is absolutely no consensus on what those morals and ethics should be. (which is why I've always thought talk of "international community" a useless form of intellectual [self satisfaction].)

Whether we like it, or want to acknowledge it, or not, there are:

a. Groups of radical, violent ideologues who draw inspiration, or at least political cover, from a specific religion they have be interpreted as requiring intrusion into all aspects of life. (Not my interpretation, it's theirs.) These groups completely and absolutely reject any notion of internationally accepted morals and ethics in any dimension of human experience.

b. A significant number of people have adopted this radical interpretation as a way of explaining their circumstances in life, whether that be the unpopular American teenager or the impoverished and brutalized Yemeni peasant.

c. There are Nation states that find it in their interest to promote and even encourage these groups as a tool in advancing what they have determined to be their national interest. That interest may be establishing a regional hegemony (Iran) or a tool for redirecting domestic frustrations (Saudi Arabia).

I agree, it's not time to push any panic button over some grand international conspiracy to impose Sharia on the world. But I think it might be short sighted not to recognize that that is a major motivator to many of the people drawn to the violent movements.

[Bob's World]

Which agenda, to bring this back to the original post, is their own, radical version of Sharia.

There have been a lot of good points raised on this thread, but one that should be added is that Nations (in the capital letter sense) have interests. They also have culturally determined morals and ethics to govern how those interests are pursued. For all the talk of "international community," there is absolutely no consensus on what those morals and ethics should be. (which is why I've always thought talk of "international community" a useless form of intellectual [self satisfaction].)

Whether we like it, or want to acknowledge it, or not, there are:

a. Groups of radical, violent ideologues who draw inspiration, or at least political cover, from a specific religion they have be interpreted as requiring intrusion into all aspects of life. (Not my interpretation, it's theirs.) These groups completely and absolutely reject any notion of internationally accepted morals and ethics in any dimension of human experience.

b. A significant number of people have adopted this radical interpretation as a way of explaining their circumstances in life, whether that be the unpopular American teenager or the impoverished and brutalized Yemeni peasant.

c. There are Nation states that find it in their interest to promote and even encourage these groups as a tool in advancing what they have determined to be their national interest. That interest may be establishing a regional hegemony (Iran) or a tool for redirecting domestic frustrations (Saudi Arabia).

I agree, it's not time to push any panic button over some grand international conspiracy to impose Sharia on the world. But I think it might be short sighted not to recognize that that is a major motivator to many of the people drawn to the violent movements.

The Pied Piper is a fairy tale. Bin Laden is not leading the children of Islam to their doom with some magic flute of ideology. He is waging UW and his purposes, while twisted, are political. If the Muslim populaces of the Middle East in large, and Muslim populaces of the West in part, did not reasonably perceive that they were held in conditions of poor governance by the West, their would be little support to AQ.

It is easier to blame Islam and label it as evil than to take hard looks at our own approaches to foreign policy in the Middle East. I get it. That doesn't mean I condone it, and I certainly won't just push of responsibility for my own actions onto some convenient foil.

Radical Islam is no more and no less the problem for western governments today than Radical Christianity was 500 years ago. Sometimes governments bring these problems on themselves through their actions. It isn't about religion, it is about politics.

[SteveMetz]

I agree, it's not time to push any panic button over some grand international conspiracy to impose Sharia on the world. But I think it might be short sighted not to recognize that that is a major motivator to many of the people drawn to the violent movements.

No doubt but my point was that hysterical and nonsensical stuff like the Boykin/Soyster report detracts from our ability to recognize its real role. It's "crying wolf." People stop listening after a while and hence won't hear if there is a real wolf.

[tequila]

Disengagement would be a risky strategy but, potentially, one with significant payoffs.

Steve, a nice article but with two significant caveats.

1) I don't think you've established that Islamophobic sentiments have become dominant within the American political establishment. It might have found a receptive audience in large segments of the American population, but that's a far cry from actually becoming influential over either the policy community or the political community as a whole. Americans generally don't vote on foreign policy, and while there is a lot of free-floating hostility out there that can coalesce around cultural markers, that's not the same as formulating a new foreign policy direction. American alliances with Muslim countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia are deeply embedded. Anti-Americanism in both places has run far higher in the past than Islamophobia has in the U.S., but that has not prevented Turkish or Saudi elites from deepening the alliance further for much the same reason --- domestic constituencies often have greater priorities than the relationship with the U.S.

2) Even assuming your point about anti-Muslim feelings becoming a driving force in American foreign policy, I cannot see how this leads to inevitably to disengagement/containment or smaller defense budgets. There are enormous domestic political constituencies invested in larger defense budgets. A forward-leaning Islamophobic American foreign policy is also possible, based on aggressive military action against supposed threats (which would now extend to a far greater spectrum of Muslim 'enemies') and a greater tolerance for civilian casualties.

[SteveMetz]

Steve, a nice article but with two significant caveats.

1) I don't think you've established that Islamophobic sentiments have become dominant within the American political establishment. It might have found a receptive audience in large segments of the American population, but that's a far cry from actually becoming influential over either the policy community or the political community as a whole. Americans generally don't vote on foreign policy, and while there is a lot of free-floating hostility out there that can coalesce around cultural markers, that's not the same as formulating a new foreign policy direction. American alliances with Muslim countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia are deeply embedded. Anti-Americanism in both places has run far higher in the past than Islamophobia has in the U.S., but that has not prevented Turkish or Saudi elites from deepening the alliance further for much the same reason --- domestic constituencies often have greater priorities than the relationship with the U.S.

2) Even assuming your point about anti-Muslim feelings becoming a driving force in American foreign policy, I cannot see how this leads to inevitably to disengagement/containment or smaller defense budgets. There are enormous domestic political constituencies invested in larger defense budgets. A forward-leaning Islamophobic American foreign policy is also possible, based on aggressive military action against supposed threats (which would now extend to a far greater spectrum of Muslim 'enemies') and a greater tolerance for civilian casualties.

In this quintessentially pyschological conflict, I don't think it matters whether America actually IS Islamophobic. What matters is whether a large segment of the population in the Islamic world believes it. And since the publics there are already prone to believe that, all it takes is the occasional Koran burning or mosque protest to sustain the perception. People in the Islamic have difficulty believing that Gingrich, Palin, Boykin, Gaffney and Fox News don't reflect the dominant position within the American public and elite. Remember that a hefty portion of the public in the Islamic world already believes that Israel and American Jews control public opinion. Again, the reality (or unreality) of this matters less than the perception.

Being Americans, though, we think like Americans. We believe that if we can show polls to people in the Islamic world demonstrating that 51% of Americans don't have negative attitudes toward Islam, that will suffice. I don't think it will.

And my point was that the more democratic governments in the Islamic world become, the more anti-Americanism will influence their policies. Just compare Turkey's relationship to the U.S. today to its relationship under the military junta. Same with Pakistan.

I believe that means that our best partners are going to be despots like Mubarak and the house of Saud. The more democracy grows, the less receptiveness to us.

Is that a basis for a global strategy?

On defense budgets, I agree with you. I simply suggested that shifting from the forward strategy in the Islamic world would give us the opportunity to shrink it. We may eschew that opportunity and simply find some new mission or threat to focus on. Maybe the Navy and Air Force will win out and China will become our focus threat.

[tequila]

And my point was that the more democratic governments in the Islamic world become, the more anti-Americanism will influence their policies. Just compare Turkey's relationship to the U.S. today to its relationship under the military junta. Same with Pakistan.

I believe that means that our best partners are going to be despots like Mubarak and the house of Saud. The more democracy grows, the less receptiveness to us.

Is that a basis for a global strategy?

*snark* It has been for decades, hasn't it? *snark*

Perhaps I'm not understanding the thrust of your article. Is it that Islamophobia in the West is the issue, or that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is the issue?

If it's anti-Americanism, I would argue that the problem is quite manageable.

Political majorities in Muslim countries are little different than in America in that they are primarily focused on domestic politics. You will get a lot of people willing to say they don't like America or American foreign policy, but very few people willing to actually vote or demonstrate or apply genuine political pressure based on anti-Americanism. This might shift based on a major media incident or if the U.S. becomes involved in a domestic issue (i.e. American bases or military presence, or U.S. involvement in elections, or U.S. invasion of a neighbor), but most people just don't pay that much attention to foreign issues, and rarely on a sustained basis.

As Ken reminds us, anti-Americanism is quite strong as a cultural undercurrent in many countries, including many that are U.S. allies. This includes South Korea, large swathes of South and Central America, France, Mexico, Germany, etc. I would chalk up places like Indonesia, Malaysia, and India as other countries whose governments often find common ground with the U.S. despite cultural anti-Americanism in many parts of society.

Culture matters to a degree, but in foreign affairs interests matter more, especially in the day to day.

[SteveMetz]

*snark* It has been for decades, hasn't it? *snark*

Perhaps I'm not understanding the thrust of your article. Is it that Islamophobia in the West is the issue, or that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is the issue?

If it's anti-Americanism, I would argue that the problem is quite manageable.

Political majorities in Muslim countries are little different than in America in that they are primarily focused on domestic politics. You will get a lot of people willing to say they don't like America or American foreign policy, but very few people willing to actually vote or demonstrate or apply genuine political pressure based on anti-Americanism. This might shift based on a major media incident or if the U.S. becomes involved in a domestic issue (i.e. American bases or military presence, or U.S. involvement in elections, or U.S. invasion of a neighbor), but most people just don't pay that much attention to foreign issues, and rarely on a sustained basis.

As Ken reminds us, anti-Americanism is quite strong as a cultural undercurrent in many countries, including many that are U.S. allies. This includes South Korea, large swathes of South and Central America, France, Mexico, Germany, etc. I would chalk up places like Indonesia, Malaysia, and India as other countries whose governments often find common ground with the U.S. despite cultural anti-Americanism in many parts of society.

Culture matters to a degree, but in foreign affairs interests matter more, especially in the day to day.

I'm not trying to assign blame. My point was simply that it makes no sense to pretend we can execute a strategy based on partnership when both sides are increasingly hostile to the other. We've deluded ourselves into believing this is all a misunderstanding, and we can fix it if we just get our STRATCOMMs better organized.

And, personally, I think the anti-Americanism is Pakistan is quite a bit different than that in Germany or South Korea.

And here's today's Exhibit #1 to show how outright ignorance and/or deliberate propaganda about Islam is becoming mainstreamed in the U.S. The op-ed begins with a demonstrably false assertion and then builds on it. But looking at all the whoopin' support in the commentary section.

[Global Scout]

And my point was that the more democratic governments in the Islamic world become, the more anti-Americanism will influence their policies. Just compare Turkey's relationship to the U.S. today to its relationship under the military junta. Same with Pakistan.

I believe that means that our best partners are going to be despots like Mubarak and the house of Saud. The more democracy grows, the less receptiveness to us.

Is that a basis for a global strategy?

Interesting observation, and while it probably shouldn't drive our strategy it should cool our jets on our effort to "push" democracy around the world.

[Bob's World]

Interesting observation, and while it probably shouldn't drive our strategy it should cool our jets on our effort to "push" democracy around the world.

Its great when its voluntary, but it's rape when one party forces it on another "for their own good" or otherwise.

I remain a big proponent for self-determination. Besides, I have a theory that we really got away from promoting self-determination in the Cold War when so many populaces were self-determining that communism was the best way to throw off the heavy yoke of western colonialism. Our national ethos got in the way of our mission to contain the Soviets, so we compromised a little and changed our product to "democracy."

Personally I think we should go back. You may not like what you get with self-determination, but at least it's never rape...

[SteveMetz]

A correction of a post I made earlier in this thread: JFQ retracted its acceptance of the essay I pasted in here so I don't know where, if anywhere, it will be published.

[Dayuhan]

Coming? It's already there...

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101007/...a_senate_angle

LAS VEGAS – U.S. Senate candidate Sharron Angle told a crowd of supporters that the country needs to address a "militant terrorist situation" that has allowed Islamic religious law to take hold in some American cities....

[Cliff]

The U.S. must restate the problem. The U.S. must take responsibility for the effects of its role in the Middle East over the past 60+ years. Once we have that cathartic moment, not unlike step one in 12-step program, we can begin to get better.

Do you see this admission as being more for our own sake, or for the benefit of the people in the Middle East? If it is for us, then it makes sense... if it is for the folks in the Middle East, then I am not sure if it would be effective.

I do agree that we should confess our sins as it were...

We can employ our influence to encourage meaningful evolution of government where such is required (on local terms, not ours)

We can become the champion of the oppressed people of these regions, standing on the principles contained within our Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights rather than more recent corruptions of that founding Ethos to justify our behavior. We can implement a form of "soft-UW" that encourages very effective non-violent approaches; over the violence offered by AQ. By out-competing AQ we render them moot. By attacking them we validate and strengthen them at the same time. (Like cutting up starfish and throwing them back in the ocean...it makes sense, but the actual effects are the opposite of those intended)

Or, placed in the terminology of my community: We must put the Liber back in De Oppresso Liber.

I agree on the non-violence. If you look at our own civil rights movement, you see many elements of a (mainly) non-violent insurgency that was relatively effective...

Why have the Palestinians, Kashmiris, or others in the Middle East not attempted to use non-violent protests and methods?

It looked to me like the Kashmiris were going in this direction a little while back... but the emphasis on throwing stones is closer to the intifada than to MLK or Gandhi.

These techniques could rally world opinion to their causes... It seems like the Gaza relief flotilla folks definitely benefited from this sort of push.

Do you think that these methods could be effective if used en masse? Certainly us training/encouraging such efforts would hopefully help... but would long-term benefits occur? Or will the people just vote to institute sharia once they have the power?

It seems like we gave the Mujahideen a lot of help, and not all of ended up liking us afterwards...

I'd be curious to here folks opinions on the viability of non-violent resistance in the Middle East.

V/R,

Cliff

[Bob's World]

Cliff,

If we encourage governments to dialog with their populace and be open to reasonable evolution with one hand, and encourage non-violent challenges of poor governance by oppressed populaces with the other, we can realign ourselves with our national ethos. Not the neutrality of a fan sitting in the bleachers watching, but rather the neutrality of an umpire on the field keeping things from getting out of hand as the competition plays out.

To proclaim that U.S. interests and US values are "universal" as we do in our National Security Strategy though,blows me away. The hubris is off the chart, or maybe it's just ignorance, I don't know which. Glenn Beck has been ranting about how we are out to form a world government; I guess if you think everyone shares your interests and values, why not? Worrisome stuff, that. People need to chart their own path; extremes of behavior don't fare well in the light of day, and there are fewer and fewer dark corners in the globe every day.

Our current doctrine for COIN presumes keeping the current government in power. I am no fan of regime change, but I think we approach the troubled states where AQ has so much sway more effectively when we do not just grant the government a guarantee that we will help them maintain the status quo. We become more effective when we don't take sides and don't project our interests and values onto others. To wage this kind of diplomacy is nothing that our "state" department is trained, organized or inclined to do. We need to tune our own government and policies up to be more effective in the emerging world, and then go out to engage it.

Who knows, our greatest allies 20 years from now may well be states that have not yet formed, or governments that do not currently exist. They might not even be states at all. Now is not the time to attempt to rigidly enforce the past, but rather to develop a greater flexibility for embracing the future as it emerges around us.

[tequila]

But in any case, when people in Pakistan read that essay, do you think they'll say, "Oh that's just a fringe publication, so we should disregard it"?

But Steve, why does it matter so much whether or not the general cultural mood in Pakistan is anti-American? Surely we should take steps to reduce it if possible, but do general public perceptions really matter so much when it comes to foreign policy?

[Cliff]

To proclaim that U.S. interests and US values are "universal" as we do in our National Security Strategy though,blows me away. The hubris is off the chart, or maybe it's just ignorance, I don't know which. Glenn Beck has been ranting about how we are out to form a world government; I guess if you think everyone shares your interests and values, why not? Worrisome stuff, that. People need to chart their own path; extremes of behavior don't fare well in the light of day, and there are fewer and fewer dark corners in the globe every day.

I agree with this. One thing that has been interesting for me to see in CGSC is the degree to which we mirror image... even folks who have just come from working wonders COIN-wise in foreign cultures still have a hard time seeing things outside the "American" perspective- especially strategically.

Our current doctrine for COIN presumes keeping the current government in power. I am no fan of regime change, but I think we approach the troubled states where AQ has so much sway more effectively when we do not just grant the government a guarantee that we will help them maintain the status quo. We become more effective when we don't take sides and don't project our interests and values onto others. To wage this kind of diplomacy is nothing that our "state" department is trained, organized or inclined to do. We need to tune our own government and policies up to be more effective in the emerging world, and then go out to engage it.

Definitely agree with this... Karzai being one good example, the current Iraqi political structure being another, and Pakistan being a potential third.

The problem is, how do you prevent the replacement from being worse than the status quo?

If you look at the trajectory of democratization and economic progress, the folks who developed economically first and politically second did better than those who tried the other route. South Korea is a great example of this... I think the economic part is probably the most important piece- you gain so much traction if people's lives are better.

Is there a middle ground, where you can encourage change but not chaos? Seems like a tough balance. I think our current policies may be too hypocritical to work - it's great to be for liberty but that kind of seems false when you support dictatorships.

I guess the other question is will anti-Americanism fade if people's economic and political conditions improve?

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

This will help our stratcomms for sure.

The Texas Board of Education has passed a resolution to limit references to Islam in textbooks.

V/R,

Cliff