Shariah is coming! Shariah is coming!

[tequila]

I just think it is odd that Tukhachevskii appears to believe that both himself and Osama bin Laden have hit upon the genuine meaning of Islam, while billions of Muslims have lost the plot.

Read anythign written by the actualised Jihadis (as opposed to those who have yet to fullfil their obligation) and what do you see?

I like that - any non-jihadi Muslim is just a jihadi who hasn't fulfilled his obligation. I suppose that would include guys like my platoon sergeant in Iraq who did three combat tours and put more bullets in "actualised jihadis" than anyone else I've ever met. But I suppose he isn't a real Muslim, because he doesn't agree with your definition of Islam? Because he's unaware that all the verses in the Quran that argue for moderation have been abrogated in "real" Islam? Hmmm ...

[Steve Blair]

Gents,

Let's all work to keep the discussion civil, shall we? Personal attacks won't work the issue to any sort of reasonable conclusion (even if it's to agree to disagree).

[Tukhachevskii]

I just think it is odd that Tukhachevskii appears to believe that both himself and Osama bin Laden have hit upon the genuine meaning of Islam, while billions of Muslims have lost the plot.



I like that - any non-jihadi Muslim is just a jihadi who hasn't fulfilled his obligation. I suppose that would include guys like my platoon sergeant in Iraq who did three combat tours and put more bullets in "actualised jihadis" than anyone else I've ever met. But I suppose he isn't a real Muslim, because he doesn't agree with your definition of Islam? Because he's unaware that all the verses in the Quran that argue for moderation have been abrogated in "real" Islam? Hmmm ...

I seem to recall tussling with you before, I hink bodegas were mentioned at some point, seems you like to attack rather than discuss, nye problema. It's not MY definition of Islam. Its a reading of Islam based upon how the central tenets demand to be read, i.e., accoding to the rules by which they were themselves adumbrated. One of the key drivers of conflict in Indonesia, for instance, is that between Ahmaddiyya adherents and adherents of (any) one of the Sunni branches. Their argument, and they're not arguing about Jihad but rather other peripheral issues but the implications are the same, is that the Ahmaddiya have innovated (tantamount to bid'a) by ignroing how the Quran and the sharia in particular are meant to be implemented. The Ahmaddiya are some of the foremost adherents of the meccan verses (those that have been abrogated) and one of the fears they have is that their youth (again talking about Indonesia in partilucar but the import is universal) have been "weened" away from them by persuasive arguments based wholly upon Islamic methodologies. As I said in my original post its not about how many Islams there are out there but rather how many variations/deviations on the theme and how the whole discursive field has a strong system steering/maintenance capability (i.e., the rules which it itself lays down about how to interpret/implement it). Listen, agree with me or don't, I really don't care but provide me with evidence to the contrary and maybe we can talk.

T, over and out

[jmm99]

seriously Shariah (and I mean civilized discourse that would "hold up in a court of law"), let's rejuvinate this thread, Mullah Omar: Taliban Rules and Regulations; and discuss what aspects of Shariah are and are not applicable to the so-called "GWOT".

BTW, Shariah is not a monolith as this map shows:

Fiqh Schools.jpg

Anyone who wants to join in discourse in the Mullah Omar thread, is welcome; but don't poison the well.

Regards

Mike

[Entropy]

One of the "features" of Islam is the lack of any formal hierarchy to enforce compliance with religious interpretation. This raises a fundamental question: Who defines Islam? Is it what a majority of Muslims believe? Is it a "strict constructionist" view of the Koran? Is it cherry-picking certain tenets of Islamic thought?

The answer is yes to all of those and more. So, who can say what is a legitimate interpretation and what isn't? That's up to individual Muslims and the best thing we can do as non-Muslims is to stay out of interpretive disputes.

[tequila]

It's not MY definition of Islam. Its a reading of Islam based upon how the central tenets demand to be read, i.e., accoding to the rules by which they were themselves adumbrated.

Sorry, it is your definition. If it wasn't, then I would expect that many Islamic authorities would be arguing that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to make war on every non-Muslim until the entire world has been converted to Islam, turned into a dhimmi, or killed. This is your interpretation, correct or no?

As I said in my original post its not about how many Islams there are out there but rather how many variations/deviations on the theme and how the whole discursive field has a strong system steering/maintenance capability (i.e., the rules which it itself lays down about how to interpret/implement it). Listen, agree with me or don't, I really don't care but provide me with evidence to the contrary and maybe we can talk.

What exactly are you saying here? That the Quran and the hadith can really only be interpreted one way? What exactly is the "steering/maintenance capability" you are talking about?

[motorfirebox]

I seem to recall tussling with you before, I hink bodegas were mentioned at some point, seems you like to attack rather than discuss, nye problema. It's not MY definition of Islam. Its a reading of Islam based upon how the central tenets demand to be read, i.e., accoding to the rules by which they were themselves adumbrated. One of the key drivers of conflict in Indonesia, for instance, is that between Ahmaddiyya adherents and adherents of (any) one of the Sunni branches. Their argument, and they're not arguing about Jihad but rather other peripheral issues but the implications are the same, is that the Ahmaddiya have innovated (tantamount to bid'a) by ignroing how the Quran and the sharia in particular are meant to be implemented. The Ahmaddiya are some of the foremost adherents of the meccan verses (those that have been abrogated) and one of the fears they have is that their youth (again talking about Indonesia in partilucar but the import is universal) have been "weened" away from them by persuasive arguments based wholly upon Islamic methodologies. As I said in my original post its not about how many Islams there are out there but rather how many variations/deviations on the theme and how the whole discursive field has a strong system steering/maintenance capability (i.e., the rules which it itself lays down about how to interpret/implement it). Listen, agree with me or don't, I really don't care but provide me with evidence to the contrary and maybe we can talk.

T, over and out

This is simply not a reasonable argument. Islam is a religion, and people are prone to interpret religious texts however they damn well please. The struggle between the western and "Muslim" worlds is not about religion, it's about economics. Religion at best shapes the threat--it doesn't create it.

[jmm99]

the bolded part of this:

from motorfirebox
Islam is a religion, and people are prone to interpret religious texts however they damn well please. The struggle between the western and "Muslim" worlds is not about religion, it's about economics. Religion at best shapes the threat--it doesn't create it.

regardless of what is is about, and as a starting point, whom do you include in the western world and whom do you include in the Muslim world. In short, define and ID the opposing sides.

That having been done, please go back to your substantive points and draw me a word picture of what that struggle looks like.

Regards

Mike

[motorfirebox]

Clearly defining what the sides are, in terms larger than specific campaigns, is a tall order (hell, even in the specific context of, say, Iraq or Afghanistan, it's not always easy). I'm not actually sure that such a thing is possible. But it is possible--and important--to clarify who the enemy isn't. Defining the other side of this conflict as Islam is a bad mistake that I wish were less prevalent.

[jmm99]

simply on grounds of logic, that if you cannot define who is the enemy, you cannot define who is not the enemy.

Not that defining membership in violent non-state actors is easy. I stick with the 2001 AUMF and follow the DC Circuit decisions. The result is that I see a armed conflict between the US and AQ (together with its associated groups). In terms of the type of conflict, AQ is waging unconventional warfare against the US - often via local insurgencies it supports in the hope we will get sucked in.

Most of our coalition partners do not see it that way, but regard AQ as a criminal group to be handled pursuant to civilian criminal law. E.g., no drone strikes and direct actions permitted.

I don't see a present, generalized struggle (in the sense of a jihad) between the western world (basically the EU, prob. Russia, the Anzacs and the Americas) and the Muslim world (shown on the map I posted).

Iran also wages unconventional warfare via proxies (not so much directly vs the US to date, but vs Israel and less directly vs Saudi Arabia).

Europe may have issues with specific Muslim population groups. I can't pontificate on that. So far, we (US) have not had problems with our Muslim population generally - as opposed to problems with individuals or small groups linked to AQ ideologically.

Regards

Mike

[motorfirebox]

Of course you can define who the enemy isn't. We're pretty sure the enemy isn't moon men from Venus, after all. It's certainly within the capability of logic to rule things out.

I think I may have been unclear. When I said the west was engaged in a struggle with the "Muslim" world, I put the quotes in because I was being facetious. I don't think defining the conflict was west vs Islam (or, god forbid, Christian vs Islam) is accurate or helpful, which is why I was arguing against the concept Tukhachevskii put forward--he stated that Islam is inherently a religion which conflicts with western interest, and I disagreed. To the extent that it's anti-western, so is Christianity and almost any other religion you could name.

Given that many of those we are incontrovertibly in conflict with--as evidenced by the fact that they're shooting at us and trying to blow us up--are Muslim, though, it's useful to clarify that the conflict doesn't (despite their claims, as well as the claims of certain western blowhards) spring from the fact that they're Muslim and we're not. If we don't make that division clear, we'll end up fighting half the planet. And quite possibly losing.

What we're in conflict with is a socioeconomic class. They're poor enough to be angry, but close enough to our fantastic wealth to be able to use certain features of it--our communication and transportation networks--against us to great effect. People don't like to think of themselves as jealous or greedy, so yeah, they wrap their conflict in their religion to make their anger more palatable to themselves (just as many in the west choose to view the conflict in terms of ideology in order to escape having to acknowledge the role their own wealth plays). But it's about haves and have-nots doing their usual dance.

[Tukhachevskii]

Sorry, but I stopped reading when I hit the sentence, "Jihad is the military manifestation (way) of that goal." I'm certainly no expert on Islam but even I know that's not correct.

The statement that you are "merely stating both the consensus of Islamic scholars and Islamic texts themselves" is simply false. Jihad is a complex notion. Any Islamic cleric will tell you that military conquest is by far the least important idea. In fact, most will argue that it is not part of jihad at all--that the AQ portrayal of it, which you seem to accept, is wrong.

By the way, here's the introduction of the book you linked. You tell me if the author says that jihad=coversion by military action.

I (would) like to think that the older I get the thicker my skin has become and I’ve got more of a handle on my temper. But try as I might, even though I tried counted beyond ten, I just couldn’t let these comments pass coming as they do from someone ordinarily described as an academic (which was always a dirty word where I was taught...by scholars); especially from someone who sought to put me in my place by quoting the sales blurb rather than actually reading the book I suggested he consult (academics!). Those quoted below (of which there were many more but I didn’t want to bore you), apart from Akbar (who is a journalist, I think) and Nafzinger (a military historian usually of the Napoleonic era), are reputable SME’s...I don’t acquire knowledge from twats like Robert Spencer (in case you were wondering).

DJIHAD etymologically signifies an effort directed towards a determined objective. (Cf. idjtihdd: the work of the scholar-jurists in seeking the solution of legal problems; mudjdhada or, again, djihdd: an effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection. Certain writers, particularly among those of ####e persuasion, qualify this djihdd as "spiritual djihdd" and as "the greater djihdd", in opposition to the djihdd which is our present concern and which is called "physical djihdd" or "the lesser djihdd". It is, however, very much more usual for the term djihdd to denote this latter form of "effort"). In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the djihdd consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence. The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace to whole universe, if necessary by force. The principle, however, must be partially combined with another which tolerates the existence, within the Islamic community itself, of the adherents of "the religions with holy books", i.e., Christians, Jews and Madjus [q.v.]. As far as these latter are concerned the djihdd ceases as soon as they agree to submit to the political authority of Islam and to pay the poll tax (djizya [q.v.]) and the land tax (kharddi [q.v.]). As long as the question could still, in fact, be posed, a controversy existed—generally resolved by a negative answer—on the question as to whether the Christians and Jews of the Arabian peninsula were entitled to such treatment as of right. To the nonscriptuaries, in particular the idolaters, this half measure has no application according to the opinion of the majority: their conversion to Islam is obligatory under pain of being put to death or reduced into slavery. In principle, the djihdd is the one form of war which is permissible in Islam, for, in theory, Islam must constitute a single community organized under a single authority and any armed conflict between Muslims is prohibited. Following, however, the disintegration of Muslim unity and the appearance, beginning in the middle of the 2nd/8th century, of an ever increasing number of independent States, the question arose as to how the wars which sprang up between them were to be classified. They were never included within the strict notion of djihdd—even in the case of wars between states of different religious persuasion—at least according to the general Sunni doctrine; and it is only by an abuse of language that this term is sometimes applied to them, while those authors who seek for a precise terminology label them only as kitdl or mukdtala (conflict, war). There is even hesitation in referring to the struggle against the renegade groups in Islam as djihdd. The viewpoint of ####e doctrine is not the same, for, according to the ####e, a refusal to subscribe to their teaching is equivalent to unbelief (kufr). The same holds good, a fortiori, for the Kharidiite doctrine [see further TAKFIR]. The djihdd is a duty. This precept is laid down in all the sources. It is true that there are to be found in the Kurgan divergent, and even contradictory, texts. These are classified by the doctrine, apart from certain variations of detail, into four successive categories: those which enjoin pardon for offences and encourage the invitation to Islam by peaceful persuasion; those which enjoin fighting to ward off aggression; those which enjoin the initiative in attack, provided it is not within the four sacred months; and those which enjoin the initiative in attack absolutely, at all times and in all places. In sum, these differences correspond to the stages in the development of Muhammad's thought and to the modifications of policy resulting from particular circumstances; the Meccan period during which Muhammad, in general, confines himself to moral and religious teaching, and the Medina period when, having become the leader of a politico-religious community, he is able to undertake, spontaneously, the struggle against those who do not wish to join this community or submit to his authority. The doctrine holds that the later texts abrogate the former contradictory texts (the theory of naskh [q.v.]), to such effect that only those of the last category remain indubitably valid; and, accordingly, the rule on the subject may be formulated in these absolute terms: "the fight (djihdd) is obligatory even when they (the unbelievers) have not themselves started it". In two isolated opinions, however, attempts were made to temper the rule in same respects. According to one of these views, attributed to ‘Ata (d. ii4/732-3), the ancient prohibition against fighting during the sacred months remains valid; while according to the other, attributed to Sufyan al- Thawrl (born 97/715), the djihdd is obligatory only in defence; it is simply recommended (li 'l-nad-b) in attack. According to a view held by modern orientalist scholarship, Muhammad's conception of the djihdd as attack applied only in relation to the peoples of Arabia; its general application was the result of the idimd (general consensus of opinion) of the immediately succeeding generations. At root, of course, this involves the problem as to whether Muhammad had conceived of Islam as universal or not. The opinion of al-Thawrl appears to have been adopted by al-Djahiz. The heterodox movement of the Ahmadiyya [q.v.], beginning towards the end of the 19th century, would go further than al-Thawri inasmuch as it refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the djihdd even as a recommended activity. Cf., in the same sense, the doctrine of Babism (see BAB).

According to the general doctrine of the Shi’a. due account taken of their dogma concerning "the absence of the Imam", who alone has the necessary competence to order war, the practice of the djihdd is necessarily suspended until the re-appearance of the Imam or the ad hoc appointment of a vicar designated by him for this task. The Zaydi sect, however, which does not recognize this dogma, follows the same teaching as that of the SunnI doctrine. Characteristics of the duty of djihdd. The djihdd is not an end in itself but a means which, in itself, is an evil (fasdd), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective towards which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is "good" from the fact that its purpose is "good" (hasan li-husn ghayrih).

[Tukhachevskii]

A religious duty. The djihdd has the effect of extending the sway of the faith; it is prescribed by God and his Prophet; the Muslim dedicates himself to the djihdd in- the same way that, in Christianity, the monk dedicates himself to the service of God; in the same vein it is said in different hadiths that "the djihdd is the monasticism of Islam"; the djihdd is "an act of pure devotion"; it is "one of the gates to Paradise"; rich heavenly rewards are guaranteed for those who devote themselves to it; those who fall in the djihdd are the martyrs of the faith, etc. A substantial part of the doctrine reckons the djihdd among the very "pillars" (arkan) of the religion, along with prayer and fasting etc. It is a duty which falls upon every Muslim who is male, free and able bodied. It is generally considered that non-Muslims may be called upon to assist the Muslims in the djihdd. A "collective" obligation (fard kifdya) in contrast to fard ‘ayn. The fard kifdya is that duty which is imposed upon the community considered as a whole and which only becomes obligatory for each individual in particular to the extent that his intervention is necessary for the realization of the purpose envisaged by the law. Thus, as soon as there exists a group of Muslims whose number is sufficient to fulfil the needs of a particular conflict, the obligation of the djihdd no longer rests on the others. The general teaching is that the duty of djihdd falls, in the first place, individually as a fard 'ayn, upon those who live in the territory nearest to the enemy, and that the same holds good in the case of the inhabitants of a town which is besieged. In the organized State, however, the appreciation of the precise moment at which the djihdd is transformed into an 'ayn obligation is a matter for the discretion of the sovereign; so that, in the case of general mobilization, the djihdd loses, for all the members of the community, its character of fard kifaya, and becomes, instead, fard cayn. All this implies, however, that for those who hold the reins of authority and, in particular, the sovereign, the djihdd is always an individual duty, since their own personal action is necessary in every case. Where there are several independent Muslim states, the duty will fall upon the ruler of the state which is nearest to the enemy. Further, the duty of the djihdd is relative and contingent in this dual sense that, on the one hand, it only comes into being when the circumstances are favourable and of such a nature as to offer some hope of a victorious outcome, and, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the duty may be renounced in consideration of the payment by the enemy of goods reaching a certain value, if such policy appears to be in conformity with the interests of the moment.

Its subsidiary character. Since the djihdd is nothing more than a means to effect conversion to Islam or submission to its authority, there is only occasion to undertake it in circumstances where the people against whom it is directed have first been invited to join Islam. Discussion turned on the question as to whether it was necessary, on this ground, to address a formal invitation to the enemy. The general doctrine holds that since Islam is sufficiently widespread in the world, all peoples are presumed to know that they have been invited to join it. It is observed, however, that it would be desirable to repeat the invitation, except in cases where there is ground for apprehension that the enemy, thus forewarned, would profit from such a delay by better organizing his defences and, in this way, compromising the successful outcome of the djihdd. Its perpetual character. The duty of the djihdd exists as long as the universal domination of Islam has not been attained. "Until the day of the resurrection", and "until the end of the world" say the maxims. Peace with non-Muslim nations is, therefore, a provisional state of affairs only; the chance of circumstances alone can justify it temporarily. Furthermore there can be no question of genuine peace treaties with these nations; only truces, whose duration ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to resume the conflict. It is, however, recognized that such repudiation should be brought to the notice of the infidel party, and that he should be afforded sufficient opportunity to be able to disseminate the news of it throughout the whole of his territory [see SULH].

Its defensive as well as offensive character. The djihdd has principally an offensive character; but it is equally a djihdd when it is a case of defending Islam against aggression. This indeed, is the essential purpose of the ribdt [q.v.] undertaken by isolated groups or individuals settled on the frontiers of Islam. The ribdt is a particularly meritorious act. Finally, there is at the present time a thesis, of a wholly apologetic character, according to which Islam relies for its expansion exclusively upon persuasion and other peaceful means, and the djihdd is only authorized in cases of "self defence" and of "support owed to a defenceless ally or brother". Disregarding entirely the previous doctrine and historical tradition, as well as the texts of the Kur'an and the sunna on the basis of which it was formulated, but claiming, even so, to remain within the bounds of strict orthodoxy, this thesis takes into account only those early texts which state the contrary (v. supra).

The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. 2 (C-G), pp. 538-540

[Tukhachevskii]

The rationale for Islamic thinking about war has its basis in the fundamental categorical structure of Islam itself. Because the world is divided between submission to God’s will and rebellion against God’s will, the fact of conflict is inevitable. (Note that I do not say between believers and unbelievers – that would be too Christian a categorization, and it would obscure the way that this conflict occurs even in the heart of the ordinary Muslim, as she or he struggles to be properly and fully submissive to God.) In this way, the fundamental logic of war is couched in theological terms of obedience to God. p.195

Those who still submit to God’s will must be prepared to fight to defend God ’ s order, and – when the requisite authorities deem it proper – to fight to expand the dominion of God across the whole globe. The ultimate aim and expectation is universal conquest; as one of the most historically significant verses in the Quran suggests, Muslims are enjoined to “ fight [the unbelievers] until there is no more persecution [or seduction] and worship [ din ] is devoted to God ” (Q. 2:193). p.195

War – literally, qital , or “ fighting ” – is simply the last step in the “ ladder of escalation ” in the effort to conduct jihad in the dar - al - harb ; it was the way in which Islam would be brought to non - Muslim lands, if those lands would not allow more peaceful means of bringing Islam. Jihad is in a way simply the reality of the tension and irresolvable conflict at the border separating the dar - al - Islam and the dar - al - Harb . p.196

Because the sword verses were revealed in Medina and later than the peace verses, which were revealed in Mecca, the sword verses are often taken to be normative, or even to have “abrogated ” (revoked) the peace verses. What is interesting, though, is how even in its more militaristic forms of the sword verses, the Islamic doctrine of jihad does not seem to have committed its faithful warriors to engage in wars of mass conversion. Historically, Islamic armies sought conquest but not conversion; in the early centuries especially, conversion seems to have been discouraged. Particularly with the other “ Peoples of the Book ” – that is, Jews and Christians – the economic benefits of taxing non - Muslims (the jizyah , tax on non - Muslims) meant that the early Islamic Caliphate stood to lose valuable streams of funding were too many of their subjects to convert to the religion of the Prophet. p.197,

C. Mathewes, Understanding Religious Ethics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

[Tukhachevskii]

One of the goals of jihad was to conquer and dominate non-Muslims. [...] In summarizing the teachings of the Quran with regard to the subject of jihad, it is important to emphasize that we have a very martial and well-developed teaching here. Although it is not an exhaustive treatment of jihad—many of the hadith and subsequent jurisprudence are devoted to annotating topics only adumbrated in the suras—the Quran nonetheless presents a well-developed religious justification for waging war against Islam’s enemies. p.10-11,

There is a redemptive aspect to jihad that is crucial to understanding its development. We have already noted Quran 9:111, where this salvific contract is spelled out. In ‘Abdallah b. al-Mubarak’s Kitab al-jihad we see similar attitudes. In the above hadith, “the sword wipes away sins” in a manner similar to the Christian tradition, which places redemption in the Cross: “Being killed in the path of Allah washes away impurity; killing is two things: atonement and rank [in heaven].” Fighters were encouraged to wear white so that the blood of their sacrifice would be apparent. p.15

Incitement and psychological fear are both important components of jihad, as is recognized in the Quran 3:151: “We will cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers on account of their associating with Allah that for which He sent down no authority.” The Prophet Muhammad further amplified this idea by noting that God had helped him with a fear (ru‘b or mahaba) that He had sent before the Muslim armies to a distance of a month’s journey. According to this idea, all who lived at this distance from the Muslims would feel this fear and be defeated by it even before meeting the Muslims in battle. The psychological preparation for victory or defeat is also a theme of the hadith literature, in which we find a great many references to poetry, flags, and slogans intended to aid the fighters. Probably the most popular slogan— Allahu akbar! (God is greater!)—is usually said to precede Muslim advance into battle. p.17-18

One of the bases for this type of regulation was defining the manner in which war should be declared and what its limits were. The Messenger of Allah, when he would send a commander with a raid or an army would enjoin upon him the fear of Allah, especially with regard to himself, but also with regard to the Muslims, and say: When you meet your polytheist enemy, call to him [to choose] between three possibilities—accept whichever one they accept, and desist from them:

1. Call them to Islam; if they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them. Then [if they accept Islam] call them to move from their homes to the home of the muhajirun [immigrants]; if they do this, then they will have the rights and the responsibilities of the muhajirun. Ifthey refuse, then designate their home, and inform them that they will be like the Muslim Bedouin—Allah’s law, which is incumbent upon the believers, will be incumbent upon them, but they will not have any right to the movable or nonmovable spoils, except when they fight at the side of the Muslims.

2. If they refuse, then call them to pay the jizya [poll tax]. If they accept, then accept it from them and desist from them.

3. If they refuse, then ask Allah for aid against them, and fight them. If you besiege the people of a fortress, and they desire to surrender unconditionally (‘ala hukm Allah), do not accept this from them, but let them surrender according to your judgment, and do with them what you wish afterwards. p. 19-20

The Prophet Muhammad is portrayed, as Patricia Crone has stated, as a doomsday prophet, sent just before the end of the world to warn those who would heed a warning and to punish those who would not. Here, the process of jihad, as in the traditions cited above, is one in which the hold of worldly things over the believer is diluted. Because of the impermanence of the soldier’s life, and the difficulties of establishing a stable family or gathering substantial possessions, many of the ties that bind people to this world are weakened or even dissolved entirely. When this is taken into consideration, the spiritual significance of jihad becomes even more pronounced. It is clear why the connection with the end of the world had to be maintained in the jihad literature. Without this final date in mind, it would have been difficult for Muslim fighters to summon up the necessary energy to achieve the conquests. p.23

Martyrdom in Islam has a much more active sense: the prospective martyr is called to seek out situations in which martyrdom might be achieved. p.26

For the true beginnings of the “greater jihad” we must go to the great theologian and Sufi al-Ghazali (d. 1111). It is to his formulations that we owe the success of this doctrine. In his great work Ihya _ulum al-din (Revival of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazali presents the lusts and passions of the soul as an invading army trying to conquer the body and to keep it from following the path of mysticism. In an interesting reinterpretation, he strips a passage from Quran 4:95 from its context (indicated in bracketed text) to argue that Muslims must fight not by means of their possessions and “persons” (the word being the plural of nafs, soul), but against their possessions and their souls: [Those of the believers who stay at home while suffering from no injury are not equal to] those who fight in the cause of Allah with their possessions and persons. Allah has raised those who fight with their possessions and persons one degree (over those who stay at home; and to each Allah has promised the fairest good. Yet Allah has granted a great reward to those who fight and not to those who stay behind). This creative reinterpretation of the Qur‘anic verse turns the focus radically away from the original intent to concentrate on the battle against one’s lower passions, especially the soul. Al-Ghazali takes this argument further when he deals with the subject of exercising the soul. Throughout the Ihya, he uses military, and especially jihad, imagery to describe this battle. However, al-Ghazali nowhere indicates that he sees the jihad against the soul as a substitute for militant jihad (he in fact rarely deals with militant jihad in the Ihya). But in the section on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil (al-amr bi-lma _ruf wa-l-nahi _an al-munkar, one of the most fundamental principles of Islamic social law), al-Ghazali adduces the example of the jihad fighter who sacrifices himself for the greater good and leads a charge against a large number of the enemy in an attempt to cause them distress (this would later become the legal basis for the suicide attack or martyrdom operation of contemporary times). p.37

Others have fallen into this error as well [of assuming the division between greater and lesser Jihad is legal or actual- T]. They comprise two basic groups: Western scholars who want to present Islam in the most innocuous terms possible, and Muslim apologists, who rediscovered the internal jihad in the nineteenth century and have been emphasizing it ever since that time as the normative expression of jihad—in defiance of all the religious and historical evidence to the contrary. The motives of the first group are well intentioned, probably undertaken with the goal of furthering interreligious dialogue and skirting an issue that has long been used by polemicists as a vehicle for attacking Islam. p.40

In his more recent Unholy War, while discussing the many meanings of jihad, Esposito continues to avoid all historical context for his discussion and simply repeats what contemporary Muslim apologists say about this doctrine. Since he has already decided that radical Muslims are terrorists, Esposito is able to avoid dealing with the fact that they have extensive support in the central texts and doctrines of Islam. p. 42

From an outsider’s point of view, after surveying the evidence from classical until contemporary times, one
must conclude that today’s jihad movements are as legitimate as any that have ever existed in classical
Islam, with the exception of the fact that they disregard the necessity of established authority—that a legitimate authority such as a caliph or an imam could declare jihad. Other than this one major difference, contemporary jihad groups fall within the confines of classical definitions of jihad. That this is true can be seen by their careful regard for classical and contemporary law, their heavy emphasis on the spiritual rewards of jihad, and their frequently voiced claim to be fighting for the sake of Islam. p.164

D. Cook, Understanding Jihad (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005)

[Tukhachevskii]

I just think it is odd that Tukhachevskii appears to believe that both himself and Osama bin Laden have hit upon the genuine meaning of Islam, while billions of Muslims have lost the plot.

Lewis said it best....

The coincidence of views between Islamologists and Islamic “fundamentalists” is apparent, not real, and the reformers’ accusations of complicity in reaction arise from a failure to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive statements. The scholarly student of slam – especially if he is not Muslim – studies Islam as a historical phenomenon, as a civilisation with a long and distinguished record of achievement. The evidence he uses is that provided by Muslims – what they have said, written and done in the course of centuries. That is, he is concerned with the past and with the ways it can be used to understand the present. It is not his task or his right to change the present or to try and shape the future. This task is for the Muslim – his right, his duty, his exclusive privilege.

Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West, p. 195 n1 to Chapter 8