Stuxnet: Target Bushehr?

[AdamG]

If I had to ‘profile’ the perpetrator, I would suggest a lone male with a grudge or grievance with one or more US intelligence agencies (perhaps a past applicant). If there is a political motive, I would suggest someone affiliated with Anonymous or other like-minded group who might think disrupting Iranian networks would mean disrupting any ongoing US intelligence operation. Either way, the objective in my view is disrupting or discrediting US efforts rather than Iran's nuclear program. That’s pure speculation, but that is the impression I get.

That'd make a good movie script. Seriously.

[Erich G. Simmers]

That'd make a good movie script. Seriously.

Have you played with Metasploit? Typing commands in to msfconsole is a little hard to dramatize on screen. About the closest we've come to making the command line sexy was having Trinity from The Matrix run an nmap scan and a fictitious SSH exploit, and Trinity did it wearing a leather outfit (article and YouTube clip*). The real perpetrator may be doing it unshaven and in a bathrobe.

Definitely strikes me as an amateur--although who knows. If the Iranians are shutting down key parts of their network (I don't know how vital the automation bits mentioned in Mikko's piece are) to do forensics to figure out how the attacker is getting in, maybe blasting "Thunderstruck" is the next best thing to some fancy exploit to ruin centrifuges. Or, perhaps, some group who wants to disrupt Iran's nuclear program is flooding them with garbage attacks to overwhelm Iranians attempts to analyze their more 'long-term,' targeted malware. That analysis takes time and personnel who are in short supply even in the U.S.

However, these types of attacks seem every bit as likely to disrupt professional intelligence agencies' access as help them in some way. That's why I think there is another motive at work here. The reported worm and Metasploit hijinks may even be two separate actors.

--

* - Funny enough, that little 1:09 clip dramatizes pretty much every policy maker's fear of an infrastructure attack on the U.S.

[AdamG]

Researchers said today they have identified part of the powerful Flame cyber espionage program as a stand-alone, “highly flexible” spy program that centered its attacks on computer systems in Lebanon and Iran.

MiniFlame, as cyber experts at Moscow-based Kaspersky Labs dubbed the malware, is an “info-stealing” virus designed to hit only a few high-profile targets – perhaps just a few dozen computer systems. Kaspersky researchers said in a blog post they actually discovered MiniFlame in July but at the time believed it to be just a module within Flame.

http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headline...-lebanon-iran/

[AdamG]

After the Stuxnet malware attacks that are thought to have caused several Iranian nuclear centrifuges to explode, Iran has been steadily boosting its ability to carry out attacks against computer networks, and is growing into “a force to be reckoned with.”

That was the warning given by Gen. William Shelton (pictured in a file photo), head of the U.S. Air Force’s Space Command, which is also in charge of the Air Force’s cyber-war group, in a speech in Washington, D.C., yesterday, which was covered by Reuters.

http://allthingsd.com/20130118/iran-...-general-says/

[mthibode]

If anyone really wants to know in detail how severe and what exactly the alleged Iranian cyber threat entails, the last place to look is to a US service representative. It is in his interest, in these budget constrained times, to hype the threat.

I suppose what we really need is a trusted third party... operating as Kapersky is doing now with the Stuxnet threat-- to gauge threat sophistication, intended target, etc. UN? Sweden?

[davidbfpo]

A RUSI Journal article (behind paywall) that disputes the impact via a newspaper article:

Iran's nuclear potential may have been significantly increased by the Stuxnet worm that is believed to have infected the country's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in 2009 and 2010, new research claims.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technolog...potential.html

[davidbfpo]

A detailed explanation of the two versions of Stuxnet; for a layman like moi, just about followed: 'Stuxnet's Secret Twin: The real program to sabotage Iran's nuclear facilities was far more sophisticated than anyone realized'.

There are some, different passages; the best is:

The system might have keep Natanz's centrifuges spinning, but it also opened them up to a cyberattack that is so far-out, it leads one to wonder whether its creators might have been on drugs.

It ends with:

In other words, blowing the cover of this online sabotage campaign came with benefits. Uncovering Stuxnet was the end of the operation, but not necessarily the end of its utility. Unlike traditional Pentagon hardware, one cannot display USB drives at a military parade. The Stuxnet revelation showed the world what cyberweapons could do in the hands of a superpower. It also saved America from embarrassment. If another country -- maybe even an adversary -- had been first in demonstrating proficiency in the digital domain, it would have been nothing short of another Sputnik moment in U.S. history. So there were plenty of good reasons not to sacrifice mission success for fear of detection.

We're not sure whether Stuxnet was disclosed intentionally. As with so many human endeavors, it may simply have been an unintended side effect that turned out to be critical. One thing we do know: It changed global military strategy in the 21st century.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...tack?page=full