The Army's FAO Program -- Room for Improvement?

**Stan** · 10-02-2010

There is no magic cookie cutter... I think we failed by not recognizing (and taking advantage of) the individual FAO talents.

Having had eight FAOs as SAO/DAO bosses from 1985 to 1997 (two of which are here), I guess my opinion counts for something like “qualified to speak on the subject”.

Much like John opined, sustaining language abilities is up to the soldier and the Army’s pro-pay was intended as little more than an incentive to stay proficient.

Tom made me speak to him in French and Old Eagle would brush up on his German in Estonia. Then there were the other five or six FAOs that could have gave a sierra in spite of being in a peaceful country under ideal conditions to learn and maintain their language and cultural aptitude.

As far as dual tracking goes, you couldn’t ask for a better combination in an officer when the chips are down. Tom would out-think the DC think tank during a full-blown refugee crisis before they had their morning coffee

. He was also like having a verbal version of Africa Wikipedia around 24/7. And, even though Old Eagle didn’t speak 10 words in Estonian he always outguessed them while planning Security Assistance and ship visits from 50 miles across the pond. What really got me was his “B’s Brain” (a capitulation) that one could track his every move, past and present, in his absence or untimely demise

Regards, Stan

**Old Eagle** · 10-02-2010

DMoot -- There is always room for improvement, don't get me wrong. If you want to work at a more detailed level, I'm more than willing to assist. There is probably an opportunity to redefine requirements based on the evolving challenges. It may be time to echelon the defn of FAO. Maybe 48 and 39 need to redefine their relationship. There are many possibilities.

Pete -- Your FAO friend offers a sample size of one. Very dangerous to extrapolate from that kind of data.

Stan -- It was more than 10. Let's see, yes, no, please, thank you...
Actually, my Finnish helped me understand more of what was going on than I would have otherwise. And my brain book did save both of us time and effort.

**Peacedog** · 10-08-2010

I've lived and worked with members of the USAF, Army, and Marine versions of these programs and across the board I think the problem with these programs is much more fundamental.

The various FAO, and FAO like programs, exist largely as an acknowledgement that the DoD requires some kind of a strategic scout.
This is commonly put forward as an individual that knows a region, its language, and its people who can advise senior DoD officials on planning, policy, and strategy.

The primary problem is that the FAO programs lack an operational mission assigned to them. The result is that while their personnel frequently get involved in HUMINT, targeted killing and comparable high profile activities the FAO program does not own these functions for their various services. The inclusion of a mission set like these into the FAO program would go a long way towards defusing the “effete diplomat and per diem whore” stink that accompanies people assigned to these billets. It would also garner respect for a community that is often viewed as a well trained pet monkey by their home service. Barring an operational mission they are little more than language qualified, hopefully, analysts in the eyes of many.

Additionally, the implementation of the program is another big problem.

First, FAO personnel should be force protection exempt when operating in their region. If you can’t get out and about to see what is going on and meet the right people, you have no purpose in this job. Bringing the goon squad with you on a meet and greet is a great way to completely kill any chance of getting anything done. True, lacking this you are going to lose people, but this is the DoD and not the State Department. We may not need the State Department we currently have, but we certainly don’t need a second State Department under the DoD.

Second, FAO personnel should be offered command opportunities and joint staff placement in positions that make sense. For example, why J-5s on geographic commands aren’t FAOs is beyond me. It may make sense to group certain enlisted career fields, like linguists, under a FAO as part of a command track in the community. I think all of this needs exploration.

**Surferbeetle** · 10-09-2010

Interesting paper which does a good job of defining things from a 30,000 ft vantage point and from a slightly idealistic and isolated viewpoint. On the ground things appear differently. The core competencies of cultural, linguistic, analytical, and military abilities are shared by a number of USG, Host Nation, and opposition actors who actually shape the battlefield. Numbers (troops to task), abilities, and resourcing play key roles in what actually occurs. On the USG side substantive actors may include DoS FSO's and GS types, DoD active and reserve FAO and CA types, and other USG entities as well as contractors of many stripes. The host nation and opposition have similar set-ups. It is my observation that an organization structured with short term generalists filling roles better suited to long term specialists is not as likely to be as effective as it could be In it's desired role. In short, the paper makes me wonder about military core competencies and mission creep.