I will offer a couple of more points.

a. Dual tracking versus single tracking--depends on the individual, that person's professional ethic, and branch. I knew dual trackers who were incompetent in both their tracks. I knew generals who claimed FAO qualifications but never served in a 48 assignment. I knew FAO single trackers who completely lost touch with the Army. In my case I was a defact single track MI FAO for 15+ years on active duty and a rather unique year last year as a civilian FAO. MI used me as a FAO strategic analyst in MI assignments so while I was essentuially single tracked I was slotted in MI jobs on occasion, one of which was current intell for the Army staff in Desert Shield and Storm. Indeed the DCSINT in the Army in the late 80s used to say he was glad that DCSOPS had the FAO program because Army Intell got its strategic analysts for free. My bottom line is that it depends on the individual's goals and the Army's ability to use what it has in hand. FAOs--good FAOs that is--do not follow cookie cutters and as soon as some personnel professional starts down that road, the Army starts losing.

b. On crossing regions, I was also somehwt unique in that I qualfied and held two regional ASIs for the Middle East/North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa and I did tours on the ground and in CONUS that worked both areas. Old Eagle got at one aspect of that when he talked about crossing regions; that is that interagency interactive skills worked across regional lines.

c. On "operational" versus FAO tours, let me say that I did 2 wars as a FAO on the ground and Big Green was nowhere around for most of it. I left US tactical units in 1979 but I served in and around international tactical forces on two continents. As for competence in US doctrine and operations, I taught at CGSC, did Desert Shield/Storm, Provide Comfort, and Restore Hope as current intelligence officer for the ARSTAFF. I ground guided Operation Support Hope and established relations with a new government including military-military relationships. I wrote the central Africa campaign plan for USEUCOM and State. My bottom line in this is that at least for Middle East and African FAOs operational can be very tactical with live ammo.

d. The Army wants FAOS but nice neat personnel development plans won't give the Army the FAOs it needs. Regardless of tracking systems, we need a senior level mentor and monitor to make sure HRC does not again screw it up.

Best
Tom